title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - Security
id: fd0f5778-d3cb-4c9a-9695-66759d04702a
related:
    - id: 51aa9387-1c53-4153-91cc-d73c59ae1ca9
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references
references:
    - https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888
author: Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community
date: 2019-11-08
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 4697
    selection_servicefilename:
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\['
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\['
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\['
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$env:ComSpec\[(\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}'
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name'
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$VerbosePreference\.ToString\('
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - Security
id: cd0f7229-d16f-42de-8fe3-fba365fbcb3a
related:
    - id: 641a4bfb-c017-44f7-800c-2aee0184ce9b
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task30)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - '&&'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - 'shellexec_rundll'
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - value
            - invoke
            - comspec
            - iex
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - Security
id: 0c718a5e-4284-4fb9-b4d9-b9a50b3a1974
related:
    - id: 72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 25)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - 'powershell'
    selection2:
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - '${input}'
            - 'noexit'
    selection3:
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - ' /c '
            - ' /r '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Password Protected ZIP File Opened (Email Attachment)
id: 571498c8-908e-40b4-910b-d2369159a3da
status: test
description: Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives. See the filename variable for more details on which file has been opened.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1523383197513379841
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5379
        TargetName|contains|all:
            - 'Microsoft_Windows_Shell_ZipFolder:filename'
            - '\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate used of encrypted ZIP files
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - Security
id: dcf2db1f-f091-425b-a821-c05875b8925a
related:
    - id: 8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 24)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        # ServiceFileName|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r)(?:\s|)\"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*\"'
        # Example 1: C:\winDoWs\SySTeM32\cmd.Exe /C"SET NOtI=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& PowERshElL -NOl SET-iteM ( 'VAR' + 'i'+ 'A' + 'blE:Ao6' + 'I0') ( [TYpe](\"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-F 'iRoN','mENT','e','nv') ) ; ${exECUtIONCOnTEXT}.\"IN`VO`KecOmMaND\".\"inVo`KES`crIPt\"( ( ( GEt-VAriAble ( 'a' + 'o6I0') -vaLU )::(\"{1}{4}{2}{3}{0}\" -f'e','gETenvIR','NtvaRIa','BL','ONme' ).Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'n','oti' ),( \"{0}{1}\" -f'pRoC','esS') )) )"
        # Example 2: cMD.exe /C "seT SlDb=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& pOWErShell .(( ^&(\"{1}{0}{2}{3}\" -f 'eT-vaR','G','iab','lE' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f '*m','DR*' ) ).\"na`ME\"[3,11,2]-JOIN'' ) ( ( ^&(\"{0}{1}\" -f'g','CI' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f 'ENV',':SlDb' ) ).\"VA`luE\" ) "
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '"set'
            - '-f'
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - '/c'
            - '/r'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - Security
id: 4edf51e1-cb83-4e1a-bc39-800e396068e3
related:
    - id: f7385ee2-0e0c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '&&'
            - 'clipboard]::'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - Security
id: 9b8d9203-4e0f-4cd9-bb06-4cc4ea6d0e9a
related:
    - id: 7e9c7999-0f9b-4d4a-a6ed-af6d553d4af4
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task31)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'mshta'
            - 'vbscript:createobject'
            - '.run'
            - 'window.close'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - System
id: f7385ee2-0e0c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2023-02-20
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '&&'
            - 'clipboard]::'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - System
id: 641a4bfb-c017-44f7-800c-2aee0184ce9b
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task30)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - '&&'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - 'shellexec_rundll'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - 'value'
            - 'invoke'
            - 'comspec'
            - 'iex'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - System
id: 487c7524-f892-4054-b263-8a0ace63fc25
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task28)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        # ImagePath|re: '(?i)(set).*&&\s?set.*(environment|invoke|\${?input).*&&.*"'
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'set'
            - '&&'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - 'environment'
            - 'invoke'
            - 'input'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - System
id: 63e3365d-4824-42d8-8b82-e56810fefa0c
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task29)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ImagePath|contains: '(Clipboard|i'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - System
id: 72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 25)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_main:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        # ImagePath|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r).+powershell.+(?:\$\{?input\}?|noexit).+\"'
        # Example 1: c:\windows\sYstEm32\CmD.eXE /C"echO\Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -NoEXiT -"
        # Example 2: c:\WiNDOws\sysTEm32\cmd.EXe /C " ECHo Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -nol ${EXEcUtIONCONTeXT}.INvOkEComMANd.InvOKEScRIPt( $InpUt )"
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - 'powershell'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - '/c'
            - '/r'
    selection_other:
        - ImagePath|contains: 'noexit'
        - ImagePath|contains|all:
              - 'input'
              - '$'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - System
id: 7e9c7999-0f9b-4d4a-a6ed-af6d553d4af4
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task31)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'mshta'
            - 'vbscript:createobject'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - System
id: 14bcba49-a428-42d9-b943-e2ce0f0f7ae6
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task27)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        # ImagePath|re: '(?i)&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\\"\s+?\-f.*&&.*cmd.*\/c' # FPs with |\/r
        # Example 1: CMD /C"sET KUR=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&Set MxI=C:\wINDowS\sYsWow64\winDOWspoWERSheLl\V1.0\PowerShelL.EXe ${ExEcut`IoN`cON`TExT}.\"invo`kEcoMm`A`ND\".( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f 'pt','EscRi','INvOk' ).Invoke( ( .( \"{0}{1}\" -f'D','IR' ) ( \"{0}{1}\"-f'ENV:kU','R')).\"vAl`Ue\" )&& CMD /C%mXI%"
        # Example 2: c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C "sEt DeJLz=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&set yBKM=PoWERShelL -noeX ^^^&(\"{2}{0}{1}\"-f '-ItE','m','seT') ( 'V' + 'a'+ 'RiAblE:z8J' +'U2' + 'l' ) ([TYpE]( \"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-f 'e','NT','e','NViRONM' ) ) ; ^^^& ( ( [sTrIng]${VE`Rbo`SepReFER`Ence})[1,3] + 'X'-joIN'')( ( (.('gI') ('V' + 'a' + 'RIAbLe:z8j' + 'u2' +'l' ) ).vALUe::( \"{2}{5}{0}{1}{6}{4}{3}\" -f 'IRo','Nm','GETE','ABlE','I','nv','enTVAr').Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'd','ejLz' ),( \"{1}{2}{0}\"-f'cEss','P','RO') )) )&& c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C %ybkm%"
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - '&&set'
            - 'cmd'
            - '/c'
            - '-f'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - '{0}'
            - '{1}'
            - '{2}'
            - '{3}'
            - '{4}'
            - '{5}'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - System
id: 51aa9387-1c53-4153-91cc-d73c59ae1ca9
status: test
description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references
references:
    - https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888
author: Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community
date: 2019-11-08
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 7045
    selection_imagepath:
        - ImagePath|re: '\$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\['
        - ImagePath|re: '\$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\['
        - ImagePath|re: '\$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\['
        - ImagePath|re: '\$env:ComSpec\[(\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}'
        - ImagePath|re: '\\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name'
        - ImagePath|re: '\$VerbosePreference\.ToString\('
        - ImagePath|re: '\String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - System
id: 8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 24)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        # ImagePath|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r)(?:\s|)\"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*\"'
        # Example 1: C:\winDoWs\SySTeM32\cmd.Exe /C"SET NOtI=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& PowERshElL -NOl SET-iteM ( 'VAR' + 'i'+ 'A' + 'blE:Ao6' + 'I0') ( [TYpe](\"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-F 'iRoN','mENT','e','nv') ) ; ${exECUtIONCOnTEXT}.\"IN`VO`KecOmMaND\".\"inVo`KES`crIPt\"( ( ( GEt-VAriAble ( 'a' + 'o6I0') -vaLU )::(\"{1}{4}{2}{3}{0}\" -f'e','gETenvIR','NtvaRIa','BL','ONme' ).Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'n','oti' ),( \"{0}{1}\" -f'pRoC','esS') )) )"
        # Example 2: cMD.exe /C "seT SlDb=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& pOWErShell .(( ^&(\"{1}{0}{2}{3}\" -f 'eT-vaR','G','iab','lE' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f '*m','DR*' ) ).\"na`ME\"[3,11,2]-JOIN'' ) ( ( ^&(\"{0}{1}\" -f'g','CI' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f 'ENV',':SlDb' ) ).\"VA`luE\" ) "
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '"set'
            - '-f'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - '/c'
            - '/r'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Binary Padding - MacOS
id: 95361ce5-c891-4b0a-87ca-e24607884a96
status: test
description: Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This rule detect using dd and truncate to add a junk data to file.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027.001/T1027.001.md
    - https://linux.die.net/man/1/truncate
    - https://linux.die.net/man/1/dd
author: 'Igor Fits, Mikhail Larin, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-19
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027.001
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_truncate:
        Image|endswith: '/truncate'
        CommandLine|contains: '-s +'
    selection_dd:
        Image|endswith: '/dd'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'if=/dev/zero' # if input is not /dev/zero, then there is no null padding
            - 'if=/dev/random' # high-quality random data
            - 'if=/dev/urandom' # low-quality random data
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate script work
level: high

title: Binary Padding - Linux
id: c52a914f-3d8b-4b2a-bb75-b3991e75f8ba
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware.
    This rule detect using dd and truncate to add a junk data to file.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027.001/T1027.001.md
author: Igor Fits, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2023-05-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027.001
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection_execve:
        type: 'EXECVE'
    keywords_truncate:
        '|all':
            - 'truncate'
            - '-s'
    keywords_dd:
        '|all':
            - 'dd'
            - 'if='
    keywords_filter:
        - 'of='
    condition: selection_execve and (keywords_truncate or (keywords_dd and not keywords_filter))
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Pad Binary to Change Hash - Linux/macOS dd
      technique: T1027.001
      atomic_guid: ffe2346c-abd5-4b45-a713-bf5f1ebd573a

title: PUA - DefenderCheck Execution
id: f0ca6c24-3225-47d5-b1f5-352bf07ecfa7
status: test
description: Detects the use of DefenderCheck, a tool to evaluate the signatures used in Microsoft Defender. It can be used to figure out the strings / byte chains used in Microsoft Defender to detect a tool and thus used for AV evasion.
references:
    - https://github.com/matterpreter/DefenderCheck
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-30
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\DefenderCheck.exe'
        - Description: 'DefenderCheck'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: HackTool - CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation
id: 6f8b3439-a203-45dc-a88b-abf57ea15ccf
status: test
description: The CrachMapExec pentesting framework implements a PowerShell obfuscation with some static strings detected by this rule.
references:
    - https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec
    - https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/0a49f75347b625e81ee6aa8c33d3970b5515ea9e/cme/helpers/powershell.py#L242
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1027.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'join*split'
            # Line 343ff
            - '( $ShellId[1]+$ShellId[13]+''x'')'
            - '( $PSHome[*]+$PSHOME[*]+'
            - '( $env:Public[13]+$env:Public[5]+''x'')'
            - '( $env:ComSpec[4,*,25]-Join'''')'
            - '[1,3]+''x''-Join'''')'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: SharpHound Recon Sessions
id: 6d580420-ff3f-4e0e-b6b0-41b90c787e28
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls useb by SharpHound to map remote connections and local group membership.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-srvs/02b1f559-fda2-4ba3-94c2-806eb2777183
    - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-SRVS.md
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:4b324fc8-1670-01d3-1278-5a47bf6ee188 opnum:12'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid: 4b324fc8-1670-01d3-1278-5a47bf6ee188
        OpNum: 12
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Possible DCSync Attack
id: 56fda488-113e-4ce9-8076-afc2457922c3
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls to MS-DRSR from non DC hosts, which could indicate DCSync / DCShadow attacks.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-drsr/f977faaa-673e-4f66-b9bf-48c640241d47?redirectedfrom=MSDN
    - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-DRSR.md
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.t1033
    - attack.discovery
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes, enable DRSR UUID (e3514235-4b06-11d1-ab04-00c04fc2dcd2) for "dangerous" opcodes (not 0,1 or 12) only from trusted IPs (DCs)'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid: e3514235-4b06-11d1-ab04-00c04fc2dcd2
    filter:
        OpNum:
            - 0
            - 1
            - 12
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Webshell Detection With Command Line Keywords
id: bed2a484-9348-4143-8a8a-b801c979301c
status: test
description: Detects certain command line parameters often used during reconnaissance activity via web shells
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-ii.html
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/bumblebee-webshell-xhunt-campaign/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/threat-advisory-oh-no-cleo-cleo-software-actively-being-exploited-in-the-wild
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Chad Hudson, Matt Anderson
date: 2017-01-01
modified: 2024-12-14
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1033
    - attack.t1087
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_webserver_image:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\w3wp.exe'
            - '\php-cgi.exe'
            - '\nginx.exe'
            - '\httpd.exe'
            - '\caddy.exe'
            - '\ws_tomcatservice.exe'
    selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat1:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\java.exe'
            - '\javaw.exe'
        ParentImage|contains:
            - '-tomcat-'
            - '\tomcat'
    selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat2:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\java.exe'
            - '\javaw.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'catalina.jar'
            - 'CATALINA_HOME'
    selection_susp_net_utility:
        OriginalFileName:
            - 'net.exe'
            - 'net1.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' user '
            - ' use '
            - ' group '
    selection_susp_ping_utility:
        OriginalFileName: 'ping.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -n '
    selection_susp_change_dir:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '&cd&echo'  # china chopper web shell
            - 'cd /d '  # https://www.computerhope.com/cdhlp.htm
    selection_susp_wmic_utility:
        OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' /node:'
    selection_susp_powershell_cli:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -enc '
            - ' -EncodedCommand '
            - ' -w hidden '
            - ' -windowstyle hidden'
            - '.WebClient).Download'
    selection_susp_misc_discovery_binaries:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\dsquery.exe'
              - '\find.exe'
              - '\findstr.exe'
              - '\ipconfig.exe'
              - '\netstat.exe'
              - '\nslookup.exe'
              - '\pathping.exe'
              - '\quser.exe'
              - '\schtasks.exe'
              - '\systeminfo.exe'
              - '\tasklist.exe'
              - '\tracert.exe'
              - '\ver.exe'
              - '\wevtutil.exe'
              - '\whoami.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'dsquery.exe'
              - 'find.exe'
              - 'findstr.exe'
              - 'ipconfig.exe'
              - 'netstat.exe'
              - 'nslookup.exe'
              - 'pathping.exe'
              - 'quser.exe'
              - 'schtasks.exe'
              - 'sysinfo.exe'
              - 'tasklist.exe'
              - 'tracert.exe'
              - 'ver.exe'
              - 'VSSADMIN.EXE'
              - 'wevtutil.exe'
              - 'whoami.exe'
    selection_susp_misc_discovery_commands:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' Test-NetConnection '
            - 'dir \'  # remote dir: dir \<redacted IP #3>\C$:\windows\temp\*.exe
    condition: 1 of selection_webserver_* and 1 of selection_susp_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Chopper Webshell Process Pattern
id: fa3c117a-bc0d-416e-a31b-0c0e80653efb
status: test
description: Detects patterns found in process executions cause by China Chopper like tiny (ASPX) webshells
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/30/analyzing-attacks-using-the-exchange-vulnerabilities-cve-2022-41040-and-cve-2022-41082/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), MSTI (query)
date: 2022-10-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1033
    - attack.t1087
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_origin:
        - Image|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
        - ParentImage|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
    selection_cmdline:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '&ipconfig&echo'
            - '&quser&echo'
            - '&whoami&echo'
            - '&c:&echo'
            - '&cd&echo'
            - '&dir&echo'
            - '&echo [E]'
            - '&echo [S]'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Webshell Hacking Activity Patterns
id: 4ebc877f-4612-45cb-b3a5-8e3834db36c9
status: test
description: |
    Detects certain parent child patterns found in cases in which a web shell is used to perform certain credential dumping or exfiltration activities on a compromised system
references:
    - https://youtu.be/7aemGhaE9ds?t=641
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-17
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1033
    - attack.t1087
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
   # Webserver
    selection_webserver_image:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\caddy.exe'
            - '\httpd.exe'
            - '\nginx.exe'
            - '\php-cgi.exe'
            - '\w3wp.exe'
            - '\ws_tomcatservice.exe'
    selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat1:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\java.exe'
            - '\javaw.exe'
        ParentImage|contains:
            - '-tomcat-'
            - '\tomcat'
    selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat2:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\java.exe'
            - '\javaw.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'catalina.jar'
            - 'CATALINA_HOME'
    # Suspicious child processes
    selection_child_1:
        # Process dumping
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'comsvcs'
    selection_child_2:
        # Winrar exfil
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -hp'
            - ' a '
            - ' -m'
    selection_child_3:
        # User add
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'net'
            - ' user '
            - ' /add'
    selection_child_4:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'net'
            - ' localgroup '
            - ' administrators '
            - '/add'
    selection_child_5:
        Image|endswith:
            # Credential stealing
            - '\ntdsutil.exe'
            # AD recon
            - '\ldifde.exe'
            - '\adfind.exe'
            # Process dumping
            - '\procdump.exe'
            - '\Nanodump.exe'
            # Destruction / ransom groups
            - '\vssadmin.exe'
            - '\fsutil.exe'
    selection_child_6:
        # SUspicious patterns
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -decode '  # Used with certutil
            - ' -NoP '  # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
            - ' -W Hidden '  # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
            - ' /decode '  # Used with certutil
            - ' /ticket:'  # Rubeus
            - ' sekurlsa'  # Mimikatz
            - '.dmp full'  # Process dumping method apart from procdump
            - '.downloadfile('  # PowerShell download command
            - '.downloadstring('  # PowerShell download command
            - 'FromBase64String' # PowerShell encoded payload
            - 'process call create' # WMIC process creation
            - 'reg save '  # save registry SAM - syskey extraction
            - 'whoami /priv'
    condition: 1 of selection_webserver_* and 1 of selection_child_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Whoami.EXE Execution From Privileged Process
id: 79ce34ca-af29-4d0e-b832-fc1b377020db
related:
    - id: 80167ada-7a12-41ed-b8e9-aa47195c66a1
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" by privileged accounts that are often abused by threat actors
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20221019044836/https://nsudo.m2team.org/en-us/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Teymur Kheirkhabarov
date: 2022-01-28
modified: 2023-12-04
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'whoami.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\whoami.exe'
    selection_user:
        User|contains:
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
            - 'TrustedInstaller'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: WhoAmI as Parameter
id: e9142d84-fbe0-401d-ac50-3e519fb00c89
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process command line that uses whoami as first parameter (as e.g. used by EfsPotato)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/blackarrowsec/status/1463805700602224645?s=12
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-29
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
    - car.2016-03-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: '.exe whoami'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Security Privileges Enumeration Via Whoami.EXE
id: 97a80ec7-0e2f-4d05-9ef4-65760e634f6b
status: test
description: Detects a whoami.exe executed with the /priv command line flag instructing the tool to show all current user privileges. This is often used after a privilege escalation attempt.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/whoami
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-05-05
modified: 2023-02-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\whoami.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'whoami.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /priv'
            - ' -priv'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - SharpLdapWhoami Execution
id: d9367cbb-c2e0-47ce-bdc0-128cb6da898d
status: test
description: Detects SharpLdapWhoami, a whoami alternative that queries the LDAP service on a domain controller
references:
    - https://github.com/bugch3ck/SharpLdapWhoami
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-29
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
    - car.2016-03-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_name:
        Image|endswith: '\SharpLdapWhoami.exe'
    selection_pe: # in case the file has been renamed after compilation
        - OriginalFileName|contains: 'SharpLdapWhoami'
        - Product: 'SharpLdapWhoami'
    selection_flags1:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - ' /method:ntlm'
            - ' /method:kerb'
            - ' /method:nego'
            - ' /m:nego'
            - ' /m:ntlm'
            - ' /m:kerb'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Programs that use the same command line flags
level: high

title: HackTool - SharpView Execution
id: b2317cfa-4a47-4ead-b3ff-297438c0bc2d
related:
    - id: dcd74b95-3f36-4ed9-9598-0490951643aa
      type: similar
status: test
description: Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems
references:
    - https://github.com/tevora-threat/SharpView/
    - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Recon/PowerView.ps1
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1049/T1049.md#atomic-test-4---system-discovery-using-sharpview
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-10
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1049
    - attack.t1069.002
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1135
    - attack.t1033
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - OriginalFileName: 'SharpView.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpView.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              # - 'Add-DomainGroupMember'
              # - 'Add-DomainObjectAcl'
              # - 'Add-ObjectAcl'
              - 'Add-RemoteConnection'
              - 'Convert-ADName'
              - 'ConvertFrom-SID'
              - 'ConvertFrom-UACValue'
              - 'Convert-SidToName'
              # - 'ConvertTo-SID'
              - 'Export-PowerViewCSV'
              # - 'Find-DomainLocalGroupMember'
              - 'Find-DomainObjectPropertyOutlier'
              - 'Find-DomainProcess'
              - 'Find-DomainShare'
              - 'Find-DomainUserEvent'
              - 'Find-DomainUserLocation'
              - 'Find-ForeignGroup'
              - 'Find-ForeignUser'
              - 'Find-GPOComputerAdmin'
              - 'Find-GPOLocation'
              - 'Find-Interesting' # 'Find-InterestingDomainAcl', 'Find-InterestingDomainShareFile', 'Find-InterestingFile'
              - 'Find-LocalAdminAccess'
              - 'Find-ManagedSecurityGroups'
              # - 'Get-ADObject'
              - 'Get-CachedRDPConnection'
              - 'Get-DFSshare'
              # - 'Get-DNSRecord'
              # - 'Get-DNSZone'
              # - 'Get-Domain'
              - 'Get-DomainComputer'
              - 'Get-DomainController'
              - 'Get-DomainDFSShare'
              - 'Get-DomainDNSRecord'
              # - 'Get-DomainDNSZone'
              - 'Get-DomainFileServer'
              - 'Get-DomainForeign' # 'Get-DomainForeignGroupMember', 'Get-DomainForeignUser'
              - 'Get-DomainGPO' # 'Get-DomainGPOComputerLocalGroupMapping', 'Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup', 'Get-DomainGPOUserLocalGroupMapping'
              - 'Get-DomainGroup' # 'Get-DomainGroupMember'
              - 'Get-DomainGUIDMap'
              - 'Get-DomainManagedSecurityGroup'
              - 'Get-DomainObject' # 'Get-DomainObjectAcl'
              - 'Get-DomainOU'
              - 'Get-DomainPolicy' # 'Get-DomainPolicyData'
              - 'Get-DomainSID'
              - 'Get-DomainSite'
              - 'Get-DomainSPNTicket'
              - 'Get-DomainSubnet'
              - 'Get-DomainTrust' # 'Get-DomainTrustMapping'
              # - 'Get-DomainUser'
              - 'Get-DomainUserEvent'
              # - 'Get-Forest'
              - 'Get-ForestDomain'
              - 'Get-ForestGlobalCatalog'
              - 'Get-ForestTrust'
              - 'Get-GptTmpl'
              - 'Get-GroupsXML'
              # - 'Get-GUIDMap'
              # - 'Get-IniContent'
              # - 'Get-IPAddress'
              - 'Get-LastLoggedOn'
              - 'Get-LoggedOnLocal'
              - 'Get-NetComputer' # 'Get-NetComputerSiteName'
              - 'Get-NetDomain' # 'Get-NetDomainController', 'Get-NetDomainTrust'
              - 'Get-NetFileServer'
              - 'Get-NetForest' # 'Get-NetForestCatalog', 'Get-NetForestDomain', 'Get-NetForestTrust'
              - 'Get-NetGPO' # 'Get-NetGPOGroup'
              # - 'Get-NetGroup'
              - 'Get-NetGroupMember'
              - 'Get-NetLocalGroup' # 'Get-NetLocalGroupMember'
              - 'Get-NetLoggedon'
              - 'Get-NetOU'
              - 'Get-NetProcess'
              - 'Get-NetRDPSession'
              - 'Get-NetSession'
              - 'Get-NetShare'
              - 'Get-NetSite'
              - 'Get-NetSubnet'
              - 'Get-NetUser'
              # - 'Get-ObjectAcl'
              - 'Get-PathAcl'
              - 'Get-PrincipalContext'
              # - 'Get-Proxy'
              - 'Get-RegistryMountedDrive'
              - 'Get-RegLoggedOn'
              # - 'Get-SiteName'
              # - 'Get-UserEvent'
              # - 'Get-WMIProcess'
              - 'Get-WMIRegCachedRDPConnection'
              - 'Get-WMIRegLastLoggedOn'
              - 'Get-WMIRegMountedDrive'
              - 'Get-WMIRegProxy'
              - 'Invoke-ACLScanner'
              - 'Invoke-CheckLocalAdminAccess'
              - 'Invoke-Kerberoast'
              - 'Invoke-MapDomainTrust'
              - 'Invoke-RevertToSelf'
              - 'Invoke-Sharefinder'
              - 'Invoke-UserImpersonation'
              # - 'New-DomainGroup'
              # - 'New-DomainUser'
              - 'Remove-DomainObjectAcl'
              - 'Remove-RemoteConnection'
              - 'Request-SPNTicket'
              # - 'Resolve-IPAddress'
              # - 'Set-ADObject'
              - 'Set-DomainObject'
              # - 'Set-DomainUserPassword'
              - 'Test-AdminAccess'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Binaries Write Suspicious Extensions
id: b8fd0e93-ff58-4cbd-8f48-1c114e342e62
related:
    - id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Windows executables that write files with suspicious extensions
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-12
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_generic:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\lsass.exe'
            - '\RuntimeBroker.exe'
            - '\sihost.exe'
            - '\smss.exe'
            - '\wininit.exe'
            - '\winlogon.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.bat'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.iso'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.txt'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    selection_special:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.bat'
            - '.hta'
            - '.iso'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    filter_main_AppLockerPolicyTest:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - ':\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.ps1'
    filter_main_script_gpo_machine:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\GroupPolicy\DataStore\'
            - '\sysvol\'
            - '\Policies\'
            - '\Machine\Scripts\Startup\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.ps1'
            - '.bat'
    filter_main_clipchamp:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Clipchamp'
            - '.ps1'
    filter_main_powershell_preview:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.ps1'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Renamed CreateDump Utility Execution
id: 1a1ed54a-2ba4-4221-94d5-01dee560d71e
related:
    - id: 515c8be5-e5df-4c5e-8f6d-a4a2f05e4b48
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects uses of a renamed legitimate createdump.exe LOLOBIN utility to dump process memory
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/
    - https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-20
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pe:
        OriginalFileName: 'FX_VER_INTERNALNAME_STR'
    selection_cli:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' -u ' # Short version of '--full'
              - ' -f ' # Short version of '--name'
              - '.dmp'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' --full ' # Short version of '--full'
              - ' --name ' # Short version of '--name'
              - '.dmp'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\createdump.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Command lines that use the same flags
level: high

title: Forfiles.EXE Child Process Masquerading
id: f53714ec-5077-420e-ad20-907ff9bb2958
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of "forfiles" from a non-default location, in order to potentially spawn a custom "cmd.exe" from the current working directory.
references:
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2023/12/31/1-little-known-secret-of-forfiles-exe/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Anish Bogati
date: 2024-01-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Notes:
        #   - The parent must not have CLI options
        #   - The Child Image must be named "cmd" as its hardcoded in the "forfiles" binary
        #   - The Child CLI will always contains "/c echo" as its hardcoded in the original "forfiles" binary
        ParentCommandLine|endswith:
            - '.exe'
            - '.exe"'
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|startswith: '/c echo "'
    filter_main_parent_not_sys:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\forfiles.exe'
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: CreateDump Process Dump
id: 515c8be5-e5df-4c5e-8f6d-a4a2f05e4b48
related:
    - id: 1a1ed54a-2ba4-4221-94d5-01dee560d71e
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects uses of the createdump.exe LOLOBIN utility to dump process memory
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/
    - https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-04
modified: 2022-08-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\createdump.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'FX_VER_INTERNALNAME_STR'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -u ' # Short version of '--full'
            - ' --full '
            - ' -f ' # Short version of '--name'
            - ' --name '
            - '.dmp '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Command lines that use the same flags
level: high

title: Process Memory Dump Via Comsvcs.DLL
id: 646ea171-dded-4578-8a4d-65e9822892e3
related:
    - id: 09e6d5c0-05b8-4ff8-9eeb-043046ec774c
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects a process memory dump via "comsvcs.dll" using rundll32, covering multiple different techniques (ordinal, minidump function, etc.)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/shantanukhande/status/1229348874298388484
    - https://twitter.com/pythonresponder/status/1385064506049630211?s=21
    - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1224848930795552769
    - https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817
    - https://twitter.com/Wietze/status/1542107456507203586
    - https://github.com/Hackndo/lsassy/blob/14d8f8ae596ecf22b449bfe919829173b8a07635/lsassy/dumpmethod/comsvcs.py
    - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52tAmVLg1KM&t=2070s
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Modexp, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-02-18
modified: 2025-02-23
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - car.2013-05-009
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'rundll32'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'comsvcs'
            - 'full'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '#-'
            - '#+'
            - '#24'
            - '24 '
            - 'MiniDump' # Matches MiniDump and MinidumpW
            - '#65560' # ordinal is 16 bit ordinal, so if you make the number large enough (don't fit in 16 bit space), then it normally wraps around.  for e.g ordinal 24 can be also represented by 65560 (65536+24)
    selection_generic:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '24'
            - 'comsvcs'
            - 'full'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' #'
            - ',#'
            - ', #'
            - '"#'
    condition: (selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*) or selection_generic
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Process Execution From A Potentially Suspicious Folder
id: 3dfd06d2-eaf4-4532-9555-68aca59f57c4
status: test
description: Detects a potentially suspicious execution from an uncommon folder.
references:
    - https://github.com/mbevilacqua/appcompatprocessor/blob/6c847937c5a836e2ce2fe2b915f213c345a3c389/AppCompatSearch.txt
    - https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/2019-crowdstrike-global-threat-report/
    - https://github.com/ThreatHuntingProject/ThreatHunting/blob/cb22598bb70651f88e0285abc8d835757d2cb596/hunts/suspicious_process_creation_via_windows_event_logs.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2024-07-12
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Users\All Users\'
            - ':\Users\Default\'
            - ':\Users\NetworkService\'
            - ':\Windows\addins\'
            - ':\Windows\debug\'
            - ':\Windows\Fonts\'
            - ':\Windows\Help\'
            - ':\Windows\IME\'
            - ':\Windows\Media\'
            - ':\Windows\repair\'
            - ':\Windows\security\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - '$Recycle.bin'
            - '\config\systemprofile\'
            - '\Intel\Logs\'
            - '\RSA\MachineKeys\'
    filter_optional_ibm:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\Public\IBM\ClientSolutions\Start_Programs\'
    filter_optional_citrix:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\config\systemprofile\Citrix\UpdaterBinaries\'
        Image|endswith: '\CitrixReceiverUpdater.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Taskmgr as LOCAL_SYSTEM
id: 9fff585c-c33e-4a86-b3cd-39312079a65f
status: test
description: Detects the creation of taskmgr.exe process in context of LOCAL_SYSTEM
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-03-18
modified: 2022-05-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
        Image|endswith: '\taskmgr.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - XORDump Execution
id: 66e563f9-1cbd-4a22-a957-d8b7c0f44372
status: test
description: Detects suspicious use of XORDump process memory dumping utility
references:
    - https://github.com/audibleblink/xordump
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-28
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\xordump.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - ' -process lsass.exe '
              - ' -m comsvcs '
              - ' -m dbghelp '
              - ' -m dbgcore '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Another tool that uses the command line switches of XORdump
level: high

title: Suspicious DumpMinitool Execution
id: eb1c4225-1c23-4241-8dd4-051389fde4ce
status: test
description: Detects suspicious ways to use the "DumpMinitool.exe" binary
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1511415432888131586
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1511489821247684615
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/DumpMinitool/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-06
modified: 2023-04-12
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\DumpMinitool.exe'
              - '\DumpMinitool.x86.exe'
              - '\DumpMinitool.arm64.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'DumpMinitool.exe'
              - 'DumpMinitool.x86.exe'
              - 'DumpMinitool.arm64.exe'
    filter_folder:
        Image|contains:
            - '\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
            - '\Extensions\'  # https://github.com/microsoft/vstest/blob/b2e2126f1aa7e5753cafe9515563c99ade6a59ce/src/package/nuspec/Microsoft.TestPlatform.Portable.nuspec#L159
    susp_flags:
        CommandLine|contains: '.txt'
    cmd_has_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' Full'
            - ' Mini'
            - ' WithHeap'
    filter_cmd_misses_flags:
        CommandLine|contains: '--dumpType'
    condition: selection and ( ( not filter_folder ) or susp_flags or ( cmd_has_flags and not filter_cmd_misses_flags ) )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential SysInternals ProcDump Evasion
id: 79b06761-465f-4f88-9ef2-150e24d3d737
status: test
description: Detects uses of the SysInternals ProcDump utility in which ProcDump or its output get renamed, or a dump file is moved or copied to a different name
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1480785527901204481
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-11
modified: 2023-05-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'copy procdump'
            - 'move procdump'
    selection_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'copy '
            - '.dmp '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '2.dmp'
            - 'lsass'
            - 'out.dmp'
    selection_3:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'copy lsass.exe_'  # procdump default pattern e.g. lsass.exe_220111_085234.dmp
            - 'move lsass.exe_'  # procdump default pattern e.g. lsass.exe_220111_085234.dmp
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - False positives are expected in cases in which ProcDump just gets copied to a different directory without any renaming
level: high

title: System File Execution Location Anomaly
id: e4a6b256-3e47-40fc-89d2-7a477edd6915
related:
    - id: be58d2e2-06c8-4f58-b666-b99f6dc3b6cd # Dedicated SvcHost rule
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of a Windows system binary that is usually located in the system folder from an uncommon location.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/GelosSnake/status/934900723426439170
    - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/39828/
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/inno-setup-malware-redline-stealer-campaign.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Patrick Bareiss, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-11-27
modified: 2026-02-12
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\atbroker.exe'
            - '\audiodg.exe'
            - '\bcdedit.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\certreq.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cmstp.exe'
            - '\conhost.exe'
            - '\consent.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\dashost.exe'
            - '\defrag.exe'
            - '\dfrgui.exe' # Was seen used by Lazarus Group - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/39828/
            - '\dism.exe'
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\dllhst3g.exe'
            - '\dwm.exe'
            - '\eventvwr.exe'
            - '\fsquirt.exe' # was seen used by sidewinder APT - https://securelist.com/sidewinder-apt/114089/
            - '\finger.exe'
            - '\logonui.exe'
            - '\LsaIso.exe'
            - '\lsass.exe'
            - '\lsm.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\ntoskrnl.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\runonce.exe'
            - '\RuntimeBroker.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\services.exe'
            - '\sihost.exe'
            - '\smartscreen.exe'
            - '\smss.exe'
            - '\spoolsv.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
            - '\taskhost.exe'
            - '\taskhostw.exe'
            - '\Taskmgr.exe'
            - '\userinit.exe'
            - '\werfault.exe'
            - '\werfaultsecure.exe'
            - '\wininit.exe'
            - '\winlogon.exe'
            - '\winver.exe'
            - '\wlanext.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
            - '\wsmprovhost.exe' # Was seen used by Lazarus Group - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/39828/
    filter_main_generic:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\'
            - 'C:\$WinREAgent\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SystemTemp\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - 'C:\Windows\uus\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
    filter_optional_system32:
        Image|contains: '\SystemRoot\System32\'
    filter_main_powershell:
        Image|contains:
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7-preview\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview' # pwsh installed from Microsoft Store
        Image|endswith: '\pwsh.exe'
    filter_main_wsl_programfiles:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\MicrosoftCorporationII.WindowsSubsystemForLinux'
            - 'C:\Program Files\WSL\'
        Image|endswith: '\wsl.exe'
    filter_main_wsl_appdata:
        Image|startswith: C:\Users\'
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\'
        Image|endswith: '\wsl.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_system_exe_anomaly/info.yml

title: Suspicious MSDT Parent Process
id: 7a74da6b-ea76-47db-92cc-874ad90df734
status: test
description: Detects msdt.exe executed by a suspicious parent as seen in CVE-2022-30190 / Follina exploitation
references:
    - https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/
author: Nextron Systems
date: 2022-06-01
modified: 2023-02-06
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
            # Note: office applications are covered by: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50
    selection_msdt:
        - Image|endswith: '\msdt.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'msdt.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Windows Update Agent Empty Cmdline
id: 52d097e2-063e-4c9c-8fbb-855c8948d135
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious Windows Update Agent activity in which a wuauclt.exe process command line doesn't contain any command line flags
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-26
modified: 2023-11-11
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\Wuauclt.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Wuauclt.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - 'Wuauclt'
            - 'Wuauclt.exe'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Calculator Usage
id: 737e618a-a410-49b5-bec3-9e55ff7fbc15
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious use of 'calc.exe' with command line parameters or in a suspicious directory, which is likely caused by some PoC or detection evasion.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1094080242686312448
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-02-09
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains: '\calc.exe '
    selection_2:
        Image|endswith: '\calc.exe'
    filter_main_known_locations:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
    condition: selection_1 or ( selection_2 and not filter_main_known_locations )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential LSASS Process Dump Via Procdump
id: 5afee48e-67dd-4e03-a783-f74259dcf998
status: stable
description: |
    Detects potential credential harvesting attempts through LSASS memory dumps using ProcDump.
    This rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns that combine memory dump flags (-ma, -mm, -mp) with LSASS-related process markers.
    LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) contains sensitive authentication data including plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets in memory.
    Attackers commonly dump LSASS memory to extract credentials for lateral movement and privilege escalation.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump
    - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/3742ebfe-64c2-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
    - https://x.com/wietze/status/1958302556033065292?s=12
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-10-30
modified: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - car.2013-05-009
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' -ma '
            - ' -mm ' # Mini dump
            - ' -mp ' # Miniplus dump
    selection_process:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' ls' # Short for lsass
            - ' keyiso'
            - ' samss'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, because no one should dump an lsass process memory
    - Another tool that uses command line flags similar to ProcDump
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process Of Wermgr.EXE
id: 396f6630-f3ac-44e3-bfc8-1b161bc00c4e
related:
    - id: 5394fcc7-aeb2-43b5-9a09-cac9fc5edcd5
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious Windows Error Reporting manager (wermgr.exe) child process
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/black-basta-infiltrates-networks-via-qakbot-brute-ratel-and-coba.html
    - https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/wermgr.exe
    - https://github.com/binderlabs/DirCreate2System
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-14
modified: 2024-08-29
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\wermgr.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\ipconfig.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\netstat.exe'
            - '\nslookup.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\whoami.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    filter_main_rundll32:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Windows\system32\WerConCpl.dll'
            - 'LaunchErcApp '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-queuereporting'
            - '-responsepester'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Renamed ZOHO Dctask64 Execution
id: 340a090b-c4e9-412e-bb36-b4b16fe96f9b
status: test
description: |
    Detects a renamed "dctask64.exe" execution, a signed binary by ZOHO Corporation part of ManageEngine Endpoint Central.
    This binary can be abused for DLL injection, arbitrary command and process execution.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222088214581825540
    - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095963789111296
    - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095371175911424
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-01-28
modified: 2025-01-22
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1055.001
    - attack.t1202
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'IMPHASH=6834B1B94E49701D77CCB3C0895E1AFD'
            - 'IMPHASH=1BB6F93B129F398C7C4A76BB97450BBA'
            - 'IMPHASH=FAA2AC19875FADE461C8D89DCF2710A3'
            - 'IMPHASH=F1039CED4B91572AB7847D26032E6BBF'
    filter_main_legit_name:
        Image|endswith: '\dctask64.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Sdiagnhost Calling Suspicious Child Process
id: f3d39c45-de1a-4486-a687-ab126124f744
status: test
description: Detects sdiagnhost.exe calling a suspicious child process (e.g. used in exploits for Follina / CVE-2022-30190)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984
    - https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/f420d295-0457-4e9b-9b9e-6732be227583/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/c4117d9a-f463-461a-b90f-4cd258746798/
author: Nextron Systems, @Kostastsale
date: 2022-06-01
modified: 2024-08-23
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\sdiagnhost.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            # Add more suspicious LOLBins
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\taskkill.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            # - '\csc.exe'   # https://app.any.run/tasks/f420d295-0457-4e9b-9b9e-6732be227583/
            - '\calc.exe'  # https://app.any.run/tasks/f420d295-0457-4e9b-9b9e-6732be227583/
    filter_main_cmd_bits:
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'bits'
    filter_main_powershell_noprofile:
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '-noprofile -'
            - '-noprofile'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Process Parents
id: cbec226f-63d9-4eca-9f52-dfb6652f24df
status: test
description: Detects suspicious parent processes that should not have any children or should only have a single possible child program
references:
    - https://twitter.com/x86matthew/status/1505476263464607744?s=12
    - https://svch0st.medium.com/stats-from-hunting-cobalt-strike-beacons-c17e56255f9b
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-21
modified: 2022-09-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\minesweeper.exe'
            - '\winver.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
    selection_special:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
         # - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\eventvwr.exe'
            - '\calc.exe'
            - '\notepad.exe'
    filter_special:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\WerFault.exe'
            - '\wermgr.exe'
            - '\conhost.exe' # csrss.exe, certutil.exe
            - '\mmc.exe'     # eventvwr.exe
            - '\win32calc.exe' # calc.exe
            - '\notepad.exe'
    filter_null:
        Image: null
    condition: selection or ( selection_special and not 1 of filter_* )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Renamed Plink Execution
id: 1c12727d-02bf-45ff-a9f3-d49806a3cf43
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed version of the Plink binary
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/
    - https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/0.58/htmldoc/Chapter7.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-06
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - OriginalFileName: 'Plink'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' -l forward'
              - ' -P '
              - ' -R '
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\plink.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high