Sigma rules for CVE-2007-5348
104 rules · scoped to cve · back to CVE-2007-5348
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.
title: Suspicious Child Process Of SQL Server
id: 869b9ca7-9ea2-4a5a-8325-e80e62f75445
related:
- id: 344482e4-a477-436c-aa70-7536d18a48c7
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of the SQLServer process. This could indicate potential RCE or SQL Injection.
references:
- Internal Research
author: FPT.EagleEye Team, wagga
date: 2020-12-11
modified: 2023-05-04
tags:
- attack.t1505.003
- attack.t1190
- attack.initial-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\sqlservr.exe'
Image|endswith:
# You can add other uncommon or suspicious processes
- '\bash.exe'
- '\bitsadmin.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\netstat.exe'
- '\nltest.exe'
- '\ping.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\sh.exe'
- '\systeminfo.exe'
- '\tasklist.exe'
- '\wsl.exe'
filter_optional_datev:
ParentImage|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\'
ParentImage|endswith: 'DATEV_DBENGINE\MSSQL\Binn\sqlservr.exe'
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'
CommandLine|startswith: '"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" '
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
level: high
title: Internet Explorer DisableFirstRunCustomize Enabled
id: ab567429-1dfb-4674-b6d2-979fd2f9d125
status: test
description: |
Detects changes to the Internet Explorer "DisableFirstRunCustomize" value, which prevents Internet Explorer from running the first run wizard the first time a user starts the browser after installing Internet Explorer or Windows.
references:
- https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/devil-bait/NCSC-MAR-Devil-Bait.pdf
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/operation-ke3chang-resurfaces-with-new-tidepool-malware/
- https://admx.help/?Category=InternetExplorer&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.InternetExplorer::NoFirstRunCustomise
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-16
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
logsource:
product: windows
category: registry_set
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|endswith: '\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main\DisableFirstRunCustomize'
Details:
- 'DWORD (0x00000001)' # Home Page
- 'DWORD (0x00000002)' # Welcome To IE
filter_main_generic:
Image:
- 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\ie4uinit.exe'
filter_optional_avira:
Image|contains|all:
- '\Temp\'
- '\.cr\avira_'
Details|contains: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
filter_optional_foxit:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Foxit Software\Foxit PDF Reader\FoxitPDFReader.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Foxit Software\Foxit PDF Reader\FoxitPDFReader.exe'
Details|contains: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- As this is controlled by group policy as well as user settings. Some false positives may occur.
level: medium
title: Internet Explorer Autorun Keys Modification
id: a80f662f-022f-4429-9b8c-b1a41aaa6688
related:
- id: 17f878b8-9968-4578-b814-c4217fc5768c
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
- https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d # a list with registry keys
author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547.001
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
ie:
TargetObject|contains:
- '\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Internet Explorer'
- '\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer'
ie_details:
TargetObject|contains:
- '\Toolbar'
- '\Extensions'
- '\Explorer Bars'
filter_empty:
Details: '(Empty)'
filter_extensions:
TargetObject|contains:
- '\Extensions\{2670000A-7350-4f3c-8081-5663EE0C6C49}'
- '\Extensions\{31D09BA0-12F5-4CCE-BE8A-2923E76605DA}'
- '\Extensions\{789FE86F-6FC4-46A1-9849-EDE0DB0C95CA}'
- '\Extensions\{A95fe080-8f5d-11d2-a20b-00aa003c157a}'
filter_toolbar:
TargetObject|endswith:
- '\Toolbar\ShellBrowser\ITBar7Layout'
- '\Toolbar\ShowDiscussionButton'
- '\Toolbar\Locked'
condition: ie and ie_details and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason
- Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason
level: medium
title: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process - MacOS
id: 69483748-1525-4a6c-95ca-90dc8d431b68
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes spawning from microsoft office suite applications such as word or excel. This could indicates malicious macro execution
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/applescript/
- https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x4B.html
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-01-31
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1059.002
- attack.t1137.002
- attack.t1204.002
logsource:
product: macos
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|contains:
- 'Microsoft Word'
- 'Microsoft Excel'
- 'Microsoft PowerPoint'
- 'Microsoft OneNote'
Image|endswith:
- '/bash'
- '/curl'
- '/dash'
- '/fish'
- '/osacompile'
- '/osascript'
- '/sh'
- '/zsh'
- '/python'
- '/python3'
- '/wget'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Code Executed Via Office Add-in XLL File
id: 36fbec91-fa1b-4d5d-8df1-8d8edcb632ad
status: test
description: |
Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system.
Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-28
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1137.006
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection:
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'new-object '
- '-ComObject '
- '.application'
- '.RegisterXLL'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Potential Persistence Via Microsoft Office Add-In
id: 8e1cb247-6cf6-42fa-b440-3f27d57e9936
status: test
description: Detects potential persistence activity via startup add-ins that load when Microsoft Office starts (.wll/.xll are simply .dll fit for Word or Excel).
references:
- Internal Research
- https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/4ae9580a1a8772db87a1b6cdb0d03e5af231e966/atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.md
author: NVISO
date: 2020-05-11
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1137.006
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_wlldropped:
TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Word\Startup\'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.wll'
selection_xlldropped:
TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Excel\Startup\'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.xll'
selection_xladropped:
TargetFilename|contains: 'Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.xlam'
selection_generic:
TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Addins\'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.xlam'
- '.xla'
- '.ppam'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate add-ins
level: high
title: Potential Persistence Via Microsoft Office Startup Folder
id: 0e20c89d-2264-44ae-8238-aeeaba609ece
status: test
description: Detects creation of Microsoft Office files inside of one of the default startup folders in order to achieve persistence.
references:
- https://insight-jp.nttsecurity.com/post/102hojk/operation-restylink-apt-campaign-targeting-japanese-companies
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/office/troubleshoot/excel/use-startup-folders
author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-02
modified: 2023-06-22
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1137
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_word_paths:
- TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Word\STARTUP'
- TargetFilename|contains|all:
- '\Office'
- '\Program Files'
- '\STARTUP'
selection_word_extension:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.doc'
- '.docm'
- '.docx'
- '.dot'
- '.dotm'
- '.rtf'
selection_excel_paths:
- TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART'
- TargetFilename|contains|all:
- '\Office'
- '\Program Files'
- '\XLSTART'
selection_excel_extension:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.xls'
- '.xlsm'
- '.xlsx'
- '.xlt'
- '.xltm'
filter_main_office:
Image|endswith:
- '\WINWORD.exe'
- '\EXCEL.exe'
condition: (all of selection_word_* or all of selection_excel_*) and not filter_main_office
falsepositives:
- Loading a user environment from a backup or a domain controller
- Synchronization of templates
level: high
title: File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
id: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
status: test
description: Detects the creation of files with an executable or script extension by an Office application.
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
- https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
author: Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng (Rule), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
- attack.t1204.002
- attack.execution
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
# Note: Please add more file extensions to the logic of your choice.
selection1:
Image|endswith:
- '\excel.exe'
- '\msaccess.exe'
- '\mspub.exe'
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\visio.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
selection2:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.bat'
- '.cmd'
- '.com'
- '.dll'
- '.exe'
- '.hta'
- '.ocx'
- '.proj'
- '.ps1'
- '.scf'
- '.scr'
- '.sys'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
- '.wsf'
- '.wsh'
filter_main_localassembly:
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\assembly\tmp\'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.dll'
filter_optional_webservicecache: # matches e.g. directory with name *.microsoft.com
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- 'C:\Users\'
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\'
- '\WebServiceCache\AllUsers'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.com'
filter_optional_webex:
Image|endswith: '\winword.exe'
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\webexdelta\'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.dll'
- '.exe'
filter_optional_backstageinappnavcache: # matches e.g. C:\Users\xxxxx\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\BackstageInAppNavCache\ODB-user@domain.com
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- 'C:\Users\'
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\'
- '\BackstageInAppNavCache\'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.com'
condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Office Macro File Creation From Suspicious Process
id: b1c50487-1967-4315-a026-6491686d860e
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a office macro file from a a suspicious process
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1566.001/T1566.001.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/compat/office-file-format-reference
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-23
modified: 2023-02-22
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
definition: 'Requirements: The "ParentImage" field is not available by default on EID 11 of Sysmon logs. To be able to use this rule to the full extent you need to enriche the log with additional ParentImage data'
detection:
selection_cmd:
- Image|endswith:
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
# Note: ParentImage is a custom field and is not available by default on Sysmon EID 11
- ParentImage|endswith:
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
selection_ext:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.docm'
- '.dotm'
- '.xlsm'
- '.xltm'
- '.potm'
- '.pptm'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Uncommon File Created In Office Startup Folder
id: a10a2c40-2c4d-49f8-b557-1a946bc55d9d
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a file with an uncommon extension in an Office application startup folder
references:
- https://app.any.run/tasks/d6fe6624-6ef8-485d-aa75-3d1bdda2a08c/
- http://addbalance.com/word/startup.htm
- https://answers.microsoft.com/en-us/msoffice/forum/all/document-in-word-startup-folder-doesnt-open-when/44ab0932-2917-4150-8cdc-2f2cf39e86f3
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Microsoft_Office_filename_extensions
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-05
modified: 2023-12-13
tags:
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1587.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection_word_paths:
- TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Word\STARTUP'
- TargetFilename|contains|all:
- '\Office'
- '\Program Files'
- '\STARTUP'
filter_exclude_word_ext:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.docb' # Word binary document introduced in Microsoft Office 2007
- '.docm' # Word macro-enabled document; same as docx, but may contain macros and scripts
- '.docx' # Word document
- '.dotm' # Word macro-enabled template; same as dotx, but may contain macros and scripts
- '.mdb' # MS Access DB
- '.mdw' # MS Access DB
- '.pdf' # PDF documents
- '.wll' # Word add-in
- '.wwl' # Word add-in
selection_excel_paths:
- TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART'
- TargetFilename|contains|all:
- '\Office'
- '\Program Files'
- '\XLSTART'
filter_exclude_excel_ext:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.xll'
- '.xls'
- '.xlsm'
- '.xlsx'
- '.xlt'
- '.xltm'
- '.xlw'
filter_main_office_click_to_run:
Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\'
Image|endswith: '\OfficeClickToRun.exe'
filter_main_office_apps:
Image|contains:
- ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
- ':\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\'
Image|endswith:
- '\winword.exe'
- '\excel.exe'
condition: ((selection_word_paths and not filter_exclude_word_ext) or (selection_excel_paths and not filter_exclude_excel_ext)) and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- False positive might stem from rare extensions used by other Office utilities.
level: high
title: Potentially Suspicious Office Document Executed From Trusted Location
id: f99abdf0-6283-4e71-bd2b-b5c048a94743
status: test
description: Detects the execution of an Office application that points to a document that is located in a trusted location. Attackers often used this to avoid macro security and execute their malicious code.
references:
- Internal Research
- https://twitter.com/Max_Mal_/status/1633863678909874176
- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/new-security-hardening-policies-for-trusted-documents/ba-p/3023465
- https://twitter.com/_JohnHammond/status/1588155401752788994
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-21
modified: 2023-10-18
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1202
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
# Note: we add a parent shell to reduce FP. Add additional 3rd party shells that you might use
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\explorer.exe'
- '\dopus.exe'
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\EXCEL.EXE'
- '\POWERPNT.EXE'
- '\WINWORD.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'Excel.exe'
- 'POWERPNT.EXE'
- 'WinWord.exe'
selection_trusted_location:
CommandLine|contains:
# Note: these are the default locations. Admins/Users could add additional ones that you need to cover
- '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates'
- '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Word\Startup\'
- '\Microsoft Office\root\Templates\'
- '\Microsoft Office\Templates\'
filter_main_dotx:
# Note: We add this filter to avoid curious people clicking on template files
CommandLine|endswith:
- '.dotx'
- '.xltx'
- '.potx'
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Potential Arbitrary File Download Using Office Application
id: 4ae3e30b-b03f-43aa-87e3-b622f4048eed
related:
- id: 0c79148b-118e-472b-bdb7-9b57b444cc19
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects potential arbitrary file download using a Microsoft Office application
references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Winword/
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Powerpnt/
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Excel/
- https://medium.com/@reegun/unsanitized-file-validation-leads-to-malicious-payload-download-via-office-binaries-202d02db7191
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Beyu Denis, oscd.community
date: 2022-05-17
modified: 2023-06-22
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1202
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\EXCEL.EXE'
- '\POWERPNT.EXE'
- '\WINWORD.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'Excel.exe'
- 'POWERPNT.EXE'
- 'WinWord.exe'
selection_http:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'http://'
- 'https://'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50
related:
- id: c27515df-97a9-4162-8a60-dc0eeb51b775 # Speicifc OneNote rule due to its recent usage in phishing attacks
type: derived
- id: e1693bc8-7168-4eab-8718-cdcaa68a1738
type: derived
- id: 23daeb52-e6eb-493c-8607-c4f0246cb7d8
type: obsolete
- id: 518643ba-7d9c-4fa5-9f37-baed36059f6a
type: obsolete
- id: 04f5363a-6bca-42ff-be70-0d28bf629ead
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process spawning from one of the Microsoft Office suite products (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio, etc.)
references:
- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/465aabe132ccb949e75b8ab9c5bda36d80cf2fd503d52b8bad54e295f28bbc21?environmentId=100
- https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
- https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e
- https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
- https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/300af51b88ad5d5b27ce4f5f54e4d6e6a3a2c06d/detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml
- https://twitter.com/andythevariable/status/1576953781581144064?s=20&t=QiJILvK4ZiBdR8RJe24u-A
- https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/exploring-the-ref2731-intrusion-set
- https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_msbuild_started_by_office_app.toml
- https://www.vmray.com/analyses/2d2fa29185ad/report/overview.html
- https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, FPT.EagleEye Team, Vadim Khrykov, Cyb3rEng, Michael Haag, Christopher Peacock @securepeacock, @scythe_io
date: 2018-04-06
modified: 2023-04-24
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1204.002
- attack.t1218.010
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\EQNEDT32.EXE'
- '\EXCEL.EXE'
- '\MSACCESS.EXE'
- '\MSPUB.exe'
- '\ONENOTE.EXE'
- '\POWERPNT.exe'
- '\VISIO.exe'
- '\WINWORD.EXE'
- '\wordpad.exe'
- '\wordview.exe'
selection_child_processes:
- OriginalFileName:
- 'bitsadmin.exe'
- 'CertOC.exe'
- 'CertUtil.exe'
- 'Cmd.Exe'
- 'CMSTP.EXE'
- 'cscript.exe'
- 'curl.exe'
- 'HH.exe'
- 'IEExec.exe'
- 'InstallUtil.exe'
- 'javaw.exe'
- 'Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe'
- 'msdt.exe'
- 'MSHTA.EXE'
- 'msiexec.exe'
- 'Msxsl.exe'
- 'odbcconf.exe'
- 'pcalua.exe'
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'RegAsm.exe'
- 'RegSvcs.exe'
- 'REGSVR32.exe'
- 'RUNDLL32.exe'
- 'schtasks.exe'
- 'ScriptRunner.exe'
- 'wmic.exe'
- 'WorkFolders.exe'
- 'wscript.exe'
- Image|endswith:
- '\AppVLP.exe'
- '\bash.exe'
- '\bitsadmin.exe'
- '\certoc.exe'
- '\certutil.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cmstp.exe'
- '\control.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\curl.exe'
- '\forfiles.exe'
- '\hh.exe'
- '\ieexec.exe'
- '\installutil.exe'
- '\javaw.exe'
- '\mftrace.exe'
- '\Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe'
- '\msbuild.exe'
- '\msdt.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\msidb.exe'
- '\msiexec.exe'
- '\msxsl.exe'
- '\odbcconf.exe'
- '\pcalua.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\regasm.exe'
- '\regsvcs.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\schtasks.exe'
- '\scrcons.exe'
- '\scriptrunner.exe'
- '\sh.exe'
- '\svchost.exe'
- '\verclsid.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
- '\workfolders.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
selection_child_susp_paths: # Idea: Laiali Kazalbach, Mohamed Elsayed (#4142)
Image|contains:
- '\AppData\'
- '\Users\Public\'
- '\ProgramData\'
- '\Windows\Tasks\'
- '\Windows\Temp\'
- '\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_child_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Binary In User Directory Spawned From Office Application
id: aa3a6f94-890e-4e22-b634-ffdfd54792cc
status: test
description: Detects an executable in the users directory started from one of the Microsoft Office suite applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio)
references:
- https://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-not-finished-morphisec-spots-new-campaign
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/23160972c6ae07f740800fa28e421a81d7c0ca5d5cab95bc082b4a986fbac57
author: Jason Lynch
date: 2019-04-02
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.002
- attack.g0046
- car.2013-05-002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\WINWORD.EXE'
- '\EXCEL.EXE'
- '\POWERPNT.exe'
- '\MSPUB.exe'
- '\VISIO.exe'
- '\MSACCESS.exe'
- '\EQNEDT32.exe'
# - '\OUTLOOK.EXE' too many FPs
Image|startswith: 'C:\users\'
Image|endswith: '.exe'
filter:
Image|endswith: '\Teams.exe'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Download from Office Domain
id: 00d49ed5-4491-4271-a8db-650a4ef6f8c1
status: test
description: Detects suspicious ways to download files from Microsoft domains that are used to store attachments in Emails or OneNote documents
references:
- https://twitter.com/an0n_r0/status/1474698356635193346?s=12
- https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1475085452784844803?s=12
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-27
modified: 2022-08-02
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1105
- attack.t1608
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_download:
- Image|endswith:
- '\curl.exe'
- '\wget.exe'
- CommandLine|contains:
- 'Invoke-WebRequest'
- 'iwr '
- 'curl '
- 'wget '
- 'Start-BitsTransfer'
- '.DownloadFile('
- '.DownloadString('
selection_domains:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'https://attachment.outlook.live.net/owa/'
- 'https://onenoteonlinesync.onenote.com/onenoteonlinesync/'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Scripts or tools that download attachments from these domains (OneNote, Outlook 365)
level: high
title: Suspicious WMIC Execution Via Office Process
id: e1693bc8-7168-4eab-8718-cdcaa68a1738
related:
- id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50
type: derived
- id: 518643ba-7d9c-4fa5-9f37-baed36059f6a
type: obsolete
- id: 9d1c72f5-43f0-4da5-9320-648cf2099dd0
type: obsolete
- id: c0e1c3d5-4381-4f18-8145-2583f06a1fe5
type: obsolete
- id: 04f5363a-6bca-42ff-be70-0d28bf629ead
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Office application called wmic to proxye execution through a LOLBIN process. This is often used to break suspicious parent-child chain (Office app spawns LOLBin).
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
- https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
author: Vadim Khrykov, Cyb3rEng
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1204.002
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1218.010
- attack.execution
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\WINWORD.EXE'
- '\EXCEL.EXE'
- '\POWERPNT.exe'
- '\MSPUB.exe'
- '\VISIO.exe'
- '\MSACCESS.EXE'
- '\EQNEDT32.EXE'
- '\ONENOTE.EXE'
- '\wordpad.exe'
- '\wordview.exe'
selection_wmic_img:
- Image|endswith: '\wbem\WMIC.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
selection_wmic_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'process'
- 'create'
- 'call'
CommandLine|contains:
# Add more suspicious LOLBINs as you see fit
- 'regsvr32'
- 'rundll32'
- 'msiexec'
- 'mshta'
- 'verclsid'
- 'wscript'
- 'cscript'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Renamed Office Binary Execution
id: 0b0cd537-fc77-4e6e-a973-e53495c1083d
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed office binary
references:
- https://infosec.exchange/@sbousseaden/109542254124022664
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-20
modified: 2025-12-09
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- OriginalFileName:
- 'Excel.exe'
- 'MSACCESS.EXE'
- 'MSPUB.EXE'
- 'OneNote.exe'
- 'OneNoteM.exe'
- 'OUTLOOK.EXE'
- 'POWERPNT.EXE'
- 'WinWord.exe'
- 'Olk.exe'
- Description:
- 'Microsoft Access'
- 'Microsoft Excel'
- 'Microsoft OneNote'
- 'Microsoft Outlook'
- 'Microsoft PowerPoint'
- 'Microsoft Publisher'
- 'Microsoft Word'
- 'Sent to OneNote Tool'
filter_main_legit_names:
Image|endswith:
- '\EXCEL.exe'
- '\excelcnv.exe'
- '\MSACCESS.exe'
- '\MSPUB.EXE'
- '\ONENOTE.EXE'
- '\ONENOTEM.EXE'
- '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
- '\POWERPNT.EXE'
- '\WINWORD.exe'
- '\OLK.EXE'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Microsoft Office DLL Sideload
id: 829a3bdf-34da-4051-9cf4-8ed221a8ae4f
status: test
description: Detects DLL sideloading of DLLs that are part of Microsoft Office from non standard location
references:
- https://hijacklibs.net/ # For list of DLLs that could be sideloaded (search for dlls mentioned here in there)
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Wietze Beukema (project and research)
date: 2022-08-17
modified: 2023-03-15
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1574.001
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\outllib.dll'
filter:
ImageLoaded|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\OFFICE'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\OFFICE'
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Root\OFFICE'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\Root\OFFICE'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: VBA DLL Loaded Via Office Application
id: e6ce8457-68b1-485b-9bdd-3c2b5d679aa9
status: test
description: Detects VB DLL's loaded by an office application. Which could indicate the presence of VBA Macros.
references:
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
author: Antonlovesdnb
date: 2020-02-19
modified: 2023-02-10
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.002
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\excel.exe'
- '\mspub.exe'
- '\onenote.exe'
- '\onenoteim.exe' # Just in case
- '\outlook.exe'
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- '\VBE7.DLL'
- '\VBEUI.DLL'
- '\VBE7INTL.DLL'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate macro usage. Add the appropriate filter according to your environment
level: high
title: GAC DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
id: 90217a70-13fc-48e4-b3db-0d836c5824ac
status: test
description: Detects any GAC DLL being loaded by an Office Product
references:
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
author: Antonlovesdnb
date: 2020-02-19
modified: 2023-02-10
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.002
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\excel.exe'
- '\mspub.exe'
- '\onenote.exe'
- '\onenoteim.exe' # Just in case
- '\outlook.exe'
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate macro usage. Add the appropriate filter according to your environment
level: high
title: Office Macros Warning Disabled
id: 91239011-fe3c-4b54-9f24-15c86bb65913
related:
- id: 9b894e57-033f-46cf-b7fa-a52804181973
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects registry changes to Microsoft Office "VBAWarning" to a value of "1" which enables the execution of all macros, whether signed or unsigned.
references:
- https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397
- https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/zloader-with-a-new-infection-technique/
- https://securelist.com/scarcruft-surveilling-north-korean-defectors-and-human-rights-activists/105074/
author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2024-03-19
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1112
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|endswith: '\Security\VBAWarnings'
Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Microsoft Office Protected View Disabled
id: a5c7a43f-6009-4a8c-80c5-32abf1c53ecc
related:
- id: 7c637634-c95d-4bbf-b26c-a82510874b34
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects changes to Microsoft Office protected view registry keys with which the attacker disables this feature.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/
- https://yoroi.company/research/cyber-criminal-espionage-operation-insists-on-italian-manufacturing/
- https://admx.help/HKCU/software/policies/microsoft/office/16.0/excel/security/protectedview
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-08
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
category: registry_set
detection:
selection_path:
TargetObject|contains|all:
- '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\'
- '\Security\ProtectedView\'
selection_values_1:
Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
TargetObject|endswith:
- '\DisableAttachementsInPV' # Turn off Protected View for attachments opened from Outlook
- '\DisableInternetFilesInPV' # Turn off Protected View for files downloaded from Internet zone
- '\DisableIntranetCheck' # Turn off Protected View for file located in UNC paths
- '\DisableUnsafeLocationsInPV' # Turn off Protected View for unsafe locations
selection_values_0:
Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
TargetObject|endswith:
- '\enabledatabasefileprotectedview'
- '\enableforeigntextfileprotectedview'
condition: selection_path and 1 of selection_values_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Uncommon Microsoft Office Trusted Location Added
id: f742bde7-9528-42e5-bd82-84f51a8387d2
related:
- id: a0bed973-45fa-4625-adb5-6ecdf9be70ac
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects changes to registry keys related to "Trusted Location" of Microsoft Office where the path is set to something uncommon. Attackers might add additional trusted locations to avoid macro security restrictions.
references:
- Internal Research
- https://admx.help/?Category=Office2016&Policy=excel16.Office.Microsoft.Policies.Windows::L_TrustedLoc01
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-21
modified: 2023-09-29
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1112
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains: 'Security\Trusted Locations\Location'
TargetObject|endswith: '\Path'
filter_exclude_known_paths:
Details|contains:
- '%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Templates'
- '%%APPDATA%%\Microsoft\Templates'
- '%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Word\Startup'
- '%%APPDATA%%\Microsoft\Word\Startup'
- ':\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Templates\'
- ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office (x86)\Templates'
- ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Templates\'
- ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Templates\'
filter_main_office_click_to_run:
Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\'
Image|endswith: '\OfficeClickToRun.exe'
filter_main_office_apps:
Image|contains:
- ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
- ':\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_exclude_*
falsepositives:
- Other unknown legitimate or custom paths need to be filtered to avoid false positives
level: high
title: Office Application Initiated Network Connection To Non-Local IP
id: 75e33ce3-ae32-4dcc-9aa8-a2a3029d6f84
status: test
description: |
Detects an office application (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) that initiate a network connection to a non-private IP addresses.
This rule aims to detect traffic similar to one seen exploited in CVE-2021-42292.
This rule will require an initial baseline and tuning that is specific to your organization.
references:
- https://corelight.com/blog/detecting-cve-2021-42292
- https://learn.microsoft.com/de-de/microsoft-365/enterprise/urls-and-ip-address-ranges?view=o365-worldwide
author: Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io', Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-10
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1203
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\excel.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
- '\wordview.exe'
Initiated: 'true'
filter_main_local_ranges:
DestinationIp|cidr:
- '127.0.0.0/8'
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
- '169.254.0.0/16'
- '::1/128' # IPv6 loopback
- 'fe80::/10' # IPv6 link-local addresses
- 'fc00::/7' # IPv6 private addresses
filter_main_msrange_generic:
DestinationIp|cidr:
- '2.16.56.0/23' # Akamai International B.V.
- '2.17.248.0/21' # Akamai International B.V.
- '13.107.240.0/21' # Microsoft Corporation
- '20.184.0.0/13' # Microsoft Corporation
- '23.61.224.0/20' # Akamai-AS
- '20.192.0.0/10' # Microsoft Corporation
- '23.72.0.0/13' # Akamai International B.V.
- '23.3.88.0/22' # Akamai-AS
- '23.216.132.0/22' # Akamai-AS
- '40.76.0.0/14' # Microsoft Corporation
- '51.10.0.0/15' # Microsoft Corporation
- '51.103.0.0/16' # Microsoft Corporation
- '51.104.0.0/15' # Microsoft Corporation
- '51.142.136.0/22' # Microsoft Corporation - https://ipinfo.io/AS8075/51.140.0.0/14-51.142.136.0/22
- '52.160.0.0/11' # Microsoft Corporation - https://ipinfo.io/AS8075/52.160.0.0/11
- '95.101.96.0/21' # Akamai-As
- '204.79.197.0/24' # Microsoft Corporation
filter_main_msrange_exchange_1:
# Exchange Online
# "urls": [
# "outlook.cloud.microsoft",
# "outlook.office.com",
# "outlook.office365.com"
# ]
DestinationIp|cidr:
- '13.107.4.0/22'
- '13.107.6.152/31'
- '13.107.18.10/31'
- '13.107.42.0/23'
- '13.107.128.0/22'
- '23.35.224.0/20'
- '23.53.40.0/22'
- '23.103.160.0/20'
- '23.216.76.0/22'
- '40.96.0.0/13'
- '40.104.0.0/15'
- '52.96.0.0/14'
- '131.253.33.215/32'
- '132.245.0.0/16'
- '150.171.32.0/22'
- '204.79.197.215/32'
- '2603:1006::/40'
- '2603:1016::/36'
- '2603:1026::/36'
- '2603:1036::/36'
- '2603:1046::/36'
- '2603:1056::/36'
- '2620:1ec:4::152/128'
- '2620:1ec:4::153/128'
- '2620:1ec:c::10/128'
- '2620:1ec:c::11/128'
- '2620:1ec:d::10/128'
- '2620:1ec:d::11/128'
- '2620:1ec:8f0::/46'
- '2620:1ec:900::/46'
- '2620:1ec:a92::152/128'
- '2620:1ec:a92::153/128'
DestinationPort:
- 80
- 443
filter_main_msrange_exchange_2:
# Exchange Online
# "urls": [
# "outlook.office365.com",
# "smtp.office365.com"
# ]
DestinationIp|cidr:
- '13.107.6.152/31'
- '13.107.18.10/31'
- '13.107.128.0/22'
- '23.103.160.0/20'
- '40.96.0.0/13'
- '40.104.0.0/15'
- '52.96.0.0/14'
- '131.253.33.215/32'
- '132.245.0.0/16'
- '150.171.32.0/22'
- '204.79.197.215/32'
- '2603:1006::/40'
- '2603:1016::/36'
- '2603:1026::/36'
- '2603:1036::/36'
- '2603:1046::/36'
- '2603:1056::/36'
- '2620:1ec:4::152/128'
- '2620:1ec:4::153/128'
- '2620:1ec:c::10/128'
- '2620:1ec:c::11/128'
- '2620:1ec:d::10/128'
- '2620:1ec:d::11/128'
- '2620:1ec:8f0::/46'
- '2620:1ec:900::/46'
- '2620:1ec:a92::152/128'
- '2620:1ec:a92::153/128'
DestinationPort:
- 143
- 587
- 993
- 995
Protocol: 'tcp'
filter_main_msrange_exchange_3:
# Exchange Online
# "urls": [
# "*.protection.outlook.com"
# ]
DestinationIp|cidr:
- '40.92.0.0/15'
- '40.107.0.0/16'
- '52.100.0.0/14'
- '52.238.78.88/32'
- '104.47.0.0/17'
- '2a01:111:f400::/48'
- '2a01:111:f403::/48'
DestinationPort: 443
filter_main_msrange_exchange_4:
# Exchange Online
# "urls": [
# "*.mail.protection.outlook.com",
# "*.mx.microsoft"
# ]
DestinationIp|cidr:
- '40.92.0.0/15'
- '40.107.0.0/16'
- '52.100.0.0/14'
- '52.238.78.88/32'
- '104.47.0.0/17'
- '2a01:111:f400::/48'
- '2a01:111:f403::/48'
DestinationPort: 25
filter_main_msrange_sharepoint_1:
# SharePoint Online and OneDrive for Business",
# "urls": [
# "*.sharepoint.com"
# ]
DestinationIp|cidr:
- '13.107.136.0/22'
- '40.108.128.0/17'
- '52.104.0.0/14'
- '104.146.128.0/17'
- '150.171.40.0/22'
- '2603:1061:1300::/40'
- '2620:1ec:8f8::/46'
- '2620:1ec:908::/46'
- '2a01:111:f402::/48'
DestinationPort:
- 80
- 443
Protocol: 'tcp'
filter_main_msrange_office_1:
# Microsoft 365 Common and Office Online",
# "urls": [
# "*.officeapps.live.com",
# "*.online.office.com",
# "office.live.com",
# "office.com.akadns.net"
# ],
DestinationIp|cidr:
- '13.107.6.171/32'
- '13.107.18.15/32'
- '13.107.140.6/32'
- '20.64.0.0/10'
- '52.108.0.0/14'
- '52.244.37.168/32'
- '2603:1006:1400::/40'
- '2603:1016:2400::/40'
- '2603:1026:2400::/40'
- '2603:1036:2400::/40'
- '2603:1046:1400::/40'
- '2603:1056:1400::/40'
- '2603:1063:2000::/38'
- '2620:1ec:c::15/128'
- '2620:1ec:8fc::6/128'
- '2620:1ec:a92::171/128'
- '2a01:111:f100:2000::a83e:3019/128'
- '2a01:111:f100:2002::8975:2d79/128'
- '2a01:111:f100:2002::8975:2da8/128'
- '2a01:111:f100:7000::6fdd:6cd5/128'
- '2a01:111:f100:a004::bfeb:88cf/128'
DestinationPort:
- 80
- 443
Protocol: 'tcp'
filter_main_msrange_office_2:
# Microsoft 365 Common and Office Online
# "urls": [
# "*.auth.microsoft.com",
# "*.msftidentity.com",
# "*.msidentity.com",
# "account.activedirectory.windowsazure.com",
# "accounts.accesscontrol.windows.net",
# "adminwebservice.microsoftonline.com",
# "api.passwordreset.microsoftonline.com",
# "autologon.microsoftazuread-sso.com",
# "becws.microsoftonline.com",
# "ccs.login.microsoftonline.com",
# "clientconfig.microsoftonline-p.net",
# "cloudapp.azure.com",
# "companymanager.microsoftonline.com",
# "device.login.microsoftonline.com",
# "graph.microsoft.com",
# "graph.windows.net",
# "login-us.microsoftonline.com",
# "login.microsoft.com",
# "login.microsoftonline-p.com",
# "login.microsoftonline.com",
# "login.windows.net",
# "logincert.microsoftonline.com",
# "loginex.microsoftonline.com",
# "nexus.microsoftonline-p.com",
# "passwordreset.microsoftonline.com",
# "provisioningapi.microsoftonline.com",
# "web.core.windows.net",
# ]
DestinationIp|cidr:
- '172.128.0.0/10'
- '20.20.32.0/19'
- '20.103.156.88/32' # msn.com
- '20.190.128.0/18'
- '20.231.128.0/19'
- '40.126.0.0/18'
- '57.150.0.0/15'
- '2603:1006:2000::/48'
- '2603:1007:200::/48'
- '2603:1016:1400::/48'
- '2603:1017::/48'
- '2603:1026:3000::/48'
- '2603:1027:1::/48'
- '2603:1036:3000::/48'
- '2603:1037:1::/48'
- '2603:1046:2000::/48'
- '2603:1047:1::/48'
- '2603:1056:2000::/48'
- '2603:1057:2::/48'
DestinationPort:
- 80
- 443
Protocol: 'tcp'
filter_main_msrange_office_3:
# Microsoft 365 Common and Office Online
# "urls": [
# "*.compliance.microsoft.com",
# "*.data.microsoft.com",
# "*.protection.office.com",
# "*.security.microsoft.com",
# "compliance.microsoft.com",
# "defender.microsoft.com",
# "protection.office.com",
# "security.microsoft.com",
# "teams.microsoft.com",
# ]
DestinationIp|cidr:
- '13.64.0.0/11'
- '13.107.6.192/32'
- '13.107.9.192/32'
- '13.89.179.14/32'
- '20.40.0.0/14'
- '20.48.0.0/12'
- '20.64.0.0/12'
- '52.123.0.0/16'
- '52.108.0.0/14'
- '52.136.0.0/13'
- '57.150.0.0/15'
- '80.239.150.67/32' # Arelion Sweden AB
- '2620:1ec:4::192/128'
- '2620:1ec:a92::192/128'
DestinationPort: 443
Protocol: 'tcp'
filter_main_destination_host:
DestinationHostname|endswith: '.deploy.static.akamaitechnologies.com'
DestinationPort: 443
Protocol: 'tcp'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- You may have to tune certain domains out that Excel may call out to, such as microsoft or other business use case domains.
- Office documents commonly have templates that refer to external addresses, like "sharepoint.ourcompany.com" may have to be tuned.
- It is highly recommended to baseline your activity and tune out common business use cases.
level: medium
title: Office Application Initiated Network Connection Over Uncommon Ports
id: 3b5ba899-9842-4bc2-acc2-12308498bf42
status: test
description: Detects an office suit application (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook) communicating to target systems over uncommon ports.
references:
- https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/07/romcom-targets-ukraine-nato-membership-talks-at-nato-summit
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-12
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.stealth
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Initiated: 'true'
Image|endswith:
- '\excel.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
- '\wordview.exe'
filter_main_common_ports:
DestinationPort:
- 53 # DNS
- 80 # HTTP
- 139 # NETBIOS
- 389 # LDAP
- 443 # HTTPS
- 445 # SMB
- 3268 # MSFT-GC
filter_main_outlook_ports:
Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
Image|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
DestinationPort:
- 143
- 465 # SMTP
- 587 # SMTP
- 993 # IMAP
- 995 # POP3
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Other ports can be used, apply additional filters accordingly
level: medium
title: PowerShell Core DLL Loaded Via Office Application
id: bb2ba6fb-95d4-4a25-89fc-30bb736c021a
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell core DLL being loaded by an Office Product
references:
- Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-01
tags:
- attack.stealth
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\excel.exe'
- '\mspub.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
- '\onenote.exe'
- '\onenoteim.exe' # Just in case
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
ImageLoaded|contains:
- '\System.Management.Automation.Dll'
- '\System.Management.Automation.ni.Dll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: DotNET Assembly DLL Loaded Via Office Application
id: ff0f2b05-09db-4095-b96d-1b75ca24894a
status: test
description: Detects any assembly DLL being loaded by an Office Product
references:
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
author: Antonlovesdnb
date: 2020-02-19
modified: 2023-03-29
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.002
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\excel.exe'
- '\mspub.exe'
- '\onenote.exe'
- '\onenoteim.exe' # Just in case
- '\outlook.exe'
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\assembly\'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: CLR DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
id: d13c43f0-f66b-4279-8b2c-5912077c1780
status: test
description: Detects CLR DLL being loaded by an Office Product
references:
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
author: Antonlovesdnb
date: 2020-02-19
modified: 2023-03-29
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.002
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\excel.exe'
- '\mspub.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
- '\onenote.exe'
- '\onenoteim.exe' # Just in case
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
ImageLoaded|contains: '\clr.dll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: Potential Persistence Via Visual Studio Tools for Office
id: 9d15044a-7cfe-4d23-8085-6ebc11df7685
status: test
description: Detects persistence via Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins in Office applications.
references:
- https://twitter.com/_vivami/status/1347925307643355138
- https://vanmieghem.io/stealth-outlook-persistence/
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-01-10
modified: 2026-01-09
tags:
- attack.t1137.006
- attack.persistence
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains:
- '\Software\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins\'
- '\Software\Microsoft\Office\Word\Addins\'
- '\Software\Microsoft\Office\Excel\Addins\'
- '\Software\Microsoft\Office\Powerpoint\Addins\'
- '\Software\Microsoft\VSTO\Security\Inclusion\'
filter_main_system:
Image:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\regsvr32.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regsvr32.exe' # e.g. default Evernote installation
filter_main_office_click_to_run:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Common Files (x86)\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\'
Image|endswith: '\OfficeClickToRun.exe'
filter_main_integrator:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\integration\integrator.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\integration\integrator.exe'
filter_main_office_apps:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\OFFICE'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\OFFICE'
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Root\OFFICE'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\Root\OFFICE'
- 'C:\PROGRA~2\MICROS~2\Office'
Image|endswith:
- '\excel.exe'
- '\Integrator.exe'
- '\OneNote.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\Teams.exe'
- '\visio.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
filter_main_vsto:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\VSTO\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Shared\VSTO\'
Image|endswith: '\VSTOInstaller.exe'
filter_optional_avg:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files\AVG\Antivirus\RegSvr.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\AVG\Antivirus\RegSvr.exe'
TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins\Antivirus.AsOutExt\'
filter_optional_avast:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files\Avast Software\Avast\RegSvr.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Avast Software\Avast\RegSvr.exe'
TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins\Avast.AsOutExt\'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Addin Installation
level: medium
title: Office Autorun Keys Modification
id: baecf8fb-edbf-429f-9ade-31fc3f22b970
related:
- id: 17f878b8-9968-4578-b814-c4217fc5768c
type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Adversaries may modify these keys to execute malicious code when Office files are opened.
There are various legitimate add-ins that also use these keys and this filter list might not be exhaustive.
Thus, it is recommended to review and tune filters for your environment to reduce false positives before deploying to production.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
- https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d # a list with registry keys
author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2026-01-09
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547.001
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection_office_root:
TargetObject|contains:
- '\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Office'
- '\Software\Microsoft\Office'
selection_office_details:
TargetObject|contains:
- '\Word\Addins'
- '\PowerPoint\Addins'
- '\Outlook\Addins'
- '\Onenote\Addins'
- '\Excel\Addins'
- '\Access\Addins'
- 'test\Special\Perf'
filter_main_empty:
Details: '(Empty)'
filter_main_null:
Details: null
filter_main_known_addins:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\'
- 'C:\PROGRA~2\MICROS~2\Office'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\regsvr32.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regsvr32.exe '
TargetObject|contains:
# Remove any unused addins in your environment from the filter
# Known addins for excel
- '\Excel\Addins\AdHocReportingExcelClientLib.AdHocReportingExcelClientAddIn.1\'
- '\Excel\Addins\ExcelPlugInShell.PowerMapConnect\'
- '\Excel\Addins\NativeShim\'
- '\Excel\Addins\NativeShim.InquireConnector.1\'
- '\Excel\Addins\PowerPivotExcelClientAddIn.NativeEntry.1\'
# Known addins for outlook
- '\Outlook\AddIns\AccessAddin.DC\'
- '\Outlook\AddIns\ColleagueImport.ColleagueImportAddin\'
- '\Outlook\AddIns\EvernoteCC.EvernoteContactConnector\'
- '\Outlook\AddIns\EvernoteOLRD.Connect\'
# - '\Outlook\Addins\GrammarlyAddIn.Connect' # Uncomment if you use Grammarly
- '\Outlook\Addins\\OneNote.OutlookAddin'
- '\Outlook\Addins\DriveFSExtensionLib.Connect\' # An Outlook Add-in to talk with Google Drive
- '\Outlook\Addins\GoogleAppsSync.Connect\' # Google Apps Sync for Microsoft Outlook
- '\Outlook\Addins\Microsoft.VbaAddinForOutlook.1\'
- '\Outlook\Addins\OcOffice.OcForms\'
- '\Outlook\Addins\OscAddin.Connect\'
- '\Outlook\Addins\OutlookChangeNotifier.Connect\'
- '\Outlook\Addins\UCAddin.LyncAddin.1'
- '\Outlook\Addins\UCAddin.UCAddin.1'
- '\Outlook\Addins\UmOutlookAddin.FormRegionAddin\'
- 'AddinTakeNotesService\FriendlyName'
filter_main_officeclicktorun:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\Updates\'
Image|endswith: '\OfficeClickToRun.exe'
filter_main_vsto:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\VSTO\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Shared\VSTO\'
Image|endswith: '\VSTOInstaller.exe'
filter_optional_avg:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files\AVG\Antivirus\RegSvr.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\AVG\Antivirus\x86\RegSvr.exe'
TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins\Antivirus.AsOutExt\'
filter_optional_avast:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files\Avast Software\Avast\RegSvr.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Avast Software\Avast\x86\RegSvr.exe'
TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins\Avast.AsOutExt\'
# These filters are not exhaustive, filter can be expanded based on environment
condition: all of selection_office_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate software or add-in installations and administrative configurations
- Automatic registry modifications during legitimate software installations
level: medium
title: Office Application Startup - Office Test
id: 3d27f6dd-1c74-4687-b4fa-ca849d128d1c
status: test
description: Detects the addition of office test registry that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started
references:
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-technical-walkthrough-office-test-persistence-method-used-in-recent-sofacy-attacks/
author: omkar72
date: 2020-10-25
modified: 2023-11-08
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1137.002
logsource:
category: registry_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains: '\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: medium
title: Office Macro File Creation
id: 91174a41-dc8f-401b-be89-7bfc140612a0
related:
- id: 0e29e3a7-1ad8-40aa-b691-9f82ecd33d66
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a new office macro files on the systems
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1566.001/T1566.001.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/compat/office-file-format-reference
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-23
modified: 2026-01-09
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.docm'
- '.dotm'
- '.xlsm'
- '.xltm'
- '.potm'
- '.pptm'
filter_main_office:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\'
Image|endswith:
- '\WINWORD.EXE'
- '\EXCEL.EXE'
- '\POWERPNT.EXE'
TargetFilename|contains: '\~$' # Temporary files created by Office applications
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Very common in environments that rely heavily on macro documents
level: low
title: Office Macro File Download
id: 0e29e3a7-1ad8-40aa-b691-9f82ecd33d66
related:
- id: 91174a41-dc8f-401b-be89-7bfc140612a0
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects the creation of a new office macro files on the system via an application (browser, mail client).
This can help identify potential malicious activity, such as the download of macro-enabled documents that could be used for exploitation.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1566.001/T1566.001.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/compat/office-file-format-reference
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-23
modified: 2025-10-29
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_processes:
Image|endswith:
# Email clients
- '\RuntimeBroker.exe' # Windows Email clients uses RuntimeBroker to create the files
- '\outlook.exe'
- '\thunderbird.exe'
# Browsers
- '\brave.exe'
- '\chrome.exe'
- '\firefox.exe'
- '\iexplore.exe'
- '\maxthon.exe'
- '\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
- '\msedge.exe'
- '\msedgewebview2.exe'
- '\opera.exe'
- '\safari.exe'
- '\seamonkey.exe'
- '\vivaldi.exe'
- '\whale.exe'
selection_ext:
- TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.docm'
- '.dotm'
- '.xlsm'
- '.xltm'
- '.potm'
- '.pptm'
- TargetFilename|contains:
- '.docm:Zone'
- '.dotm:Zone'
- '.xlsm:Zone'
- '.xltm:Zone'
- '.potm:Zone'
- '.pptm:Zone'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate macro files downloaded from the internet
- Legitimate macro files sent as attachments via emails
level: low
title: HackTool - Windows Credential Editor (WCE) Execution
id: 7aa7009a-28b9-4344-8c1f-159489a390df
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE), a popular post-exploitation tool used to extract plaintext passwords, hash, PIN code and Kerberos tickets from memory.
It is often used by threat actors for credential dumping and lateral movement within compromised networks.
references:
- https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-12-31
modified: 2025-10-21
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.s0005
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\WCE.exe'
- '\WCE64.exe'
selection_hash:
Hashes|contains:
- 'IMPHASH=136F0A8572C058A96436C82E541E4C41'
- 'IMPHASH=589657C64DDE88533186C39F82FA1F50'
- 'IMPHASH=6BFE09EFCB4FFDE061EBDBAFC4DB84CF'
- 'IMPHASH=7D490037BF450877E6D0287BDCFF8D2E'
- 'IMPHASH=8AB93B061287C79F3088C5BC7E7D97ED'
- 'IMPHASH=A53A02B997935FD8EEDCB5F7ABAB9B9F'
- 'IMPHASH=BA434A7A729EEC20E136CA4C32D6C740'
- 'IMPHASH=BD1D1547DA13C0FCB6C15E86217D5EB8'
- 'IMPHASH=E96A73C7BF33A464C510EDE582318BF2'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: Windows Credential Editor Registry
id: a6b33c02-8305-488f-8585-03cb2a7763f2
status: test
description: Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE)
references:
- https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-12-31
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.s0005
logsource:
category: registry_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains: Services\WCESERVICE\Start
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via Windows Authentication
id: 6e78f90f-0043-4a01-ac41-f97681613a66
status: test
description: |
Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using Windows Authentication.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1213
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 9002
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Windows LAPS Credential Dump From Entra ID
id: a4b25073-8947-489c-a8dd-93b41c23f26d
status: test
description: Detects when an account dumps the LAPS password from Entra ID.
references:
- https://twitter.com/NathanMcNulty/status/1785051227568632263
- https://www.cloudcoffee.ch/microsoft-365/configure-windows-laps-in-microsoft-intune/
- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-entra-blog/introducing-windows-local-administrator-password-solution-with/ba-p/1942487
author: andrewdanis
date: 2024-06-26
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098.005
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
category: 'Device'
activityType|contains: 'Recover device local administrator password'
additionalDetails.additionalInfo|contains: 'Successfully recovered local credential by device id'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Approved activity performed by an Administrator.
level: high
title: Tamper Windows Defender - PSClassic
id: ec19ebab-72dc-40e1-9728-4c0b805d722c
related:
- id: 14c71865-6cd3-44ae-adaa-1db923fae5f2
type: similar
status: test
description: Attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of Windows Defender ATP or set default actions to allow.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-07
modified: 2024-01-02
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_classic_provider_start
detection:
selection_set_mppreference:
Data|contains: 'Set-MpPreference'
selection_options_bool_allow:
Data|contains:
- '-dbaf $true'
- '-dbaf 1'
- '-dbm $true'
- '-dbm 1'
- '-dips $true'
- '-dips 1'
- '-DisableArchiveScanning $true'
- '-DisableArchiveScanning 1'
- '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring $true'
- '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring 1'
- '-DisableBlockAtFirstSeen $true'
- '-DisableBlockAtFirstSeen 1'
- '-DisableCatchupFullScan $true'
- '-DisableCatchupFullScan 1'
- '-DisableCatchupQuickScan $true'
- '-DisableCatchupQuickScan 1'
- '-DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem $true'
- '-DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem 1'
- '-DisableIOAVProtection $true'
- '-DisableIOAVProtection 1'
- '-DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true'
- '-DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1'
- '-DisableRemovableDriveScanning $true'
- '-DisableRemovableDriveScanning 1'
- '-DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan $true'
- '-DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan 1'
- '-DisableScanningNetworkFiles $true'
- '-DisableScanningNetworkFiles 1'
- '-DisableScriptScanning $true'
- '-DisableScriptScanning 1'
- '-MAPSReporting $false'
- '-MAPSReporting 0'
- '-drdsc $true'
- '-drdsc 1'
- '-drtm $true'
- '-drtm 1'
- '-dscrptsc $true'
- '-dscrptsc 1'
- '-dsmndf $true'
- '-dsmndf 1'
- '-dsnf $true'
- '-dsnf 1'
- '-dss $true'
- '-dss 1'
selection_options_actions_func:
Data|contains:
- 'HighThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'htdefac Allow'
- 'LowThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'ltdefac Allow'
- 'ModerateThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'mtdefac Allow'
- 'SevereThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'stdefac Allow'
condition: selection_set_mppreference and 1 of selection_options_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts that disable Windows Defender for troubleshooting purposes. Must be investigated.
level: high
title: Tamper Windows Defender Remove-MpPreference - ScriptBlockLogging
id: ae2bdd58-0681-48ac-be7f-58ab4e593458
related:
- id: 07e3cb2c-0608-410d-be4b-1511cb1a0448
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender configuration using the 'MpPreference' cmdlet
references:
- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/windows-10-controlled-folder-access-event-search/ba-p/2326088
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-05
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection_remove:
ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Remove-MpPreference'
selection_tamper:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- '-ControlledFolderAccessProtectedFolders '
- '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids '
- '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions '
- '-CheckForSignaturesBeforeRunningScan '
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: high
title: Tamper Windows Defender - ScriptBlockLogging
id: 14c71865-6cd3-44ae-adaa-1db923fae5f2
related:
- id: ec19ebab-72dc-40e1-9728-4c0b805d722c
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of Windows Defender ATP or set default actions to allow.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/defender/set-mppreference?view=windowsserver2022-ps
- https://bidouillesecurity.com/disable-windows-defender-in-powershell/
author: frack113, elhoim, Tim Shelton (fps, alias support), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-16
modified: 2024-01-02
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection_options_disabling_preference:
ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Set-MpPreference'
selection_options_disabling_function:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- '-dbaf $true'
- '-dbaf 1'
- '-dbm $true'
- '-dbm 1'
- '-dips $true'
- '-dips 1'
- '-DisableArchiveScanning $true'
- '-DisableArchiveScanning 1'
- '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring $true'
- '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring 1'
- '-DisableBlockAtFirstSeen $true'
- '-DisableBlockAtFirstSeen 1'
- '-DisableCatchupFullScan $true'
- '-DisableCatchupFullScan 1'
- '-DisableCatchupQuickScan $true'
- '-DisableCatchupQuickScan 1'
- '-DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem $true'
- '-DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem 1'
- '-DisableIOAVProtection $true'
- '-DisableIOAVProtection 1'
- '-DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true'
- '-DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1'
- '-DisableRemovableDriveScanning $true'
- '-DisableRemovableDriveScanning 1'
- '-DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan $true'
- '-DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan 1'
- '-DisableScanningNetworkFiles $true'
- '-DisableScanningNetworkFiles 1'
- '-DisableScriptScanning $true'
- '-DisableScriptScanning 1'
- '-MAPSReporting $false'
- '-MAPSReporting 0'
- '-drdsc $true'
- '-drdsc 1'
- '-drtm $true'
- '-drtm 1'
- '-dscrptsc $true'
- '-dscrptsc 1'
- '-dsmndf $true'
- '-dsmndf 1'
- '-dsnf $true'
- '-dsnf 1'
- '-dss $true'
- '-dss 1'
selection_other_default_actions_allow:
ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Set-MpPreference'
selection_other_default_actions_func:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- 'HighThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'htdefac Allow'
- 'LowThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'ltdefac Allow'
- 'ModerateThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'mtdefac Allow'
- 'SevereThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'stdefac Allow'
condition: all of selection_options_disabling_* or all of selection_other_default_actions_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts that disable Windows Defender for troubleshooting purposes. Must be investigated.
level: high
title: Clearing Windows Console History
id: bde47d4b-9987-405c-94c7-b080410e8ea7
status: test
description: Identifies when a user attempts to clear console history. An adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion.
references:
- https://stefanos.cloud/blog/kb/how-to-clear-the-powershell-command-history/
- https://www.shellhacks.com/clear-history-powershell/
- https://community.sophos.com/sophos-labs/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-25
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1070
- attack.t1070.003
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection1:
ScriptBlockText|contains: Clear-History
selection2a:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- Remove-Item
- rm
selection2b:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- ConsoleHost_history.txt
- (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath
condition: selection1 or selection2a and selection2b
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: PowerShell Set-Acl On Windows Folder - PsScript
id: 3bf1d859-3a7e-44cb-8809-a99e066d3478
related:
- id: cae80281-ef23-44c5-873b-fd48d2666f49 # PsScript Low
type: derived
- id: 0944e002-e3f6-4eb5-bf69-3a3067b53d73 # ProcCreation Susp
type: derived
- id: bdeb2cff-af74-4094-8426-724dc937f20a # ProcCreation Low
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell scripts to set the ACL to a file in the Windows folder
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/74438b0237d141ee9c99747976447dc884cb1a39/atomics/T1505.005/T1505.005.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-acl?view=powershell-5.1
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1222
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: bade5735-5ab0-4aa7-a642-a11be0e40872
detection:
selection_cmdlet:
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'Set-Acl '
- '-AclObject '
selection_paths:
# Note: Add more suspicious paths
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- '-Path "C:\Windows'
- '-Path "C:/Windows'
- "-Path 'C:\\Windows"
- "-Path 'C:/Windows"
- '-Path C:\\Windows'
- '-Path C:/Windows'
- '-Path $env:windir'
- '-Path "$env:windir'
- "-Path '$env:windir"
selection_permissions:
# Note: Add more suspicious permissions
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- 'FullControl'
- 'Allow'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Windows Binaries Write Suspicious Extensions
id: b8fd0e93-ff58-4cbd-8f48-1c114e342e62
related:
- id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Windows executables that write files with suspicious extensions
references:
- Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-12
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_generic:
Image|endswith:
- '\csrss.exe'
- '\lsass.exe'
- '\RuntimeBroker.exe'
- '\sihost.exe'
- '\smss.exe'
- '\wininit.exe'
- '\winlogon.exe'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.bat'
- '.dll'
- '.exe'
- '.hta'
- '.iso'
- '.ps1'
- '.txt'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
selection_special:
Image|endswith:
- '\dllhost.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\svchost.exe'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.bat'
- '.hta'
- '.iso'
- '.ps1'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
filter_main_AppLockerPolicyTest:
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe'
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- ':\Users\'
- '\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.ps1'
filter_main_script_gpo_machine:
Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\GroupPolicy\DataStore\'
- '\sysvol\'
- '\Policies\'
- '\Machine\Scripts\Startup\'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.ps1'
- '.bat'
filter_main_clipchamp:
Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Clipchamp'
- '.ps1'
filter_main_powershell_preview:
Image:
- 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe'
TargetFilename|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.ps1'
condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Windows Shell/Scripting Application File Write to Suspicious Folder
id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
status: test
description: Detects Windows shells and scripting applications that write files to suspicious folders
references:
- Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-20
modified: 2023-03-29
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_1:
Image|endswith:
- '\bash.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\msbuild.exe' # https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_msbuild_started_by_office_app.toml
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\sh.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
TargetFilename|startswith:
- 'C:\PerfLogs\'
- 'C:\Users\Public\'
selection_2:
Image|endswith:
- '\certutil.exe'
- '\forfiles.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
# - '\rundll32.exe' # Potential FP
- '\schtasks.exe'
- '\scriptrunner.exe'
- '\wmic.exe' # https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
TargetFilename|contains:
- 'C:\PerfLogs\'
- 'C:\Users\Public\'
- 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - File
id: 68578b43-65df-4f81-9a9b-92f32711a951
status: test
description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll (UACMe 32)
references:
- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1548.002
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection1:
TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
TargetFilename|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Temp\OskSupport.dll'
selection2:
Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe'
TargetFilename: 'C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\osk.exe'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Potential Windows Defender AV Bypass Via Dump64.EXE Rename
id: 129966c9-de17-4334-a123-8b58172e664d
status: test
description: |
Detects when a user is potentially trying to bypass the Windows Defender AV by renaming a tool to dump64.exe and placing it in the Visual Studio folder.
Currently the rule is covering only usage of procdump but other utilities can be added in order to increase coverage.
references:
- https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1460597833917251595
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-26
modified: 2024-06-21
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_dump:
Image|startswith: ':\Program Files'
Image|contains: '\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
Image|endswith: '\dump64.exe'
selection_tools_procdump:
- OriginalFileName: 'procdump'
- CommandLine|contains:
- ' -ma ' # Full Dump
- ' -mp ' # Mini Plus
condition: selection_dump and 1 of selection_tools_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Windows Service Tampering
id: ce72ef99-22f1-43d4-8695-419dcb5d9330
related:
- id: eb87818d-db5d-49cc-a987-d5da331fbd90
type: obsolete
- id: 6783aa9e-0dc3-49d4-a94a-8b39c5fd700b
type: obsolete
- id: 7fd4bb39-12d0-45ab-bb36-cebabc73dc7b
type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
Detects the usage of binaries such as 'net', 'sc' or 'powershell' in order to stop, pause, disable or delete critical or important Windows services such as AV, Backup, etc. As seen being used in some ransomware scripts
references:
- https://www.trendmicro.com/content/dam/trendmicro/global/en/research/22/h/ransomware-actor-abuses-genshin-impact-anti-cheat-driver-to-kill-antivirus/Genshin%20Impact%20Figure%2010.jpg
- https://www.trellix.com/en-sg/about/newsroom/stories/threat-labs/lockergoga-ransomware-family-used-in-targeted-attacks.html
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
- https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/08/19/back-in-black-unlocking-a-lockbit-3-0-ransomware-attack/
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/38283b775552da8981452941ea74191aa0d203edd3f61fb2dee7b0aea3514955
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/delete-method-in-class-win32-service
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 , X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-01
modified: 2025-08-27
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1489
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_tools_img:
- OriginalFileName:
- 'net.exe'
- 'net1.exe'
- 'PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'psservice.exe'
- 'pwsh.dll'
- 'sc.exe'
- 'wmic.exe'
- Image|endswith:
- '\net.exe'
- '\net1.exe'
- '\PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\PsService.exe'
- '\PsService64.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\sc.exe'
- '\wmic.exe' # wmic process call win32_service where name='servicename' delete
selection_tools_cli:
- CommandLine|contains:
- ' delete '
- '.delete()' # Get-WmiObject win32_service -Filter "name='$serviceName'" ).delete()
- ' pause ' # Covers flags from: PsService and Sc.EXE
- ' stop ' # Covers flags from: PsService.EXE, Net.EXE and Sc.EXE
- 'Stop-Service '
- 'Remove-Service '
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'config'
- 'start=disabled'
selection_services:
CommandLine|contains:
- '143Svc'
- 'Acronis VSS Provider'
- 'AcronisAgent'
- 'AcrSch2Svc'
- 'AdobeARMservice'
- 'AHS Service'
- 'Antivirus'
- 'Apache4'
- 'ARSM'
- 'aswBcc'
- 'AteraAgent'
- 'Avast Business Console Client Antivirus Service'
- 'avast! Antivirus'
- 'AVG Antivirus'
- 'avgAdminClient'
- 'AvgAdminServer'
- 'AVP1'
- 'BackupExec'
- 'bedbg'
- 'BITS'
- 'BrokerInfrastructure'
- 'CASLicenceServer'
- 'CASWebServer'
- 'Client Agent 7.60'
- 'Core Browsing Protection'
- 'Core Mail Protection'
- 'Core Scanning Server'
- 'DCAgent'
- 'dwmrcs'
- 'EhttpSr'
- 'ekrn'
- 'Enterprise Client Service'
- 'epag'
- 'EPIntegrationService'
- 'EPProtectedService'
- 'EPRedline'
- 'EPSecurityService'
- 'EPUpdateService'
- 'EraserSvc11710'
- 'EsgShKernel'
- 'ESHASRV'
- 'FA_Scheduler'
- 'FirebirdGuardianDefaultInstance'
- 'FirebirdServerDefaultInstance'
- 'FontCache3.0.0.0'
- 'HealthTLService'
- 'hmpalertsvc'
- 'HMS'
- 'HostControllerService'
- 'hvdsvc'
- 'IAStorDataMgrSvc'
- 'IBMHPS'
- 'ibmspsvc'
- 'IISAdmin'
- 'IMANSVC'
- 'IMAP4Svc'
- 'instance2'
- 'KAVFS'
- 'KAVFSGT'
- 'kavfsslp'
- 'KeyIso'
- 'klbackupdisk'
- 'klbackupflt'
- 'klflt'
- 'klhk'
- 'KLIF'
- 'klim6'
- 'klkbdflt'
- 'klmouflt'
- 'klnagent'
- 'klpd'
- 'kltap'
- 'KSDE1.0.0'
- 'LogProcessorService'
- 'M8EndpointAgent'
- 'macmnsvc'
- 'masvc'
- 'MBAMService'
- 'MBCloudEA'
- 'MBEndpointAgent'
- 'McAfeeDLPAgentService'
- 'McAfeeEngineService'
- 'MCAFEEEVENTPARSERSRV'
- 'McAfeeFramework'
- 'MCAFEETOMCATSRV530'
- 'McShield'
- 'McTaskManager'
- 'mfefire'
- 'mfemms'
- 'mfevto'
- 'mfevtp'
- 'mfewc'
- 'MMS'
- 'mozyprobackup'
- 'mpssvc'
- 'MSComplianceAudit'
- 'MSDTC'
- 'MsDtsServer'
- 'MSExchange'
- 'msftesq1SPROO'
- 'msftesql$PROD'
- 'msftesql$SQLEXPRESS'
- 'MSOLAP$SQL_2008'
- 'MSOLAP$SYSTEM_BGC'
- 'MSOLAP$TPS'
- 'MSOLAP$TPSAMA'
- 'MSOLAPSTPS'
- 'MSOLAPSTPSAMA'
- 'mssecflt'
- 'MSSQ!I.SPROFXENGAGEMEHT'
- 'MSSQ0SHAREPOINT'
- 'MSSQ0SOPHOS'
- 'MSSQL'
- 'MSSQLFDLauncher$'
- 'MySQL'
- 'NanoServiceMain'
- 'NetMsmqActivator'
- 'NetPipeActivator'
- 'netprofm'
- 'NetTcpActivator'
- 'NetTcpPortSharing'
- 'ntrtscan'
- 'nvspwmi'
- 'ofcservice'
- 'Online Protection System'
- 'OracleClientCache80'
- 'OracleDBConsole'
- 'OracleMTSRecoveryService'
- 'OracleOraDb11g_home1'
- 'OracleService'
- 'OracleVssWriter'
- 'osppsvc'
- 'PandaAetherAgent'
- 'PccNTUpd'
- 'PDVFSService'
- 'POP3Svc'
- 'postgresql-x64-9.4'
- 'POVFSService'
- 'PSUAService'
- 'Quick Update Service'
- 'RepairService'
- 'ReportServer'
- 'ReportServer$'
- 'RESvc'
- 'RpcEptMapper'
- 'sacsvr'
- 'SamSs'
- 'SAVAdminService'
- 'SAVService'
- 'ScSecSvc'
- 'SDRSVC'
- 'SearchExchangeTracing'
- 'sense'
- 'SentinelAgent'
- 'SentinelHelperService'
- 'SepMasterService'
- 'ShMonitor'
- 'Smcinst'
- 'SmcService'
- 'SMTPSvc'
- 'SNAC'
- 'SntpService'
- 'Sophos'
- 'SQ1SafeOLRService'
- 'SQL Backups'
- 'SQL Server'
- 'SQLAgent'
- 'SQLANYs_Sage_FAS_Fixed_Assets'
- 'SQLBrowser'
- 'SQLsafe'
- 'SQLSERVERAGENT'
- 'SQLTELEMETRY'
- 'SQLWriter'
- 'SSISTELEMETRY130'
- 'SstpSvc'
- 'storflt'
- 'svcGenericHost'
- 'swc_service'
- 'swi_filter'
- 'swi_service'
- 'swi_update'
- 'Symantec'
- 'sysmon'
- 'TeamViewer'
- 'Telemetryserver'
- 'ThreatLockerService'
- 'TMBMServer'
- 'TmCCSF'
- 'TmFilter'
- 'TMiCRCScanService'
- 'tmlisten'
- 'TMLWCSService'
- 'TmPfw'
- 'TmPreFilter'
- 'TmProxy'
- 'TMSmartRelayService'
- 'tmusa'
- 'Tomcat'
- 'Trend Micro Deep Security Manager'
- 'TrueKey'
- 'UFNet'
- 'UI0Detect'
- 'UniFi'
- 'UTODetect'
- 'vds'
- 'Veeam'
- 'VeeamDeploySvc'
- 'Veritas System Recovery'
- 'vmic'
- 'VMTools'
- 'vmvss'
- 'VSApiNt'
- 'VSS'
- 'W3Svc'
- 'wbengine'
- 'WdNisSvc'
- 'WeanClOudSve'
- 'Weems JY'
- 'WinDefend'
- 'wmms'
- 'wozyprobackup'
- 'WPFFontCache_v0400'
- 'WRSVC'
- 'wsbexchange'
- 'WSearch'
- 'wscsvc'
- 'Zoolz 2 Service'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Administrators or tools shutting down the services due to upgrade or removal purposes. If you experience some false positive, please consider adding filters to the parent process launching this command and not removing the entry
level: high
title: UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - Process
id: 0058b9e5-bcd7-40d4-9205-95ca5a16d7b2
status: test
description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll (UACMe 32)
references:
- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1548.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img_1:
Image: 'C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\osk.exe'
selection_img_2:
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'
ParentCommandLine: '"C:\Windows\system32\mmc.exe" "C:\Windows\system32\eventvwr.msc" /s'
selection_integrity:
IntegrityLevel:
- 'High'
- 'System'
- 'S-1-16-16384' # System
- 'S-1-16-12288' # High
condition: 1 of selection_img_* and selection_integrity
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Uninstall of Windows Defender Feature via PowerShell
id: c443012c-7928-43bf-ac20-7eda5efe61ad
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the use of PowerShell with Uninstall-WindowsFeature or Remove-WindowsFeature cmdlets to disable or remove the Windows Defender GUI feature, a common technique used by adversaries to evade defenses.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.windows.servermanager.migration/uninstall-windowsfeature
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/04/03/malicious-iso-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware
author: yxinmiracle
date: 2025-08-22
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\powershell_ise.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
selection_cli_uninstall:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Uninstall-WindowsFeature'
- 'Remove-WindowsFeature' # Only supported in Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 2012 R2
selection_cli_defender_feature:
CommandLine|contains: 'Windows-Defender'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Windows Defender Context Menu Removed
id: b9e8c7d6-a5f4-4e3d-8b1a-9f0c8d7e6a5b
related:
- id: 72a0369a-2576-4aaf-bfc9-6bb24a574ac6
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the use of reg.exe or PowerShell to delete the Windows Defender context menu handler registry keys.
This action removes the "Scan with Microsoft Defender" option from the right-click menu for files, directories, and drives.
Attackers may use this technique to hinder manual, on-demand scans and reduce the visibility of the security product.
references:
- https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/395ed5fe-ad13-4366-9405-a228427bdd91/
- https://winaero.com/how-to-delete-scan-with-windows-defender-from-context-menu-in-windows-10/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/
author: 'Matt Anderson (Huntress)'
date: 2025-07-09
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\powershell_ise.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\reg.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'powershell_ise.EXE'
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
- 'reg.exe'
selection_action:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'del'
- 'Remove-Item'
- 'ri '
selection_reg_path:
CommandLine|contains: '\shellex\ContextMenuHandlers\EPP'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- May be part of a system customization or "debloating" script, but this is highly unusual in a managed corporate environment.
level: high