title: PowerShell Get-Process LSASS in ScriptBlock
id: 84c174ab-d3ef-481f-9c86-a50d0b8e3edb
status: test
description: Detects a Get-Process command on lsass process, which is in almost all cases a sign of malicious activity
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220205033028/https://twitter.com/PythonResponder/status/1385064506049630211
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-04-23
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Get-Process lsass'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate certificate exports invoked by administrators or users (depends on processes in the environment - filter if unusable)
level: high

title: Cred Dump Tools Dropped Files
id: 8fbf3271-1ef6-4e94-8210-03c2317947f6
status: test
description: Files with well-known filenames (parts of credential dump software or files produced by them) creation
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
date: 2019-11-01
modified: 2025-10-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.003
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.005
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - TargetFilename|contains:
              - '\fgdump-log'
              - '\kirbi'
              - '\pwdump'
              - '\pwhashes'
              - '\wce_ccache'
              - '\wce_krbtkts'
        - TargetFilename|endswith:
              - '\cachedump.exe'
              - '\cachedump64.exe'
              - '\DumpExt.dll'
              - '\DumpSvc.exe'
              - '\Dumpy.exe'
              - '\fgexec.exe'
              - '\lsremora.dll'
              - '\lsremora64.dll'
              - '\NTDS.out'
              - '\procdump.exe'
              - '\procdump64.exe'
              - '\procdump64a.exe'
              - '\pstgdump.exe'
              - '\pwdump.exe'
              - '\SAM.out'
              - '\SECURITY.out'
              - '\servpw.exe'
              - '\servpw64.exe'
              - '\SYSTEM.out'
              - '\test.pwd'
              - '\wceaux.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Administrator using tool for password recovery
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_cred_dump_tools_dropped_files/info.yml

title: LSASS Process Memory Dump Creation Via Taskmgr.EXE
id: 69ca12af-119d-44ed-b50f-a47af0ebc364
status: test
description: Detects the creation of an "lsass.dmp" file by the taskmgr process. This indicates a manual dumping of the LSASS.exe process memory using Windows Task Manager.
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-10-19
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/987e3ca988ae3cff4b9f6e388c139c05bf44bbb8/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#L1
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - ':\Windows\system32\taskmgr.exe'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\taskmgr.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\lsass'
            - '.DMP'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare case of troubleshooting by an administrator or support that has to be investigated regardless
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_taskmgr_lsass_dump/info.yml

title: LSASS Process Dump Artefact In CrashDumps Folder
id: 6902955a-01b7-432c-b32a-6f5f81d8f625
status: test
description: Detects the presence of an LSASS dump file in the "CrashDumps" folder. This could be a sign of LSASS credential dumping. Techniques such as the LSASS Shtinkering have been seen abusing the Windows Error Reporting to dump said process.
references:
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering
    - https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Asaf%20Gilboa%20-%20LSASS%20Shtinkering%20Abusing%20Windows%20Error%20Reporting%20to%20Dump%20LSASS.pdf
author: '@pbssubhash'
date: 2022-12-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\CrashDumps\'
        TargetFilename|contains: 'lsass.exe.'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.dmp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate dump of the process by the operating system due to a crash of lsass
level: high

title: HackTool - CrackMapExec File Indicators
id: 736ffa74-5f6f-44ca-94ef-1c0df4f51d2a
related:
    - id: 9433ff9c-5d3f-4269-99f8-95fc826ea489
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects file creation events with filename patterns used by CrackMapExec.
references:
    - https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-03-11
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_path:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\' # The disk extension is hardcoded in the tool.
    selection_names_str:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\temp.ps1' # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/3c3e412193cb6d3237abe90c543e5d995bfa4447/cme/modules/keepass_trigger.py#L42C41-L42C68
            - '\msol.ps1' # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/3c3e412193cb6d3237abe90c543e5d995bfa4447/cme/modules/msol.py#L48C98-L48C106
    selection_names_re:
        - TargetFilename|re: '\\[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}\.txt$' # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/3c3e412193cb6d3237abe90c543e5d995bfa4447/cme/protocols/wmi/wmiexec.py#L86
        - TargetFilename|re: '\\[a-zA-Z]{8}\.tmp$' # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/3c3e412193cb6d3237abe90c543e5d995bfa4447/cme/protocols/smb/atexec.py#L145C19-L146
    condition: selection_path and 1 of selection_names_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: LSASS Process Memory Dump Files
id: a5a2d357-1ab8-4675-a967-ef9990a59391
related:
    - id: db2110f3-479d-42a6-94fb-d35bc1e46492
      type: obsolete
    - id: 5e3d3601-0662-4af0-b1d2-36a05e90c40a
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects creation of files with names used by different memory dumping tools to create a memory dump of the LSASS process memory, which contains user credentials.
references:
    - https://www.google.com/search?q=procdump+lsass
    - https://medium.com/@markmotig/some-ways-to-dump-lsass-exe-c4a75fdc49bf
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_memdump_file_created.toml
    - https://www.whiteoaksecurity.com/blog/attacks-defenses-dumping-lsass-no-mimikatz/
    - https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump
    - https://github.com/CCob/MirrorDump
    - https://github.com/safedv/RustiveDump/blob/1a9b026b477587becfb62df9677cede619d42030/src/main.rs#L35
    - https://github.com/ricardojoserf/NativeDump/blob/01d8cd17f31f51f5955a38e85cd3c83a17596175/NativeDump/Program.cs#L258
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-15
modified: 2024-10-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_1:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\Andrew.dmp'
            - '\Coredump.dmp'
            - '\lsass.dmp'
            - '\lsass.rar'
            - '\lsass.zip'
            - '\NotLSASS.zip'  # https://github.com/CCob/MirrorDump
            - '\PPLBlade.dmp'  # https://github.com/tastypepperoni/PPLBlade
            - '\rustive.dmp' # https://github.com/safedv/RustiveDump/blob/main/src/main.rs#L35
    selection_2:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\lsass_2'  # default format of procdump v9.0 is lsass_YYMMDD_HHmmss.dmp
            - '\lsassdmp'
            - '\lsassdump'
    selection_3:
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\lsass'
            - '.dmp'
    selection_4:
        TargetFilename|contains: 'SQLDmpr'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.mdmp'
    selection_5:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\nanodump'
            - '\proc_' # NativeDump pattern https://github.com/ricardojoserf/NativeDump/blob/01d8cd17f31f51f5955a38e85cd3c83a17596175/NativeDump/Program.cs#L258
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.dmp'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - SafetyKatz Dump Indicator
id: e074832a-eada-4fd7-94a1-10642b130e16
status: test
description: Detects default lsass dump filename generated by SafetyKatz.
references:
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/SafetyKatz
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/SafetyKatz/blob/715b311f76eb3a4c8d00a1bd29c6cd1899e450b7/SafetyKatz/Program.cs#L63
author: Markus Neis
date: 2018-07-24
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\Temp\debug.bin'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate files with similar filename structure
level: high

title: WerFault LSASS Process Memory Dump
id: c3e76af5-4ce0-4a14-9c9a-25ceb8fda182
status: test
description: Detects WerFault creating a dump file with a name that indicates that the dump file could be an LSASS process memory, which contains user credentials
references:
    - https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image: C:\WINDOWS\system32\WerFault.exe
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\lsass'
            - 'lsass.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - Impacket File Indicators
id: 03f4ca17-de95-428d-a75a-4ee78b047256
related:
    - id: 6e2a900a-ced9-4e4a-a9c2-13e706f9518a
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: Detects file creation events with filename patterns used by Impacket.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/05/19/another-confluence-bites-the-dust-falling-to-elpaco-team-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/fortra/impacket
author: "The DFIR Report, IrishDeath"
date: 2025-05-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_names_re:
        TargetFilename|re: '\\sessionresume_[a-zA-Z]{8}$' # https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/ead516a1209742efc7ac550707a9304ba08681e9/impacket/examples/secretsdump.py#L1925C38-L1925C51
    condition: selection_names_re
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Password Dumper Remote Thread in LSASS
id: f239b326-2f41-4d6b-9dfa-c846a60ef505
status: stable
description: |
    Detects password dumper activity by monitoring remote thread creation EventID 8 in combination with the lsass.exe process as TargetImage.
    The process in field Process is the malicious program. A single execution can lead to hundreds of events.
references:
    - https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/WCE.htm
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-02-19
modified: 2021-06-21
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.s0005
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: create_remote_thread
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        StartModule: ''
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Antivirus products
level: high

title: Potential Credential Dumping Attempt Via PowerShell Remote Thread
id: fb656378-f909-47c1-8747-278bf09f4f4f
related:
    - id: 3f07b9d1-2082-4c56-9277-613a621983cc
      type: obsolete
    - id: 0f920ebe-7aea-4c54-b202-9aa0c609cfe5
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects remote thread creation by PowerShell processes into "lsass.exe"
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse
author: oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: create_remote_thread
detection:
    selection:
        SourceImage|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - CrackMapExec Process Patterns
id: f26307d8-14cd-47e3-a26b-4b4769f24af6
status: test
description: Detects suspicious process patterns found in logs when CrackMapExec is used
references:
    - https://mpgn.gitbook.io/crackmapexec/smb-protocol/obtaining-credentials/dump-lsass
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-12
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_lsass_dump1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'tasklist /fi '
            - 'Imagename eq lsass.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'cmd.exe /c '
            - 'cmd.exe /r '
            - 'cmd.exe /k '
            - 'cmd /c '
            - 'cmd /r '
            - 'cmd /k '
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
    selection_lsass_dump2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'do rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - ' full'
            - '%%B'
    selection_procdump:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'tasklist /v /fo csv'
            - 'findstr /i "lsass"'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Renamed CreateDump Utility Execution
id: 1a1ed54a-2ba4-4221-94d5-01dee560d71e
related:
    - id: 515c8be5-e5df-4c5e-8f6d-a4a2f05e4b48
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects uses of a renamed legitimate createdump.exe LOLOBIN utility to dump process memory
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/
    - https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-20
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pe:
        OriginalFileName: 'FX_VER_INTERNALNAME_STR'
    selection_cli:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' -u ' # Short version of '--full'
              - ' -f ' # Short version of '--name'
              - '.dmp'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' --full ' # Short version of '--full'
              - ' --name ' # Short version of '--name'
              - '.dmp'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\createdump.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Command lines that use the same flags
level: high

title: Potential Windows Defender AV Bypass Via Dump64.EXE Rename
id: 129966c9-de17-4334-a123-8b58172e664d
status: test
description: |
    Detects when a user is potentially trying to bypass the Windows Defender AV by renaming a tool to dump64.exe and placing it in the Visual Studio folder.
    Currently the rule is covering only usage of procdump but other utilities can be added in order to increase coverage.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1460597833917251595
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-26
modified: 2024-06-21
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_dump:
        Image|startswith: ':\Program Files'
        Image|contains: '\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
        Image|endswith: '\dump64.exe'
    selection_tools_procdump:
        - OriginalFileName: 'procdump'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - ' -ma ' # Full Dump
              - ' -mp ' # Mini Plus
    condition: selection_dump and 1 of selection_tools_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Time Travel Debugging Utility Usage
id: 0b4ae027-2a2d-4b93-8c7e-962caaba5b2a
related:
    - id: e76c8240-d68f-4773-8880-5c6f63595aaf
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects usage of Time Travel Debugging Utility. Adversaries can execute malicious processes and dump processes, such as lsass.exe, via tttracer.exe.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Tttracer/
    - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1196390321783025666
    - https://twitter.com/oulusoyum/status/1191329746069655553
author: 'Ensar Şamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative'
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\tttracer.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage by software developers/testers
level: high

title: LSASS Dump Keyword In CommandLine
id: ffa6861c-4461-4f59-8a41-578c39f3f23e
related:
    - id: a5a2d357-1ab8-4675-a967-ef9990a59391
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the presence of the keywords "lsass" and ".dmp" in the commandline, which could indicate a potential attempt to dump or create a dump of the lsass process.
references:
    - https://github.com/Hackndo/lsassy
    - https://medium.com/@markmotig/some-ways-to-dump-lsass-exe-c4a75fdc49bf
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_memdump_file_created.toml
    - https://www.whiteoaksecurity.com/blog/attacks-defenses-dumping-lsass-no-mimikatz/
    - https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump
    - https://github.com/CCob/MirrorDump
author: E.M. Anhaus, Tony Lambert, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2023-08-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'lsass.dmp'
              - 'lsass.zip'
              - 'lsass.rar'
              - 'Andrew.dmp'
              - 'Coredump.dmp'
              - 'NotLSASS.zip'  # https://github.com/CCob/MirrorDump
              - 'lsass_2'  # default format of procdump v9.0 is lsass_YYMMDD_HHmmss.dmp
              - 'lsassdump'
              - 'lsassdmp'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'lsass'
              - '.dmp'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'SQLDmpr'
              - '.mdmp'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'nanodump'
              - '.dmp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: CreateDump Process Dump
id: 515c8be5-e5df-4c5e-8f6d-a4a2f05e4b48
related:
    - id: 1a1ed54a-2ba4-4221-94d5-01dee560d71e
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects uses of the createdump.exe LOLOBIN utility to dump process memory
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/
    - https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-04
modified: 2022-08-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\createdump.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'FX_VER_INTERNALNAME_STR'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -u ' # Short version of '--full'
            - ' --full '
            - ' -f ' # Short version of '--name'
            - ' --name '
            - '.dmp '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Command lines that use the same flags
level: high

title: Process Memory Dump Via Comsvcs.DLL
id: 646ea171-dded-4578-8a4d-65e9822892e3
related:
    - id: 09e6d5c0-05b8-4ff8-9eeb-043046ec774c
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects a process memory dump via "comsvcs.dll" using rundll32, covering multiple different techniques (ordinal, minidump function, etc.)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/shantanukhande/status/1229348874298388484
    - https://twitter.com/pythonresponder/status/1385064506049630211?s=21
    - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1224848930795552769
    - https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817
    - https://twitter.com/Wietze/status/1542107456507203586
    - https://github.com/Hackndo/lsassy/blob/14d8f8ae596ecf22b449bfe919829173b8a07635/lsassy/dumpmethod/comsvcs.py
    - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52tAmVLg1KM&t=2070s
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Modexp, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-02-18
modified: 2025-02-23
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - car.2013-05-009
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'rundll32'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'comsvcs'
            - 'full'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '#-'
            - '#+'
            - '#24'
            - '24 '
            - 'MiniDump' # Matches MiniDump and MinidumpW
            - '#65560' # ordinal is 16 bit ordinal, so if you make the number large enough (don't fit in 16 bit space), then it normally wraps around.  for e.g ordinal 24 can be also represented by 65560 (65536+24)
    selection_generic:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '24'
            - 'comsvcs'
            - 'full'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' #'
            - ',#'
            - ', #'
            - '"#'
    condition: (selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*) or selection_generic
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: HackTool - XORDump Execution
id: 66e563f9-1cbd-4a22-a957-d8b7c0f44372
status: test
description: Detects suspicious use of XORDump process memory dumping utility
references:
    - https://github.com/audibleblink/xordump
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-28
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\xordump.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - ' -process lsass.exe '
              - ' -m comsvcs '
              - ' -m dbghelp '
              - ' -m dbgcore '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Another tool that uses the command line switches of XORdump
level: high

title: Suspicious DumpMinitool Execution
id: eb1c4225-1c23-4241-8dd4-051389fde4ce
status: test
description: Detects suspicious ways to use the "DumpMinitool.exe" binary
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1511415432888131586
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1511489821247684615
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/DumpMinitool/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-06
modified: 2023-04-12
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\DumpMinitool.exe'
              - '\DumpMinitool.x86.exe'
              - '\DumpMinitool.arm64.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'DumpMinitool.exe'
              - 'DumpMinitool.x86.exe'
              - 'DumpMinitool.arm64.exe'
    filter_folder:
        Image|contains:
            - '\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
            - '\Extensions\'  # https://github.com/microsoft/vstest/blob/b2e2126f1aa7e5753cafe9515563c99ade6a59ce/src/package/nuspec/Microsoft.TestPlatform.Portable.nuspec#L159
    susp_flags:
        CommandLine|contains: '.txt'
    cmd_has_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' Full'
            - ' Mini'
            - ' WithHeap'
    filter_cmd_misses_flags:
        CommandLine|contains: '--dumpType'
    condition: selection and ( ( not filter_folder ) or susp_flags or ( cmd_has_flags and not filter_cmd_misses_flags ) )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential SysInternals ProcDump Evasion
id: 79b06761-465f-4f88-9ef2-150e24d3d737
status: test
description: Detects uses of the SysInternals ProcDump utility in which ProcDump or its output get renamed, or a dump file is moved or copied to a different name
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1480785527901204481
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-11
modified: 2023-05-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'copy procdump'
            - 'move procdump'
    selection_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'copy '
            - '.dmp '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '2.dmp'
            - 'lsass'
            - 'out.dmp'
    selection_3:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'copy lsass.exe_'  # procdump default pattern e.g. lsass.exe_220111_085234.dmp
            - 'move lsass.exe_'  # procdump default pattern e.g. lsass.exe_220111_085234.dmp
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - False positives are expected in cases in which ProcDump just gets copied to a different directory without any renaming
level: high

title: Potential Credential Dumping Via WER
id: 9a4ccd1a-3526-4d99-b980-9f9c5d3a6ff3
status: test
description: Detects potential credential dumping via Windows Error Reporting LSASS Shtinkering technique which uses the Windows Error Reporting to dump lsass
references:
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering
    - https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Asaf%20Gilboa%20-%20LSASS%20Shtinkering%20Abusing%20Windows%20Error%20Reporting%20to%20Dump%20LSASS.pdf
author: '@pbssubhash , Nasreddine Bencherchali'
date: 2022-12-08
modified: 2022-12-09
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\Werfault.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'WerFault.exe'
    selection_cli:
        ParentUser|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
        User|contains:
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            # Doc: WerFault.exe -u -p <target process> -ip <source process> -s <file mapping handle>
            # Example: C:\Windows\system32\Werfault.exe -u -p 744 -ip 1112 -s 244
            # If the source process is not equal to the target process and the target process is LSASS then this is an indication of this technique
            # Example: If the "-p" points the PID of "lsass.exe" and "-ip" points to a different process than "lsass.exe" then this is a sign of malicious activity
            - ' -u -p '
            - ' -ip '
            - ' -s '
    filter_lsass:
        ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Windows Error Reporting might produce similar behavior. In that case, check the PID associated with the "-p" parameter in the CommandLine.
level: high

title: HackTool - Doppelanger LSASS Dumper Execution
id: d474c8fe-bb69-4ea0-b7d9-f682b56d52d3
status: experimental
description: Detects the execution of the Doppelanger hacktool which is used to dump LSASS memory via process cloning while evading common detection methods
references:
    - https://labs.yarix.com/2025/06/doppelganger-an-advanced-lsass-dumper-with-process-cloning/
    - https://github.com/vari-sh/RedTeamGrimoire/tree/668e0357072546065729ad623f8c02f7be21bb08/Doppelganger
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-07-01
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\Doppelganger.exe'
        - Hashes|contains:
              - 'IMPHASH=AB94D5217896ADCD765A06B2D52F0AEB'
              - 'IMPHASH=65F0EA61156EE0C2A35421926F0C7F78'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - Mimikatz Execution
id: a642964e-bead-4bed-8910-1bb4d63e3b4d
status: test
description: Detection well-known mimikatz command line arguments
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
    - https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community, David ANDRE (additional keywords), Tim Shelton
date: 2019-10-22
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.005
    - attack.t1003.006
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_tools_name:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'DumpCreds'
            - 'mimikatz'
    selection_function_names: # To cover functions from modules that are not in module_names
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '::aadcookie' # misc module
            - '::detours' # misc module
            - '::memssp' # misc module
            - '::mflt' # misc module
            - '::ncroutemon' # misc module
            - '::ngcsign' # misc module
            - '::printnightmare' # misc module
            - '::skeleton' # misc module
            - '::preshutdown'  # service module
            - '::mstsc'  # ts module
            - '::multirdp'  # ts module
    selection_module_names:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'rpc::'
            - 'token::'
            - 'crypto::'
            - 'dpapi::'
            - 'sekurlsa::'
            - 'kerberos::'
            - 'lsadump::'
            - 'privilege::'
            - 'process::'
            - 'vault::'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Adplus.EXE Abuse
id: 2f869d59-7f6a-4931-992c-cce556ff2d53
status: test
description: Detects execution of "AdPlus.exe", a binary that is part of the Windows SDK that can be used as a LOLBIN in order to dump process memory and execute arbitrary commands.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Adplus/
    - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1534916659676422152
    - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1534915321856917506
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-09
modified: 2023-06-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\adplus.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Adplus.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Dump process memory
            - ' -hang '
            - ' -pn '
            - ' -pmn '
            - ' -p '
            - ' -po '
            # Using a config file
            - ' -c '
            # Execute commands inline
            - ' -sc '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of Adplus for debugging purposes
level: high

title: HackTool - WSASS Execution
id: 589ac73f-8e12-409c-964e-31a2f5775ae2
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects execution of WSASS, a tool used to dump LSASS memory on Windows systems by leveraging WER's
    (Windows Error Reporting) WerFaultSecure.EXE to bypass PPL (Protected Process Light) protections.
references:
    - https://github.com/TwoSevenOneT/WSASS
    - https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/09/Dumping-LSASS-With-WER-On-Modern-Windows-11.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-23
modified: 2026-01-09
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\wsass.exe'
    selection_hash:
        Hashes|contains: 'IMPHASH=32F5095C9BBDCACF28FD4060EB4DFC42'
    selection_cli:
        # change to |re|i after Sigma v2.0 release
        # plain string without quotation marks as it has to match for both ' and "
        CommandLine|re: (?i)\.exe[\"\']?\s+[^\"]{0,64}werfaultsecure\.exe[\"\']?\s+\d{2,10} # wsass.exe "path to werfaultsecure" lsass_pid
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_wsass/info.yml

title: Potential LSASS Process Dump Via Procdump
id: 5afee48e-67dd-4e03-a783-f74259dcf998
status: stable
description: |
    Detects potential credential harvesting attempts through LSASS memory dumps using ProcDump.
    This rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns that combine memory dump flags (-ma, -mm, -mp) with LSASS-related process markers.
    LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) contains sensitive authentication data including plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets in memory.
    Attackers commonly dump LSASS memory to extract credentials for lateral movement and privilege escalation.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump
    - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/3742ebfe-64c2-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
    - https://x.com/wietze/status/1958302556033065292?s=12
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-10-30
modified: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - car.2013-05-009
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' -ma '
            - ' -mm ' # Mini dump
            - ' -mp ' # Miniplus dump
    selection_process:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' ls' # Short for lsass
            - ' keyiso'
            - ' samss'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, because no one should dump an lsass process memory
    - Another tool that uses command line flags similar to ProcDump
level: high

title: Process Memory Dump via RdrLeakDiag.EXE
id: edadb1e5-5919-4e4c-8462-a9e643b02c4b
related:
    - id: 6355a919-2e97-4285-a673-74645566340d
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the use of the Microsoft Windows Resource Leak Diagnostic tool "rdrleakdiag.exe" to dump process memory
references:
    - https://www.pureid.io/dumping-abusing-windows-credentials-part-1/
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rdrleakdiag/
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1299071304805560321?s=21
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2024/06/05/operation-crimson-palace-a-technical-deep-dive
author: Cedric MAURUGEON, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-09-24
modified: 2024-08-15
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rdrleakdiag.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: RdrLeakDiag.exe
    selection_cli_dump:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - '/memdmp'
            - 'fullmemdmp'
    selection_cli_output_process:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' /o ' # Output
            - ' /p ' # Process
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: HackTool - HandleKatz LSASS Dumper Execution
id: ca621ba5-54ab-4035-9942-d378e6fcde3c
status: test
description: Detects the use of HandleKatz, a tool that demonstrates the usage of cloned handles to Lsass in order to create an obfuscated memory dump of the same
references:
    - https://github.com/codewhitesec/HandleKatz
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-18
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_loader_img:
        Image|endswith: '\loader.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '--pid:'
    selection_loader_imphash:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'IMPHASH=38D9E015591BBFD4929E0D0F47FA0055'
            - 'IMPHASH=0E2216679CA6E1094D63322E3412D650'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '--pid:'
            - '--outfile:'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.dmp'
            - 'lsass'
            - '.obf'
            - 'dump'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PPL Tampering Via WerFaultSecure
id: 1f0b4cac-9c81-41f4-95d0-8475ff46b3e2
related:
    - id: 387df17d-3b04-448f-8669-9e7fd5e5fd8c
      type: similar
    - id: 8a2f4b1c-3d5e-4f7a-9b2c-1e4f6d8a9c2b
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects potential abuse of WerFaultSecure.exe to dump Protected Process Light (PPL) processes like LSASS or to freeze security solutions (EDR/antivirus).
    This technique is used by tools such as EDR-Freeze and WSASS to bypass PPL protections and access sensitive information or disable security software.
    Distinct command line patterns help identify the specific tool:
    - WSASS usage typically shows: "WSASS.exe WerFaultSecure.exe [PID]" in ParentCommandLine
    - EDR-Freeze usage typically shows: "EDR-Freeze_[version].exe [PID] [timeout]" in ParentCommandLine
    Legitimate debugging operations using WerFaultSecure are rare in production environments and should be investigated.
references:
    - https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/09/EDR-Freeze-Puts-EDRs-Antivirus-Into-Coma.html
    - https://github.com/TwoSevenOneT/EDR-Freeze/blob/a7f61030b36fbde89871f393488f7075d2aa89f6/EDR-Freeze.cpp#L53
    - https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/09/Dumping-LSASS-With-WER-On-Modern-Windows-11.html
    - https://github.com/TwoSevenOneT/WSASS/blob/2c8fd9fa32143e7bc9f066e9511c6f8a57bc64b5/WSASS.cpp#L251
author: Jason (https://github.com/0xbcf)
date: 2025-09-23
modified: 2025-11-23
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_image:
        - Image|endswith: '\WerFaultSecure.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'WerFaultSecure.exe'
    selection_args:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' /h '
            - ' /pid ' # Antimalware or EDR process pid will be after this flag
            - ' /tid '
            - ' /encfile '
            - ' /cancel '
            - ' /type '
            - ' 268310'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of WerFaultSecure for debugging purposes
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_werfaultsecure_abuse/info.yml

title: Process Access via TrolleyExpress Exclusion
id: 4c0aaedc-154c-4427-ada0-d80ef9c9deb6
status: test
description: Detects a possible process memory dump that uses the white-listed Citrix TrolleyExpress.exe filename as a way to dump the lsass process memory
references:
    - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1491557187168178176
    - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ie831jF0bb0
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-10
modified: 2022-05-13
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
      # We assume that the lsass.exe process has a process ID that's between 700 and 999 and the dumper uses just the PID as parameter
            - '\TrolleyExpress 7'
            - '\TrolleyExpress 8'
            - '\TrolleyExpress 9'
            - '\TrolleyExpress.exe 7'
            - '\TrolleyExpress.exe 8'
            - '\TrolleyExpress.exe 9'
      # Common dumpers
            - '\TrolleyExpress.exe -ma '
    renamed:
        Image|endswith: '\TrolleyExpress.exe'
    filter_renamed:
        OriginalFileName|contains: 'CtxInstall'
    filter_empty:
        OriginalFileName: null
    condition: selection or ( renamed and not 1 of filter* )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - CreateMiniDump Execution
id: 36d88494-1d43-4dc0-b3fa-35c8fea0ca9d
status: test
description: Detects the use of CreateMiniDump hack tool used to dump the LSASS process memory for credential extraction on the attacker's machine
references:
    - https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsass-passwords-without-mimikatz-minidumpwritedump-av-signature-bypass
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-12-22
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\CreateMiniDump.exe'
        - Hashes|contains: 'IMPHASH=4a07f944a83e8a7c2525efa35dd30e2f'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Process Access to LSASS with Dbgcore/Dbghelp DLLs
id: 9f5c1d59-33be-4e60-bcab-85d2f566effd
related:
    - id: 416bc4a2-7217-4519-8dc7-c3271817f1d5
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious process access to LSASS.exe from processes located in uncommon locations with dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll in the call trace.
    These DLLs contain functions like MiniDumpWriteDump that can be abused for credential dumping purposes. While modern tools like Mimikatz have moved to using ntdll.dll,
    dbgcore.dll and dbghelp.dll are still used by basic credential dumping utilities and legacy tools for LSASS memory access and process suspension techniques.
references:
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/you-bet-your-lsass-hunting-lsass-access.html
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpwritedump
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_lsass_calltrace:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        CallTrace|contains:
            - 'dbgcore.dll'
            - 'dbghelp.dll'
    # The following selection is commented out and not enabled by default because any access to LSASS with dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll in the call trace from uncommon locations is assumed to be suspicious,
    # but it may reduce false positives if the rule is too noisy. These GrantedAccess bits are commonly used for dumping LSASS memory.
    # Uncomment if you observe false positives with the default rule.
    # selection_granted_access:
    #     GrantedAccess|contains:
    #         - '0x1fffff'
    #         - '0x10'
    #         - '0x1010'
    #         - '0x1410'
    #         - '0x1438'
    selection_susp_location:
        SourceImage|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - '\$Recycle.Bin\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Contacts\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Documents\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Favorites\'
            - '\Favourites\'
            - '\inetpub\wwwroot\'
            - '\Music\'
            - '\Pictures\'
            - '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - '\Users\Default\'
            - '\Videos\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Possibly during software installation or update processes
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_susp_dbgcore_dbghelp_load/info.yml

title: Lsass Memory Dump via Comsvcs DLL
id: a49fa4d5-11db-418c-8473-1e014a8dd462
status: test
description: Detects adversaries leveraging the MiniDump export function from comsvcs.dll via rundll32 to perform a memory dump from lsass.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/shantanukhande/status/1229348874298388484
    - https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-20
modified: 2023-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        SourceImage|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CallTrace|contains: 'comsvcs.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: LSASS Memory Access by Tool With Dump Keyword In Name
id: 9bd012ee-0dff-44d7-84a0-aa698cfd87a3
status: test
description: Detects LSASS process access requests from a source process with the "dump" keyword in its image name.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1491557187168178176
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dump-credentials-from-lsass-process-without-mimikatz
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-10
modified: 2023-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.s0002
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        SourceImage|contains: 'dump'
        GrantedAccess|endswith:
            - '10'
            - '30'
            - '50'
            - '70'
            - '90'
            - 'B0'
            - 'D0'
            - 'F0'
            - '18'
            - '38'
            - '58'
            - '78'
            - '98'
            - 'B8'
            - 'D8'
            - 'F8'
            - '1A'
            - '3A'
            - '5A'
            - '7A'
            - '9A'
            - 'BA'
            - 'DA'
            - 'FA'
            - '0x14C2'  # https://github.com/b4rtik/ATPMiniDump/blob/76304f93b390af3bb66e4f451ca16562a479bdc9/ATPMiniDump/ATPMiniDump.c
            - 'FF'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare programs that contain the word dump in their name and access lsass
level: high

title: Remote LSASS Process Access Through Windows Remote Management
id: aa35a627-33fb-4d04-a165-d33b4afca3e8
status: stable
description: Detects remote access to the LSASS process via WinRM. This could be a sign of credential dumping from tools like mimikatz.
references:
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/
author: Patryk Prauze - ING Tech
date: 2019-05-20
modified: 2023-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.006
    - attack.s0002
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        SourceImage|endswith: ':\Windows\system32\wsmprovhost.exe'
    filter_main_access:
        GrantedAccess: '0x80000000'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: HackTool - Generic Process Access
id: d0d2f720-d14f-448d-8242-51ff396a334e
status: test
description: Detects process access requests from hacktool processes based on their default image name
references:
    - https://jsecurity101.medium.com/bypassing-access-mask-auditing-strategies-480fb641c158
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/you-bet-your-lsass-hunting-lsass-access.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-11-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.s0002
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - SourceImage|endswith:
              - '\Akagi.exe'
              - '\Akagi64.exe'
              - '\atexec_windows.exe'
              - '\Certify.exe'
              - '\Certipy.exe'
              - '\CoercedPotato.exe'
              - '\crackmapexec.exe'
              - '\CreateMiniDump.exe'
              - '\dcomexec_windows.exe'
              - '\dpapi_windows.exe'
              - '\findDelegation_windows.exe'
              - '\GetADUsers_windows.exe'
              - '\GetNPUsers_windows.exe'
              - '\getPac_windows.exe'
              - '\getST_windows.exe'
              - '\getTGT_windows.exe'
              - '\GetUserSPNs_windows.exe'
              - '\gmer.exe'
              - '\hashcat.exe'
              - '\htran.exe'
              - '\ifmap_windows.exe'
              - '\impersonate.exe'
              - '\Inveigh.exe'
              - '\LocalPotato.exe'
              - '\mimikatz_windows.exe'
              - '\mimikatz.exe'
              - '\netview_windows.exe'
              - '\nmapAnswerMachine_windows.exe'
              - '\opdump_windows.exe'
              - '\PasswordDump.exe'
              - '\Potato.exe'
              - '\PowerTool.exe'
              - '\PowerTool64.exe'
              - '\psexec_windows.exe'
              - '\PurpleSharp.exe'
              - '\pypykatz.exe'
              - '\QuarksPwDump.exe'
              - '\rdp_check_windows.exe'
              - '\Rubeus.exe'
              - '\SafetyKatz.exe'
              - '\sambaPipe_windows.exe'
              - '\SelectMyParent.exe'
              - '\SharpChisel.exe'
              - '\SharPersist.exe'
              - '\SharpEvtMute.exe'
              - '\SharpImpersonation.exe'
              - '\SharpLDAPmonitor.exe'
              - '\SharpLdapWhoami.exe'
              - '\SharpUp.exe'
              - '\SharpView.exe'
              - '\smbclient_windows.exe'
              - '\smbserver_windows.exe'
              - '\sniff_windows.exe'
              - '\sniffer_windows.exe'
              - '\split_windows.exe'
              - '\SpoolSample.exe'
              - '\Stracciatella.exe'
              - '\SysmonEOP.exe'
              - '\temp\rot.exe'
              - '\ticketer_windows.exe'
              - '\TruffleSnout.exe'
              - '\winPEASany_ofs.exe'
              - '\winPEASany.exe'
              - '\winPEASx64_ofs.exe'
              - '\winPEASx64.exe'
              - '\winPEASx86_ofs.exe'
              - '\winPEASx86.exe'
              - '\xordump.exe'
        - SourceImage|contains:
              - '\goldenPac'
              - '\just_dce_'
              - '\karmaSMB'
              - '\kintercept'
              - '\LocalPotato'
              - '\ntlmrelayx'
              - '\rpcdump'
              - '\samrdump'
              - '\secretsdump'
              - '\smbexec'
              - '\smbrelayx'
              - '\wmiexec'
              - '\wmipersist'
              - 'HotPotato'
              - 'Juicy Potato'
              - 'JuicyPotato'
              - 'PetitPotam'
              - 'RottenPotato'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: LSASS Access From Potentially White-Listed Processes
id: 4be8b654-0c01-4c9d-a10c-6b28467fc651
status: test
description: |
    Detects a possible process memory dump that uses a white-listed filename like TrolleyExpress.exe as a way to dump the LSASS process memory without Microsoft Defender interference
references:
    - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1491557187168178176
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dump-credentials-from-lsass-process-without-mimikatz
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1460597833917251595
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-10
modified: 2023-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.s0002
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        SourceImage|endswith:
            - '\TrolleyExpress.exe'  # Citrix
            - '\ProcessDump.exe'     # Cisco Jabber
            - '\dump64.exe'          # Visual Studio
        GrantedAccess|endswith:
            - '10'
            - '30'
            - '50'
            - '70'
            - '90'
            - 'B0'
            - 'D0'
            - 'F0'
            - '18'
            - '38'
            - '58'
            - '78'
            - '98'
            - 'B8'
            - 'D8'
            - 'F8'
            - '1A'
            - '3A'
            - '5A'
            - '7A'
            - '9A'
            - 'BA'
            - 'DA'
            - 'FA'
            - '0x14C2'  # https://github.com/b4rtik/ATPMiniDump/blob/76304f93b390af3bb66e4f451ca16562a479bdc9/ATPMiniDump/ATPMiniDump.c
            - 'FF'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious LSASS Access Via MalSecLogon
id: 472159c5-31b9-4f56-b794-b766faa8b0a7
status: test
description: Detects suspicious access to LSASS handle via a call trace to "seclogon.dll" with a suspicious access right.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1541920424635912196
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/2bc1795f3d7bcc3946452eb4f07ae799a756d94e/rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_handle_via_malseclogon.toml
    - https://splintercod3.blogspot.com/p/the-hidden-side-of-seclogon-part-3.html
author: Samir Bousseaden (original elastic rule), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        SourceImage|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        GrantedAccess: '0x14c0'
        CallTrace|contains: 'seclogon.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Credential Dumping Activity By Python Based Tool
id: f8be3e82-46a3-4e4e-ada5-8e538ae8b9c9
related:
    - id: 4b9a8556-99c4-470b-a40c-9c8d02c77ed0
      type: obsolete
    - id: 7186e989-4ed7-4f4e-a656-4674b9e3e48b
      type: obsolete
status: stable
description: Detects LSASS process access for potential credential dumping by a Python-like tool such as LaZagne or Pypykatz.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/bh4b3sh/status/1303674603819081728
    - https://github.com/skelsec/pypykatz
author: Bhabesh Raj, Jonhnathan Ribeiro
date: 2023-11-27
modified: 2023-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.s0349
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        CallTrace|contains|all:
            - '_ctypes.pyd+'
            - ':\Windows\System32\KERNELBASE.dll+'
            - ':\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+'
        CallTrace|contains:
            - 'python27.dll+'
            - 'python3*.dll+'
        GrantedAccess: '0x1FFFFF'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - HandleKatz Duplicating LSASS Handle
id: b1bd3a59-c1fd-4860-9f40-4dd161a7d1f5
status: test
description: Detects HandleKatz opening LSASS to duplicate its handle to later dump the memory without opening any new handles
references:
    - https://github.com/codewhitesec/HandleKatz
author: Bhabesh Raj (rule), @thefLinkk
date: 2022-06-27
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe' # Theoretically, can be any benign process holding handle to LSASS
        GrantedAccess: '0x1440' # Only PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION
        # Example: C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+9d234\|UNKNOWN(00000000001C119B)
        CallTrace|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll+'
        CallTrace|contains: '|UNKNOWN('
        CallTrace|endswith: ')'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Credential Dumping Attempt Via WerFault
id: e5b33f7d-eb93-48b6-9851-09e1e610b6d7
status: test
description: Detects process LSASS memory dump using Mimikatz, NanoDump, Invoke-Mimikatz, Procdump or Taskmgr based on the CallTrace pointing to ntdll.dll, dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll for win10, server2016 and up.
references:
    - https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump/commit/578116faea3d278d53d70ea932e2bbfe42569507
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2012-06-27
modified: 2023-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.s0002
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        SourceImage|endswith: '\WerFault.exe'
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        GrantedAccess: '0x1FFFFF'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Actual failures in lsass.exe that trigger a crash dump (unlikely)
    - Unknown cases in which WerFault accesses lsass.exe
level: high

title: Suspicious Renamed Comsvcs DLL Loaded By Rundll32
id: 8cde342c-ba48-4b74-b615-172c330f2e93
status: test
description: Detects rundll32 loading a renamed comsvcs.dll to dump process memory
references:
    - https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1555200155351228419
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-14
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        Hashes|contains:
            # Add more hashes for other windows versions
            - IMPHASH=eed93054cb555f3de70eaa9787f32ebb # Windows 11 21H2 x64
            - IMPHASH=5e0dbdec1fce52daae251a110b4f309d # Windows 10 1607
            - IMPHASH=eadbccbb324829acb5f2bbe87e5549a8 # Windows 10 1809
            - IMPHASH=407ca0f7b523319d758a40d7c0193699 # Windows 10 2004 x64
            - IMPHASH=281d618f4e6271e527e6386ea6f748de # Windows 10 2004 x86
    filter:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\comsvcs.dll'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Time Travel Debugging Utility Usage - Image
id: e76c8240-d68f-4773-8880-5c6f63595aaf
status: test
description: Detects usage of Time Travel Debugging Utility. Adversaries can execute malicious processes and dump processes, such as lsass.exe, via tttracer.exe.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Tttracer/
    - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1196390321783025666
    - https://twitter.com/oulusoyum/status/1191329746069655553
author: 'Ensar Şamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative'
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\ttdrecord.dll'
            - '\ttdwriter.dll'
            - '\ttdloader.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage by software developers/testers
level: high

title: Suspicious Unsigned Dbghelp/Dbgcore DLL Loaded
id: bdc64095-d59a-42a2-8588-71fd9c9d9abc
related:
    - id: 0e277796-5f23-4e49-a490-483131d4f6e1 # Suspicious Loading
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects the load of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL (used to make memory dumps) by suspicious processes.
    Tools like ProcessHacker and some attacker tradecract use MiniDumpWriteDump API found in dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll.
    As an example, SilentTrynity C2 Framework has a module that leverages this API to dump the contents of Lsass.exe and transfer it over the network back to the attacker's machine.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump
    - https://www.pinvoke.net/default.aspx/dbghelp/MiniDumpWriteDump.html
    - https://medium.com/@fsx30/bypass-edrs-memory-protection-introduction-to-hooking-2efb21acffd6
author: Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community, Ecco
date: 2019-10-27
modified: 2022-12-09
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\dbghelp.dll'
            - '\dbgcore.dll'
        Signed: 'false'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Mimikatz Use
id: 06d71506-7beb-4f22-8888-e2e5e2ca7fd8
status: test
description: This method detects mimikatz keywords in different Eventlogs (some of them only appear in older Mimikatz version that are however still used by different threat groups)
references:
    - https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE (additional keywords)
date: 2017-01-10
modified: 2022-01-05
tags:
    - attack.s0002
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.credential-access
    - car.2013-07-001
    - car.2019-04-004
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.006
logsource:
    product: windows
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'dpapi::masterkey'
        - 'eo.oe.kiwi'
        - 'event::clear'
        - 'event::drop'
        - 'gentilkiwi.com'
        - 'kerberos::golden'
        - 'kerberos::ptc'
        - 'kerberos::ptt'
        - 'kerberos::tgt'
        - 'Kiwi Legit Printer'
        - 'lsadump::'
        - 'mimidrv.sys'
        - '\mimilib.dll'
        - 'misc::printnightmare'
        - 'misc::shadowcopies'
        - 'misc::skeleton'
        - 'privilege::backup'
        - 'privilege::debug'
        - 'privilege::driver'
        - 'sekurlsa::'
    filter:
        EventID: 15  # Sysmon's FileStream Events (could cause false positives when Sigma rules get copied on/to a system)
    condition: keywords and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Naughty administrators
    - AV Signature updates
    - Files with Mimikatz in their filename
level: high

title: LSASS Process Crashed - Application
id: a18e0862-127b-43ca-be12-1a542c75c7c5
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects Windows error reporting events where the process that crashed is LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service).
    This could be the cause of a provoked crash by techniques such as Lsass-Shtinkering to dump credentials.
references:
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering
    - https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Asaf%20Gilboa%20-%20LSASS%20Shtinkering%20Abusing%20Windows%20Error%20Reporting%20to%20Dump%20LSASS.pdf
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-erref/596a1078-e883-4972-9bbc-49e60bebca55
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-07
modified: 2025-12-03
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Application Error'
        EventID: 1000
        AppName: 'lsass.exe'
        ExceptionCode: 'c0000001' # STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate crashing of the lsass process
level: high

title: Password Dumper Activity on LSASS
id: aa1697b7-d611-4f9a-9cb2-5125b4ccfd5c
status: test
description: Detects process handle on LSASS process with certain access mask and object type SAM_DOMAIN
references:
    - https://twitter.com/jackcr/status/807385668833968128
author: sigma
date: 2017-02-12
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4656
        ProcessName|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        AccessMask: '0x705'
        ObjectType: 'SAM_DOMAIN'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution - Security
id: f0d1feba-4344-4ca9-8121-a6c97bd6df52
related:
    - id: 4976aa50-8f41-45c6-8b15-ab3fc10e79ed
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution events
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2017-03-05
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.005
    - attack.t1003.006
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.s0005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - 'cachedump'
            - 'dumpsvc'
            - 'fgexec'
            - 'gsecdump'
            - 'mimidrv'
            - 'pwdump'
            - 'servpw'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Administrator using credential dumping tool for password recovery
level: high

title: LSASS Access Detected via Attack Surface Reduction
id: a0a278fe-2c0e-4de2-ac3c-c68b08a9ba98
status: test
description: Detects Access to LSASS Process
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction
author: Markus Neis
date: 2018-08-26
modified: 2022-08-13
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: windefend
    definition: 'Requirements:Enabled Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe) from Attack Surface Reduction (GUID: 9e6c4e1f-7d60-472f-ba1a-a39ef669e4b2)'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 1121
        Path|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
    filter_thor:
        ProcessName|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\'
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\thor64.exe'
            - '\thor.exe'
    filter_exact:
        ProcessName:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\atiesrxx.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\nvwmi64.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\Taskmgr.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe'
    filter_begins:
        ProcessName|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\'
            - 'C:\WINDOWS\Installer\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Google Chrome GoogleUpdate.exe
    - Some Taskmgr.exe related activity
level: high