title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - Security
id: cd0f7229-d16f-42de-8fe3-fba365fbcb3a
related:
    - id: 641a4bfb-c017-44f7-800c-2aee0184ce9b
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task30)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - '&&'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - 'shellexec_rundll'
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - value
            - invoke
            - comspec
            - iex
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - Security
id: 0c718a5e-4284-4fb9-b4d9-b9a50b3a1974
related:
    - id: 72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 25)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - 'powershell'
    selection2:
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - '${input}'
            - 'noexit'
    selection3:
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - ' /c '
            - ' /r '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Password Protected ZIP File Opened (Email Attachment)
id: 571498c8-908e-40b4-910b-d2369159a3da
status: test
description: Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives. See the filename variable for more details on which file has been opened.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1523383197513379841
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5379
        TargetName|contains|all:
            - 'Microsoft_Windows_Shell_ZipFolder:filename'
            - '\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate used of encrypted ZIP files
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - Security
id: dcf2db1f-f091-425b-a821-c05875b8925a
related:
    - id: 8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 24)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        # ServiceFileName|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r)(?:\s|)\"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*\"'
        # Example 1: C:\winDoWs\SySTeM32\cmd.Exe /C"SET NOtI=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& PowERshElL -NOl SET-iteM ( 'VAR' + 'i'+ 'A' + 'blE:Ao6' + 'I0') ( [TYpe](\"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-F 'iRoN','mENT','e','nv') ) ; ${exECUtIONCOnTEXT}.\"IN`VO`KecOmMaND\".\"inVo`KES`crIPt\"( ( ( GEt-VAriAble ( 'a' + 'o6I0') -vaLU )::(\"{1}{4}{2}{3}{0}\" -f'e','gETenvIR','NtvaRIa','BL','ONme' ).Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'n','oti' ),( \"{0}{1}\" -f'pRoC','esS') )) )"
        # Example 2: cMD.exe /C "seT SlDb=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& pOWErShell .(( ^&(\"{1}{0}{2}{3}\" -f 'eT-vaR','G','iab','lE' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f '*m','DR*' ) ).\"na`ME\"[3,11,2]-JOIN'' ) ( ( ^&(\"{0}{1}\" -f'g','CI' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f 'ENV',':SlDb' ) ).\"VA`luE\" ) "
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '"set'
            - '-f'
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - '/c'
            - '/r'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - Security
id: 4edf51e1-cb83-4e1a-bc39-800e396068e3
related:
    - id: f7385ee2-0e0c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '&&'
            - 'clipboard]::'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - Security
id: 9b8d9203-4e0f-4cd9-bb06-4cc4ea6d0e9a
related:
    - id: 7e9c7999-0f9b-4d4a-a6ed-af6d553d4af4
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task31)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'mshta'
            - 'vbscript:createobject'
            - '.run'
            - 'window.close'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - System
id: f7385ee2-0e0c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2023-02-20
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '&&'
            - 'clipboard]::'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - System
id: 641a4bfb-c017-44f7-800c-2aee0184ce9b
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task30)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - '&&'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - 'shellexec_rundll'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - 'value'
            - 'invoke'
            - 'comspec'
            - 'iex'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - System
id: 487c7524-f892-4054-b263-8a0ace63fc25
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task28)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        # ImagePath|re: '(?i)(set).*&&\s?set.*(environment|invoke|\${?input).*&&.*"'
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'set'
            - '&&'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - 'environment'
            - 'invoke'
            - 'input'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - System
id: 63e3365d-4824-42d8-8b82-e56810fefa0c
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task29)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ImagePath|contains: '(Clipboard|i'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - System
id: 72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 25)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_main:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        # ImagePath|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r).+powershell.+(?:\$\{?input\}?|noexit).+\"'
        # Example 1: c:\windows\sYstEm32\CmD.eXE /C"echO\Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -NoEXiT -"
        # Example 2: c:\WiNDOws\sysTEm32\cmd.EXe /C " ECHo Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -nol ${EXEcUtIONCONTeXT}.INvOkEComMANd.InvOKEScRIPt( $InpUt )"
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - 'powershell'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - '/c'
            - '/r'
    selection_other:
        - ImagePath|contains: 'noexit'
        - ImagePath|contains|all:
              - 'input'
              - '$'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - System
id: 7e9c7999-0f9b-4d4a-a6ed-af6d553d4af4
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task31)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'mshta'
            - 'vbscript:createobject'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - System
id: 14bcba49-a428-42d9-b943-e2ce0f0f7ae6
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task27)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        # ImagePath|re: '(?i)&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\\"\s+?\-f.*&&.*cmd.*\/c' # FPs with |\/r
        # Example 1: CMD /C"sET KUR=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&Set MxI=C:\wINDowS\sYsWow64\winDOWspoWERSheLl\V1.0\PowerShelL.EXe ${ExEcut`IoN`cON`TExT}.\"invo`kEcoMm`A`ND\".( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f 'pt','EscRi','INvOk' ).Invoke( ( .( \"{0}{1}\" -f'D','IR' ) ( \"{0}{1}\"-f'ENV:kU','R')).\"vAl`Ue\" )&& CMD /C%mXI%"
        # Example 2: c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C "sEt DeJLz=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&set yBKM=PoWERShelL -noeX ^^^&(\"{2}{0}{1}\"-f '-ItE','m','seT') ( 'V' + 'a'+ 'RiAblE:z8J' +'U2' + 'l' ) ([TYpE]( \"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-f 'e','NT','e','NViRONM' ) ) ; ^^^& ( ( [sTrIng]${VE`Rbo`SepReFER`Ence})[1,3] + 'X'-joIN'')( ( (.('gI') ('V' + 'a' + 'RIAbLe:z8j' + 'u2' +'l' ) ).vALUe::( \"{2}{5}{0}{1}{6}{4}{3}\" -f 'IRo','Nm','GETE','ABlE','I','nv','enTVAr').Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'd','ejLz' ),( \"{1}{2}{0}\"-f'cEss','P','RO') )) )&& c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C %ybkm%"
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - '&&set'
            - 'cmd'
            - '/c'
            - '-f'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - '{0}'
            - '{1}'
            - '{2}'
            - '{3}'
            - '{4}'
            - '{5}'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - System
id: 51aa9387-1c53-4153-91cc-d73c59ae1ca9
status: test
description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references
references:
    - https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888
author: Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community
date: 2019-11-08
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 7045
    selection_imagepath:
        - ImagePath|re: '\$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\['
        - ImagePath|re: '\$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\['
        - ImagePath|re: '\$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\['
        - ImagePath|re: '\$env:ComSpec\[(\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}'
        - ImagePath|re: '\\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name'
        - ImagePath|re: '\$VerbosePreference\.ToString\('
        - ImagePath|re: '\String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - System
id: 8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 24)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        # ImagePath|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r)(?:\s|)\"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*\"'
        # Example 1: C:\winDoWs\SySTeM32\cmd.Exe /C"SET NOtI=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& PowERshElL -NOl SET-iteM ( 'VAR' + 'i'+ 'A' + 'blE:Ao6' + 'I0') ( [TYpe](\"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-F 'iRoN','mENT','e','nv') ) ; ${exECUtIONCOnTEXT}.\"IN`VO`KecOmMaND\".\"inVo`KES`crIPt\"( ( ( GEt-VAriAble ( 'a' + 'o6I0') -vaLU )::(\"{1}{4}{2}{3}{0}\" -f'e','gETenvIR','NtvaRIa','BL','ONme' ).Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'n','oti' ),( \"{0}{1}\" -f'pRoC','esS') )) )"
        # Example 2: cMD.exe /C "seT SlDb=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& pOWErShell .(( ^&(\"{1}{0}{2}{3}\" -f 'eT-vaR','G','iab','lE' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f '*m','DR*' ) ).\"na`ME\"[3,11,2]-JOIN'' ) ( ( ^&(\"{0}{1}\" -f'g','CI' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f 'ENV',':SlDb' ) ).\"VA`luE\" ) "
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '"set'
            - '-f'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - '/c'
            - '/r'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Binaries Write Suspicious Extensions
id: b8fd0e93-ff58-4cbd-8f48-1c114e342e62
related:
    - id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Windows executables that write files with suspicious extensions
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-12
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_generic:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\lsass.exe'
            - '\RuntimeBroker.exe'
            - '\sihost.exe'
            - '\smss.exe'
            - '\wininit.exe'
            - '\winlogon.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.bat'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.iso'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.txt'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    selection_special:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.bat'
            - '.hta'
            - '.iso'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    filter_main_AppLockerPolicyTest:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - ':\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.ps1'
    filter_main_script_gpo_machine:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\GroupPolicy\DataStore\'
            - '\sysvol\'
            - '\Policies\'
            - '\Machine\Scripts\Startup\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.ps1'
            - '.bat'
    filter_main_clipchamp:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Clipchamp'
            - '.ps1'
    filter_main_powershell_preview:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.ps1'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Forfiles.EXE Child Process Masquerading
id: f53714ec-5077-420e-ad20-907ff9bb2958
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of "forfiles" from a non-default location, in order to potentially spawn a custom "cmd.exe" from the current working directory.
references:
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2023/12/31/1-little-known-secret-of-forfiles-exe/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Anish Bogati
date: 2024-01-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Notes:
        #   - The parent must not have CLI options
        #   - The Child Image must be named "cmd" as its hardcoded in the "forfiles" binary
        #   - The Child CLI will always contains "/c echo" as its hardcoded in the original "forfiles" binary
        ParentCommandLine|endswith:
            - '.exe'
            - '.exe"'
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|startswith: '/c echo "'
    filter_main_parent_not_sys:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\forfiles.exe'
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Process Execution From A Potentially Suspicious Folder
id: 3dfd06d2-eaf4-4532-9555-68aca59f57c4
status: test
description: Detects a potentially suspicious execution from an uncommon folder.
references:
    - https://github.com/mbevilacqua/appcompatprocessor/blob/6c847937c5a836e2ce2fe2b915f213c345a3c389/AppCompatSearch.txt
    - https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/2019-crowdstrike-global-threat-report/
    - https://github.com/ThreatHuntingProject/ThreatHunting/blob/cb22598bb70651f88e0285abc8d835757d2cb596/hunts/suspicious_process_creation_via_windows_event_logs.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2024-07-12
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Users\All Users\'
            - ':\Users\Default\'
            - ':\Users\NetworkService\'
            - ':\Windows\addins\'
            - ':\Windows\debug\'
            - ':\Windows\Fonts\'
            - ':\Windows\Help\'
            - ':\Windows\IME\'
            - ':\Windows\Media\'
            - ':\Windows\repair\'
            - ':\Windows\security\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - '$Recycle.bin'
            - '\config\systemprofile\'
            - '\Intel\Logs\'
            - '\RSA\MachineKeys\'
    filter_optional_ibm:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\Public\IBM\ClientSolutions\Start_Programs\'
    filter_optional_citrix:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\config\systemprofile\Citrix\UpdaterBinaries\'
        Image|endswith: '\CitrixReceiverUpdater.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Taskmgr as LOCAL_SYSTEM
id: 9fff585c-c33e-4a86-b3cd-39312079a65f
status: test
description: Detects the creation of taskmgr.exe process in context of LOCAL_SYSTEM
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-03-18
modified: 2022-05-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
        Image|endswith: '\taskmgr.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: System File Execution Location Anomaly
id: e4a6b256-3e47-40fc-89d2-7a477edd6915
related:
    - id: be58d2e2-06c8-4f58-b666-b99f6dc3b6cd # Dedicated SvcHost rule
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of a Windows system binary that is usually located in the system folder from an uncommon location.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/GelosSnake/status/934900723426439170
    - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/39828/
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/inno-setup-malware-redline-stealer-campaign.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Patrick Bareiss, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-11-27
modified: 2026-02-12
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\atbroker.exe'
            - '\audiodg.exe'
            - '\bcdedit.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\certreq.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cmstp.exe'
            - '\conhost.exe'
            - '\consent.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\dashost.exe'
            - '\defrag.exe'
            - '\dfrgui.exe' # Was seen used by Lazarus Group - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/39828/
            - '\dism.exe'
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\dllhst3g.exe'
            - '\dwm.exe'
            - '\eventvwr.exe'
            - '\fsquirt.exe' # was seen used by sidewinder APT - https://securelist.com/sidewinder-apt/114089/
            - '\finger.exe'
            - '\logonui.exe'
            - '\LsaIso.exe'
            - '\lsass.exe'
            - '\lsm.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\ntoskrnl.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\runonce.exe'
            - '\RuntimeBroker.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\services.exe'
            - '\sihost.exe'
            - '\smartscreen.exe'
            - '\smss.exe'
            - '\spoolsv.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
            - '\taskhost.exe'
            - '\taskhostw.exe'
            - '\Taskmgr.exe'
            - '\userinit.exe'
            - '\werfault.exe'
            - '\werfaultsecure.exe'
            - '\wininit.exe'
            - '\winlogon.exe'
            - '\winver.exe'
            - '\wlanext.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
            - '\wsmprovhost.exe' # Was seen used by Lazarus Group - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/39828/
    filter_main_generic:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\'
            - 'C:\$WinREAgent\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SystemTemp\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - 'C:\Windows\uus\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
    filter_optional_system32:
        Image|contains: '\SystemRoot\System32\'
    filter_main_powershell:
        Image|contains:
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7-preview\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview' # pwsh installed from Microsoft Store
        Image|endswith: '\pwsh.exe'
    filter_main_wsl_programfiles:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\MicrosoftCorporationII.WindowsSubsystemForLinux'
            - 'C:\Program Files\WSL\'
        Image|endswith: '\wsl.exe'
    filter_main_wsl_appdata:
        Image|startswith: C:\Users\'
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\'
        Image|endswith: '\wsl.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_system_exe_anomaly/info.yml

title: Suspicious MSDT Parent Process
id: 7a74da6b-ea76-47db-92cc-874ad90df734
status: test
description: Detects msdt.exe executed by a suspicious parent as seen in CVE-2022-30190 / Follina exploitation
references:
    - https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/
author: Nextron Systems
date: 2022-06-01
modified: 2023-02-06
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
            # Note: office applications are covered by: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50
    selection_msdt:
        - Image|endswith: '\msdt.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'msdt.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Windows Update Agent Empty Cmdline
id: 52d097e2-063e-4c9c-8fbb-855c8948d135
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious Windows Update Agent activity in which a wuauclt.exe process command line doesn't contain any command line flags
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-26
modified: 2023-11-11
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\Wuauclt.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Wuauclt.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - 'Wuauclt'
            - 'Wuauclt.exe'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Calculator Usage
id: 737e618a-a410-49b5-bec3-9e55ff7fbc15
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious use of 'calc.exe' with command line parameters or in a suspicious directory, which is likely caused by some PoC or detection evasion.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1094080242686312448
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-02-09
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains: '\calc.exe '
    selection_2:
        Image|endswith: '\calc.exe'
    filter_main_known_locations:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
    condition: selection_1 or ( selection_2 and not filter_main_known_locations )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process Of Wermgr.EXE
id: 396f6630-f3ac-44e3-bfc8-1b161bc00c4e
related:
    - id: 5394fcc7-aeb2-43b5-9a09-cac9fc5edcd5
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious Windows Error Reporting manager (wermgr.exe) child process
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/black-basta-infiltrates-networks-via-qakbot-brute-ratel-and-coba.html
    - https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/wermgr.exe
    - https://github.com/binderlabs/DirCreate2System
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-14
modified: 2024-08-29
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\wermgr.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\ipconfig.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\netstat.exe'
            - '\nslookup.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\whoami.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    filter_main_rundll32:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Windows\system32\WerConCpl.dll'
            - 'LaunchErcApp '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-queuereporting'
            - '-responsepester'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Renamed ZOHO Dctask64 Execution
id: 340a090b-c4e9-412e-bb36-b4b16fe96f9b
status: test
description: |
    Detects a renamed "dctask64.exe" execution, a signed binary by ZOHO Corporation part of ManageEngine Endpoint Central.
    This binary can be abused for DLL injection, arbitrary command and process execution.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222088214581825540
    - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095963789111296
    - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095371175911424
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-01-28
modified: 2025-01-22
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1055.001
    - attack.t1202
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'IMPHASH=6834B1B94E49701D77CCB3C0895E1AFD'
            - 'IMPHASH=1BB6F93B129F398C7C4A76BB97450BBA'
            - 'IMPHASH=FAA2AC19875FADE461C8D89DCF2710A3'
            - 'IMPHASH=F1039CED4B91572AB7847D26032E6BBF'
    filter_main_legit_name:
        Image|endswith: '\dctask64.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Sdiagnhost Calling Suspicious Child Process
id: f3d39c45-de1a-4486-a687-ab126124f744
status: test
description: Detects sdiagnhost.exe calling a suspicious child process (e.g. used in exploits for Follina / CVE-2022-30190)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984
    - https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/f420d295-0457-4e9b-9b9e-6732be227583/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/c4117d9a-f463-461a-b90f-4cd258746798/
author: Nextron Systems, @Kostastsale
date: 2022-06-01
modified: 2024-08-23
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\sdiagnhost.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            # Add more suspicious LOLBins
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\taskkill.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            # - '\csc.exe'   # https://app.any.run/tasks/f420d295-0457-4e9b-9b9e-6732be227583/
            - '\calc.exe'  # https://app.any.run/tasks/f420d295-0457-4e9b-9b9e-6732be227583/
    filter_main_cmd_bits:
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'bits'
    filter_main_powershell_noprofile:
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '-noprofile -'
            - '-noprofile'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Process Parents
id: cbec226f-63d9-4eca-9f52-dfb6652f24df
status: test
description: Detects suspicious parent processes that should not have any children or should only have a single possible child program
references:
    - https://twitter.com/x86matthew/status/1505476263464607744?s=12
    - https://svch0st.medium.com/stats-from-hunting-cobalt-strike-beacons-c17e56255f9b
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-21
modified: 2022-09-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\minesweeper.exe'
            - '\winver.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
    selection_special:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
         # - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\eventvwr.exe'
            - '\calc.exe'
            - '\notepad.exe'
    filter_special:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\WerFault.exe'
            - '\wermgr.exe'
            - '\conhost.exe' # csrss.exe, certutil.exe
            - '\mmc.exe'     # eventvwr.exe
            - '\win32calc.exe' # calc.exe
            - '\notepad.exe'
    filter_null:
        Image: null
    condition: selection or ( selection_special and not 1 of filter_* )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Renamed Plink Execution
id: 1c12727d-02bf-45ff-a9f3-d49806a3cf43
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed version of the Plink binary
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/
    - https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/0.58/htmldoc/Chapter7.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-06
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - OriginalFileName: 'Plink'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' -l forward'
              - ' -P '
              - ' -R '
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\plink.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Process Masquerading As SvcHost.EXE
id: be58d2e2-06c8-4f58-b666-b99f6dc3b6cd
related:
    - id: 01d2e2a1-5f09-44f7-9fc1-24faa7479b6d
      type: similar
    - id: e4a6b256-3e47-40fc-89d2-7a477edd6915
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects a suspicious process that is masquerading as the legitimate "svchost.exe" by naming its binary "svchost.exe" and executing from an uncommon location.
    Adversaries often disguise their malicious binaries by naming them after legitimate system processes like "svchost.exe" to evade detection.
references:
    - https://tria.ge/240731-jh4crsycnb/behavioral2
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-detection/process-masquerading/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2024-08-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    filter_main_img_location:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe'
    filter_main_ofn:
        OriginalFileName: 'svchost.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_svchost_masqueraded_execution/info.yml

title: Uncommon Svchost Command Line Parameter
id: f17211f1-1f24-4d0c-829f-31e28dc93cdd
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects instances of svchost.exe running with an unusual or uncommon command line parameter by excluding known legitimate or common patterns.
    This could point at a file masquerading as svchost, a process injection, or hollowing of a legitimate svchost instance.
references:
    - https://cardinalops.com/blog/the-art-of-anomaly-hunting-patterns-detection/
    - https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/blackbyte-exbyte-ransomware
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits/
    - https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064518/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf
author: Liran Ravich
date: 2025-11-14
modified: 2026-03-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.t1055
    - attack.t1055.012
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Example of command to simulate: "C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe" calc.exe
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    filter_main_flags:
        CommandLine|re: '-k\s\w{1,64}(?:\s?(?:-p|-s))?'
    filter_main_empty:
        CommandLine: ''
    filter_main_null:
        CommandLine: null
    filter_optional_defender:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\MsMpEng.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'svchost.exe'
    filter_optional_mrt:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\MRT.exe'
        CommandLine: 'svchost.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential MsiExec Masquerading
id: e22a6eb2-f8a5-44b5-8b44-a2dbd47b1144
status: test
description: Detects the execution of msiexec.exe from an uncommon directory
references:
    - https://twitter.com/200_okay_/status/1194765831911215104
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-11-14
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: '\msiexec.exe'
    filter:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Scheduled Task Creation Masquerading as System Processes
id: 9f8573c9-22b4-40e3-89c1-72bc2b8d49ab
status: experimental
description: Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that involve system processes, which may indicate malicious actors masquerading as or abusing these processes to execute payloads or maintain persistence.
references:
    - https://tria.ge/241015-l98snsyeje/behavioral2
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-02-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1036.004
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /create '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' audiodg'
            - ' conhost'
            - ' dwm.exe'
            - ' explorer'
            - ' lsass'
            - ' lsm'
            - ' mmc'
            - ' msiexec'
            - ' regsvr32'
            - ' rundll32'
            - ' services'
            - ' spoolsv'
            - ' svchost'
            - ' taskeng'
            - ' taskhost'
            - ' wininit'
            - ' winlogon'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate system administration tasks scheduling trusted system processes.
level: high

title: Flash Player Update from Suspicious Location
id: 4922a5dd-6743-4fc2-8e81-144374280997
status: test
description: Detects a flashplayer update from an unofficial location
references:
    - https://gist.github.com/roycewilliams/a723aaf8a6ac3ba4f817847610935cfb
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-10-25
modified: 2022-08-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1189
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        - c-uri|contains: '/flash_install.php'
        - c-uri|endswith: '/install_flash_player.exe'
    filter:
        cs-host|endswith: '.adobe.com'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown flash download locations
level: high

title: OpenCanary - TFTP Request
id: b4e6b016-a2ac-4759-ad85-8000b300d61e
status: test
description: Detects instances where a TFTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1041
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 10001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Shell Execution via Rsync - Linux
id: e2326866-609f-4015-aea9-7ec634e8aa04
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of the "rsync" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/rsync/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.), Florian Roth
date: 2024-09-02
modified: 2025-01-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/rsync'
            - '/rsyncd'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -e '
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/ash '
            - '/bash '
            - '/dash '
            - '/csh '
            - '/sh '
            - '/zsh '
            - '/tcsh '
            - '/ksh '
            - "'ash "
            - "'bash "
            - "'dash "
            - "'csh "
            - "'sh "
            - "'zsh "
            - "'tcsh "
            - "'ksh "
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate cases in which "rsync" is used to execute a shell
level: high

title: Shell Execution via Git - Linux
id: 47b3bbd4-1bf7-48cc-84ab-995362aaa75a
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "git" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/git/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '/git'
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -p '
            - 'help'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'bash 0<&1'
            - 'dash 0<&1'
            - 'sh 0<&1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Invocation of Shell via Rsync
id: 297241f3-8108-4b3a-8c15-2dda9f844594
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of a shell as sub process of "rsync" without the expected command line flag "-e" being used, which could be an indication of exploitation as described in CVE-2024-12084. This behavior is commonly associated with attempts to execute arbitrary commands or escalate privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further exploitation.
references:
    - https://sysdig.com/blog/detecting-and-mitigating-cve-2024-12084-rsync-remote-code-execution/
    - https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/a20436375a1e26524931dd8ea1a3af10
author: Florian Roth
date: 2025-01-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '/rsync'
            - '/rsyncd'
        Image|endswith:
            - '/ash'
            - '/bash'
            - '/csh'
            - '/dash'
            - '/ksh'
            - '/sh'
            - '/tcsh'
            - '/zsh'
    filter_main_expected:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -e '
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Capsh Shell Invocation - Linux
id: db1ac3be-f606-4e3a-89e0-9607cbe6b98a
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "capsh" utility to invoke a shell.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/capsh/#shell
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/capsh'
        CommandLine|endswith: ' --'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Inline Python Execution - Spawn Shell Via OS System Library
id: 2d2f44ff-4611-4778-a8fc-323a0e9850cc
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of inline Python code via the "-c" in order to call the "system" function from the "os" library, and spawn a shell.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/python/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '/python'
              - '/python2'
              - '/python3'
        - Image|contains:
              - '/python2.'  # python image is always of the form ../python3.10; ../python is just a symlink
              - '/python3.'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -c '
            - 'os.system('
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Netcat Reverse Shell Execution
id: 7f734ed0-4f47-46c0-837f-6ee62505abd9
status: test
description: Detects execution of netcat with the "-e" flag followed by common shells. This could be a sign of a potential reverse shell setup.
references:
    - https://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet
    - https://www.revshells.com/
    - https://www.hackingtutorials.org/networking/hacking-netcat-part-2-bind-reverse-shells/
    - https://www.infosecademy.com/netcat-reverse-shells/
    - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/ncat.1.html
author: '@d4ns4n_, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)'
date: 2023-04-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_nc:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/nc'
            - '/ncat'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -c '
            - ' -e '
    selection_shell:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' ash'
            - ' bash'
            - ' bsh'
            - ' csh'
            - ' ksh'
            - ' pdksh'
            - ' sh'
            - ' tcsh'
            - '/bin/ash'
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/bsh'
            - '/bin/csh'
            - '/bin/ksh'
            - '/bin/pdksh'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/tcsh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
            - '$IFSash'
            - '$IFSbash'
            - '$IFSbsh'
            - '$IFScsh'
            - '$IFSksh'
            - '$IFSpdksh'
            - '$IFSsh'
            - '$IFStcsh'
            - '$IFSzsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious Invocation of Shell via AWK - Linux
id: 8c1a5675-cb85-452f-a298-b01b22a51856
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of "awk" or it's sibling commands, to invoke a shell using the system() function.
    This behavior is commonly associated with attempts to execute arbitrary commands or escalate privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further exploitation.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/awk/#shell
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/gawk/#shell
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/nawk/#shell
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/mawk/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/awk'
            - '/gawk'
            - '/mawk'
            - '/nawk'
        CommandLine|contains: 'BEGIN {system'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Java Children Processes
id: d292e0af-9a18-420c-9525-ec0ac3936892
status: test
description: Detects java process spawning suspicious children
references:
    - https://www.tecmint.com/different-types-of-linux-shells/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '/java'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/sh'
            - 'bash'
            - 'dash'
            - 'ksh'
            - 'zsh'
            - 'csh'
            - 'fish'
            - 'curl'
            - 'wget'
            - 'python'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Shell Invocation Via Ssh - Linux
id: 8737b7f6-8df3-4bb7-b1da-06019b99b687
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "ssh" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/ssh/
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-08-29
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '/ssh'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ProxyCommand=;'
            - 'permitlocalcommand=yes'
            - 'localhost'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
            - 'sh 0<&2 1>&2'
            - 'sh 1>&2 0<&2'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: BPFDoor Abnormal Process ID or Lock File Accessed
id: 808146b2-9332-4d78-9416-d7e47012d83d
status: test
description: detects BPFDoor .lock and .pid files access in temporary file storage facility
references:
    - https://www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/bpfdoor-an-evasive-linux-backdoor-technical-analysis/
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/a-peek-behind-the-bpfdoor
    - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-bpfdoor-telecom-networks-sleeper-cells-threat-research-report/
    - https://github.com/rapid7/Rapid7-Labs/blob/741c7196ec12a0a56b63463d1fd726ff14d3a97a/BPFDoor/rapid7_detect_bpfdoor.sh
author: Rafal Piasecki
date: 2022-08-10
modified: 2026-03-30
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection:
        type: 'PATH'
        name:
            - /var/run/aepmonend.pid
            - /var/run/auditd.lock
            - /var/run/cma.lock
            - /var/run/console-kit.pid
            - /var/run/consolekit.pid
            - /var/run/daemon.pid
            - /var/run/hald-addon.pid
            - /var/run/hald-smartd.pid
            - /var/run/haldrund.pid
            - /var/run/hp-health.pid
            - /var/run/hpasmlit.lock
            - /var/run/hpasmlited.pid
            - /var/run/kdevrund.pid
            - /var/run/lldpad.lock
            - /var/run/mcelog.pid
            - /var/run/system.pid
            - /var/run/uvp-srv.pid
            - /var/run/vmtoolagt.pid
            - /var/run/xinetd.lock
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PCRE.NET Package Temp Files
id: 6e90ae7a-7cd3-473f-a035-4ebb72d961da
status: test
description: Detects processes creating temp files related to PCRE.NET package
references:
    - https://twitter.com/rbmaslen/status/1321859647091970051
    - https://twitter.com/tifkin_/status/1321916444557365248
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-29
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\ba9ea7344a4a5f591d6e5dc32a13494b\
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Shell/Scripting Application File Write to Suspicious Folder
id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
status: test
description: Detects Windows shells and scripting applications that write files to suspicious folders
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-20
modified: 2023-03-29
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\msbuild.exe'  # https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_msbuild_started_by_office_app.toml
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\PerfLogs\'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\'
    selection_2:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            # - '\rundll32.exe' # Potential FP
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'  # https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - 'C:\PerfLogs\'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - Stracciatella Execution
id: 7a4d9232-92fc-404d-8ce1-4c92e7caf539
status: test
description: Detects Stracciatella which executes a Powershell runspace from within C# (aka SharpPick technique) with AMSI, ETW and Script Block Logging disabled based on PE metadata characteristics.
references:
    - https://github.com/mgeeky/Stracciatella
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-17
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\Stracciatella.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Stracciatella.exe'
        - Description: 'Stracciatella'
        - Hashes|contains:
              - 'SHA256=9d25e61ec1527e2a69d7c2a4e3fe2fe15890710c198a66a9f25d99fdf6c7b956'
              - 'SHA256=fd16609bd9830c63b9413671678bb159b89c357d21942ddbb6b93add808d121a'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious Persistence Via VMwareToolBoxCmd.EXE VM State Change Script
id: 236d8e89-ed95-4789-a982-36f4643738ba
related:
    - id: 7aa4e81a-a65c-4e10-9f81-b200eb229d7d
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects execution of the "VMwareToolBoxCmd.exe" with the "script" and "set" flag to setup a specific script that's located in a potentially suspicious location to run for a specific VM state
references:
    - https://bohops.com/2021/10/08/analyzing-and-detecting-a-vmtools-persistence-technique/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_bin_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\VMwareToolBoxCmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'toolbox-cmd.exe'
    selection_bin_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' script '
            - ' set '
    selection_susp_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potentially Suspicious Execution From Parent Process In Public Folder
id: 69bd9b97-2be2-41b6-9816-fb08757a4d1a
status: test
description: |
    Detects a potentially suspicious execution of a parent process located in the "\Users\Public" folder executing a child process containing references to shell or scripting binaries and commandlines.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-25
modified: 2024-07-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|contains: ':\Users\Public\'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\bitsadmin.exe'
              - '\certutil.exe'
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'bitsadmin'
              - 'certutil'
              - 'cscript'
              - 'mshta'
              - 'powershell'
              - 'regsvr32'
              - 'rundll32'
              - 'wscript'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Run PowerShell Script from Redirected Input Stream
id: c83bf4b5-cdf0-437c-90fa-43d734f7c476
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell script execution via input stream redirect
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/4db780e0f0b2e2bb8cb1fa13e09196da9b9f1834/yml/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Powershell.yml
    - https://twitter.com/Moriarty_Meng/status/984380793383370752
author: Moriarty Meng (idea), Anton Kutepov (rule), oscd.community
date: 2020-10-17
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        CommandLine|re: '\s-\s*<'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high