Sigma rules for Wintego Systems
166 rules · scoped to actor · back to Wintego Systems
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.
title: Suspicious File Downloaded From File-Sharing Website Via Certutil.EXE
id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794
related:
- id: 19b08b1c-861d-4e75-a1ef-ea0c1baf202b # Direct IP download
type: similar
- id: 13e6fe51-d478-4c7e-b0f2-6da9b400a829 # Generic download
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of certutil with certain flags that allow the utility to download files from file-sharing websites.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil
- https://forensicitguy.github.io/agenttesla-vba-certutil-download/
- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/04/13/compromised-exchange-server-hosting-cryptojacker-targeting-other-exchange-servers/
- https://twitter.com/egre55/status/1087685529016193025
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certutil/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/17/new-ttps-observed-in-mint-sandstorm-campaign-targeting-high-profile-individuals-at-universities-and-research-orgs/
- https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/certutil-one-more-gui-lolbin
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-15
modified: 2025-12-10
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe'
selection_flags:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'urlcache '
- 'verifyctl '
- 'URL '
selection_http:
CommandLine|contains:
- '.githubusercontent.com' # Includes both gists and github repositories / Michael Haag (idea)
- 'anonfiles.com'
- 'cdn.discordapp.com'
- 'ddns.net'
- 'dl.dropboxusercontent.com'
- 'ghostbin.co'
- 'github.com'
- 'glitch.me'
- 'gofile.io'
- 'hastebin.com'
- 'mediafire.com'
- 'mega.nz'
- 'onrender.com'
- 'pages.dev'
- 'paste.ee'
- 'pastebin.com'
- 'pastebin.pl'
- 'pastetext.net'
- 'privatlab.com'
- 'privatlab.net'
- 'send.exploit.in'
- 'sendspace.com'
- 'storage.googleapis.com'
- 'storjshare.io'
- 'supabase.co'
- 'temp.sh'
- 'transfer.sh'
- 'trycloudflare.com'
- 'ufile.io'
- 'w3spaces.com'
- 'workers.dev'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_download_file_sharing_domains/info.yml
title: Suspicious SYSTEM User Process Creation
id: 2617e7ed-adb7-40ba-b0f3-8f9945fe6c09
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process creation as SYSTEM user (suspicious program or command line parameter)
references:
- Internal Research
- https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE (additional keywords)
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2025-10-19
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1134
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1027
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
IntegrityLevel:
- 'System'
- 'S-1-16-16384'
User|contains: # covers many language settings
- 'AUTHORI'
- 'AUTORI'
selection_special:
- Image|endswith:
- '\calc.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\forfiles.exe'
- '\hh.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\ping.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- CommandLine|re: 'net\s+user\s+'
- CommandLine|contains:
# - 'sc stop ' # stops a system service # causes FPs
- ' -NoP ' # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
- ' -W Hidden ' # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
- ' -decode ' # Used with certutil
- ' /decode ' # Used with certutil
- ' /urlcache ' # Used with certutil
- ' -urlcache ' # Used with certutil
- ' -e* JAB' # PowerShell encoded commands
- ' -e* SUVYI' # PowerShell encoded commands
- ' -e* SQBFAFgA' # PowerShell encoded commands
- ' -e* aWV4I' # PowerShell encoded commands
- ' -e* IAB' # PowerShell encoded commands
- ' -e* PAA' # PowerShell encoded commands
- ' -e* aQBlAHgA' # PowerShell encoded commands
- 'vssadmin delete shadows' # Ransomware
- 'reg SAVE HKLM' # save registry SAM - syskey extraction
- ' -ma ' # ProcDump
- 'Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run' # Run key in command line - often in combination with REG ADD
- '.downloadstring(' # PowerShell download command
- '.downloadfile(' # PowerShell download command
- ' /ticket:' # Rubeus
- 'dpapi::' # Mimikatz
- 'event::clear' # Mimikatz
- 'event::drop' # Mimikatz
- 'id::modify' # Mimikatz
- 'kerberos::' # Mimikatz
- 'lsadump::' # Mimikatz
- 'misc::' # Mimikatz
- 'privilege::' # Mimikatz
- 'rpc::' # Mimikatz
- 'sekurlsa::' # Mimikatz
- 'sid::' # Mimikatz
- 'token::' # Mimikatz
- 'vault::cred' # Mimikatz
- 'vault::list' # Mimikatz
- ' p::d ' # Mimikatz
- ';iex(' # PowerShell IEX
- 'MiniDump' # Process dumping method apart from procdump
filter_main_ping:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'ping'
- '127.0.0.1'
- ' -n '
filter_vs:
Image|endswith: '\PING.EXE'
ParentCommandLine|contains: '\DismFoDInstall.cmd'
filter_config_mgr:
ParentImage|contains: ':\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.GuestConfiguration.ConfigurationforWindows\'
filter_java:
ParentImage|contains:
- ':\Program Files (x86)\Java\'
- ':\Program Files\Java\'
ParentImage|endswith: '\bin\javaws.exe'
Image|contains:
- ':\Program Files (x86)\Java\'
- ':\Program Files\Java\'
Image|endswith: '\bin\jp2launcher.exe'
CommandLine|contains: ' -ma '
condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Administrative activity
- Scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
- Monitoring activity
level: high
title: Potential CommandLine Obfuscation Using Unicode Characters From Suspicious Image
id: 584bca0f-3608-4402-80fd-4075ff6072e3
related:
- id: e0552b19-5a83-4222-b141-b36184bb8d79
type: similar
- id: ad691d92-15f2-4181-9aa4-723c74f9ddc3 # RTLO
type: similar
- id: 2c0d2d7b-30d6-4d14-9751-7b9113042ab9
type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
Detects potential commandline obfuscation using unicode characters.
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit.
references:
- https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/windows-command-line-obfuscation
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027/T1027.md#atomic-test-6---dlp-evasion-via-sensitive-data-in-vba-macro-over-http
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Josh Nickels
date: 2024-09-02
modified: 2025-05-30
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\powershell_ise.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
OriginalFileName:
- 'Cmd.EXE'
- 'cscript.exe'
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
- 'wscript.exe'
selection_special_chars:
CommandLine|contains:
# spacing modifier letters that get auto-replaced
- 'ˣ' # 0x02E3
- '˪' # 0x02EA
- 'ˢ' # 0x02E2
# Forward slash alternatives
- '∕' # 0x22FF
- '⁄' # 0x206F
# Hyphen alternatives
- '―' # 0x2015
- '—' # 0x2014
# Whitespace that don't work as path separator
- ' ' # 0x00A0
# Other
- '¯'
- '®'
- '¶'
# Unicode whitespace characters
- '⠀' # Braille Pattern Blank (Unicode: U+2800)
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - Security
id: 4c54ba8f-73d2-4d40-8890-d9cf1dca3d30
related:
- id: 14bcba49-a428-42d9-b943-e2ce0f0f7ae6
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task27)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
# ServiceFileName|re: '(?i)&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\\"\s+?\-f.*&&.*cmd.*\/c' # FPs with |\/r
# Example 1: CMD /C"sET KUR=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&Set MxI=C:\wINDowS\sYsWow64\winDOWspoWERSheLl\V1.0\PowerShelL.EXe ${ExEcut`IoN`cON`TExT}.\"invo`kEcoMm`A`ND\".( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f 'pt','EscRi','INvOk' ).Invoke( ( .( \"{0}{1}\" -f'D','IR' ) ( \"{0}{1}\"-f'ENV:kU','R')).\"vAl`Ue\" )&& CMD /C%mXI%"
# Example 2: c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C "sEt DeJLz=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&set yBKM=PoWERShelL -noeX ^^^&(\"{2}{0}{1}\"-f '-ItE','m','seT') ( 'V' + 'a'+ 'RiAblE:z8J' +'U2' + 'l' ) ([TYpE]( \"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-f 'e','NT','e','NViRONM' ) ) ; ^^^& ( ( [sTrIng]${VE`Rbo`SepReFER`Ence})[1,3] + 'X'-joIN'')( ( (.('gI') ('V' + 'a' + 'RIAbLe:z8j' + 'u2' +'l' ) ).vALUe::( \"{2}{5}{0}{1}{6}{4}{3}\" -f 'IRo','Nm','GETE','ABlE','I','nv','enTVAr').Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'd','ejLz' ),( \"{1}{2}{0}\"-f'cEss','P','RO') )) )&& c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C %ybkm%"
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- '&&set'
- 'cmd'
- '/c'
- '-f'
ServiceFileName|contains:
- '{0}'
- '{1}'
- '{2}'
- '{3}'
- '{4}'
- '{5}'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Password Protected ZIP File Opened (Suspicious Filenames)
id: 54f0434b-726f-48a1-b2aa-067df14516e4
status: test
description: Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives with suspicious file names. See the filename variable for more details on which file has been opened.
references:
- https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1523383197513379841
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-09
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.t1105
- attack.t1036
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5379
TargetName|contains: 'Microsoft_Windows_Shell_ZipFolder:filename'
selection_filename:
TargetName|contains:
- 'invoice'
- 'new order'
- 'rechnung'
- 'factura'
- 'delivery'
- 'purchase'
- 'order'
- 'payment'
condition: selection and selection_filename
falsepositives:
- Legitimate used of encrypted ZIP files
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - Security
id: 1a0a2ff1-611b-4dac-8216-8a7b47c618a6
related:
- id: 63e3365d-4824-42d8-8b82-e56810fefa0c
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task29)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|contains: '(Clipboard|i'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - Security
id: 80b708f3-d034-40e4-a6c8-d23b7a7db3d1
related:
- id: 487c7524-f892-4054-b263-8a0ace63fc25
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task28)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- 'set'
- '&&'
ServiceFileName|contains:
- 'environment'
- 'invoke'
- '${input)'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - Security
id: fd0f5778-d3cb-4c9a-9695-66759d04702a
related:
- id: 51aa9387-1c53-4153-91cc-d73c59ae1ca9
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references
references:
- https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888
author: Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community
date: 2019-11-08
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection_eid:
EventID: 4697
selection_servicefilename:
- ServiceFileName|re: '\$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\['
- ServiceFileName|re: '\$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\['
- ServiceFileName|re: '\$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\['
- ServiceFileName|re: '\$env:ComSpec\[(\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}'
- ServiceFileName|re: '\\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name'
- ServiceFileName|re: '\$VerbosePreference\.ToString\('
- ServiceFileName|re: '\String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - Security
id: cd0f7229-d16f-42de-8fe3-fba365fbcb3a
related:
- id: 641a4bfb-c017-44f7-800c-2aee0184ce9b
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task30)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- '&&'
- 'rundll32'
- 'shell32.dll'
- 'shellexec_rundll'
ServiceFileName|contains:
- value
- invoke
- comspec
- iex
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - Security
id: 0c718a5e-4284-4fb9-b4d9-b9a50b3a1974
related:
- id: 72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 25)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- 'cmd'
- 'powershell'
selection2:
ServiceFileName|contains:
- '${input}'
- 'noexit'
selection3:
ServiceFileName|contains:
- ' /c '
- ' /r '
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Password Protected ZIP File Opened (Email Attachment)
id: 571498c8-908e-40b4-910b-d2369159a3da
status: test
description: Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives. See the filename variable for more details on which file has been opened.
references:
- https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1523383197513379841
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-09
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5379
TargetName|contains|all:
- 'Microsoft_Windows_Shell_ZipFolder:filename'
- '\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate used of encrypted ZIP files
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - Security
id: dcf2db1f-f091-425b-a821-c05875b8925a
related:
- id: 8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 24)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
# ServiceFileName|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r)(?:\s|)\"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*\"'
# Example 1: C:\winDoWs\SySTeM32\cmd.Exe /C"SET NOtI=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& PowERshElL -NOl SET-iteM ( 'VAR' + 'i'+ 'A' + 'blE:Ao6' + 'I0') ( [TYpe](\"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-F 'iRoN','mENT','e','nv') ) ; ${exECUtIONCOnTEXT}.\"IN`VO`KecOmMaND\".\"inVo`KES`crIPt\"( ( ( GEt-VAriAble ( 'a' + 'o6I0') -vaLU )::(\"{1}{4}{2}{3}{0}\" -f'e','gETenvIR','NtvaRIa','BL','ONme' ).Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'n','oti' ),( \"{0}{1}\" -f'pRoC','esS') )) )"
# Example 2: cMD.exe /C "seT SlDb=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& pOWErShell .(( ^&(\"{1}{0}{2}{3}\" -f 'eT-vaR','G','iab','lE' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f '*m','DR*' ) ).\"na`ME\"[3,11,2]-JOIN'' ) ( ( ^&(\"{0}{1}\" -f'g','CI' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f 'ENV',':SlDb' ) ).\"VA`luE\" ) "
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- 'cmd'
- '"set'
- '-f'
ServiceFileName|contains:
- '/c'
- '/r'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - Security
id: 4edf51e1-cb83-4e1a-bc39-800e396068e3
related:
- id: f7385ee2-0e0c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- 'cmd'
- '&&'
- 'clipboard]::'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - Security
id: 9b8d9203-4e0f-4cd9-bb06-4cc4ea6d0e9a
related:
- id: 7e9c7999-0f9b-4d4a-a6ed-af6d553d4af4
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task31)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- 'mshta'
- 'vbscript:createobject'
- '.run'
- 'window.close'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - System
id: f7385ee2-0e0c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2023-02-20
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
ImagePath|contains|all:
- 'cmd'
- '&&'
- 'clipboard]::'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - System
id: 641a4bfb-c017-44f7-800c-2aee0184ce9b
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task30)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
ImagePath|contains|all:
- '&&'
- 'rundll32'
- 'shell32.dll'
- 'shellexec_rundll'
ImagePath|contains:
- 'value'
- 'invoke'
- 'comspec'
- 'iex'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - System
id: 487c7524-f892-4054-b263-8a0ace63fc25
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task28)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
# ImagePath|re: '(?i)(set).*&&\s?set.*(environment|invoke|\${?input).*&&.*"'
ImagePath|contains|all:
- 'set'
- '&&'
ImagePath|contains:
- 'environment'
- 'invoke'
- 'input'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - System
id: 63e3365d-4824-42d8-8b82-e56810fefa0c
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task29)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
ImagePath|contains: '(Clipboard|i'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - System
id: 72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 25)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection_main:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
# ImagePath|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r).+powershell.+(?:\$\{?input\}?|noexit).+\"'
# Example 1: c:\windows\sYstEm32\CmD.eXE /C"echO\Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -NoEXiT -"
# Example 2: c:\WiNDOws\sysTEm32\cmd.EXe /C " ECHo Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -nol ${EXEcUtIONCONTeXT}.INvOkEComMANd.InvOKEScRIPt( $InpUt )"
ImagePath|contains|all:
- 'cmd'
- 'powershell'
ImagePath|contains:
- '/c'
- '/r'
selection_other:
- ImagePath|contains: 'noexit'
- ImagePath|contains|all:
- 'input'
- '$'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - System
id: 7e9c7999-0f9b-4d4a-a6ed-af6d553d4af4
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task31)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
ImagePath|contains|all:
- 'mshta'
- 'vbscript:createobject'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - System
id: 14bcba49-a428-42d9-b943-e2ce0f0f7ae6
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task27)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
# ImagePath|re: '(?i)&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\\"\s+?\-f.*&&.*cmd.*\/c' # FPs with |\/r
# Example 1: CMD /C"sET KUR=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&Set MxI=C:\wINDowS\sYsWow64\winDOWspoWERSheLl\V1.0\PowerShelL.EXe ${ExEcut`IoN`cON`TExT}.\"invo`kEcoMm`A`ND\".( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f 'pt','EscRi','INvOk' ).Invoke( ( .( \"{0}{1}\" -f'D','IR' ) ( \"{0}{1}\"-f'ENV:kU','R')).\"vAl`Ue\" )&& CMD /C%mXI%"
# Example 2: c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C "sEt DeJLz=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&set yBKM=PoWERShelL -noeX ^^^&(\"{2}{0}{1}\"-f '-ItE','m','seT') ( 'V' + 'a'+ 'RiAblE:z8J' +'U2' + 'l' ) ([TYpE]( \"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-f 'e','NT','e','NViRONM' ) ) ; ^^^& ( ( [sTrIng]${VE`Rbo`SepReFER`Ence})[1,3] + 'X'-joIN'')( ( (.('gI') ('V' + 'a' + 'RIAbLe:z8j' + 'u2' +'l' ) ).vALUe::( \"{2}{5}{0}{1}{6}{4}{3}\" -f 'IRo','Nm','GETE','ABlE','I','nv','enTVAr').Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'd','ejLz' ),( \"{1}{2}{0}\"-f'cEss','P','RO') )) )&& c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C %ybkm%"
ImagePath|contains|all:
- '&&set'
- 'cmd'
- '/c'
- '-f'
ImagePath|contains:
- '{0}'
- '{1}'
- '{2}'
- '{3}'
- '{4}'
- '{5}'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - System
id: 51aa9387-1c53-4153-91cc-d73c59ae1ca9
status: test
description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references
references:
- https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888
author: Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community
date: 2019-11-08
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection_eid:
EventID: 7045
selection_imagepath:
- ImagePath|re: '\$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\['
- ImagePath|re: '\$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\['
- ImagePath|re: '\$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\['
- ImagePath|re: '\$env:ComSpec\[(\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}'
- ImagePath|re: '\\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name'
- ImagePath|re: '\$VerbosePreference\.ToString\('
- ImagePath|re: '\String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - System
id: 8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 24)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
# ImagePath|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r)(?:\s|)\"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*\"'
# Example 1: C:\winDoWs\SySTeM32\cmd.Exe /C"SET NOtI=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& PowERshElL -NOl SET-iteM ( 'VAR' + 'i'+ 'A' + 'blE:Ao6' + 'I0') ( [TYpe](\"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-F 'iRoN','mENT','e','nv') ) ; ${exECUtIONCOnTEXT}.\"IN`VO`KecOmMaND\".\"inVo`KES`crIPt\"( ( ( GEt-VAriAble ( 'a' + 'o6I0') -vaLU )::(\"{1}{4}{2}{3}{0}\" -f'e','gETenvIR','NtvaRIa','BL','ONme' ).Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'n','oti' ),( \"{0}{1}\" -f'pRoC','esS') )) )"
# Example 2: cMD.exe /C "seT SlDb=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& pOWErShell .(( ^&(\"{1}{0}{2}{3}\" -f 'eT-vaR','G','iab','lE' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f '*m','DR*' ) ).\"na`ME\"[3,11,2]-JOIN'' ) ( ( ^&(\"{0}{1}\" -f'g','CI' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f 'ENV',':SlDb' ) ).\"VA`luE\" ) "
ImagePath|contains|all:
- 'cmd'
- '"set'
- '-f'
ImagePath|contains:
- '/c'
- '/r'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Password Spray Activity
id: 28ecba0a-c743-4690-ad29-9a8f6f25a6f9
status: test
description: Indicates that a password spray attack has been successfully performed.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#password-spray
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
- attack.t1110
- attack.credential-access
logsource:
product: azure
service: riskdetection
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'passwordSpray'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high
title: Potential MFA Bypass Using Legacy Client Authentication
id: 53bb4f7f-48a8-4475-ac30-5a82ddfdf6fc
status: test
description: Detects successful authentication from potential clients using legacy authentication via user agent strings. This could be a sign of MFA bypass using a password spray attack.
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20230217071802/https://blooteem.com/march-2022
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/10/26/protect-your-business-from-password-sprays-with-microsoft-dart-recommendations/
author: Harjot Singh, '@cyb3rjy0t'
date: 2023-03-20
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.credential-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078.004
- attack.t1110
logsource:
product: azure
service: signinlogs
detection:
selection:
Status: 'Success'
userAgent|contains:
- 'BAV2ROPC'
- 'CBAinPROD'
- 'CBAinTAR'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Known Legacy Accounts
level: high
title: Sign-in Failure Due to Conditional Access Requirements Not Met
id: b4a6d707-9430-4f5f-af68-0337f52d5c42
status: test
description: Define a baseline threshold for failed sign-ins due to Conditional Access failures
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-06-01
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.credential-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1110
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: azure
service: signinlogs
detection:
selection:
ResultType: 53003
Resultdescription: Blocked by Conditional Access
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Service Account misconfigured
- Misconfigured Systems
- Vulnerability Scanners
level: high
title: Use of Legacy Authentication Protocols
id: 60f6535a-760f-42a9-be3f-c9a0a025906e
status: test
description: Alert on when legacy authentication has been used on an account
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-06-17
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.credential-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078.004
- attack.t1110
logsource:
product: azure
service: signinlogs
detection:
selection:
ActivityDetails: Sign-ins
ClientApp:
- Other client
- IMAP
- POP3
- MAPI
- SMTP
- Exchange ActiveSync
- Exchange Web Services
Username: 'UPN'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- User has been put in acception group so they can use legacy authentication
level: high
title: HackTool - CrackMapExec Execution
id: 42a993dd-bb3e-48c8-b372-4d6684c4106c
status: test
description: This rule detect common flag combinations used by CrackMapExec in order to detect its use even if the binary has been replaced.
references:
- https://mpgn.gitbook.io/crackmapexec/smb-protocol/authentication/checking-credentials-local
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/telegram-malware-iranian-espionage
- https://www.infosecmatter.com/crackmapexec-module-library/?cmem=mssql-mimikatz
- https://www.infosecmatter.com/crackmapexec-module-library/?cmem=smb-pe_inject
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-25
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.credential-access
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1053
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1110
- attack.t1201
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_binary:
Image|endswith: '\crackmapexec.exe'
selection_special:
CommandLine|contains: ' -M pe_inject '
selection_execute:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' --local-auth'
- ' -u '
- ' -x '
selection_hash:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' --local-auth'
- ' -u '
- ' -p '
- " -H 'NTHASH'"
selection_module_mssql:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' mssql '
- ' -u '
- ' -p '
- ' -M '
- ' -d '
selection_module_smb1:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' smb '
- ' -u '
- ' -H '
- ' -M '
- ' -o '
selection_module_smb2:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' smb '
- ' -u '
- ' -p '
- ' --local-auth'
part_localauth_1:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' --local-auth'
- ' -u '
- ' -p '
part_localauth_2:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' 10.'
- ' 192.168.'
- '/24 '
condition: 1 of selection_* or all of part_localauth*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: HackTool - Hydra Password Bruteforce Execution
id: aaafa146-074c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects command line parameters used by Hydra password guessing hack tool
references:
- https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra
author: Vasiliy Burov
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1110
- attack.t1110.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-u '
- '-p '
CommandLine|contains:
- '^USER^'
- '^PASS^'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Software that uses the caret encased keywords PASS and USER in its command line
level: high
title: External Remote SMB Logon from Public IP
id: 78d5cab4-557e-454f-9fb9-a222bd0d5edc
related:
- id: 259a9cdf-c4dd-4fa2-b243-2269e5ab18a2
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects successful logon from public IP address via SMB. This can indicate a publicly-exposed SMB port.
references:
- https://www.inversecos.com/2020/04/successful-4624-anonymous-logons-to.html
- https://twitter.com/Purp1eW0lf/status/1616144561965002752
author: Micah Babinski (@micahbabinski), Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
date: 2023-01-19
modified: 2024-03-11
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.credential-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1133
- attack.t1078
- attack.t1110
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4624
LogonType: 3
filter_main_local_ranges:
IpAddress|cidr:
- '::1/128' # IPv6 loopback
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '127.0.0.0/8'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
- '169.254.0.0/16'
- 'fc00::/7' # IPv6 private addresses
- 'fe80::/10' # IPv6 link-local addresses
filter_main_empty:
IpAddress: '-'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate or intentional inbound connections from public IP addresses on the SMB port.
level: high
title: Hack Tool User Agent
id: c42a3073-30fb-48ae-8c99-c23ada84b103
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent strings user by hack tools in proxy logs
references:
- https://github.com/fastly/waf_testbed/blob/8bfc406551f3045e418cbaad7596cff8da331dfc/templates/default/scanners-user-agents.data.erb
- http://rules.emergingthreats.net/open/snort-2.9.0/rules/emerging-user_agents.rules
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-07-08
modified: 2022-07-07
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1190
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1110
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-useragent|contains:
# Vulnerability scanner and brute force tools
- '(hydra)'
- ' arachni/'
- ' BFAC '
- ' brutus '
- ' cgichk '
- 'core-project/1.0'
- ' crimscanner/'
- 'datacha0s'
- 'dirbuster'
- 'domino hunter'
- 'dotdotpwn'
- 'FHScan Core'
- 'floodgate'
- 'get-minimal'
- 'gootkit auto-rooter scanner'
- 'grendel-scan'
- ' inspath '
- 'internet ninja'
- 'jaascois'
- ' zmeu '
- 'masscan'
- ' metis '
- 'morfeus fucking scanner'
- 'n-stealth'
- 'nsauditor'
- 'pmafind'
- 'security scan'
- 'springenwerk'
- 'teh forest lobster'
- 'toata dragostea'
- ' vega/'
- 'voideye'
- 'webshag'
- 'webvulnscan'
- ' whcc/'
# SQL Injection
- ' Havij'
- 'absinthe'
- 'bsqlbf'
- 'mysqloit'
- 'pangolin'
- 'sql power injector'
- 'sqlmap'
- 'sqlninja'
- 'uil2pn'
# Hack tool
- 'ruler' # https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/using-outlook-forms-lateral-movement-persistence/
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; pt-PT; rv:1.9.1.2) Gecko/20090729 Firefox/3.5.2 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729)' # SQLi Dumper
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: HackTool - Hashcat Password Cracker Execution
id: 39b31e81-5f5f-4898-9c0e-2160cfc0f9bf
status: test
description: Execute Hashcat.exe with provided SAM file from registry of Windows and Password list to crack against
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1110.002/T1110.002.md#atomic-test-1---password-cracking-with-hashcat
- https://hashcat.net/wiki/doku.php?id=hashcat
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-27
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1110.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '\hashcat.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-a '
- '-m 1000 '
- '-r '
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Tools that use similar command line flags and values
level: high
title: OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via Windows Authentication
id: 6e78f90f-0043-4a01-ac41-f97681613a66
status: test
description: |
Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using Windows Authentication.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1213
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 9002
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: OpenCanary - MySQL Login Attempt
id: e7d79a1b-25ed-4956-bd56-bd344fa8fd06
status: test
description: Detects instances where a MySQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1213
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 8001
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via SQLAuth
id: 3ec9a16d-0b4f-4967-9542-ebf38ceac7dd
status: test
description: |
Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using SQLAuth.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1213
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 9001
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: OpenCanary - REDIS Action Command Attempt
id: 547dfc53-ebf6-4afe-8d2e-793d9574975d
status: test
description: Detects instances where a REDIS service on an OpenCanary node has had an action command attempted.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1213
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 17001
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: OpenCanary - GIT Clone Request
id: 4fe17521-aef3-4e6a-9d6b-4a7c8de155a8
status: test
description: Detects instances where a GIT service on an OpenCanary node has had Git Clone request.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1213
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 16001
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Bitbucket Full Data Export Triggered
id: 195e1b9d-bfc2-4ffa-ab4e-35aef69815f8
status: test
description: Detects when full data export is attempted.
references:
- https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/audit-log-events-776640423.html
- https://confluence.atlassian.com/adminjiraserver0811/importing-and-exporting-data-1019391889.html
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf)
date: 2024-02-25
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1213.003
logsource:
product: bitbucket
service: audit
definition: 'Requirements: "Advance" log level is required to receive these audit events.'
detection:
selection:
auditType.category: 'Data pipeline'
auditType.action: 'Full data export triggered'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate user activity.
level: high
title: Potential Okta Password in AlternateID Field
id: 91b76b84-8589-47aa-9605-c837583b82a9
status: test
description: |
Detects when a user has potentially entered their password into the
username field, which will cause the password to be retained in log files.
references:
- https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
- https://www.mitiga.io/blog/how-okta-passwords-can-be-compromised-uncovering-a-risk-to-user-data
- https://help.okta.com/en-us/Content/Topics/users-groups-profiles/usgp-create-character-restriction.htm
author: kelnage
date: 2023-04-03
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1552
logsource:
product: okta
service: okta
detection:
selection:
legacyEventType: 'core.user_auth.login_failed'
filter_main:
# Okta service account names start with 0oa
# Email addresses are the default format for Okta usernames, so attempt
# to exclude alternateIds that look like valid emails
# If your Okta configuration uses different character restrictions, you
# will need to update this regular expression to reflect that or disable the rule for your environment
# Possible false negatives are failed login attempts with a password that looks like a valid email address
actor.alternateId|re: '(^0oa.*|[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,10})'
condition: selection and not filter_main
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Application AppID Uri Configuration Changes
id: 1b45b0d1-773f-4f23-aedc-814b759563b1
status: test
description: Detects when a configuration change is made to an applications AppID URI.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#appid-uri-added-modified-or-removed
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-02
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.credential-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1552
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
properties.message:
- Update Application
- Update Service principal
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- When and administrator is making legitimate AppID URI configuration changes to an application. This should be a planned event.
level: high
title: Uncommon File Created by Notepad++ Updater Gup.EXE
id: 3b8f4c92-6a51-4d7e-9c3a-8e2d1f5a7b09
status: experimental
description: |
Detects when the Notepad++ updater (gup.exe) creates files in suspicious or uncommon locations.
This could indicate potential exploitation of the updater component to deliver unwanted malware or unwarranted files.
references:
- https://notepad-plus-plus.org/news/v889-released/
- https://www.heise.de/en/news/Notepad-updater-installed-malware-11109726.html
- https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-chrysalis-backdoor-dive-into-lotus-blossoms-toolkit/
- https://www.validin.com/blog/exploring_notepad_plus_plus_network_indicators/
- https://securelist.com/notepad-supply-chain-attack/118708/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-02-03
modified: 2026-03-16
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1195.002
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1557
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\gup.exe'
filter_main_legit_paths:
TargetFilename|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Notepad++\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Notepad++\'
filter_main_temp_update_installer:
TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
- 'npp.'
- '.Installer.'
- '.exe'
filter_main_temp_generic_zip:
TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
- '.zip'
filter_main_recycle_bin:
TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\$Recycle.Bin\S-1-5-21'
filter_main_plugins:
- TargetFilename|contains:
- '\plugins\JsonTools\testfiles\'
- '\Notepad++\plugins\ComparePlugin\'
- TargetFilename|contains|all:
- 'npp.'
- '.portable.'
- '\plugins\'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Custom or portable Notepad++ installations in non-standard directories.
- Legitimate update processes creating temporary files in unexpected locations.
level: high
title: Suspicious Child Process of Notepad++ Updater - GUP.Exe
id: bb0e87ce-c89f-4857-84fa-095e4483e9cb
status: experimental
description: |
Detects suspicious child process creation by the Notepad++ updater process (gup.exe).
This could indicate potential exploitation of the updater component to deliver unwanted malware.
references:
- https://notepad-plus-plus.org/news/v889-released/
- https://www.heise.de/en/news/Notepad-updater-installed-malware-11109726.html
- https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-chrysalis-backdoor-dive-into-lotus-blossoms-toolkit/
- https://www.validin.com/blog/exploring_notepad_plus_plus_network_indicators/
- https://securelist.com/notepad-supply-chain-attack/118708/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-02-03
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1195.002
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1557
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: '\gup.exe'
selection_child_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
selection_child_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'bitsadmin'
- 'certutil'
- 'curl'
- 'finger'
- 'forfiles'
- 'regsvr32'
- 'rundll32'
- 'wget'
condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_child_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: ADFS Database Named Pipe Connection By Uncommon Tool
id: 1ea13e8c-03ea-409b-877d-ce5c3d2c1cb3
status: test
description: |
Detects suspicious local connections via a named pipe to the AD FS configuration database (Windows Internal Database).
Used to access information such as the AD FS configuration settings which contains sensitive information used to sign SAML tokens.
references:
- https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/f99542b94afe0ad2f19a82cc08262e7ac8e1428e/Detections/SecurityEvent/ADFSDBNamedPipeConnection.yaml
- https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/
- https://github.com/Azure/SimuLand
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2021-10-08
modified: 2023-11-30
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1005
logsource:
product: windows
category: pipe_created
definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
selection:
PipeName: '\MICROSOFT##WID\tsql\query'
filter_main_generic:
Image|endswith:
- ':\Windows\System32\mmc.exe'
- ':\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
- ':\Windows\System32\wsmprovhost.exe'
- ':\Windows\SysWOW64\mmc.exe'
- ':\Windows\SysWOW64\wsmprovhost.exe'
- ':\Windows\WID\Binn\sqlwriter.exe'
- '\AzureADConnect.exe'
- '\Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe'
- '\Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe'
- '\Microsoft.Tri.Sensor.exe'
- '\sqlservr.exe'
- '\tssdis.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: Esentutl Steals Browser Information
id: 6a69f62d-ce75-4b57-8dce-6351eb55b362
status: test
description: One way Qbot steals sensitive information is by extracting browser data from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge by using the built-in utility esentutl.exe
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/
- https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/qbot/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/10/31/follina-exploit-leads-to-domain-compromise/
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-13
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1005
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\esentutl.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'esentutl.exe'
selection_flag:
CommandLine|contains|windash: '-r'
selection_webcache:
CommandLine|contains: '\Windows\WebCache'
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use
level: medium
title: Veeam Backup Database Suspicious Query
id: 696bfb54-227e-4602-ac5b-30d9d2053312
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious SQL queries using SQLCmd targeting the Veeam backup databases in order to steal information.
references:
- https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-04
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1005
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_sql:
Image|endswith: '\sqlcmd.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'VeeamBackup'
- 'From '
selection_db:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'BackupRepositories'
- 'Backups'
- 'Credentials'
- 'HostCreds'
- 'SmbFileShares'
- 'Ssh_creds'
- 'VSphereInfo'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: Crash Dump Created By Operating System
id: 882fbe50-d8d7-4e29-ae80-0648a8556866
related:
- id: 2ff692c2-4594-41ec-8fcb-46587de769e0
type: similar
status: experimental
description: Detects "BugCheck" errors indicating the system rebooted due to a crash, capturing the bugcheck code, dump file path, and report ID.
references:
- https://www.sans.edu/cyber-research/from-crash-compromise-unlocking-potential-windows-crash-dumps-offensive-security/
- https://jasonmull.com/articles/offensive/2025-05-12-windows-crash-dumps-offensive-security/
author: Jason Mull
date: 2025-05-12
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1003.002
- attack.t1005
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Microsoft-Windows-WER-SystemErrorReporting'
EventID: 1001
condition: selection
level: medium
title: Invoke-Obfuscation COMPRESS OBFUSCATION - PowerShell Module
id: 7034cbbb-cc55-4dc2-8dad-36c0b942e8f1
related:
- id: 20e5497e-331c-4cd5-8d36-935f6e2a9a07
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via COMPRESS OBFUSCATION
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 19)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-18
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_module
definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
selection_4103:
Payload|contains|all:
- 'new-object'
- 'text.encoding]::ascii'
Payload|contains:
- 'system.io.compression.deflatestream'
- 'system.io.streamreader'
Payload|endswith: 'readtoend'
condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: Invoke-Obfuscation RUNDLL LAUNCHER - PowerShell Module
id: a23791fe-8846-485a-b16b-ca691e1b03d4
related:
- id: e6cb92b4-b470-4eb8-8a9d-d63e8583aae0
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 23)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-18
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_module
definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
selection_4103:
Payload|contains|all:
- 'rundll32.exe'
- 'shell32.dll'
- 'shellexec_rundll'
- 'powershell'
condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: Invoke-Obfuscation RUNDLL LAUNCHER - PowerShell
id: e6cb92b4-b470-4eb8-8a9d-d63e8583aae0
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 23)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-18
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection_4104:
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'rundll32.exe'
- 'shell32.dll'
- 'shellexec_rundll'
- 'powershell'
condition: selection_4104
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: Invoke-Obfuscation COMPRESS OBFUSCATION - PowerShell
id: 20e5497e-331c-4cd5-8d36-935f6e2a9a07
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via COMPRESS OBFUSCATION
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 19)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-18
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection_4104:
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'new-object'
- 'text.encoding]::ascii'
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- 'system.io.compression.deflatestream'
- 'system.io.streamreader'
ScriptBlockText|endswith: 'readtoend'
condition: selection_4104
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium