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Sigma

Sigma rules for CVE-2004-0200

57 rules · scoped to cve · back to CVE-2004-0200
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.

Detection rules

7 of 57
direct medium
Microsoft VBA For Outlook Addin Loaded Via Outlook
Detects outlvba (Microsoft VBA for Outlook Addin) DLL being loaded by the outlook process
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 9a0b8719-cd3c-4f0a-90de-765a4cb3f5ed license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Microsoft VBA For Outlook Addin Loaded Via Outlook
id: 9a0b8719-cd3c-4f0a-90de-765a4cb3f5ed
status: test
description: Detects outlvba (Microsoft VBA for Outlook Addin) DLL being loaded by the outlook process
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=58
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-08
modified: 2024-03-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\outlook.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\outlvba.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate macro usage. Add the appropriate filter according to your environment
level: medium
direct medium
Outlook Security Settings Updated - Registry
Detects changes to the registry values related to outlook security settings
status test author frack113 id c3cefdf4-6703-4e1c-bad8-bf422fc5015a license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Outlook Security Settings Updated - Registry
id: c3cefdf4-6703-4e1c-bad8-bf422fc5015a
related:
    - id: 6763c6c8-bd01-4687-bc8d-4fa52cf8ba08 # EnableUnsafeClientMailRules
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects changes to the registry values related to outlook security settings
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1137/T1137.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/outlook/troubleshoot/security/information-about-email-security-settings
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-28
modified: 2026-01-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1137
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\Outlook\Security\'
    filter_main_outlook:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\'
        Image|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
level: medium
direct medium
Publisher Attachment File Dropped In Suspicious Location
Detects creation of files with the ".pub" extension in suspicious or uncommon locations. This could be a sign of attackers abusing Publisher documents
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 3d2a2d59-929c-4b78-8c1a-145dfe9e07b1 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Publisher Attachment File Dropped In Suspicious Location
id: 3d2a2d59-929c-4b78-8c1a-145dfe9e07b1
status: test
description: Detects creation of files with the ".pub" extension in suspicious or uncommon locations. This could be a sign of attackers abusing Publisher documents
references:
    - https://twitter.com/EmericNasi/status/1623224526220804098
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - 'C:\Temp\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.pub'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of ".pub" files from those locations
level: medium
direct high
Suspicious File Created Via OneNote Application
Detects suspicious files created via the OneNote application. This could indicate a potential malicious ".one"/".onepkg" file was executed as seen being used in malware activity in the wild
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id fcc6d700-68d9-4241-9a1a-06874d621b06 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Suspicious File Created Via OneNote Application
id: fcc6d700-68d9-4241-9a1a-06874d621b06
status: test
description: Detects suspicious files created via the OneNote application. This could indicate a potential malicious ".one"/".onepkg" file was executed as seen being used in malware activity in the wild
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-now-use-microsoft-onenote-attachments-to-spread-malware/
    - https://blog.osarmor.com/319/onenote-attachment-delivers-asyncrat-malware/
    - https://twitter.com/MaD_c4t/status/1623414582382567424
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/detecting-onenote-abuse
    - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/new-attacks-old-tricks-how-onenote-malware-is-evolving/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/17f2d378-6d11-4d6f-8340-954b04f35e83/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-09
modified: 2023-02-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\onenote.exe'
            - '\onenotem.exe'
            - '\onenoteim.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\OneNote\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            # TODO: Add more suspicious extensions
            - '.bat'
            - '.chm'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.htm'
            - '.html'
            - '.js'
            - '.lnk'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.wsf'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positives should be very low with the extensions list cited. Especially if you don't heavily utilize OneNote.
    - Occasional FPs might occur if OneNote is used internally to share different embedded documents
level: high
direct high
Suspicious Microsoft OneNote Child Process
Detects suspicious child processes of the Microsoft OneNote application. This may indicate an attempt to execute malicious embedded objects from a .one file.
status test author Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea) id c27515df-97a9-4162-8a60-dc0eeb51b775 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Suspicious Microsoft OneNote Child Process
id: c27515df-97a9-4162-8a60-dc0eeb51b775
related:
    - id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50 # Generic rule for suspicious office application child processes
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of the Microsoft OneNote application. This may indicate an attempt to execute malicious embedded objects from a .one file.
references:
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-e34e43eb5666427602ddf488b2bf3b545bd9aae81af3e6f6c7949f9652abdf18
    - https://micahbabinski.medium.com/detecting-onenote-one-malware-delivery-407e9321ecf0
author: Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-10-21
modified: 2023-02-10
tags:
    - attack.t1566
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\onenote.exe'
    selection_opt_img:
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'bitsadmin.exe'
              - 'CertOC.exe'
              - 'CertUtil.exe'
              - 'Cmd.Exe'
              - 'CMSTP.EXE'
              - 'cscript.exe'
              - 'curl.exe'
              - 'HH.exe'
              - 'IEExec.exe'
              - 'InstallUtil.exe'
              - 'javaw.exe'
              - 'Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe'
              - 'msdt.exe'
              - 'MSHTA.EXE'
              - 'msiexec.exe'
              - 'Msxsl.exe'
              - 'odbcconf.exe'
              - 'pcalua.exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'RegAsm.exe'
              - 'RegSvcs.exe'
              - 'REGSVR32.exe'
              - 'RUNDLL32.exe'
              - 'schtasks.exe'
              - 'ScriptRunner.exe'
              - 'wmic.exe'
              - 'WorkFolders.exe'
              - 'wscript.exe'
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\AppVLP.exe'
              - '\bash.exe'
              - '\bitsadmin.exe'
              - '\certoc.exe'
              - '\certutil.exe'
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\cmstp.exe'
              - '\control.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\curl.exe'
              - '\forfiles.exe'
              - '\hh.exe'
              - '\ieexec.exe'
              - '\installutil.exe'
              - '\javaw.exe'
              - '\mftrace.exe'
              - '\Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe'
              - '\msbuild.exe'
              - '\msdt.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\msidb.exe'
              - '\msiexec.exe'
              - '\msxsl.exe'
              - '\odbcconf.exe'
              - '\pcalua.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\regasm.exe'
              - '\regsvcs.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\schtasks.exe'
              - '\scrcons.exe'
              - '\scriptrunner.exe'
              - '\sh.exe'
              - '\svchost.exe'
              - '\verclsid.exe'
              - '\wmic.exe'
              - '\workfolders.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
    selection_opt_explorer:
        Image|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.hta'
            - '.vb'
            - '.wsh'
            - '.js'
            - '.ps'
            - '.scr'
            - '.pif'
            - '.bat'
            - '.cmd'
    selection_opt_paths:
        Image|contains:
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\ProgramData\'
            - '\Windows\Tasks\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
    filter_teams:
        Image|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith: '-Embedding'
    filter_onedrive:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\'
        Image|endswith: '\FileCoAuth.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith: '-Embedding'
    condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_opt_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - File located in the AppData folder with trusted signature
level: high
direct high
OneNote.EXE Execution of Malicious Embedded Scripts
Detects the execution of malicious OneNote documents that contain embedded scripts. When a user clicks on a OneNote attachment and then on the malicious link inside the ".one" file, it exports and executes the malicious embedded script from specific directories.
status test author @kostastsale id 84b1706c-932a-44c4-ae28-892b28a25b94 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: OneNote.EXE Execution of Malicious Embedded Scripts
id: 84b1706c-932a-44c4-ae28-892b28a25b94
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of malicious OneNote documents that contain embedded scripts.
    When a user clicks on a OneNote attachment and then on the malicious link inside the ".one" file, it exports and executes the malicious embedded script from specific directories.
references:
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/tag/one/
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2023-02-02
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\onenote.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\exported\'
            - '\onenoteofflinecache_files\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
direct medium
OneNote Attachment File Dropped In Suspicious Location
Detects creation of files with the ".one"/".onepkg" extension in suspicious or uncommon locations. This could be a sign of attackers abusing OneNote attachments
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 7fd164ba-126a-4d9c-9392-0d4f7c243df0 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: OneNote Attachment File Dropped In Suspicious Location
id: 7fd164ba-126a-4d9c-9392-0d4f7c243df0
status: test
description: Detects creation of files with the ".one"/".onepkg" extension in suspicious or uncommon locations. This could be a sign of attackers abusing OneNote attachments
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-now-use-microsoft-onenote-attachments-to-spread-malware/
    - https://blog.osarmor.com/319/onenote-attachment-delivers-asyncrat-malware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-22
modified: 2023-09-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            # Note: add more common locations for drops such as download folders and the like. Or baseline legitimate locations and alert on everything else
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - ':\Temp\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.one'
            - '.onepkg'
    filter_main_onenote:
        Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
        Image|endswith: '\ONENOTE.EXE'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of ".one" or ".onepkg" files from those locations
level: medium
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