title: Renamed CreateDump Utility Execution
id: 1a1ed54a-2ba4-4221-94d5-01dee560d71e
related:
    - id: 515c8be5-e5df-4c5e-8f6d-a4a2f05e4b48
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects uses of a renamed legitimate createdump.exe LOLOBIN utility to dump process memory
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/
    - https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-20
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pe:
        OriginalFileName: 'FX_VER_INTERNALNAME_STR'
    selection_cli:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' -u ' # Short version of '--full'
              - ' -f ' # Short version of '--name'
              - '.dmp'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' --full ' # Short version of '--full'
              - ' --name ' # Short version of '--name'
              - '.dmp'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\createdump.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Command lines that use the same flags
level: high

title: Forfiles.EXE Child Process Masquerading
id: f53714ec-5077-420e-ad20-907ff9bb2958
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of "forfiles" from a non-default location, in order to potentially spawn a custom "cmd.exe" from the current working directory.
references:
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2023/12/31/1-little-known-secret-of-forfiles-exe/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Anish Bogati
date: 2024-01-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Notes:
        #   - The parent must not have CLI options
        #   - The Child Image must be named "cmd" as its hardcoded in the "forfiles" binary
        #   - The Child CLI will always contains "/c echo" as its hardcoded in the original "forfiles" binary
        ParentCommandLine|endswith:
            - '.exe'
            - '.exe"'
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|startswith: '/c echo "'
    filter_main_parent_not_sys:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\forfiles.exe'
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: CreateDump Process Dump
id: 515c8be5-e5df-4c5e-8f6d-a4a2f05e4b48
related:
    - id: 1a1ed54a-2ba4-4221-94d5-01dee560d71e
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects uses of the createdump.exe LOLOBIN utility to dump process memory
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/
    - https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-04
modified: 2022-08-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\createdump.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'FX_VER_INTERNALNAME_STR'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -u ' # Short version of '--full'
            - ' --full '
            - ' -f ' # Short version of '--name'
            - ' --name '
            - '.dmp '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Command lines that use the same flags
level: high

title: Process Memory Dump Via Comsvcs.DLL
id: 646ea171-dded-4578-8a4d-65e9822892e3
related:
    - id: 09e6d5c0-05b8-4ff8-9eeb-043046ec774c
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects a process memory dump via "comsvcs.dll" using rundll32, covering multiple different techniques (ordinal, minidump function, etc.)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/shantanukhande/status/1229348874298388484
    - https://twitter.com/pythonresponder/status/1385064506049630211?s=21
    - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1224848930795552769
    - https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817
    - https://twitter.com/Wietze/status/1542107456507203586
    - https://github.com/Hackndo/lsassy/blob/14d8f8ae596ecf22b449bfe919829173b8a07635/lsassy/dumpmethod/comsvcs.py
    - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52tAmVLg1KM&t=2070s
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Modexp, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-02-18
modified: 2025-02-23
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - car.2013-05-009
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'rundll32'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'comsvcs'
            - 'full'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '#-'
            - '#+'
            - '#24'
            - '24 '
            - 'MiniDump' # Matches MiniDump and MinidumpW
            - '#65560' # ordinal is 16 bit ordinal, so if you make the number large enough (don't fit in 16 bit space), then it normally wraps around.  for e.g ordinal 24 can be also represented by 65560 (65536+24)
    selection_generic:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '24'
            - 'comsvcs'
            - 'full'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' #'
            - ',#'
            - ', #'
            - '"#'
    condition: (selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*) or selection_generic
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Process Execution From A Potentially Suspicious Folder
id: 3dfd06d2-eaf4-4532-9555-68aca59f57c4
status: test
description: Detects a potentially suspicious execution from an uncommon folder.
references:
    - https://github.com/mbevilacqua/appcompatprocessor/blob/6c847937c5a836e2ce2fe2b915f213c345a3c389/AppCompatSearch.txt
    - https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/2019-crowdstrike-global-threat-report/
    - https://github.com/ThreatHuntingProject/ThreatHunting/blob/cb22598bb70651f88e0285abc8d835757d2cb596/hunts/suspicious_process_creation_via_windows_event_logs.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2024-07-12
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Users\All Users\'
            - ':\Users\Default\'
            - ':\Users\NetworkService\'
            - ':\Windows\addins\'
            - ':\Windows\debug\'
            - ':\Windows\Fonts\'
            - ':\Windows\Help\'
            - ':\Windows\IME\'
            - ':\Windows\Media\'
            - ':\Windows\repair\'
            - ':\Windows\security\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - '$Recycle.bin'
            - '\config\systemprofile\'
            - '\Intel\Logs\'
            - '\RSA\MachineKeys\'
    filter_optional_ibm:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\Public\IBM\ClientSolutions\Start_Programs\'
    filter_optional_citrix:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\config\systemprofile\Citrix\UpdaterBinaries\'
        Image|endswith: '\CitrixReceiverUpdater.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Taskmgr as LOCAL_SYSTEM
id: 9fff585c-c33e-4a86-b3cd-39312079a65f
status: test
description: Detects the creation of taskmgr.exe process in context of LOCAL_SYSTEM
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-03-18
modified: 2022-05-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
        Image|endswith: '\taskmgr.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - XORDump Execution
id: 66e563f9-1cbd-4a22-a957-d8b7c0f44372
status: test
description: Detects suspicious use of XORDump process memory dumping utility
references:
    - https://github.com/audibleblink/xordump
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-28
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\xordump.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - ' -process lsass.exe '
              - ' -m comsvcs '
              - ' -m dbghelp '
              - ' -m dbgcore '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Another tool that uses the command line switches of XORdump
level: high

title: Suspicious DumpMinitool Execution
id: eb1c4225-1c23-4241-8dd4-051389fde4ce
status: test
description: Detects suspicious ways to use the "DumpMinitool.exe" binary
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1511415432888131586
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1511489821247684615
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/DumpMinitool/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-06
modified: 2023-04-12
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\DumpMinitool.exe'
              - '\DumpMinitool.x86.exe'
              - '\DumpMinitool.arm64.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'DumpMinitool.exe'
              - 'DumpMinitool.x86.exe'
              - 'DumpMinitool.arm64.exe'
    filter_folder:
        Image|contains:
            - '\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
            - '\Extensions\'  # https://github.com/microsoft/vstest/blob/b2e2126f1aa7e5753cafe9515563c99ade6a59ce/src/package/nuspec/Microsoft.TestPlatform.Portable.nuspec#L159
    susp_flags:
        CommandLine|contains: '.txt'
    cmd_has_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' Full'
            - ' Mini'
            - ' WithHeap'
    filter_cmd_misses_flags:
        CommandLine|contains: '--dumpType'
    condition: selection and ( ( not filter_folder ) or susp_flags or ( cmd_has_flags and not filter_cmd_misses_flags ) )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential SysInternals ProcDump Evasion
id: 79b06761-465f-4f88-9ef2-150e24d3d737
status: test
description: Detects uses of the SysInternals ProcDump utility in which ProcDump or its output get renamed, or a dump file is moved or copied to a different name
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1480785527901204481
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-11
modified: 2023-05-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'copy procdump'
            - 'move procdump'
    selection_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'copy '
            - '.dmp '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '2.dmp'
            - 'lsass'
            - 'out.dmp'
    selection_3:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'copy lsass.exe_'  # procdump default pattern e.g. lsass.exe_220111_085234.dmp
            - 'move lsass.exe_'  # procdump default pattern e.g. lsass.exe_220111_085234.dmp
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - False positives are expected in cases in which ProcDump just gets copied to a different directory without any renaming
level: high

title: System File Execution Location Anomaly
id: e4a6b256-3e47-40fc-89d2-7a477edd6915
related:
    - id: be58d2e2-06c8-4f58-b666-b99f6dc3b6cd # Dedicated SvcHost rule
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of a Windows system binary that is usually located in the system folder from an uncommon location.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/GelosSnake/status/934900723426439170
    - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/39828/
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/inno-setup-malware-redline-stealer-campaign.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Patrick Bareiss, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-11-27
modified: 2026-02-12
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\atbroker.exe'
            - '\audiodg.exe'
            - '\bcdedit.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\certreq.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cmstp.exe'
            - '\conhost.exe'
            - '\consent.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\dashost.exe'
            - '\defrag.exe'
            - '\dfrgui.exe' # Was seen used by Lazarus Group - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/39828/
            - '\dism.exe'
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\dllhst3g.exe'
            - '\dwm.exe'
            - '\eventvwr.exe'
            - '\fsquirt.exe' # was seen used by sidewinder APT - https://securelist.com/sidewinder-apt/114089/
            - '\finger.exe'
            - '\logonui.exe'
            - '\LsaIso.exe'
            - '\lsass.exe'
            - '\lsm.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\ntoskrnl.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\runonce.exe'
            - '\RuntimeBroker.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\services.exe'
            - '\sihost.exe'
            - '\smartscreen.exe'
            - '\smss.exe'
            - '\spoolsv.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
            - '\taskhost.exe'
            - '\taskhostw.exe'
            - '\Taskmgr.exe'
            - '\userinit.exe'
            - '\werfault.exe'
            - '\werfaultsecure.exe'
            - '\wininit.exe'
            - '\winlogon.exe'
            - '\winver.exe'
            - '\wlanext.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
            - '\wsmprovhost.exe' # Was seen used by Lazarus Group - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/39828/
    filter_main_generic:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\'
            - 'C:\$WinREAgent\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SystemTemp\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - 'C:\Windows\uus\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
    filter_optional_system32:
        Image|contains: '\SystemRoot\System32\'
    filter_main_powershell:
        Image|contains:
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7-preview\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview' # pwsh installed from Microsoft Store
        Image|endswith: '\pwsh.exe'
    filter_main_wsl_programfiles:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\MicrosoftCorporationII.WindowsSubsystemForLinux'
            - 'C:\Program Files\WSL\'
        Image|endswith: '\wsl.exe'
    filter_main_wsl_appdata:
        Image|startswith: C:\Users\'
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\'
        Image|endswith: '\wsl.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_system_exe_anomaly/info.yml

title: Suspicious MSDT Parent Process
id: 7a74da6b-ea76-47db-92cc-874ad90df734
status: test
description: Detects msdt.exe executed by a suspicious parent as seen in CVE-2022-30190 / Follina exploitation
references:
    - https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/
author: Nextron Systems
date: 2022-06-01
modified: 2023-02-06
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
            # Note: office applications are covered by: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50
    selection_msdt:
        - Image|endswith: '\msdt.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'msdt.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Windows Update Agent Empty Cmdline
id: 52d097e2-063e-4c9c-8fbb-855c8948d135
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious Windows Update Agent activity in which a wuauclt.exe process command line doesn't contain any command line flags
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-26
modified: 2023-11-11
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\Wuauclt.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Wuauclt.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - 'Wuauclt'
            - 'Wuauclt.exe'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Calculator Usage
id: 737e618a-a410-49b5-bec3-9e55ff7fbc15
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious use of 'calc.exe' with command line parameters or in a suspicious directory, which is likely caused by some PoC or detection evasion.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1094080242686312448
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-02-09
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains: '\calc.exe '
    selection_2:
        Image|endswith: '\calc.exe'
    filter_main_known_locations:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
    condition: selection_1 or ( selection_2 and not filter_main_known_locations )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential LSASS Process Dump Via Procdump
id: 5afee48e-67dd-4e03-a783-f74259dcf998
status: stable
description: |
    Detects potential credential harvesting attempts through LSASS memory dumps using ProcDump.
    This rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns that combine memory dump flags (-ma, -mm, -mp) with LSASS-related process markers.
    LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) contains sensitive authentication data including plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets in memory.
    Attackers commonly dump LSASS memory to extract credentials for lateral movement and privilege escalation.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump
    - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/3742ebfe-64c2-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
    - https://x.com/wietze/status/1958302556033065292?s=12
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-10-30
modified: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - car.2013-05-009
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' -ma '
            - ' -mm ' # Mini dump
            - ' -mp ' # Miniplus dump
    selection_process:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' ls' # Short for lsass
            - ' keyiso'
            - ' samss'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, because no one should dump an lsass process memory
    - Another tool that uses command line flags similar to ProcDump
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process Of Wermgr.EXE
id: 396f6630-f3ac-44e3-bfc8-1b161bc00c4e
related:
    - id: 5394fcc7-aeb2-43b5-9a09-cac9fc5edcd5
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious Windows Error Reporting manager (wermgr.exe) child process
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/black-basta-infiltrates-networks-via-qakbot-brute-ratel-and-coba.html
    - https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/wermgr.exe
    - https://github.com/binderlabs/DirCreate2System
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-14
modified: 2024-08-29
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\wermgr.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\ipconfig.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\netstat.exe'
            - '\nslookup.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\whoami.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    filter_main_rundll32:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Windows\system32\WerConCpl.dll'
            - 'LaunchErcApp '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-queuereporting'
            - '-responsepester'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Renamed ZOHO Dctask64 Execution
id: 340a090b-c4e9-412e-bb36-b4b16fe96f9b
status: test
description: |
    Detects a renamed "dctask64.exe" execution, a signed binary by ZOHO Corporation part of ManageEngine Endpoint Central.
    This binary can be abused for DLL injection, arbitrary command and process execution.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222088214581825540
    - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095963789111296
    - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095371175911424
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-01-28
modified: 2025-01-22
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1055.001
    - attack.t1202
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'IMPHASH=6834B1B94E49701D77CCB3C0895E1AFD'
            - 'IMPHASH=1BB6F93B129F398C7C4A76BB97450BBA'
            - 'IMPHASH=FAA2AC19875FADE461C8D89DCF2710A3'
            - 'IMPHASH=F1039CED4B91572AB7847D26032E6BBF'
    filter_main_legit_name:
        Image|endswith: '\dctask64.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Sdiagnhost Calling Suspicious Child Process
id: f3d39c45-de1a-4486-a687-ab126124f744
status: test
description: Detects sdiagnhost.exe calling a suspicious child process (e.g. used in exploits for Follina / CVE-2022-30190)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984
    - https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/f420d295-0457-4e9b-9b9e-6732be227583/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/c4117d9a-f463-461a-b90f-4cd258746798/
author: Nextron Systems, @Kostastsale
date: 2022-06-01
modified: 2024-08-23
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\sdiagnhost.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            # Add more suspicious LOLBins
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\taskkill.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            # - '\csc.exe'   # https://app.any.run/tasks/f420d295-0457-4e9b-9b9e-6732be227583/
            - '\calc.exe'  # https://app.any.run/tasks/f420d295-0457-4e9b-9b9e-6732be227583/
    filter_main_cmd_bits:
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'bits'
    filter_main_powershell_noprofile:
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '-noprofile -'
            - '-noprofile'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Process Parents
id: cbec226f-63d9-4eca-9f52-dfb6652f24df
status: test
description: Detects suspicious parent processes that should not have any children or should only have a single possible child program
references:
    - https://twitter.com/x86matthew/status/1505476263464607744?s=12
    - https://svch0st.medium.com/stats-from-hunting-cobalt-strike-beacons-c17e56255f9b
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-21
modified: 2022-09-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\minesweeper.exe'
            - '\winver.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
    selection_special:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
         # - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\eventvwr.exe'
            - '\calc.exe'
            - '\notepad.exe'
    filter_special:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\WerFault.exe'
            - '\wermgr.exe'
            - '\conhost.exe' # csrss.exe, certutil.exe
            - '\mmc.exe'     # eventvwr.exe
            - '\win32calc.exe' # calc.exe
            - '\notepad.exe'
    filter_null:
        Image: null
    condition: selection or ( selection_special and not 1 of filter_* )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Renamed Plink Execution
id: 1c12727d-02bf-45ff-a9f3-d49806a3cf43
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed version of the Plink binary
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/
    - https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/0.58/htmldoc/Chapter7.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-06
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - OriginalFileName: 'Plink'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' -l forward'
              - ' -P '
              - ' -R '
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\plink.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Process Masquerading As SvcHost.EXE
id: be58d2e2-06c8-4f58-b666-b99f6dc3b6cd
related:
    - id: 01d2e2a1-5f09-44f7-9fc1-24faa7479b6d
      type: similar
    - id: e4a6b256-3e47-40fc-89d2-7a477edd6915
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects a suspicious process that is masquerading as the legitimate "svchost.exe" by naming its binary "svchost.exe" and executing from an uncommon location.
    Adversaries often disguise their malicious binaries by naming them after legitimate system processes like "svchost.exe" to evade detection.
references:
    - https://tria.ge/240731-jh4crsycnb/behavioral2
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-detection/process-masquerading/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2024-08-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    filter_main_img_location:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe'
    filter_main_ofn:
        OriginalFileName: 'svchost.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_svchost_masqueraded_execution/info.yml

title: Uncommon Svchost Command Line Parameter
id: f17211f1-1f24-4d0c-829f-31e28dc93cdd
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects instances of svchost.exe running with an unusual or uncommon command line parameter by excluding known legitimate or common patterns.
    This could point at a file masquerading as svchost, a process injection, or hollowing of a legitimate svchost instance.
references:
    - https://cardinalops.com/blog/the-art-of-anomaly-hunting-patterns-detection/
    - https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/blackbyte-exbyte-ransomware
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits/
    - https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064518/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf
author: Liran Ravich
date: 2025-11-14
modified: 2026-03-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.t1055
    - attack.t1055.012
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Example of command to simulate: "C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe" calc.exe
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    filter_main_flags:
        CommandLine|re: '-k\s\w{1,64}(?:\s?(?:-p|-s))?'
    filter_main_empty:
        CommandLine: ''
    filter_main_null:
        CommandLine: null
    filter_optional_defender:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\MsMpEng.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'svchost.exe'
    filter_optional_mrt:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\MRT.exe'
        CommandLine: 'svchost.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential MsiExec Masquerading
id: e22a6eb2-f8a5-44b5-8b44-a2dbd47b1144
status: test
description: Detects the execution of msiexec.exe from an uncommon directory
references:
    - https://twitter.com/200_okay_/status/1194765831911215104
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-11-14
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: '\msiexec.exe'
    filter:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Scheduled Task Creation Masquerading as System Processes
id: 9f8573c9-22b4-40e3-89c1-72bc2b8d49ab
status: experimental
description: Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that involve system processes, which may indicate malicious actors masquerading as or abusing these processes to execute payloads or maintain persistence.
references:
    - https://tria.ge/241015-l98snsyeje/behavioral2
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-02-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1036.004
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /create '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' audiodg'
            - ' conhost'
            - ' dwm.exe'
            - ' explorer'
            - ' lsass'
            - ' lsm'
            - ' mmc'
            - ' msiexec'
            - ' regsvr32'
            - ' rundll32'
            - ' services'
            - ' spoolsv'
            - ' svchost'
            - ' taskeng'
            - ' taskhost'
            - ' wininit'
            - ' winlogon'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate system administration tasks scheduling trusted system processes.
level: high

title: Flash Player Update from Suspicious Location
id: 4922a5dd-6743-4fc2-8e81-144374280997
status: test
description: Detects a flashplayer update from an unofficial location
references:
    - https://gist.github.com/roycewilliams/a723aaf8a6ac3ba4f817847610935cfb
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-10-25
modified: 2022-08-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1189
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        - c-uri|contains: '/flash_install.php'
        - c-uri|endswith: '/install_flash_player.exe'
    filter:
        cs-host|endswith: '.adobe.com'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown flash download locations
level: high

title: Powershell DNSExfiltration
id: d59d7842-9a21-4bc6-ba98-64bfe0091355
status: test
description: DNSExfiltrator allows for transferring (exfiltrate) a file over a DNS request covert channel
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1048/T1048.md#atomic-test-3---dnsexfiltration-doh
    - https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-07
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_cmdlet:
        - ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Invoke-DNSExfiltrator'
        - ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
              - ' -i '
              - ' -d '
              - ' -p '
              - ' -doh '
              - ' -t '
    condition: selection_cmdlet
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate script
level: high

title: Suspicious Redirection to Local Admin Share
id: ab9e3b40-0c85-4ba1-aede-455d226fd124
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious output redirection to the local admins share, this technique is often found in malicious scripts or hacktool stagers
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
    - http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-16
modified: 2023-12-28
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_redirect:
        CommandLine|contains: '>'
    selection_share:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\\\\127.0.0.1\\admin$\\'
            - '\\\\localhost\\admin$\\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PUA - Restic Backup Tool Execution
id: 6ddff2e8-ea1a-45d0-8938-93dfc1d67ae7
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of the Restic backup tool, which can be used for data exfiltration.
    Threat actors may leverage Restic to back up and exfiltrate sensitive data to remote storage locations, including cloud services.
    If not legitimately used in the enterprise environment, its presence may indicate malicious activity.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2024/09/30/nitrogen-campaign-drops-sliver-and-ends-with-blackcat-ransomware/#exfiltration
    - https://restic.net/
    - https://restic.readthedocs.io/en/stable/030_preparing_a_new_repo.html
author: Nounou Mbeiri, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
    - attack.t1567.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_specific:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '--password-file'
              - 'init'
              - ' -r '
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '--use-fs-snapshot'
              - 'backup'
              - ' -r '
    selection_restic:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'sftp:'
            - 'rest:http'
            - 's3:s3.'
            - 's3.http'
            - 'azure:'
            - ' gs:'
            - 'rclone:'
            - 'swift:'
            - ' b2:'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' init '
            - ' -r '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of Restic for backup purposes within the organization.
level: high

title: Suspicious WebDav Client Execution Via Rundll32.EXE
id: 982e9f2d-1a85-4d5b-aea4-31f5e97c6555
status: test
description: |
    Detects "svchost.exe" spawning "rundll32.exe" with command arguments like C:\windows\system32\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie. This could be an indicator of exfiltration or use of WebDav to launch code (hosted on WebDav Server) or potentially a sign of exploitation of CVE-2023-23397
references:
    - https://twitter.com/aceresponder/status/1636116096506818562
    - https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2023/03/exploiting-cve-2023-23397-microsoft-outlook-elevation-of-privilege-vulnerability/
    - https://www.pwndefend.com/2023/03/15/the-long-game-persistent-hash-theft/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Figure-7-sample-webdav-process-create-event.png
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/03/24/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2023-23397/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-03-16
modified: 2023-09-18
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048.003
    - cve.2023-23397
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: '-s WebClient'
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'C:\windows\system32\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie'
        CommandLine|re: '://\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}'
    filter_local_ips:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '://10.' # 10.0.0.0/8
            - '://192.168.' # 192.168.0.0/16
            - '://172.16.' # 172.16.0.0/12
            - '://172.17.'
            - '://172.18.'
            - '://172.19.'
            - '://172.20.'
            - '://172.21.'
            - '://172.22.'
            - '://172.23.'
            - '://172.24.'
            - '://172.25.'
            - '://172.26.'
            - '://172.27.'
            - '://172.28.'
            - '://172.29.'
            - '://172.30.'
            - '://172.31.'
            - '://127.' # 127.0.0.0/8
            - '://169.254.' # 169.254.0.0/16
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Shell Execution via Rsync - Linux
id: e2326866-609f-4015-aea9-7ec634e8aa04
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of the "rsync" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/rsync/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.), Florian Roth
date: 2024-09-02
modified: 2025-01-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/rsync'
            - '/rsyncd'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -e '
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/ash '
            - '/bash '
            - '/dash '
            - '/csh '
            - '/sh '
            - '/zsh '
            - '/tcsh '
            - '/ksh '
            - "'ash "
            - "'bash "
            - "'dash "
            - "'csh "
            - "'sh "
            - "'zsh "
            - "'tcsh "
            - "'ksh "
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate cases in which "rsync" is used to execute a shell
level: high

title: Shell Execution via Git - Linux
id: 47b3bbd4-1bf7-48cc-84ab-995362aaa75a
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "git" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/git/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '/git'
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -p '
            - 'help'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'bash 0<&1'
            - 'dash 0<&1'
            - 'sh 0<&1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Invocation of Shell via Rsync
id: 297241f3-8108-4b3a-8c15-2dda9f844594
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of a shell as sub process of "rsync" without the expected command line flag "-e" being used, which could be an indication of exploitation as described in CVE-2024-12084. This behavior is commonly associated with attempts to execute arbitrary commands or escalate privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further exploitation.
references:
    - https://sysdig.com/blog/detecting-and-mitigating-cve-2024-12084-rsync-remote-code-execution/
    - https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/a20436375a1e26524931dd8ea1a3af10
author: Florian Roth
date: 2025-01-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '/rsync'
            - '/rsyncd'
        Image|endswith:
            - '/ash'
            - '/bash'
            - '/csh'
            - '/dash'
            - '/ksh'
            - '/sh'
            - '/tcsh'
            - '/zsh'
    filter_main_expected:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -e '
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Capsh Shell Invocation - Linux
id: db1ac3be-f606-4e3a-89e0-9607cbe6b98a
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "capsh" utility to invoke a shell.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/capsh/#shell
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/capsh'
        CommandLine|endswith: ' --'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Inline Python Execution - Spawn Shell Via OS System Library
id: 2d2f44ff-4611-4778-a8fc-323a0e9850cc
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of inline Python code via the "-c" in order to call the "system" function from the "os" library, and spawn a shell.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/python/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '/python'
              - '/python2'
              - '/python3'
        - Image|contains:
              - '/python2.'  # python image is always of the form ../python3.10; ../python is just a symlink
              - '/python3.'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -c '
            - 'os.system('
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Netcat Reverse Shell Execution
id: 7f734ed0-4f47-46c0-837f-6ee62505abd9
status: test
description: Detects execution of netcat with the "-e" flag followed by common shells. This could be a sign of a potential reverse shell setup.
references:
    - https://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet
    - https://www.revshells.com/
    - https://www.hackingtutorials.org/networking/hacking-netcat-part-2-bind-reverse-shells/
    - https://www.infosecademy.com/netcat-reverse-shells/
    - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/ncat.1.html
author: '@d4ns4n_, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)'
date: 2023-04-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_nc:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/nc'
            - '/ncat'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -c '
            - ' -e '
    selection_shell:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' ash'
            - ' bash'
            - ' bsh'
            - ' csh'
            - ' ksh'
            - ' pdksh'
            - ' sh'
            - ' tcsh'
            - '/bin/ash'
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/bsh'
            - '/bin/csh'
            - '/bin/ksh'
            - '/bin/pdksh'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/tcsh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
            - '$IFSash'
            - '$IFSbash'
            - '$IFSbsh'
            - '$IFScsh'
            - '$IFSksh'
            - '$IFSpdksh'
            - '$IFSsh'
            - '$IFStcsh'
            - '$IFSzsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious Invocation of Shell via AWK - Linux
id: 8c1a5675-cb85-452f-a298-b01b22a51856
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of "awk" or it's sibling commands, to invoke a shell using the system() function.
    This behavior is commonly associated with attempts to execute arbitrary commands or escalate privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further exploitation.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/awk/#shell
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/gawk/#shell
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/nawk/#shell
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/mawk/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/awk'
            - '/gawk'
            - '/mawk'
            - '/nawk'
        CommandLine|contains: 'BEGIN {system'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Java Children Processes
id: d292e0af-9a18-420c-9525-ec0ac3936892
status: test
description: Detects java process spawning suspicious children
references:
    - https://www.tecmint.com/different-types-of-linux-shells/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '/java'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/sh'
            - 'bash'
            - 'dash'
            - 'ksh'
            - 'zsh'
            - 'csh'
            - 'fish'
            - 'curl'
            - 'wget'
            - 'python'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Shell Invocation Via Ssh - Linux
id: 8737b7f6-8df3-4bb7-b1da-06019b99b687
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "ssh" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/ssh/
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-08-29
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '/ssh'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ProxyCommand=;'
            - 'permitlocalcommand=yes'
            - 'localhost'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
            - 'sh 0<&2 1>&2'
            - 'sh 1>&2 0<&2'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: BPFDoor Abnormal Process ID or Lock File Accessed
id: 808146b2-9332-4d78-9416-d7e47012d83d
status: test
description: detects BPFDoor .lock and .pid files access in temporary file storage facility
references:
    - https://www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/bpfdoor-an-evasive-linux-backdoor-technical-analysis/
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/a-peek-behind-the-bpfdoor
    - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-bpfdoor-telecom-networks-sleeper-cells-threat-research-report/
    - https://github.com/rapid7/Rapid7-Labs/blob/741c7196ec12a0a56b63463d1fd726ff14d3a97a/BPFDoor/rapid7_detect_bpfdoor.sh
author: Rafal Piasecki
date: 2022-08-10
modified: 2026-03-30
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection:
        type: 'PATH'
        name:
            - /var/run/aepmonend.pid
            - /var/run/auditd.lock
            - /var/run/cma.lock
            - /var/run/console-kit.pid
            - /var/run/consolekit.pid
            - /var/run/daemon.pid
            - /var/run/hald-addon.pid
            - /var/run/hald-smartd.pid
            - /var/run/haldrund.pid
            - /var/run/hp-health.pid
            - /var/run/hpasmlit.lock
            - /var/run/hpasmlited.pid
            - /var/run/kdevrund.pid
            - /var/run/lldpad.lock
            - /var/run/mcelog.pid
            - /var/run/system.pid
            - /var/run/uvp-srv.pid
            - /var/run/vmtoolagt.pid
            - /var/run/xinetd.lock
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PCRE.NET Package Temp Files
id: 6e90ae7a-7cd3-473f-a035-4ebb72d961da
status: test
description: Detects processes creating temp files related to PCRE.NET package
references:
    - https://twitter.com/rbmaslen/status/1321859647091970051
    - https://twitter.com/tifkin_/status/1321916444557365248
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-29
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\ba9ea7344a4a5f591d6e5dc32a13494b\
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Shell/Scripting Application File Write to Suspicious Folder
id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
status: test
description: Detects Windows shells and scripting applications that write files to suspicious folders
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-20
modified: 2023-03-29
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\msbuild.exe'  # https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_msbuild_started_by_office_app.toml
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\PerfLogs\'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\'
    selection_2:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            # - '\rundll32.exe' # Potential FP
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'  # https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - 'C:\PerfLogs\'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - Stracciatella Execution
id: 7a4d9232-92fc-404d-8ce1-4c92e7caf539
status: test
description: Detects Stracciatella which executes a Powershell runspace from within C# (aka SharpPick technique) with AMSI, ETW and Script Block Logging disabled based on PE metadata characteristics.
references:
    - https://github.com/mgeeky/Stracciatella
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-17
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\Stracciatella.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Stracciatella.exe'
        - Description: 'Stracciatella'
        - Hashes|contains:
              - 'SHA256=9d25e61ec1527e2a69d7c2a4e3fe2fe15890710c198a66a9f25d99fdf6c7b956'
              - 'SHA256=fd16609bd9830c63b9413671678bb159b89c357d21942ddbb6b93add808d121a'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious Persistence Via VMwareToolBoxCmd.EXE VM State Change Script
id: 236d8e89-ed95-4789-a982-36f4643738ba
related:
    - id: 7aa4e81a-a65c-4e10-9f81-b200eb229d7d
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects execution of the "VMwareToolBoxCmd.exe" with the "script" and "set" flag to setup a specific script that's located in a potentially suspicious location to run for a specific VM state
references:
    - https://bohops.com/2021/10/08/analyzing-and-detecting-a-vmtools-persistence-technique/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_bin_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\VMwareToolBoxCmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'toolbox-cmd.exe'
    selection_bin_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' script '
            - ' set '
    selection_susp_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potentially Suspicious Execution From Parent Process In Public Folder
id: 69bd9b97-2be2-41b6-9816-fb08757a4d1a
status: test
description: |
    Detects a potentially suspicious execution of a parent process located in the "\Users\Public" folder executing a child process containing references to shell or scripting binaries and commandlines.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-25
modified: 2024-07-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|contains: ':\Users\Public\'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\bitsadmin.exe'
              - '\certutil.exe'
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'bitsadmin'
              - 'certutil'
              - 'cscript'
              - 'mshta'
              - 'powershell'
              - 'regsvr32'
              - 'rundll32'
              - 'wscript'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Run PowerShell Script from Redirected Input Stream
id: c83bf4b5-cdf0-437c-90fa-43d734f7c476
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell script execution via input stream redirect
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/4db780e0f0b2e2bb8cb1fa13e09196da9b9f1834/yml/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Powershell.yml
    - https://twitter.com/Moriarty_Meng/status/984380793383370752
author: Moriarty Meng (idea), Anton Kutepov (rule), oscd.community
date: 2020-10-17
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        CommandLine|re: '\s-\s*<'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Add Insecure Download Source To Winget
id: 81a0ecb5-0a41-4ba1-b2ba-c944eb92bfa2
related:
    - id: 05ebafc8-7aa2-4bcd-a269-2aec93f9e842
      type: similar
    - id: c15a46a0-07d4-4c87-b4b6-89207835a83b
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects usage of winget to add a new insecure (http) download source.
    Winget will not allow the addition of insecure sources, hence this could indicate potential suspicious activity (or typos)
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/package-manager/winget/source
    - https://github.com/nasbench/Misc-Research/tree/b9596e8109dcdb16ec353f316678927e507a5b8d/LOLBINs/Winget
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\winget.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'winget.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'source '
            - 'add '
            - 'http://'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - False positives might occur if the users are unaware of such control checks
level: high

title: Suspicious Remote Child Process From Outlook
id: e212d415-0e93-435f-9e1a-f29005bb4723
related:
    - id: 208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d # Outlook Child Processes
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious child process spawning from Outlook where the image is located in a remote location (SMB/WebDav shares).
references:
    - https://github.com/sensepost/ruler
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/12/overruled-containing-a-potentially-destructive-adversary.html
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=49
author: Markus Neis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-12-27
modified: 2023-02-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\outlook.exe'
        Image|startswith: '\\\\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
id: 1228c958-e64e-4e71-92ad-7d429f4138ba
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious script execution from suspicious directories or folders accessible by environment variables that may indicate malware activity.
    Script interpreters (cscript, wscript, mshta, powershell) executing from folders like Temp, Public, or user profile directories may suggest attempts to evade detection or execute malicious scripts.
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/91ba814a86ddedc7a9d546e26f912c541205b47a853d227756ab1334ade92c3f
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-russia-ukraine-military
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/shell/csidl
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-08
modified: 2026-02-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_proc_image:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    selection_proc_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -ep bypass '
            - ' -ExecutionPolicy bypass '
            - ' -w hidden '
            - '/e:javascript '
            - '/e:Jscript '
            - '/e:vbscript '
    selection_proc_original:
        OriginalFileName:
            - 'cscript.exe'
            - 'mshta.exe'
            - 'wscript.exe'
    selection_folders_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - '\%Public%'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\Temp'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
            - '\Windows\Temp'
            - '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - '%TEMP%'
            - '%TMP%'
            - '%LocalAppData%\Temp'
    selection_folders_2:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favorites\'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favourites\'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Contacts\'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Documents\'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Music\'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Pictures\'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Videos\'
    filter_optional_chocolatey_installer:
        ParentImage:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\Msiexec.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Msiexec.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command'
            - 'AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - 'Install-Chocolatey.ps1'
    condition: 1 of selection_proc_* and 1 of selection_folders_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Various legitimate software have been observed to use similar techniques for installation or update purposes;thus, it is recommended to review and tune filters for your environment to reduce false positives before deploying to production.
level: high

title: Renamed PingCastle Binary Execution
id: 2433a154-bb3d-42e4-86c3-a26bdac91c45
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed "PingCastle" binary based on the PE metadata fields.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/
    - https://www.pingcastle.com/documentation/scanner/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-01-11
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PingCastleReporting.exe'
              - 'PingCastleCloud.exe'
              - 'PingCastle.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '--scanner aclcheck'
              - '--scanner antivirus'
              - '--scanner computerversion'
              - '--scanner foreignusers'
              - '--scanner laps_bitlocker'
              - '--scanner localadmin'
              - '--scanner nullsession'
              - '--scanner nullsession-trust'
              - '--scanner oxidbindings'
              - '--scanner remote'
              - '--scanner share'
              - '--scanner smb'
              - '--scanner smb3querynetwork'
              - '--scanner spooler'
              - '--scanner startup'
              - '--scanner zerologon'
        - CommandLine|contains: '--no-enum-limit'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '--healthcheck'
              - '--level Full'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '--healthcheck'
              - '--server '
    filter_main_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\PingCastleReporting.exe'
            - '\PingCastleCloud.exe'
            - '\PingCastle.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PUA - Wsudo Suspicious Execution
id: bdeeabc9-ff2a-4a51-be59-bb253aac7891
status: test
description: Detects usage of wsudo (Windows Sudo Utility). Which is a tool that let the user execute programs with different permissions (System, Trusted Installer, Administrator...etc)
references:
    - https://github.com/M2Team/Privexec/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-02
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_metadata:
        - Image|endswith: '\wsudo.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wsudo.exe'
        - Description: 'Windows sudo utility'
        - ParentImage|endswith: '\wsudo-bridge.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-u System'
            - '-uSystem'
            - '-u TrustedInstaller'
            - '-uTrustedInstaller'
            - ' --ti '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Program Names
id: efdd8dd5-cee8-4e59-9390-7d4d5e4dd6f6
status: test
description: Detects suspicious patterns in program names or folders that are often found in malicious samples or hacktools
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-11
modified: 2023-03-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_image:
        - Image|contains:
              - '\CVE-202' # Update this when we reach the year 2100
              - '\CVE202' # Update this when we reach the year 2100
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\poc.exe'
              - '\artifact.exe'
              - '\artifact64.exe'
              - '\artifact_protected.exe'
              - '\artifact32.exe'
              - '\artifact32big.exe'
              - 'obfuscated.exe'
              - 'obfusc.exe'
              - '\meterpreter'
    selection_commandline:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'inject.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-CVE'
            - 'pupy.ps1'
            - 'payload.ps1'
            - 'beacon.ps1'
            - 'PowerView.ps1'
            - 'bypass.ps1'
            - 'obfuscated.ps1'
            - 'obfusc.ps1'
            - 'obfus.ps1'
            - 'obfs.ps1'
            - 'evil.ps1'
            - 'MiniDogz.ps1'
            - '_enc.ps1'
            - '\shell.ps1'
            - '\rshell.ps1'
            - 'revshell.ps1'
            - '\av.ps1'
            - '\av_test.ps1'
            - 'adrecon.ps1'
            - 'mimikatz.ps1'
            - '\PowerUp_'
            - 'powerup.ps1'
            - '\Temp\a.ps1'
            - '\Temp\p.ps1'
            - '\Temp\1.ps1'
            - 'Hound.ps1'
            - 'encode.ps1'
            - 'powercat.ps1'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate tools that accidentally match on the searched patterns
level: high