title: Activity From Anonymous IP Address
id: be4d9c86-d702-4030-b52e-c7859110e5e8
status: test
description: Identifies that users were active from an IP address that has been identified as an anonymous proxy IP address.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#activity-from-anonymous-ip-address
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'riskyIPAddress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: Suspicious Browser Activity
id: 944f6adb-7a99-4c69-80c1-b712579e93e6
status: test
description: Indicates anomalous behavior based on suspicious sign-in activity across multiple tenants from different countries in the same browser
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#suspicious-browser
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'suspiciousBrowser'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: New Country
id: adf9f4d2-559e-4f5c-95be-c28dff0b1476
status: test
description: Detects sign-ins from new countries. The detection considers past activity locations to determine new and infrequent locations.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#new-country
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'newCountry'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: Unfamiliar Sign-In Properties
id: 128faeef-79dd-44ca-b43c-a9e236a60f49
status: test
description: Detects sign-in with properties that are unfamiliar to the user. The detection considers past sign-in history to look for anomalous sign-ins.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#unfamiliar-sign-in-properties
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'unfamiliarFeatures'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - User changing to a new device, location, browser, etc.
level: high

title: Atypical Travel
id: 1a41023f-1e70-4026-921a-4d9341a9038e
status: test
description: Identifies two sign-ins originating from geographically distant locations, where at least one of the locations may also be atypical for the user, given past behavior.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#atypical-travel
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'unlikelyTravel'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: Azure AD Threat Intelligence
id: a2cb56ff-4f46-437a-a0fa-ffa4d1303cba
status: test
description: Indicates user activity that is unusual for the user or consistent with known attack patterns.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#azure-ad-threat-intelligence-sign-in
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#azure-ad-threat-intelligence-user
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'investigationsThreatIntelligence'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: Impossible Travel
id: b2572bf9-e20a-4594-b528-40bde666525a
status: test
description: Identifies user activities originating from geographically distant locations within a time period shorter than the time it takes to travel from the first location to the second.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#impossible-travel
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'impossibleTravel'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Connecting to a VPN, performing activity and then dropping and performing additional activity.
level: high

title: Suspicious SignIns From A Non Registered Device
id: 572b12d4-9062-11ed-a1eb-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects risky authentication from a non AD registered device without MFA being required.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in
author: Harjot Singh, '@cyb3rjy0t'
date: 2023-01-10
modified: 2025-07-02
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection_main:
        Status: 'Success'
        AuthenticationRequirement: 'singleFactorAuthentication'
        RiskState: 'atRisk'
    selection_empty1:
        DeviceDetail.trusttype: ''
    selection_empty2:
        DeviceDetail.trusttype: null
    condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_empty*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Roles Assigned Outside PIM
id: b1bc08d1-8224-4758-a0e6-fbcfc98c73bb
status: test
description: Identifies when a privilege role assignment has taken place outside of PIM and may indicate an attack.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#roles-are-being-assigned-outside-of-privileged-identity-management
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: pim
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'rolesAssignedOutsidePrivilegedIdentityManagementAlertConfiguration'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Investigate where users are being assigned privileged roles outside of Privileged Identity Management and prohibit future assignments from there.
level: high

title: Roles Activated Too Frequently
id: 645fd80d-6c07-435b-9e06-7bc1b5656cba
status: test
description: Identifies when the same privilege role has multiple activations by the same user.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#roles-are-being-activated-too-frequently
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: pim
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'sequentialActivationRenewalsAlertIncident'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Investigate where if active time period for a role is set too short.
level: high

title: Roles Activation Doesn't Require MFA
id: 94a66f46-5b64-46ce-80b2-75dcbe627cc0
status: test
description: Identifies when a privilege role can be activated without performing mfa.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#roles-dont-require-multi-factor-authentication-for-activation
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: pim
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'noMfaOnRoleActivationAlertIncident'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Investigate if user is performing MFA at sign-in.
level: high

title: Too Many Global Admins
id: 7bbc309f-e2b1-4eb1-8369-131a367d67d3
status: test
description: Identifies an event where there are there are too many accounts assigned the Global Administrator role.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#there-are-too-many-global-administrators
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: pim
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'tooManyGlobalAdminsAssignedToTenantAlertIncident'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Investigate if threshold setting in PIM is too low.
level: high

title: Stale Accounts In A Privileged Role
id: e402c26a-267a-45bd-9615-bd9ceda6da85
status: test
description: Identifies when an account hasn't signed in during the past n number of days.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#potential-stale-accounts-in-a-privileged-role
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: pim
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'staleSignInAlertIncident'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Investigate if potential generic account that cannot be removed.
level: high

title: Roles Are Not Being Used
id: 8c6ec464-4ae4-43ac-936a-291da66ed13d
status: test
description: Identifies when a user has been assigned a privilege role and are not using that role.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#administrators-arent-using-their-privileged-roles
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: pim
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'redundantAssignmentAlertIncident'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Investigate if potential generic account that cannot be removed.
level: high

title: Invalid PIM License
id: 58af08eb-f9e1-43c8-9805-3ad9b0482bd8
status: test
description: Identifies when an organization doesn't have the proper license for PIM and is out of compliance.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#the-organization-doesnt-have-microsoft-entra-premium-p2-or-microsoft-entra-id-governance
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: pim
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'invalidLicenseAlertIncident'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Investigate if licenses have expired.
level: high

title: PIM Alert Setting Changes To Disabled
id: aeaef14c-e5bf-4690-a9c8-835caad458bd
status: test
description: Detects when PIM alerts are set to disabled.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Disable PIM Alert
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrator disabling PIM alerts as an active choice.
level: high

title: Azure Subscription Permission Elevation Via AuditLogs
id: ca9bf243-465e-494a-9e54-bf9fc239057d
status: test
description: |
    Detects when a user has been elevated to manage all Azure Subscriptions.
    This change should be investigated immediately if it isn't planned.
    This setting could allow an attacker access to Azure subscriptions in your environment.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts#assignment-and-elevation
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-26
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Category: 'Administrative'
        OperationName: 'Assigns the caller to user access admin'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - If this was approved by System Administrator.
level: high

title: Account Created And Deleted Within A Close Time Frame
id: 6f583da0-3a90-4566-a4ed-83c09fe18bbf
status: test
description: Detects when an account was created and deleted in a short period of time.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#short-lived-accounts
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', MikeDuddington, '@dudders1', Tim Shelton
date: 2022-08-11
modified: 2022-08-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Add user
            - Delete user
        Status: Success
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legit administrative action
level: high

title: Azure Login Bypassing Conditional Access Policies
id: 13f2d3f5-6497-44a7-bf5f-dc13ffafe5dc
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a successful login to the Microsoft Intune Company Portal which could allow bypassing Conditional Access Policies and InTune device trust using a tool like TokenSmith.
author: Josh Nickels, Marius Rothenbücher
references:
    - https://labs.jumpsec.com/tokensmith-bypassing-intune-compliant-device-conditional-access/
    - https://github.com/JumpsecLabs/TokenSmith
date: 2025-01-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    service: audit
    product: m365
detection:
    selection:
        Operation: 'UserLoggedIn'
        ApplicationId: '9ba1a5c7-f17a-4de9-a1f1-6178c8d51223'
        ResultStatus: 'Success'
        RequestType: 'Cmsi:Cmsi'
    filter_main_bjectid:
        ObjectId: '0000000a-0000-0000-c000-000000000000' # Microsoft Intune seen when mobile devices are enrolled
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: External Remote SMB Logon from Public IP
id: 78d5cab4-557e-454f-9fb9-a222bd0d5edc
related:
    - id: 259a9cdf-c4dd-4fa2-b243-2269e5ab18a2
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects successful logon from public IP address via SMB. This can indicate a publicly-exposed SMB port.
references:
    - https://www.inversecos.com/2020/04/successful-4624-anonymous-logons-to.html
    - https://twitter.com/Purp1eW0lf/status/1616144561965002752
author: Micah Babinski (@micahbabinski), Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
date: 2023-01-19
modified: 2024-03-11
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 3
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        IpAddress|cidr:
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
    filter_main_empty:
        IpAddress: '-'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate or intentional inbound connections from public IP addresses on the SMB port.
level: high

title: Potential GobRAT File Discovery Via Grep
id: e34cfa0c-0a50-4210-9cb3-5632d08eb041
status: test
description: Detects the use of grep to discover specific files created by the GobRAT malware
references:
    - https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2023/05/gobrat.html
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/60bcd645450e4c846238cf0e7226dc40c84c96eba99f6b2cffcd0ab4a391c8b3/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3e44c807a25a56f4068b5b8186eee5002eed6f26d665a8b791c472ad154585d1/detection
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-06-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1082
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/grep'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'apached'
            - 'frpc'
            - 'sshd.sh'
            - 'zone.arm'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - WinPwn Execution - ScriptBlock
id: 851fd622-b675-4d26-b803-14bc7baa517a
related:
    - id: d557dc06-62e8-4468-a8e8-7984124908ce
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects scriptblock text keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-12-04
references:
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn
    - https://www.publicnow.com/view/EB87DB49C654D9B63995FAD4C9DE3D3CC4F6C3ED?1671634841
    - https://reconshell.com/winpwn-tool-for-internal-windows-pentesting-and-ad-security/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/4d6c4e8e23d465af7a2388620cfe3f8c76e16cf0/atomics/T1082/T1082.md
    - https://grep.app/search?q=winpwn&filter[repo][0]=redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1046
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1518
    - attack.t1548.002
    - attack.t1552.001
    - attack.t1555
    - attack.t1555.003
logsource:
    category: ps_script
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'Offline_Winpwn'
            - 'WinPwn '
            - 'WinPwn.exe'
            - 'WinPwn.ps1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - As the script block is a blob of text. False positive may occur with scripts that contain the keyword as a reference or simply use it for detection.
level: high

title: Suspicious Kernel Dump Using Dtrace
id: 7124aebe-4cd7-4ccb-8df0-6d6b93c96795
status: test
description: Detects suspicious way to dump the kernel on Windows systems using dtrace.exe, which is available on Windows systems since Windows 10 19H1
references:
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1474899714290208777?s=12
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/devtest/dtrace
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-28
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1082
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_plain:
        Image|endswith: '\dtrace.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'lkd(0)'
    selection_obfuscated:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'syscall:::return'
            - 'lkd('
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dtrace_kernel_dump/info.yml

title: HackTool - WinPwn Execution
id: d557dc06-62e8-4468-a8e8-7984124908ce
related:
    - id: 851fd622-b675-4d26-b803-14bc7baa517a
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects commandline keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-12-04
references:
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn
    - https://www.publicnow.com/view/EB87DB49C654D9B63995FAD4C9DE3D3CC4F6C3ED?1671634841
    - https://reconshell.com/winpwn-tool-for-internal-windows-pentesting-and-ad-security/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/4d6c4e8e23d465af7a2388620cfe3f8c76e16cf0/atomics/T1082/T1082.md
    - https://grep.app/search?q=winpwn&filter[repo][0]=redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1046
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1518
    - attack.t1548.002
    - attack.t1552.001
    - attack.t1555
    - attack.t1555.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Offline_Winpwn'
            - 'WinPwn '
            - 'WinPwn.exe'
            - 'WinPwn.ps1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - winPEAS Execution
id: 98b53e78-ebaf-46f8-be06-421aafd176d9
status: test
description: WinPEAS is a script that search for possible paths to escalate privileges on Windows hosts. The checks are explained on book.hacktricks.xyz
references:
    - https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng
    - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation
author: Georg Lauenstein (sure[secure])
date: 2022-09-19
modified: 2023-03-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'winPEAS.exe'
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\winPEASany_ofs.exe'
              - '\winPEASany.exe'
              - '\winPEASx64_ofs.exe'
              - '\winPEASx64.exe'
              - '\winPEASx86_ofs.exe'
              - '\winPEASx86.exe'
    selection_cli_option:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' applicationsinfo' # Search installed applications information
            - ' browserinfo' # Search browser information
            - ' eventsinfo' # Display interesting events information
            - ' fileanalysis' # Search specific files that can contains credentials and for regexes inside files
            - ' filesinfo' # Search generic files that can contains credentials
            - ' processinfo' # Search processes information
            - ' servicesinfo' # Search services information
            - ' windowscreds' # Search windows credentials
    selection_cli_dl:
        CommandLine|contains: 'https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/'
    selection_cli_specific:
        - ParentCommandLine|endswith: ' -linpeas'
        - CommandLine|endswith: ' -linpeas'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Network Reconnaissance Activity
id: e6313acd-208c-44fc-a0ff-db85d572e90e
status: test
description: Detects a set of suspicious network related commands often used in recon stages
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-07
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.t1082
    - car.2016-03-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'nslookup'
            - '_ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high

title: Shell Execution GCC  - Linux
id: 9b5de532-a757-4d70-946c-1f3e44f48b4d
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "gcc" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/gcc/#shell
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/c89/#shell
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/c99/#shell
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/c89'
            - '/c99'
            - '/gcc'
        CommandLine|contains: '-wrapper'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash,-s'
            - '/bin/dash,-s'
            - '/bin/fish,-s'
            - '/bin/sh,-s'
            - '/bin/zsh,-s'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Shell Execution via Find - Linux
id: 6adfbf8f-52be-4444-9bac-81b539624146
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the find command to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or exploitation attempt.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/find/#shell
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '/find'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' . '
            - '-exec'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Shell Execution via Flock - Linux
id: 4b09c71e-4269-4111-9cdd-107d8867f0cc
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "flock" command to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/flock/#shell
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '/flock'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -u '
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Shell Execution via Nice - Linux
id: 093d68c7-762a-42f4-9f46-95e79142571a
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "nice" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/nice/#shell
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/nice'
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Vim GTFOBin Abuse - Linux
id: 7ab8f73a-fcff-428b-84aa-6a5ff7877dea
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of "vim" and it's siblings commands to execute a shell or proxy commands.
    Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/vim/
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/rvim/
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/vimdiff/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-28
modified: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/rvim'
            - '/vim'
            - '/vimdiff'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' --cmd'
            - ' -c '
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':!/'
            - ':lua '
            - ':py '
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PUA - Seatbelt Execution
id: 38646daa-e78f-4ace-9de0-55547b2d30da
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the PUA/Recon tool Seatbelt via PE information of command line parameters
references:
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt
    - https://www.bluetangle.dev/2022/08/fastening-seatbelt-on-threat-hunting.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-18
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1526
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\Seatbelt.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Seatbelt.exe'
        - Description: 'Seatbelt'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              # This just a list of the commands that will produce the least amount of FP in "theory"
              # Comment out/in as needed in your environment
              # To get the full list of commands see reference section
              - ' DpapiMasterKeys'
              - ' InterestingProcesses'
              - ' InterestingFiles'
              - ' CertificateThumbprints'
              - ' ChromiumBookmarks'
              - ' ChromiumHistory'
              - ' ChromiumPresence'
              - ' CloudCredentials'
              - ' CredEnum'
              - ' CredGuard'
              - ' FirefoxHistory'
              - ' ProcessCreationEvents'
              # - ' RDPSessions'
              # - ' PowerShellHistory'
    selection_group_list:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -group=misc'
            - ' -group=remote'
            - ' -group=chromium'
            - ' -group=slack'
            - ' -group=system'
            - ' -group=user'
            - ' -group=all'
    selection_group_output:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -outputfile='
    condition: selection_img or all of selection_group_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: HackTool - SharpChisel Execution
id: cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf
related:
    - id: 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Sharp Chisel via the commandline arguments
references:
    - https://github.com/shantanu561993/SharpChisel
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/wading-through-muddy-waters-recent-activity-of-an-iranian-state-sponsored-threat-actor/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-05
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpChisel.exe'
        - Product: 'SharpChisel'
    # See rule 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5 for Chisel.exe coverage
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Renamed Cloudflared.EXE Execution
id: e0c69ebd-b54f-4aed-8ae3-e3467843f3f0
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed "cloudflared" binary.
references:
    - https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared/releases
    - https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-networks/do-more-with-tunnels/trycloudflare/
    - https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared
    - https://www.intrinsec.com/akira_ransomware/
    - https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/tunnel-vision-cloudflared-abused-in-the-wild/
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.001
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-12-20
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cleanup:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' tunnel '
            - 'cleanup '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-config '
            - '-connector-id '
    selection_tunnel:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' tunnel '
            - ' run '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-config '
            - '-credentials-contents '
            - '-credentials-file '
            - '-token '
    selection_accountless:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-url'
            - 'tunnel'
    selection_hashes:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'SHA256=2fb6c04c4f95fb8d158af94c137f90ac820716deaf88d8ebec956254e046cb29'
            - 'SHA256=b3d21940a10fdef5e415ad70331ce257c24fe3bcf7722262302e0421791f87e8'
            - 'SHA256=1fbd8362b2d2d2e6a5750ae3db69cd1815e6c1d31da48a98b796450971a8e039'
            - 'SHA256=0409c9b12f9d0eda86e461ed9bdabeefb00172b26322079681a0bdf48e68dc28'
            - 'SHA256=7cfb411d04bac42ef93d1f0c93c0a481e38c6f4612b97ae89d4702595988edc7'
            - 'SHA256=5b3c2d846ab162dc6bc595cce3a49de5731afde5d6060be7066d21b013a28373'
            - 'SHA256=ce95df7f69664c3df19b76028e115931919a71517b776da7b42d353e2ff4a670'
            - 'SHA256=1293525a19cfe3bc8296b62fbfe19f083632ed644a1c18c10b045a1d3030d81a'
            - 'SHA256=af2b9161cfcb654b16408cd6b098afe9d1fb61a037d18d7090a119d4c0c8e0f0'
            - 'SHA256=39ddceb56a15798826a5fc4892fa2b474c444bb4d7a8bf2fa95e41cab10fa7a1'
            - 'SHA256=ccd11f2328023a0e7929e845d5b6e7bc783fb4650d65faef3ae090239d4bbce2'
            - 'SHA256=b6e5c5d2567ae8c69cc012ebcae30e6c9b5359d64a58d17ba75ec89f8bce71ac'
            - 'SHA256=f813484ea441404f18caad96f28138e8aaf0cb256163c09c2ab8a3acab87f69f'
            - 'SHA256=fc4a0802ab9c7409b892ca00636bec61e2acfc911bccfdeb9978b8ab5a2f828d'
            - 'SHA256=083150724b49604c8765c1ba19541fa260b133be0acb0647fcd936d81f054499'
            - 'SHA256=44303d6572956f28a0f2e4b188934fb9874f2584f5c81fa431a463cfbf28083b'
            - 'SHA256=5d38c46032a58e28ae5f7d174d8761ec3d64d186677f3ec53af5f51afb9bfd2f'
            - 'SHA256=e1e70fa42059911bc6685fafef957f9a73fc66f214d0704a9b932683a5204032'
            - 'SHA256=c01356092a365b84f84f0e66870bd1a05ba3feb53cafd973fa5fea2534bee234'
            - 'SHA256=b3f9c06151e30ee43d39e788a79cd918a314f24e04fe87f3de8272a2057b624f'
            - 'SHA256=cd81b2792f0739f473c31c9cb7cf2313154bfa28b839975802b90e8790bb5058'
            - 'SHA256=9ec7e6c8e1bfd883663d8d9d62c9e4f9ae373b731407181e32491b27a7218a2c'
            - 'SHA256=c2cfd23fdc6c0e1b1ffa0e545cbe556f18d11b362b4a89ba0713f6ab01c4827f'
            - 'SHA256=53f8adbd76c0eb16f5e43cadde422474d8a06f9c8f959389c1930042ad8beaa5'
            - 'SHA256=648c8d2f8001c113d2986dd00b7bbd181593d462bef73522cee212c4f71f95b3'
            - 'SHA256=ae047e2095e46c3f9c518b2be67ec753f4f0aad23b261a361fcb6144dcdb63b4'
            - 'SHA256=3153d2baa462978dd22ab33d1c2274ecc88c200225d6a3327f98d5b752d08f5c'
            - 'SHA256=f49cde976e628012c9db73e1c8d76081944ecf2297cdafeb78bb13290da274c4'
            - 'SHA256=d2513e58bb03ccc83affde685c6ef987924c37ce6707d8e9857e2524b0d7e90f'
            - 'SHA256=bb67c7623ba92fe64ffd9816b8d5b3b1ea3013960a30bd4cf6e295b3eb5b1bad'
            - 'SHA256=b34b3c3a91e3165d1481f0b3ec23eab93a1cfba94345a6cbfe5b18ddbd48eac7'
            - 'SHA256=f7848034e010d55f15e474ca998f96391e320ff29b00cfcc4c5e536529703e75'
            - 'SHA256=b6fc9493778cbe3bfc062d73f5cc604bc0ff058bc5e5dc6aac87f3a4008b54b6'
            - 'SHA256=f5c5e962577e2293c4ad10603816dce7cc273585969615fbf4e4bfa9eaff1688'
            - 'SHA256=d14c52d9220b606f428a8fe9f7c108b0d6f14cf71e7384749e98e6a95962e68f'
            - 'SHA256=d3a0e1a79158f3985cd49607ebe0cdfcc49cb9af96b8f43aefd0cdfe2f22e663'
            - 'SHA256=2fbbfc8299537ff80cadf9d0e27c223fe0ccb9052bf9d8763ad717bbfa521c77'
            - 'SHA256=19074674c6fbdaa573b3081745e5e26144fdf7a086d14e0e220d1814f1f13078'
    filter_main_known_names:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cloudflared.exe'
            - '\cloudflared-windows-386.exe'
            - '\cloudflared-windows-amd64.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PUA - Chisel Tunneling Tool Execution
id: 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5
related:
    - id: cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Chisel tunneling tool via the commandline arguments
references:
    - https://github.com/jpillora/chisel/
    - https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/lorenz-ransomware-chiseling-in/
    - https://blog.sekoia.io/lucky-mouse-incident-response-to-detection-engineering/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-13
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\chisel.exe'
    selection_param1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'exe client '
            - 'exe server '
    selection_param2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-socks5'
            - '-reverse'
            - ' r:'
            - ':127.0.0.1:'
            - '-tls-skip-verify '
            - ':socks'
    condition: selection_img or all of selection_param*
falsepositives:
    - Some false positives may occur with other tools with similar commandlines
level: high

title: Communication To LocaltoNet Tunneling Service Initiated - Linux
id: c4568f5d-131f-4e78-83d4-45b2da0ec4f1
status: test
description: |
    Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "LocaltoNet" tunneling sub-domains.
    LocaltoNet is a reverse proxy that enables localhost services to be exposed to the Internet.
    Attackers have been seen to use this service for command-and-control activities to bypass MFA and perimeter controls.
references:
    - https://localtonet.com/documents/supported-tunnels
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc3944-targets-saas-applications
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2024-06-17
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1102
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.localto.net'
            - '.localtonet.com'
        Initiated: 'true'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the LocaltoNet service.
level: high

title: Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service - Linux
id: 19bf6fdb-7721-4f3d-867f-53467f6a5db6
status: test
description: Detects an executable accessing an ngrok tunneling endpoint, which could be a sign of forbidden exfiltration of data exfiltration by malicious actors
references:
    - https://twitter.com/hakluke/status/1587733971814977537/photo/1
    - https://ngrok.com/docs/secure-tunnels/tunnels/ssh-reverse-tunnel-agent
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-03
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.t1568.002
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1102
    - attack.s0508
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: network_connection
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|contains:
            - 'tunnel.us.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.eu.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.ap.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.au.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.sa.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.jp.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.in.ngrok.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of ngrok
level: high

title: Communication To LocaltoNet Tunneling Service Initiated
id: 3ab65069-d82a-4d44-a759-466661a082d1
status: test
description: |
    Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "LocaltoNet" tunneling sub-domains.
    LocaltoNet is a reverse proxy that enables localhost services to be exposed to the Internet.
    Attackers have been seen to use this service for command-and-control activities to bypass MFA and perimeter controls.
references:
    - https://localtonet.com/documents/supported-tunnels
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc3944-targets-saas-applications
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2024-06-17
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1102
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.localto.net'
            - '.localtonet.com'
        Initiated: 'true'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the LocaltoNet service.
level: high

title: Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service Initiated
id: 1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849
related:
    - id: 18249279-932f-45e2-b37a-8925f2597670
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" tunneling domains.
    Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware.
    While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/hakluke/status/1587733971814977537/photo/1
    - https://ngrok.com/docs/secure-tunnels/tunnels/ssh-reverse-tunnel-agent
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-03
modified: 2024-02-02
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.t1568.002
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1102
    - attack.s0508
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|contains:
            - 'tunnel.us.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.eu.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.ap.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.au.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.sa.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.jp.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.in.ngrok.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the ngrok service.
level: high

title: New Connection Initiated To Potential Dead Drop Resolver Domain
id: 297ae038-edc2-4b2e-bb3e-7c5fc94dd5c7
related:
    - id: d7b09985-95a3-44be-8450-b6eadf49833e
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
    Detects an executable, which is not an internet browser or known application, initiating network connections to legit popular websites, which were seen to be used as dead drop resolvers in previous attacks.
    In this context attackers leverage known websites such as "facebook", "youtube", etc. In order to pass through undetected.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220830134315/https://content.fireeye.com/apt-41/rpt-apt41/
    - https://securelist.com/the-tetrade-brazilian-banking-malware/97779/
    - https://blog.bushidotoken.net/2021/04/dead-drop-resolvers-espionage-inspired.html
    - https://github.com/kleiton0x00/RedditC2
    - https://twitter.com/kleiton0x7e/status/1600567316810551296
    - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/kleiton-kurti_github-kleiton0x00redditc2-abusing-reddit-activity-7009939662462984192-5DbI/?originalSubdomain=al
author: Sorina Ionescu, X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-17
modified: 2024-10-21
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1102
    - attack.t1102.001
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.t.me'
            - '4shared.com'
            - 'abuse.ch'
            - 'anonfiles.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
            - 'cloudflare.com'
            - 'ddns.net'
            - 'discord.com'
            - 'docs.google.com'
            - 'drive.google.com'
            - 'dropbox.com'
            - 'dropmefiles.com'
            - 'facebook.com'
            - 'feeds.rapidfeeds.com'
            - 'fotolog.com'
            - 'ghostbin.co/'
            - 'githubusercontent.com'
            - 'gofile.io'
            - 'hastebin.com'
            - 'imgur.com'
            - 'livejournal.com'
            - 'mediafire.com'
            - 'mega.co.nz'
            - 'mega.nz'
            - 'onedrive.com'
            - 'pages.dev'
            - 'paste.ee'
            - 'pastebin.com'
            - 'pastebin.pl'
            - 'pastetext.net'
            - 'pixeldrain.com'
            - 'privatlab.com'
            - 'privatlab.net'
            - 'reddit.com'
            - 'send.exploit.in'
            - 'sendspace.com'
            - 'steamcommunity.com'
            - 'storage.googleapis.com'
            - 'technet.microsoft.com'
            - 'temp.sh'
            - 'transfer.sh'
            - 'trycloudflare.com'
            - 'twitter.com'
            - 'ufile.io'
            - 'vimeo.com'
            - 'w3spaces.com'
            - 'wetransfer.com'
            - 'workers.dev'
            - 'youtube.com'
    # Note: Add/Remove browsers/applications that you don't use or those that have custom install locations
    # Note: To avoid complex conditions the filters for some apps are generic by name only. A custom tuning is recommended for best results
    filter_main_chrome:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
    filter_main_chrome_appdata:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        Image|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
    filter_main_firefox:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
    filter_main_firefox_appdata:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        Image|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
    filter_main_ie:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
    filter_main_edge_1:
        - Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\'
        - Image|endswith: '\WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
        - Image:
              - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
              - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
    filter_main_edge_2:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\msedgewebview2.exe'
    filter_main_safari:
        Image|contains:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Safari\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Safari\'
        Image|endswith: '\safari.exe'
    filter_main_defender:
        Image|contains:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\MsMpEng.exe' # Microsoft Defender executable
            - '\MsSense.exe' # Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection Service Executable
    filter_main_prtg:
        # Paessler's PRTG Network Monitor
        Image|endswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\PRTG Network Monitor\PRTG Probe.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\PRTG Network Monitor\PRTG Probe.exe'
    filter_main_brave:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\BraveSoftware\'
        Image|endswith: '\brave.exe'
    filter_main_maxthon:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Maxthon\'
        Image|endswith: '\maxthon.exe'
    filter_main_opera:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Programs\Opera\'
        Image|endswith: '\opera.exe'
    filter_main_seamonkey:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\SeaMonkey\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\SeaMonkey\'
        Image|endswith: '\seamonkey.exe'
    filter_main_vivaldi:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Vivaldi\'
        Image|endswith: '\vivaldi.exe'
    filter_main_whale:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Naver\Naver Whale\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Naver\Naver Whale\'
        Image|endswith: '\whale.exe'
    # Note: The TOR browser shouldn't be something you allow in your corporate network.
    # filter_main_tor:
    #     Image|contains: '\Tor Browser\'
    filter_main_whaterfox:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Waterfox\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Waterfox\'
        Image|endswith: '\Waterfox.exe'
    filter_main_midori:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Programs\midori-ng\'
        Image|endswith: '\Midori Next Generation.exe'
    filter_main_slimbrowser:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\SlimBrowser\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\SlimBrowser\'
        Image|endswith: '\slimbrowser.exe'
    filter_main_flock:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Flock\'
        Image|endswith: '\Flock.exe'
    filter_main_phoebe:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Phoebe\'
        Image|endswith: '\Phoebe.exe'
    filter_main_falkon:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Falkon\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Falkon\'
        Image|endswith: '\falkon.exe'
    filter_main_qtweb:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\QtWeb\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\QtWeb\'
        Image|endswith: '\QtWeb.exe'
    filter_main_avant:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Avant Browser\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Avant Browser\'
        Image|endswith: '\avant.exe'
    filter_main_whatsapp:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\WindowsApps\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\'
        Image|endswith: '\WhatsApp.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith: 'facebook.com'
    filter_main_telegram:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Telegram Desktop\'
        Image|endswith: '\Telegram.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith: '.t.me'
    filter_main_onedrive:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\'
        Image|endswith: '\OneDrive.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith: 'onedrive.com'
    filter_main_dropbox:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\Client\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Dropbox\Client\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\Dropbox.exe'
            - '\DropboxInstaller.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith: 'dropbox.com'
    filter_main_mega:
        Image|endswith:
            # Note: This is a basic/best effort filter in order to avoid FP with the MEGA installer and executable.
            #       In practice please apply exact path to avoid basic path bypass techniques.
            - '\MEGAsync.exe'
            - '\MEGAsyncSetup32_*RC.exe' # Beta versions
            - '\MEGAsyncSetup32.exe' # Installers 32bit
            - '\MEGAsyncSetup64.exe' # Installers 64bit
            - '\MEGAupdater.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - 'mega.co.nz'
            - 'mega.nz'
    filter_main_googledrive:
        Image|contains:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Google\Drive File Stream\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Drive File Stream\'
        Image|endswith: 'GoogleDriveFS.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith: 'drive.google.com'
    filter_main_discord:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Discord\'
        Image|endswith: '\Discord.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - 'discord.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
    filter_main_null:
        Image: null
    filter_main_empty:
        Image: ''
    # filter_optional_qlik:
    #     Image|endswith: '\Engine.exe' # Process from qlik.com app
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - One might need to exclude other internet browsers found in it's network or other applications like ones mentioned above from Microsoft Defender.
    - Ninite contacting githubusercontent.com
level: high

title: Process Initiated Network Connection To Ngrok Domain
id: 18249279-932f-45e2-b37a-8925f2597670
related:
    - id: 1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" domains.
    Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware.
    While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download.
references:
    - https://ngrok.com/
    - https://ngrok.com/blog-post/new-ngrok-domains
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cca0c1182ac114b44dc52dd2058fcd38611c20bb6b5ad84710681d38212f835a/
    - https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/files/2023_YEAR/CYBERCENTER/november/APT29%20attacks%20Embassies%20using%20CVE-2023-38831%20-%20report%20en.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-16
modified: 2025-07-30
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1102
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.ngrok-free.app'
            - '.ngrok-free.dev'
            - '.ngrok.app'
            - '.ngrok.dev'
            - '.ngrok.io'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the ngrok service.
# Note: The level of this rule is related to your internal policy.
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process Of Manage Engine ServiceDesk
id: cea2b7ea-792b-405f-95a1-b903ea06458f
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of the "Manage Engine ServiceDesk Plus" Java web service
references:
    - https://www.horizon3.ai/manageengine-cve-2022-47966-technical-deep-dive/
    - https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2022-47966/blob/3a51c6b72ebbd87392babd955a8fbeaee2090b35/CVE-2022-47966.py
    - https://blog.viettelcybersecurity.com/saml-show-stopper/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-18
modified: 2023-08-29
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1102
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|contains|all:
            - '\ManageEngine\ServiceDesk\'
            - '\java.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\AppVLP.exe'
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\calc.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\curl.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\mftrace.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\notepad.exe'  # Often used in POCs
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\query.exe'
            - '\reg.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\scrcons.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\whoami.exe'  # Often used in POCs
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            # - '\hh.exe'
            # - '\regsvr32.exe'
            # - '\rundll32.exe'
            # - '\scriptrunner.exe'
    filter_main_net:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' stop'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate sub processes started by Manage Engine ServiceDesk Pro
level: high

title: Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine
id: ba3f5c1b-6272-4119-9dbd-0bc8d21c2702
related:
    - id: 03d83090-8cba-44a0-b02f-0b756a050306
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the use of WinAPI Functions via the commandline. As seen used by threat actors via the tool winapiexec
references:
    - https://twitter.com/m417z/status/1566674631788007425
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-06
modified: 2025-03-06
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'AddSecurityPackage'
            - 'AdjustTokenPrivileges'
            - 'Advapi32'
            - 'CloseHandle'
            - 'CreateProcessWithToken'
            - 'CreatePseudoConsole'
            - 'CreateRemoteThread'
            - 'CreateThread'
            - 'CreateUserThread'
            - 'DangerousGetHandle'
            - 'DuplicateTokenEx'
            - 'EnumerateSecurityPackages'
            - 'FreeHGlobal'
            - 'FreeLibrary'
            - 'GetDelegateForFunctionPointer'
            - 'GetLogonSessionData'
            - 'GetModuleHandle'
            - 'GetProcAddress'
            - 'GetProcessHandle'
            - 'GetTokenInformation'
            - 'ImpersonateLoggedOnUser'
            - 'kernel32'
            - 'LoadLibrary'
            - 'memcpy'
            - 'MiniDumpWriteDump'
            # - 'msvcrt'
            - 'ntdll'
            - 'OpenDesktop'
            - 'OpenProcess'
            - 'OpenProcessToken'
            - 'OpenThreadToken'
            - 'OpenWindowStation'
            - 'PtrToString'
            - 'QueueUserApc'
            - 'ReadProcessMemory'
            - 'RevertToSelf'
            - 'RtlCreateUserThread'
            - 'secur32'
            - 'SetThreadToken'
            # - 'user32'
            - 'VirtualAlloc'
            - 'VirtualFree'
            - 'VirtualProtect'
            - 'WaitForSingleObject'
            - 'WriteInt32'
            - 'WriteProcessMemory'
            - 'ZeroFreeGlobalAllocUnicode'
    filter_optional_mpcmdrun:
        Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'GetLoadLibraryWAddress32'
    filter_optional_compatTelRunner:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\CompatTelRunner.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'FreeHGlobal'
            - 'PtrToString'
            - 'kernel32'
            - 'CloseHandle'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Some legitimate action or applications may use these functions. Investigate further to determine the legitimacy of the activity.
level: high

title: Suspicious Mshta.EXE Execution Patterns
id: e32f92d1-523e-49c3-9374-bdb13b46a3ba
status: test
description: Detects suspicious mshta process execution patterns
references:
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application
    - https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/mshta.exe
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/34221348-072d-4b70-93f3-aa71f6ebecad/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-17
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'MSHTA.EXE'
    selection_susp:
        # Suspicious parents
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        # Suspicious folders
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    filter_img:
        # Filter legit Locations
        - Image|startswith:
              - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
              - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
        # Suspicious extensions
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '.htm'
              - '.hta'
        # Filter simple execution
        - CommandLine|endswith:
              - 'mshta.exe'
              - 'mshta'
    condition: all of selection_* or (selection_img and not filter_img)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - CobaltStrike BOF Injection Pattern
id: 09706624-b7f6-455d-9d02-adee024cee1d
status: test
description: Detects a typical pattern of a CobaltStrike BOF which inject into other processes
references:
    - https://github.com/boku7/injectAmsiBypass
    - https://github.com/boku7/spawn
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-04
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CallTrace|re: '^C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll\.dll\+[a-z0-9]{4,6}\|C:\\Windows\\System32\\KERNELBASE\.dll\+[a-z0-9]{4,6}\|UNKNOWN\([A-Z0-9]{16}\)$'
        GrantedAccess:
            - '0x1028'
            - '0x1fffff'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - HandleKatz Duplicating LSASS Handle
id: b1bd3a59-c1fd-4860-9f40-4dd161a7d1f5
status: test
description: Detects HandleKatz opening LSASS to duplicate its handle to later dump the memory without opening any new handles
references:
    - https://github.com/codewhitesec/HandleKatz
author: Bhabesh Raj (rule), @thefLinkk
date: 2022-06-27
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe' # Theoretically, can be any benign process holding handle to LSASS
        GrantedAccess: '0x1440' # Only PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION
        # Example: C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+9d234\|UNKNOWN(00000000001C119B)
        CallTrace|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll+'
        CallTrace|contains: '|UNKNOWN('
        CallTrace|endswith: ')'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Base64 Decoded From Images
id: 09a910bf-f71f-4737-9c40-88880ba5913d
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of tail to extract bytes at an offset from an image and then decode the base64 value to create a new file with the decoded content. The detected execution is a bash one-liner.
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/16bafdf741e7a13137c489f3c8db1334f171c7cb13b62617d691b0a64783cc48/behavior
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/483fafc64a2b84197e1ef6a3f51e443f84dc5742602e08b9e8ec6ad690b34ed0/behavior
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-12-20
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1140
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    # Example:  /bin/bash sh -c tail -c +21453 '/Volumes/Installer/Installer.app/Contents/Resources/workout-logo.jpeg' | base64 --decode > /tmp/54A0A2CD-FAD1-4D4D-AAF5-5266F6344ABE.zip
    # VT Query: 'behavior_processes:"tail" (behavior_processes:"jpeg" or behavior_processes:"jpg" or behavior_processes:"png" or behavior_processes:"gif") behavior_processes:"base64" behavior_processes:"--decode >" and tag:dmg'
    selection_image:
        Image|endswith: '/bash'
    selection_view:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'tail'
            - '-c'
    selection_b64:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'base64'
            - '-d' # Also covers "--decode"
            - '>'
    selection_files:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.avif'
            - '.gif'
            - '.jfif'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.pjp'
            - '.pjpeg'
            - '.png'
            - '.svg'
            - '.webp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Inbox Manipulation Rules
id: ceb55fd0-726e-4656-bf4e-b585b7f7d572
status: test
description: Detects suspicious rules that delete or move messages or folders are set on a user's inbox.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#suspicious-inbox-manipulation-rules
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1140
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'mcasSuspiciousInboxManipulationRules'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Actual mailbox rules that are moving items based on their workflow.
level: high

title: MSHTA Execution with Suspicious File Extensions
id: cc7abbd0-762b-41e3-8a26-57ad50d2eea3
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of mshta.exe with file types that looks like they do not typically represent HTA (HTML Application) content,
    such as .png, .jpg, .zip, .pdf, and others, which are often polyglots. MSHTA is a legitimate Windows utility for executing HTML Applications
    containing VBScript or JScript. Threat actors often abuse this lolbin utility to download and
    execute malicious scripts disguised as benign files or hosted under misleading extensions to evade detection.
references:
    - http://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files
    - https://0x00sec.org/t/clientside-exploitation-in-2018-how-pentesting-has-changed/7356
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/framework/data/xml/xslt/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script
    - https://medium.com/tsscyber/pentesting-and-hta-bypassing-powershell-constrained-language-mode-53a42856c997
    - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1326228491302563846
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c1f27d9795a2eba630db8a043580a0761798f06370fb1317067805f8a845b00c
author: Diego Perez (@darkquassar), Markus Neis, Swisscom (Improve Rule), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-02-22
modified: 2025-05-12
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1140
    - attack.t1218.005
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.007
    - cve.2020-1599
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'mshta.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.7z'
            - '.avi'
            - '.bat'
            - '.bmp'
            - '.conf'
            - '.csv'
            - '.dll'
            - '.doc'
            - '.gif'
            - '.gz'
            - '.ini'
            - '.jpe'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.json'
            - '.lnk'
            - '.log'
            - '.mkv'
            - '.mp3'
            - '.mp4'
            - '.pdf'
            - '.png'
            - '.ppt'
            - '.rar'
            - '.rtf'
            - '.svg'
            - '.tar'
            - '.tmp'
            - '.txt'
            - '.xls'
            - '.xml'
            - '.yaml'
            - '.yml'
            - '.zip'
            - 'vbscript'
            # - '.chm'  # could be prone to false positives
            # - '.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high

title: OpenCanary - HTTP GET Request
id: af6c3078-84cd-4c68-8842-08b76bd81b13
status: test
description: Detects instances where an HTTP service on an OpenCanary node has received a GET request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 3000
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high