title: PCRE.NET Package Image Load
id: 84b0a8f3-680b-4096-a45b-e9a89221727c
status: test
description: Detects processes loading modules related to PCRE.NET package
references:
    - https://twitter.com/rbmaslen/status/1321859647091970051
    - https://twitter.com/tifkin_/status/1321916444557365248
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-29
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\ba9ea7344a4a5f591d6e5dc32a13494b\
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Hacktool Ruler
id: 24549159-ac1b-479c-8175-d42aea947cae
status: test
description: This events that are generated when using the hacktool Ruler by Sensepost
references:
    - https://github.com/sensepost/ruler
    - https://github.com/sensepost/ruler/issues/47
    - https://github.com/staaldraad/go-ntlm/blob/cd032d41aa8ce5751c07cb7945400c0f5c81e2eb/ntlm/ntlmv1.go#L427
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-05-31
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.execution
    - attack.collection
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.t1114
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1550.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID: 4776
        Workstation: 'RULER'
    selection2:
        EventID:
            - 4624
            - 4625
        WorkstationName: 'RULER'
    condition: (1 of selection*)
falsepositives:
    - Go utilities that use staaldraad awesome NTLM library
level: high

title: Windows Defender Threat Detected
id: 57b649ef-ff42-4fb0-8bf6-62da243a1708
status: stable
description: Detects actions taken by Windows Defender malware detection engines
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/troubleshoot-microsoft-defender-antivirus
author: Ján Trenčanský
date: 2020-07-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: windefend
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 1006 # The antimalware engine found malware or other potentially unwanted software.
            - 1015 # The antimalware platform detected suspicious behavior.
            - 1116 # The antimalware platform detected malware or other potentially unwanted software.
            - 1117 # he antimalware platform performed an action to protect your system from malware or other potentially unwanted software.
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Windows Defender AMSI Trigger Detected
id: ea9bf0fa-edec-4fb8-8b78-b119f2528186
status: stable
description: Detects triggering of AMSI by Windows Defender.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/how-amsi-helps
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2020-09-14
modified: 2022-12-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: windefend
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 1116 # The antimalware platform detected malware or other potentially unwanted software.
        SourceName: 'AMSI'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: AWS EC2 Startup Shell Script Change
id: 1ab3c5ed-5baf-417b-bb6b-78ca33f6c3df
status: test
description: Detects changes to the EC2 instance startup script. The shell script will be executed as root/SYSTEM every time the specific instances are booted up.
references:
    - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/866376cd711666c775bbfcde0524c817f2c5b181/pacu/modules/ec2__startup_shell_script/main.py#L9
author: faloker
date: 2020-02-12
modified: 2022-06-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.004
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection_source:
        eventSource: ec2.amazonaws.com
        requestParameters.attribute: 'userData'
        eventName: ModifyInstanceAttribute
    condition: selection_source
falsepositives:
    - Valid changes to the startup script
level: high

title: Network Connection Initiated via Finger.EXE
id: 2fdaf50b-9fd5-449f-ba69-f17248119af6
related:
    - id: c082c2b0-525b-4dbc-9a26-a57dc4692074
      type: similar
    - id: af491bca-e752-4b44-9c86-df5680533dbc
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects network connections via finger.exe, which can be abused by threat actors to retrieve remote commands for execution on Windows devices.
    In one ClickFix malware campaign, adversaries leveraged the finger protocol to fetch commands from a remote server.
    Since the finger utility is not commonly used in modern Windows environments, its presence already raises suspicion.
    Investigating such network connections can also help identify potential malicious infrastructure used by threat actors
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/decades-old-finger-protocol-abused-in-clickfix-malware-attacks/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-19
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        Image|endswith: '\finger.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: DNS Query by Finger Utility
id: c082c2b0-525b-4dbc-9a26-a57dc4692074
related:
    - id: 2fdaf50b-9fd5-449f-ba69-f17248119af6
      type: similar
    - id: af491bca-e752-4b44-9c86-df5680533dbc
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects DNS queries made by the finger utility, which can be abused by threat actors to retrieve remote commands for execution on Windows devices.
    In one ClickFix malware campaign, adversaries leveraged the finger protocol to fetch commands from a remote server.
    Since the finger utility is not commonly used in modern Windows environments, its presence already raises suspicion.
    Investigating such DNS queries can also help identify potential malicious infrastructure used by threat actors for command and control (C2) communication.
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/decades-old-finger-protocol-abused-in-clickfix-malware-attacks/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-19
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: dns_query
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\finger.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious HWP Sub Processes
id: 023394c4-29d5-46ab-92b8-6a534c6f447b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (Hanword) sub processes that could indicate an exploitation
references:
    - https://www.securitynewspaper.com/2016/11/23/technical-teardown-exploit-malware-hwp-files/
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/search?query=context:74940dcc5b38f9f9b1a0fea760d344735d7d91b610e6d5bd34533dd0153402c5&from_sample=5db135000388385a7644131f&block_redirect=1
    - https://twitter.com/cyberwar_15/status/1187287262054076416
    - https://blog.alyac.co.kr/1901
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hangul_(word_processor)
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.g0032
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\Hwp.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\gbb.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - CrackMapExec Execution
id: 42a993dd-bb3e-48c8-b372-4d6684c4106c
status: test
description: This rule detect common flag combinations used by CrackMapExec in order to detect its use even if the binary has been replaced.
references:
    - https://mpgn.gitbook.io/crackmapexec/smb-protocol/authentication/checking-credentials-local
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/telegram-malware-iranian-espionage
    - https://www.infosecmatter.com/crackmapexec-module-library/?cmem=mssql-mimikatz
    - https://www.infosecmatter.com/crackmapexec-module-library/?cmem=smb-pe_inject
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-25
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1053
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1201
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_binary:
        Image|endswith: '\crackmapexec.exe'
    selection_special:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -M pe_inject '
    selection_execute:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' --local-auth'
            - ' -u '
            - ' -x '
    selection_hash:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' --local-auth'
            - ' -u '
            - ' -p '
            - " -H 'NTHASH'"
    selection_module_mssql:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' mssql '
            - ' -u '
            - ' -p '
            - ' -M '
            - ' -d '
    selection_module_smb1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' smb '
            - ' -u '
            - ' -H '
            - ' -M '
            - ' -o '
    selection_module_smb2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' smb '
            - ' -u '
            - ' -p '
            - ' --local-auth'
    part_localauth_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' --local-auth'
            - ' -u '
            - ' -p '
    part_localauth_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' 10.'
            - ' 192.168.'
            - '/24 '
    condition: 1 of selection_* or all of part_localauth*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious HH.EXE Execution
id: e8a95b5e-c891-46e2-b33a-93937d3abc31
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious execution of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
references:
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/chm-badness-delivers-a-banking-trojan/
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-27939090904026cc396b0b629c8e4314acd6f5dac40a676edbc87f4567b47eb7
    - https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/unintentional-leak-glimpse-attack-vectors-apt37
author: Maxim Pavlunin
date: 2020-04-01
modified: 2023-04-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1218.001
    - attack.t1218.010
    - attack.t1218.011
    - attack.t1566
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'HH.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\hh.exe'
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.application'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Content.Outlook\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            # - '\AppData\Local\Temp\Temp?_'
            # - '\AppData\Local\Temp\Rar$'
            # - '\AppData\Local\Temp\7z'
            # - '\AppData\Local\Temp\wz'
            # - '\AppData\Local\Temp\peazip-tmp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - Koadic Execution
id: 5cddf373-ef00-4112-ad72-960ac29bac34
status: test
description: Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool
references:
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/
    - https://github.com/offsecginger/koadic/blob/457f9a3ff394c989cdb4c599ab90eb34fb2c762c/data/stager/js/stdlib.js
    - https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/
author: wagga, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2020-01-12
modified: 2023-02-11
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/q'
            - '/c'
            - 'chcp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Operator Bloopers Cobalt Strike Modules
id: 4f154fb6-27d1-4813-a759-78b93e0b9c48
related:
    - id: 647c7b9e-d784-4fda-b9a0-45c565a7b729
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects Cobalt Strike module/commands accidentally entered in CMD shell
references:
    - https://hstechdocs.helpsystems.com/manuals/cobaltstrike/current/userguide/content/cobalt-4-5-user-guide.pdf
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/04/bazarloader-and-the-conti-leaks/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/16/sans-ransomware-summit-2022-can-you-detect-this/
author: _pete_0, TheDFIRReport
date: 2022-05-06
modified: 2023-01-30
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Invoke-UserHunter'
            - 'Invoke-ShareFinder'
            - 'Invoke-Kerberoast'
            - 'Invoke-SMBAutoBrute'
            - 'Invoke-Nightmare'
            - 'zerologon'
            - 'av_query'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Execution
id: 95022b85-ff2a-49fa-939a-d7b8f56eeb9b
status: test
description: Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook a automated breach emulations utility
references:
    - https://redmimicry.com/posts/redmimicry-winnti/
author: Alexander Rausch
date: 2020-06-24
modified: 2023-03-01
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1218.011
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'gthread-3.6.dll'
            - '\Windows\Temp\tmp.bat'
            - 'sigcmm-2.4.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Operator Bloopers Cobalt Strike Commands
id: 647c7b9e-d784-4fda-b9a0-45c565a7b729
related:
    - id: 4f154fb6-27d1-4813-a759-78b93e0b9c48
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects use of Cobalt Strike commands accidentally entered in the CMD shell
references:
    - https://hstechdocs.helpsystems.com/manuals/cobaltstrike/current/userguide/content/cobalt-4-5-user-guide.pdf
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/04/bazarloader-and-the-conti-leaks/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/16/sans-ransomware-summit-2022-can-you-detect-this/
author: _pete_0, TheDFIRReport
date: 2022-05-06
modified: 2023-01-30
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
    - stp.1u
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|startswith:
            - 'cmd '
            - 'cmd.exe'
            - 'c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'psinject'
            - 'spawnas'
            - 'make_token'
            - 'remote-exec'
            - 'rev2self'
            - 'dcsync'
            - 'logonpasswords'
            - 'execute-assembly'
            - 'getsystem'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HTML Help HH.EXE Suspicious Child Process
id: 52cad028-0ff0-4854-8f67-d25dfcbc78b4
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious child process of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
references:
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/chm-badness-delivers-a-banking-trojan/
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-27939090904026cc396b0b629c8e4314acd6f5dac40a676edbc87f4567b47eb7
    - https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/unintentional-leak-glimpse-attack-vectors-apt37
author: Maxim Pavlunin, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-04-01
modified: 2023-04-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1218.001
    - attack.t1218.010
    - attack.t1218.011
    - attack.t1566
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\hh.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\CertReq.exe'
            - '\CertUtil.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\installutil.exe'
            - '\MSbuild.exe'
            - '\MSHTA.EXE'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - CrackMapExec Execution Patterns
id: 058f4380-962d-40a5-afce-50207d36d7e2
status: stable
description: Detects various execution patterns of the CrackMapExec pentesting framework
references:
    - https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2023-11-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1053
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.s0106
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # cme/protocols/smb/wmiexec.py (generalized execute_remote and execute_fileless)
            - 'cmd.exe /Q /c * 1> \\\\*\\*\\* 2>&1'
            # cme/protocols/smb/atexec.py:109 (fileless output via share)
            - 'cmd.exe /C * > \\\\*\\*\\* 2>&1'
            # cme/protocols/smb/atexec.py:111 (fileless output via share)
            - 'cmd.exe /C * > *\\Temp\\* 2>&1'
            # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/d8c50c8cbaf36c29329078662473f75e440978d2/cme/helpers/powershell.py#L136 (PowerShell execution with obfuscation)
            - 'powershell.exe -exec bypass -noni -nop -w 1 -C "'
            # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/d8c50c8cbaf36c29329078662473f75e440978d2/cme/helpers/powershell.py#L160 (PowerShell execution without obfuscation)
            - 'powershell.exe -noni -nop -w 1 -enc '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Conhost.exe CommandLine Path Traversal
id: ee5e119b-1f75-4b34-add8-3be976961e39
status: test
description: detects the usage of path traversal in conhost.exe indicating possible command/argument confusion/hijacking
references:
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/06/indirect-command-execution/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentCommandLine|contains: 'conhost'
        CommandLine|contains: '/../../'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential CommandLine Path Traversal Via Cmd.EXE
id: 087790e3-3287-436c-bccf-cbd0184a7db1
status: test
description: Detects potential path traversal attempt via cmd.exe. Could indicate possible command/argument confusion/hijacking
references:
    - https://hackingiscool.pl/cmdhijack-command-argument-confusion-with-path-traversal-in-cmd-exe/
    - https://twitter.com/Oddvarmoe/status/1270633613449723905
author: xknow @xknow_infosec, Tim Shelton
date: 2020-06-11
modified: 2023-03-06
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - ParentImage|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'cmd.exe'
    selection_flags:
        - ParentCommandLine|contains:
              - '/c'
              - '/k'
              - '/r'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '/c'
              - '/k'
              - '/r'
    selection_path_traversal:
        - ParentCommandLine: '/../../'
        - CommandLine|contains: '/../../'
    filter_java:
        CommandLine|contains: '\Tasktop\keycloak\bin\/../../jre\bin\java'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Java tools are known to produce false-positive when loading libraries
level: high

title: Suspicious Scripting in a WMI Consumer
id: fe21810c-2a8c-478f-8dd3-5a287fb2a0e0
status: test
description: Detects suspicious commands that are related to scripting/powershell in WMI Event Consumers
references:
    - https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/615bf1f6bac3c1bdc417025c40c073e6c2771a76/yara/gen_susp_lnk_files.yar#L19
    - https://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/LiquidSnake
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro
date: 2019-04-15
modified: 2023-09-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: wmi_event
detection:
    selection_destination:
        - Destination|contains|all:
              - 'new-object'
              - 'net.webclient'
              - '.downloadstring'
        - Destination|contains|all:
              - 'new-object'
              - 'net.webclient'
              - '.downloadfile'
        - Destination|contains:
              - ' iex('
              - ' -nop '
              - ' -noprofile '
              - ' -decode '
              - ' -enc '
              - 'WScript.Shell'
              - 'System.Security.Cryptography.FromBase64Transform'
    condition: selection_destination
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative scripts
level: high

title: HackTool - NetExec File Indicators
id: efc21479-9e83-41da-8cf1-122e06ba8db3
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects file creation events indicating NetExec (nxc.exe) execution on the local machine.
    NetExec is a PyInstaller-bundled binary that extracts its embedded data files to a "_MEI<random>" directory
    under the Temp folder upon execution. Files dropped under the "\nxc\" sub-directory of that
    extraction path are unique to NetExec and serve as reliable on-disk indicators of execution.
    NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation and lateral movement tool used for
    Active Directory enumeration, credential harvesting, and remote code execution.
references:
    - https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec
    - https://www.netexec.wiki/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-04-08
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1059.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|contains: '\nxc-windows-latest\'
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - '\Temp\_MEI'
              - '\nxc\data\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_hktl_netexec_file_indicators/info.yml

title: Adwind RAT / JRAT File Artifact
id: 0bcfabcb-7929-47f4-93d6-b33fb67d34d1
related:
    - id: 1fac1481-2dbc-48b2-9096-753c49b4ec71
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects javaw.exe in AppData folder as used by Adwind / JRAT
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ba86fa0d4b6af2db0656a88b1dd29f36fe362473ae8ad04255c4e52f214a541c?environmentId=100
    - https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom Ueltschi, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2017-11-10
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - '\AppData\Roaming\Oracle\bin\java'
              - '.exe'
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - '\Retrive'
              - '.vbs'
    condition: selection
level: high

title: WScript or CScript Dropper - File
id: 002bdb95-0cf1-46a6-9e08-d38c128a6127
related:
    - id: cea72823-df4d-4567-950c-0b579eaf0846
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a file ending in jse, vbe, js, vba, vbs, wsf, wsh written by cscript.exe or wscript.exe
references:
    - WScript or CScript Dropper (cea72823-df4d-4567-950c-0b579eaf0846)
author: Tim Shelton
date: 2022-01-10
modified: 2026-02-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Tmp\'
            - ':\Users\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\Temp'
            - '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.js'
            - '.jse'
            - '.vba'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - CACTUSTORCH Remote Thread Creation
id: 2e4e488a-6164-4811-9ea1-f960c7359c40
status: test
description: Detects remote thread creation from CACTUSTORCH as described in references.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1090588499517079552 # Deleted
    - https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/CACTUSTORCH
author: '@SBousseaden (detection), Thomas Patzke (rule)'
date: 2019-02-01
modified: 2023-05-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055.012
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.t1218.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: create_remote_thread
detection:
    selection:
        SourceImage|endswith:
            - '\System32\cscript.exe'
            - '\System32\wscript.exe'
            - '\System32\mshta.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
            - '\excel.exe'
        TargetImage|contains: '\SysWOW64\'
        StartModule: null
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process Of BgInfo.EXE
id: 811f459f-9231-45d4-959a-0266c6311987
related:
    - id: aaf46cdc-934e-4284-b329-34aa701e3771
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of "BgInfo.exe" which could be a sign of potential abuse of the binary to proxy execution via external VBScript
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Bginfo/
    - https://oddvar.moe/2017/05/18/bypassing-application-whitelisting-with-bginfo/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-16
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\bginfo.exe'
            - '\bginfo64.exe'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\calc.exe'
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\notepad.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - Image|contains:
              - '\AppData\Local\'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\'
              - ':\Users\Public\'
              - ':\Temp\'
              - ':\Windows\Temp\'
              - ':\PerfLogs\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Cscript/Wscript Uncommon Script Extension Execution
id: 99b7460d-c9f1-40d7-a316-1f36f61d52ee
status: test
description: Detects Wscript/Cscript executing a file with an uncommon (i.e. non-script) extension
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-15
modified: 2023-06-19
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'wscript.exe'
              - 'cscript.exe'
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\wscript.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
    selection_extension:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: add additional potential suspicious extension
            # We could specify the "//E:" flag to avoid typos by admin. But since that's prone to blind spots via the creation of assoc it's better not to include it
            - '.csv'
            - '.dat'
            - '.doc'
            - '.gif'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.png'
            - '.ppt'
            - '.txt'
            - '.xls'
            - '.xml'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Reconnaissance Activity Via GatherNetworkInfo.VBS
id: 07aa184a-870d-413d-893a-157f317f6f58
related:
    - id: f92a6f1e-a512-4a15-9735-da09e78d7273 # FileCreate
      type: similar
    - id: 575dce0c-8139-4e30-9295-1ee75969f7fe # ProcCreation LOLBIN
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of the built-in script located in "C:\Windows\System32\gatherNetworkInfo.vbs". Which can be used to gather information about the target machine
references:
    - https://posts.slayerlabs.com/living-off-the-land/#gathernetworkinfovbs
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/trojanized-windows-installers-ukrainian-government
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1615
    - attack.t1059.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: 'gatherNetworkInfo.vbs'
    filter:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Csc.EXE Execution Form Potentially Suspicious Parent
id: b730a276-6b63-41b8-bcf8-55930c8fc6ee
status: test
description: Detects a potentially suspicious parent of "csc.exe", which could be a sign of payload delivery.
references:
    - https://www.uptycs.com/blog/warzonerat-can-now-evade-with-process-hollowing
    - https://reaqta.com/2017/11/short-journey-darkvnc/
    - https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cybersecurity/cyber-threat-intelligence/yellow-liderc-ships-its-scripts-delivers-imaploader-malware.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-02-11
modified: 2026-03-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.t1218.005
    - attack.t1027.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\csc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'csc.exe'
    selection_parent_generic:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\excel.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\onenote.exe'
            - '\outlook.exe'
            - '\powerpnt.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    selection_parent_powershell:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            - '-Encoded '
            - 'FromBase64String'
    selection_parent_susp_location:
        - ParentCommandLine|re: '(?:[Pp]rogram[Dd]ata|%(?:[Ll]ocal)?[Aa]pp[Dd]ata%|\\[Aa]pp[Dd]ata\\(?:[Ll]ocal(?:[Ll]ow)?|[Rr]oaming))\\[^\\]{1,256}$'
        - ParentCommandLine|contains:
              - ':\PerfLogs\'
              - ':\Users\Public\'
              - ':\Windows\Temp\'
              - '\Temporary Internet'
        - ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favorites\'
        - ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favourites\'
        - ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Contacts\'
        - ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Pictures\'
    filter_main_programfiles:
        # Note: this is a generic filter. You could baseline execution in your env for a more robust rule
        ParentImage|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\' # https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1206874118282448897
            - 'C:\Program Files\' # https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1206874118282448897
    filter_main_sdiagnhost:
        ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe' # https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1206874118282448897
    filter_main_w3p:
        ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe' # https://twitter.com/gabriele_pippi/status/1206907900268072962
    filter_optional_chocolatey:
        ParentImage: 'C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\choco.exe' # Chocolatey https://chocolatey.org/
    filter_optional_defender:
        ParentCommandLine|contains: '\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection'
    filter_optional_ansible:
        # Note: As ansible is widely used we exclude it with this generic filter.
        # A better option would be to filter based on script content basis or other marker while hunting
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            # '{"failed":true,"msg":"Ansible requires PowerShell v3.0 or newer"}'
            - 'JwB7ACIAZgBhAGkAbABlAGQAIgA6AHQAcgB1AGUALAAiAG0AcwBnACIAOgAiAEEAbgBzAGkAYgBsAGUAIAByAGUAcQB1AGkAcgBlAHMAIABQAG8AdwBlAHIAUwBoAGUAbABsACAAdgAzAC4AMAAgAG8AcgAgAG4AZQB3AGUAcgAiAH0AJw'
            - 'cAewAiAGYAYQBpAGwAZQBkACIAOgB0AHIAdQBlACwAIgBtAHMAZwAiADoAIgBBAG4AcwBpAGIAbABlACAAcgBlAHEAdQBpAHIAZQBzACAAUABvAHcAZQByAFMAaABlAGwAbAAgAHYAMwAuADAAIABvAHIAIABuAGUAdwBlAHIAIgB9ACcA'
            - 'nAHsAIgBmAGEAaQBsAGUAZAAiADoAdAByAHUAZQAsACIAbQBzAGcAIgA6ACIAQQBuAHMAaQBiAGwAZQAgAHIAZQBxAHUAaQByAGUAcwAgAFAAbwB3AGUAcgBTAGgAZQBsAGwAIAB2ADMALgAwACAAbwByACAAbgBlAHcAZQByACIAfQAnA'
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_parent_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Shell/Scripting Processes Spawning Suspicious Programs
id: 3a6586ad-127a-4d3b-a677-1e6eacdf8fde
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of a Windows shell and scripting processes such as wscript, rundll32, powershell, mshta...etc.
references:
    - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton
date: 2018-04-06
modified: 2023-05-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            # - '\cmd.exe'  # too many false positives
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wmiprvse.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\nslookup.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
    filter_ccmcache:
        CurrentDirectory|contains: '\ccmcache\'
    filter_amazon:
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            # FP - Amazon Workspaces
            - '\Program Files\Amazon\WorkSpacesConfig\Scripts\setup-scheduledtask.ps1'
            - '\Program Files\Amazon\WorkSpacesConfig\Scripts\set-selfhealing.ps1'
            - '\Program Files\Amazon\WorkSpacesConfig\Scripts\check-workspacehealth.ps1'
            - '\nessus_' # Tenable/Nessus VA Scanner
    filter_nessus:
        CommandLine|contains: '\nessus_' # Tenable/Nessus VA Scanner
    filter_sccm_install:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\MEM_Configmgr_'
            - '\splash.hta'
            - '{1E460BD7-F1C3-4B2E-88BF-4E770A288AF5}'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\MEM_Configmgr_'
            - '\SMSSETUP\BIN\'
            - '\autorun.hta'
            - '{1E460BD7-F1C3-4B2E-88BF-4E770A288AF5}'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative scripts
    - Microsoft SCCM
level: high

title: Potential Remote SquiblyTwo Technique Execution
id: 8d63dadf-b91b-4187-87b6-34a1114577ea
related:
    - id: 06ce37c2-61ab-4f05-9ff5-b1a96d18ae32
      type: similar
    - id: 05c36dd6-79d6-4a9a-97da-3db20298ab2d
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential execution of the SquiblyTwo technique that leverages Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)
    to execute malicious code remotely. This technique bypasses application whitelisting by using wmic.exe to process
    malicious XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) scripts that can contain embedded JScript or VBScript.
    The attack typically works by fetching XSL content from a remote source (using HTTP/HTTPS) and executing it
    with full trust privileges directly in memory, avoiding disk-based detection mechanisms. This is a common
    LOLBin (Living Off The Land Binary) technique used for defense evasion and code execution.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20190209154607/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html
    - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/986280382042595328 # Deleted
    - https://atomicredteam.io/defense-evasion/T1220/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/
    - https://x.com/byrne_emmy12099/status/1932346420226658668
author: Markus Neis, Florian Roth, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2026-01-24
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1220
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pe:
        - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
        - Hashes|contains:  # Sysmon field hashes contains all types
              - 'IMPHASH=1B1A3F43BF37B5BFE60751F2EE2F326E'
              - 'IMPHASH=37777A96245A3C74EB217308F3546F4C'
              - 'IMPHASH=9D87C9D67CE724033C0B40CC4CA1B206'
              - 'IMPHASH=B12619881D79C3ACADF45E752A58554A'
              - 'IMPHASH=16A48C3CABF98A9DC1BF02C07FE1EA00'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '/format:'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '://'
            - '\\\\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Disable of ETW Trace - Powershell
id: 115fdba9-f017-42e6-84cf-d5573bf2ddf8
related:
    - id: a238b5d0-ce2d-4414-a676-7a531b3d13d6
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects usage of powershell cmdlets to disable or remove ETW trace sessions
references:
    - https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-28
modified: 2022-11-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1070
    - attack.t1685
    - car.2016-04-002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_pwsh_remove:   # Autologger provider removal
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Remove-EtwTraceProvider '
    selection_pwsh_set:   # Provider “Enable” property modification
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Set-EtwTraceProvider '
            - '0x11'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Clearing Windows Console History
id: bde47d4b-9987-405c-94c7-b080410e8ea7
status: test
description: Identifies when a user attempts to clear console history. An adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion.
references:
    - https://stefanos.cloud/blog/kb/how-to-clear-the-powershell-command-history/
    - https://www.shellhacks.com/clear-history-powershell/
    - https://community.sophos.com/sophos-labs/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-25
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070
    - attack.t1070.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection1:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: Clear-History
    selection2a:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - Remove-Item
            - rm
    selection2b:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - ConsoleHost_history.txt
            - (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath
    condition: selection1 or selection2a and selection2b
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Exchange PowerShell Cmdlet History Deleted
id: a55349d8-9588-4c5a-8e3b-1925fe2a4ffe
status: test
description: Detects the deletion of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet History logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence
references:
    - https://m365internals.com/2022/10/07/hunting-in-on-premises-exchange-server-logs/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-26
modified: 2022-12-30
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070
logsource:
    category: file_delete
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith: '\Logging\CmdletInfra\LocalPowerShell\Cmdlet\'
        TargetFilename|contains: '_Cmdlet_'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Possible FP during log rotation
level: high

title: Fsutil Suspicious Invocation
id: add64136-62e5-48ea-807e-88638d02df1e
status: stable
description: |
  Detects suspicious parameters of fsutil (deleting USN journal, configuring it with small size, etc).
  Might be used by ransomwares during the attack (seen by NotPetya and others).
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-usn
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070/T1070.md
    - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/c91f422a-5214-4b17-8664-c5fcf115c0a2.html
    - https://github.com/albertzsigovits/malware-notes/blob/558898932c1579ff589290092a2c8febefc3a4c9/Ransomware/Lockbit.md
    - https://blog.cluster25.duskrise.com/2023/05/22/back-in-black-blackbyte-nt
author: Ecco, E.M. Anhaus, oscd.community
date: 2019-09-26
modified: 2023-09-09
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070
    - attack.t1485
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\fsutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'fsutil.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'deletejournal'        # usn deletejournal ==> generally ransomware or attacker
            - 'createjournal'        # usn createjournal ==> can modify config to set it to a tiny size
            - 'setZeroData'          # file setZeroData  ==> empties a file with zeroes
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Admin activity
    - Scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high

title: Shadow Copies Deletion Using Operating Systems Utilities
id: c947b146-0abc-4c87-9c64-b17e9d7274a2
status: stable
description: Shadow Copies deletion using operating systems utilities
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/wannacry.html
    - https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/new-teslacrypt-ransomware-arrives-via-spam/
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/why-everyone-should-disable-vssadmin-exe-now/
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa?environmentId=100
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine#the-process
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine/blob/20a569fa21625086433dcce8bb2765d0ea08dcb6/yara/gen_ransomware_command_lines.yar
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-october-2021/
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/blackbyte-exbyte-ransomware
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Michael Haag, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community, Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)
date: 2019-10-22
modified: 2022-11-03
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070
    - attack.t1490
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\wmic.exe'
              - '\vssadmin.exe'
              - '\diskshadow.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'wmic.exe'
              - 'VSSADMIN.EXE'
              - 'diskshadow.exe'
    selection1_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'shadow'  # will match "delete shadows" and "shadowcopy delete" and "shadowstorage"
            - 'delete'
    selection2_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wbadmin.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'WBADMIN.EXE'
    selection2_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'delete'
            - 'catalog'
            - 'quiet' # will match -quiet or /quiet
    selection3_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'VSSADMIN.EXE'
    selection3_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'resize'
            - 'shadowstorage'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'unbounded'
            - '/MaxSize='
    condition: (all of selection1*) or (all of selection2*) or (all of selection3*)
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Administrator deletes Shadow Copies using operating systems utilities for legitimate reason
    - LANDesk LDClient Ivanti-PSModule (PS EncodedCommand)
level: high

title: ETW Trace Evasion Activity
id: a238b5d0-ce2d-4414-a676-7a531b3d13d6
status: test
description: |
    Detects command line activity that tries to clear or disable any ETW trace log which could be a sign of logging evasion.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil
    - https://abuse.io/lockergoga.txt
    - https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
author: '@neu5ron, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community'
date: 2019-03-22
modified: 2022-06-28
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1070
    - attack.t1685
    - car.2016-04-002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_clear_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cl'
            - '/Trace'
    selection_clear_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'clear-log'
            - '/Trace'
    selection_disable_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'sl'
            - '/e:false'
    selection_disable_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'set-log'
            - '/e:false'
    selection_disable_3:   # ETW provider removal from a trace session
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'logman'
            - 'update'
            - 'trace'
            - '--p'
            - '-ets'
    selection_pwsh_remove:   # Autologger provider removal
        CommandLine|contains: 'Remove-EtwTraceProvider'
    selection_pwsh_set:   # Provider “Enable” property modification
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Set-EtwTraceProvider'
            - '0x11'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Sysmon Driver Unloaded Via Fltmc.EXE
id: 4d7cda18-1b12-4e52-b45c-d28653210df8
related:
    - id: 4931188c-178e-4ee7-a348-39e8a7a56821 # Generic
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects possible Sysmon filter driver unloaded via fltmc.exe
references:
    - https://www.darkoperator.com/blog/2018/10/5/operating-offensively-against-sysmon
author: Kirill Kiryanov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-23
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1070
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.t1685.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\fltMC.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'fltMC.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'unload'
            - 'sysmon'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Remove Exported Mailbox from Exchange Webserver
id: 09570ae5-889e-43ea-aac0-0e1221fb3d95
status: test
description: Detects removal of an exported Exchange mailbox which could be to cover tracks from ProxyShell exploit
references:
    - https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/1416b5776d963f21b7b5b45d19f3e961201e0aed/modules/exploits/windows/http/exchange_proxyshell_rce.rb#L430
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-27
modified: 2023-01-23
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070
logsource:
    service: msexchange-management
    product: windows
detection:
    keywords:
        '|all':
            - 'Remove-MailboxExportRequest'
            - ' -Identity '
            - ' -Confirm "False"'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Terminal Server Client Connection History Cleared - Registry
id: 07bdd2f5-9c58-4f38-aec8-e101bb79ef8d
status: test
description: Detects the deletion of registry keys containing the MSTSC connection history
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/remote/remove-entries-from-remote-desktop-connection-computer
    - http://woshub.com/how-to-clear-rdp-connections-history/
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/a/vice-society-ransomware-group-targets-manufacturing-companies.html
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-10-19
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1070
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_delete
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        EventType: DeleteValue
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default\MRU'
    selection2:
        EventType: DeleteKey
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers\'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - SILENTTRINITY Stager Execution
id: 03552375-cc2c-4883-bbe4-7958d5a980be
related:
    - id: 75c505b1-711d-4f68-a357-8c3fe37dbf2d # DLL Load
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects SILENTTRINITY stager use via PE metadata
references:
    - https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/SILENTTRINITY
author: Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-22
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Description|contains: 'st2stager'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: HackTool - SILENTTRINITY Stager DLL Load
id: 75c505b1-711d-4f68-a357-8c3fe37dbf2d
related:
    - id: 03552375-cc2c-4883-bbe4-7958d5a980be # Process Creation
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects SILENTTRINITY stager dll loading activity
references:
    - https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/SILENTTRINITY
author: Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-22
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Description|contains: 'st2stager'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Wannacry Killswitch Domain
id: 3eaf6218-3bed-4d8a-8707-274096f12a18
status: test
description: Detects wannacry killswitch domain dns queries
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/wannacry-ransomware-campaign
author: Mike Wade
date: 2020-09-16
modified: 2022-03-24
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: dns
detection:
    selection:
        query:
            - 'ifferfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.testing'
            - 'ifferfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.test'
            - 'ifferfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com'
            - 'ayylmaotjhsstasdfasdfasdfasdfasdfasdfasdf.com'
            - 'iuqssfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Analyst testing
level: high

title: Outbound Network Connection Initiated By Microsoft Dialer
id: 37e4024a-6c80-4d8f-b95d-2e7e94f3a8d1
status: test
description: |
    Detects outbound network connection initiated by Microsoft Dialer.
    The Microsoft Dialer, also known as Phone Dialer, is a built-in utility application included in various versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. Its primary function is to provide users with a graphical interface for managing phone calls via a modem or a phone line connected to the computer.
    This is an outdated process in the current conext of it's usage and is a common target for info stealers for process injection, and is used to make C2 connections, common example is "Rhadamanthys"
references:
    - https://tria.ge/240301-rk34sagf5x/behavioral2
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/6720b85b-9c53-4a12-b1dc-73052a78477d
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/rhadamanthys-v0-5-0-a-deep-dive-into-the-stealers-components/
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/dialer.exe-0B69655F912619756C704A0BF716B61F.html
author: CertainlyP
date: 2024-04-26
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\dialer.exe'
        Initiated: 'true'
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - In Modern Windows systems, unable to see legitimate usage of this process, However, if an organization has legitimate purpose for this there can be false positives.
level: high

title: Renamed Visual Studio Code Tunnel Execution
id: 2cf29f11-e356-4f61-98c0-1bdb9393d6da
status: test
description: Detects renamed Visual Studio Code tunnel execution. Attackers can abuse this functionality to establish a C2 channel
references:
    - https://ipfyx.fr/post/visual-studio-code-tunnel/
    - https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/01/31/code_c2.html
    - https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/remote/tunnels
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-28
modified: 2025-10-29
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1219
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_image_only_tunnel:
        OriginalFileName: null
        CommandLine|endswith: '.exe tunnel'
    selection_image_tunnel_args:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '.exe tunnel'
            - '--accept-server-license-terms'
    selection_image_tunnel_service:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'tunnel '
            - 'service'
            - 'internal-run'
            - 'tunnel-service.log'
    selection_parent_tunnel:
        ParentCommandLine|endswith: ' tunnel'
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/d /c '
            - '\servers\Stable-'
            - 'code-server.cmd'
    filter_main_parent_code:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\code-tunnel.exe'
            - '\code.exe'
    filter_main_image_code:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\code-tunnel.exe'
            - '\code.exe'
    condition: (1 of selection_image_* and not 1 of filter_main_image_*) or (selection_parent_tunnel and not 1 of filter_main_parent_*)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Bitsadmin to Uncommon TLD
id: 9eb68894-7476-4cd6-8752-23b51f5883a7
status: test
description: Detects Bitsadmin connections to domains with uncommon TLDs
references:
    - https://twitter.com/jhencinski/status/1102695118455349248
    - https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Investigating+Microsoft+BITS+Activity/23281/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton
date: 2019-03-07
modified: 2023-05-17
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1197
    - attack.s0190
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-useragent|startswith: 'Microsoft BITS/'
    falsepositives:
        cs-host|endswith:
            - '.com'
            - '.net'
            - '.org'
            - '.scdn.co' # spotify streaming
            - '.sfx.ms' # Microsoft domain, example request: https://oneclient.sfx.ms/PreSignInSettings/Prod/2022-08-15-21-xx-xx/PreSignInSettingsConfig.json
    condition: selection and not falsepositives
falsepositives:
    - Rare programs that use Bitsadmin and update from regional TLDs e.g. .uk or .ca
level: high

title: Raw Paste Service Access
id: 5468045b-4fcc-4d1a-973c-c9c9578edacb
status: test
description: Detects direct access to raw pastes in different paste services often used by malware in their second stages to download malicious code in encrypted or encoded form
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/paste.ee/relations
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-12-05
modified: 2023-01-19
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1102.001
    - attack.t1102.003
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri|contains:
            - '.paste.ee/r/'
            - '.pastebin.com/raw/'
            - '.hastebin.com/raw/'
            - '.ghostbin.co/paste/*/raw/'
            - 'pastetext.net/'
            - 'pastebin.pl/'
            - 'paste.ee/'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - User activity (e.g. developer that shared and copied code snippets and used the raw link instead of just copy & paste)
level: high

title: Malware User Agent
id: 5c84856b-55a5-45f1-826f-13f37250cf4e
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent strings used by malware in proxy logs
references:
    - http://rules.emergingthreats.net/open/snort-2.9.0/rules/emerging-user_agents.rules
    - http://www.botopedia.org/search?searchword=scan&searchphrase=all
    - https://networkraptor.blogspot.com/2015/01/user-agent-strings.html
    - https://perishablepress.com/blacklist/ua-2013.txt
    - https://www.bluecoat.com/en-gb/security-blog/2015-05-05/know-your-agents
    - https://twitter.com/kladblokje_88/status/1614673320124743681?s=12&t=joEpeVa5d58aHYNGA_To7Q
    - https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FtYbfsDXoAQ1Y8M?format=jpg&name=large
    - https://twitter.com/crep1x/status/1635034100213112833
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-07-08
modified: 2024-04-14
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-useragent:
            # RATs
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:53.0) Gecko/20100101 Chrome /53.0' # DragonOK
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1)' # Used by PlugX - base-lining recommended - https://community.rsa.com/thread/185439
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0)' # Used by PlugX - base-lining recommended - https://community.rsa.com/thread/185439
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0; .NET CLR  1.1.4322)' # Used by PlugX - old - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/
            - 'HttpBrowser/1.0' # HTTPBrowser RAT
            - '*<|>*' # Houdini / Iniduoh / njRAT
            - 'nsis_inetc (mozilla)' # ZeroAccess
            - 'Wget/1.9+cvs-stable (Red Hat modified)' # Dyre / Upatre
            # Ghost419 https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/gold-dragon-widens-olympics-malware-attacks-gains-permanent-presence-on-victims-systems/
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)'
            # Malware
            - '*zeroup*' # W32/Renos.Downloader
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1 ; v.*' # Kazy
            - '* adlib/*'
            - '* tiny' # Trojan Downloader
            - '* BGroom *' # Trojan Downloader
            - '* changhuatong'
            - '* CholTBAgent'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 WinInet'
            - 'RookIE/1.0'
            - 'M' # HkMain
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0)' # Egamipload - old UA - probable prone to false positives
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible;MSIE 7.0;Windows NT 6.0)' # Yakes
            - 'backdoorbot'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.3) Gecko/20100401 Firefox/3.6.1 (.NET CLR 3.5.30731)' # Sality
            - 'Opera/8.81 (Windows NT 6.0; U; en)' # Sality
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.3) Gecko/20100401 Firefox/3.6.1 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729)' # Sality
            - 'Opera' # Trojan Keragany
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0; Windows 98)' # Fareit
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.01; Windows NT 5.0)' # Webshell's back connect
            - 'MSIE' # Toby web shell
            - '*(Charon; Inferno)' # Loki Bot
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/5.0)' # Fareit / Pony
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.1; Windows NT)' # https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/8abbef8e58f012d45a7cb46c3c2729dcd33cf53e721ff8c59e238862aa0a9e0e/detection
            - 'Mozilla/4.0(compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)' # MacControl malware https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d60f61f1f03a5011a0240694e110c6d370bf68a92753093186c6d14e26a15428/detection https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/osxmacontrol-back-it-again
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)' # used by Zebrocy malware https://app.any.run/tasks/7d7fa4a0-6970-4428-828b-29572abf9ceb/
            # Ursnif
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)'
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64)'
            # Emotet
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; Trident/7.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; InfoPath.3)' # https://twitter.com/webbthewombat/status/1225827092132179968
            # Lockbit (https://twitter.com/kladblokje_88/status/1614673320124743681?s=12&t=joEpeVa5d58aHYNGA_To7Q)
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1)'
            - 'AppleWebkit/587.38 (KHTML, like Gecko)'
            - 'Chrome/91.0.4472.77'
            - 'Safari/537.36'
            - 'Edge/91.0.864.37'
            - 'Firefox/89.0'
            - 'Gecko/20100101'
            # Others
            - '* pxyscand*'
            - '* asd'
            - '* mdms'
            - 'sample'
            - 'nocase'
            - 'Moxilla'
            - 'Win32 *'
            - '*Microsoft Internet Explorer*'
            - 'agent *'
            - 'AutoIt' # Suspicious - base-lining recommended
            - 'IczelionDownLoad'
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 10.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; Tablet PC 2.0)' # https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/thor-plugx-variant/
            - 'record' # https://blog.sekoia.io/raccoon-stealer-v2-part-1-the-return-of-the-dead/
            - 'mozzzzzzzzzzz' # https://blog.sekoia.io/raccoon-stealer-v2-part-1-the-return-of-the-dead/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:76.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/76.0' # Quasar RAT UA https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1559994820692672519?s=20&t=g3tkNL09dZZWbFN10qDVjg
            - 'Havana/0.1' # https://www.cybereason.com/blog/threat-alert-havanacrypt-ransomware-masquerading-as-google-update
            - 'antSword/v2.1' # AntSword Webshell UA
            - 'rqwrwqrqwrqw'  # Racoon Stealer
            - 'qwrqrwrqwrqwr'  # Racoon Stealer
            - 'rc2.0/client'  # Racoon Stealer
            - 'TakeMyPainBack'  # Racoon Stealer
            - 'xxx' # Racoon Stealer
            - '20112211' # Racoon Stealer
            - '23591' # Racoon Stealer
            - '901785252112' # Racoon Stealer
            - '1235125521512' # Racoon Stealer
            - '125122112551' # Racoon Stealer
            - 'B1D3N_RIM_MY_ASS' # Racoon Stealer
            - 'AYAYAYAY1337' # Racoon Stealer
            - 'iMightJustPayMySelfForAFeature' # Racoon Stealer
            - 'ForAFeature' # Racoon Stealer
            - 'Ares_ldr_v_*' # AresLoader
            # - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:106.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/106' # seen used by AresLoader
            - 'Microsoft Internet Explorer' # https://github.com/silence-is-best/c2db
            - 'CLCTR' # https://github.com/silence-is-best/c2db
            - 'uploader' # https://github.com/silence-is-best/c2db
            - 'agent' # https://github.com/silence-is-best/c2db
            - 'License' # https://github.com/silence-is-best/c2db
            - 'vb wininet' # https://github.com/silence-is-best/c2db
            - 'Client' # https://github.com/silence-is-best/c2db
            - 'Lilith-Bot/3.0' # Lilith Stealer - https://twitter.com/suyog41/status/1558051450797690880
            - 'svc/1.0' # SVC Loader - https://twitter.com/suyog41/status/1558051450797690880
            - 'WSHRAT' # WSHRAT - https://twitter.com/suyog41/status/1558051450797690880
            - 'ZeroStresser Botnet/1.5' # Zerobot - https://twitter.com/suyog41/status/1558051450797690880
            - 'OK' # Nymaim - https://twitter.com/suyog41/status/1558051450797690880
            - 'Project1sqlite' # DarkCloud - https://twitter.com/suyog41/status/1558051450797690880
            - 'Project1' # DarkCloud - https://twitter.com/suyog41/status/1558051450797690880
            - 'DuckTales' # Racoon Stealer
            - 'Zadanie' # Racoon Stealer
            - 'GunnaWunnaBlueTips' # Racoon Stealer
            - 'Xlmst' # Racoon Stealer
            - 'GeekingToTheMoon' # Racoon Stealer
            - 'SunShineMoonLight' # Racoon Stealer
            - 'BunnyRequester' # BunnyStealer
            - 'BunnyTasks' # BunnyStealer
            - 'BunnyStealer' # BunnyStealer
            - 'BunnyLoader_Dropper' # BunnyStealer
            - 'BunnyLoader' # BunnyStealer
            - 'BunnyShell' # BunnyStealer
            - 'SPARK-COMMIT' # SparkRAT - https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/tellmethetruth-exploitation-of-cve-2023-46604-leading-to-ransomware/
            - '4B4DB4B3' # B4B3RAT - https://twitter.com/naumovax/status/1718956514491130301
            - 'SouthSide' # Racoon Stealer
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; Tob 1.1)' # Latrodectus loader
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - Empire UserAgent URI Combo
id: b923f7d6-ac89-4a50-a71a-89fb846b4aa8
status: test
description: Detects user agent and URI paths used by empire agents
references:
    - https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-07-13
modified: 2024-02-26
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-useragent: 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko'
        cs-uri:
            - '/admin/get.php'
            - '/news.php'
            - '/login/process.php'
        cs-method: 'POST'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Valid requests with this exact user agent to server scripts of the defined names
level: high

title: APT User Agent
id: 6ec820f2-e963-4801-9127-d8b2dce4d31b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent strings used in APT malware in proxy logs
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis
date: 2019-11-12
modified: 2024-02-15
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-useragent:
         # APT Related
            - 'SJZJ (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Win32)' # APT Backspace
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/20.0' # APT GrizzlySteppe - ChopStick - US CERT https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2017/02/10/enhanced-analysis-grizzly-steppe
            - 'User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; SLCC' # Comment Crew Miniasp
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.4; Win32;32-bit)' # Comment Crew Miniasp
            - 'webclient' # Naikon APT
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; zh-EN; rv:1.7.12) Gecko/200' # Naikon APT
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI 6.0;' # SnowGlobe Babar - yes, it is cut
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:28.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/28.0' # Sofacy - Xtunnel
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/' # Sofacy - Xtunnel
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/2' # Sofacy - Xtunnel
            - 'Mozilla/4.0' # Derusbi backdoor ELF https://github.com/fideliscyber/indicators/tree/master/FTA-1021
            - 'Netscape' # Unit78020 Malware
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; zh-EN; rv:1.7.12) Gecko/20100719 Firefox/1.0.7' # Unit78020 Malware
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Firefox/3.6.13 GTB7.1' # Winnti related
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/5.0)' # Winnti related
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NETCLR 2.0.50727)' # APT17
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.0; SV1)' # Bronze Butler - Daserf
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 11.0; Windows NT 6.1; SV1)' # Bronze Butler - Daserf
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Win32)' # TSCookie https://app.any.run/tasks/0996b314-5133-491b-8d23-d431ffdec597
            - 'Mozilla v5.1 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:6.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/6.0.1' # Delphi downloader https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/04/24/sednit-update-analysis-zebrocy/
            - 'Mozilla/6.1 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 5.3; Trident/5.0)' # VPNFilter https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/05/VPNFilter.html
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; InfoPath.1)' # Sofacy User-Agent https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) WinHttp/1.6.3.8 (WinHTTP/5.1) like Gecko' # Sofacy User-Agent https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/
            - 'Mozilla v5.1 *' # Sofacy Zebrocy samples
            - 'MSIE 8.0' # Sofacy Azzy Backdoor  from https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/a80e29c0757bee05338fd5c22a542d852ad86c477068e3eb4aacc1c3e59e2eef?environmentId=100
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; InfoPath.2)' # https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/07/microsoft-office-vulnerabilities-used-to-distribute-felixroot-backdoor.html
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; RMS)' # Attacks on industrial enterprises using RMS and TeamViewer - https://securelist.com/attacks-on-industrial-enterprises-using-rms-and-teamviewer/87104/
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; DynGate)' # Attacks on industrial enterprises using RMS and TeamViewer - https://securelist.com/attacks-on-industrial-enterprises-using-rms-and-teamviewer/87104/
            - 'O/9.27 (W; U; Z)' # Cmstar https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/e4328011bb2b04abc856ccd04404c9f95d67167f6c291d343e8ffa8aa2aa2099/details
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.0; Trident/5.0;  Trident/5.0*' # KerrDown UA
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 9; *' # Suspicious 'Windows NT 9' user agent - used by APT33 malware in 2018
            - 'hots scot' # Unknown iOS zero-day implant https://twitter.com/craiu/status/1176437994288484352?s=20
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT)' # https://blog.telsy.com/meeting-powerband-the-apt33-net-powerton-variant/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) Chrome/28.0.1500.95 Safari/537.36' # Hidden Cobra malware
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; Win32; rv:47.0)' # Strong Pity loader https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1264185981118406657
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1;SV1;' # Mustang Panda https://insights.oem.avira.com/new-wave-of-plugx-targets-hong-kong/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:22.0) Firefox/22.0' # BackdoorDiplomacy https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/06/10/backdoordiplomacy-upgrading-quarian-turian/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 Chrome/72.0.3626.109 Safari/537.36' # SideWalk malware used by Sparkling Goblin
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:FTS_06) Gecko/22.36.35.06 Firefox/2.0' # LitePower stager used by WRITE https://securelist.com/wirtes-campaign-in-the-middle-east-living-off-the-land-since-at-least-2019/105044/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/102.0.5005.63 Safari/537.36 Edg/100.0.1185.39' # https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/29/zinc-weaponizing-open-source-software/
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; InfoPath.3; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)' # https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/29/zinc-weaponizing-open-source-software/
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 10.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; Tablet PC 2.0)' # PlugX backdoor https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/thor-plugx-variant/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/42.0.2311.135 Safari/537.36 Edge/12.246001'  # RedCurl Downloader APT https://www.facct.ru/blog/redcurl-2024
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Old browsers
level: high

title: Windows WebDAV User Agent
id: e09aed7a-09e0-4c9a-90dd-f0d52507347e
status: test
description: Detects WebDav DownloadCradle
references:
    - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-04-06
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-useragent|startswith: 'Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/'
        cs-method: 'GET'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrative scripts that download files from the Internet
    - Administrative scripts that retrieve certain website contents
    - Legitimate WebDAV administration
level: high

title: Exploit Framework User Agent
id: fdd1bfb5-f60b-4a35-910e-f36ed3d0b32f
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent strings used by exploit / pentest frameworks like Metasploit in proxy logs
references:
    - https://blog.didierstevens.com/2015/03/16/quickpost-metasploit-user-agent-strings/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-07-08
modified: 2025-01-18
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-useragent:
        # Cobalt Strike https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-malleable-c2
            - 'Internet Explorer *'
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; InfoPath.2)' # https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2016-06-28-cobalt-strike-http-c2-redirectors-with-apache-mod_rewrite/

        # Metasploit Framework - Analysis by Didier Stevens https://blog.didierstevens.com/2015/03/16/quickpost-metasploit-user-agent-strings/
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; Metasploit RSPEC)'
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.1; Windows NT)'
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)' # old browser, rare, base-lining needed
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)' # old browser, rare, base-lining needed
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.0; Trident/4.0)' # old browser, rare, base-lining needed
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; Trident/4.0; SIMBAR={7DB0F6DE-8DE7-4841-9084-28FA914B0F2E}; SLCC1; .N'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html)' # only use in proxy logs - not for detection in web server logs
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/525.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/4.0.221.6 Safari/525.13'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/5.0; MAAU)' # Payloads

        # Metasploit Update by Florian Roth 08.07.2017
            - 'Mozilla/5.0'
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; SPIPE/1.0'
        # - 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/6.0)'  # too many false positives expected
        # - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko'  # too many false positives expected
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; rv:39.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/35.0'
            - 'Sametime Community Agent' # Unknown if prone to false positives - https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/97095ab3113de2f046e64a64c461a1f888554401/modules/exploits/windows/http/steamcast_useragent.rb
            - 'X-FORWARDED-FOR'
            - 'DotDotPwn v2.1'
            - 'SIPDROID'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win32; x32; rv:60.0)' # CobaltStrike https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tracking-oceanlotus-new-downloader-kerrdown/

        # Empire
            - 'Mozilla/6.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20140205     Firefox/27.0 Iceweasel/25.3.0'

        # Exploits
            - '*wordpress hash grabber*'
            - '*exploit*'

        # Havoc
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/96.0.4664.110 Safari/537.36'  # https://github.com/HavocFramework/Havoc/issues/519
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high