Sigma rules · Qilin · threatengine.sh

related critical

Antivirus Password Dumper Detection

Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a password dumper. This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.

status stable author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp id 78cc2dd2-7d20-4d32-93ff-057084c38b93 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: Antivirus Password Dumper Detection
id: 78cc2dd2-7d20-4d32-93ff-057084c38b93
status: stable
description: |
    Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a password dumper.
    This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5fcda49ee7f202559a6cbbb34edb65c33c9a1e0bde9fa2af06a6f11b55ded619
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a4edfbd42595d5bddb442c82a02cf0aaa10893c1bf79ea08b9ce576f82749448
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2024-11-02
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1558
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    category: antivirus
detection:
    selection:
        - Signature|startswith: 'PWS'
        - Signature|contains:
              - 'Certify'
              - 'DCSync'
              - 'DumpCreds'
              - 'DumpLsass'
              - 'DumpPert'
              - 'HTool/WCE'
              - 'Kekeo'
              - 'Lazagne'
              - 'LsassDump'
              - 'Mimikatz'
              - 'MultiDump'
              - 'Nanodump'
              - 'NativeDump'
              - 'Outflank'
              - 'PShlSpy'
              - 'PSWTool'
              - 'PWCrack'
              - 'PWDump'
              - 'PWS.'
              - 'PWSX'
              - 'pypykatz'
              - 'Rubeus'
              - 'SafetyKatz'
              - 'SecurityTool'
              - 'SharpChrome'
              - 'SharpDPAPI'
              - 'SharpDump'
              - 'SharpKatz'
              - 'SharpS.' # Sharpsploit, e.g. 530ea2ff9049f5dfdfa0a2e9c27c2e3c0685eb6cbdf85370c20a7bfae49f592d
              - 'ShpKatz'
              - 'TrickDump'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

related critical

Hacktool Execution - Imphash

Detects the execution of different Windows based hacktools via their import hash (imphash) even if the files have been renamed

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 24e3e58a-646b-4b50-adef-02ef935b9fc8 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: Hacktool Execution - Imphash
id: 24e3e58a-646b-4b50-adef-02ef935b9fc8
status: test
description: Detects the execution of different Windows based hacktools via their import hash (imphash) even if the files have been renamed
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-04
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1588.002
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Hashes|contains: # Sysmon field hashes contains all types
            - IMPHASH=BCCA3C247B619DCD13C8CDFF5F123932 # PetitPotam
            - IMPHASH=3A19059BD7688CB88E70005F18EFC439 # PetitPotam
            - IMPHASH=bf6223a49e45d99094406777eb6004ba # PetitPotam
            - IMPHASH=23867A89C2B8FC733BE6CF5EF902F2D1 # JuicyPotato
            - IMPHASH=A37FF327F8D48E8A4D2F757E1B6E70BC # JuicyPotato
            - IMPHASH=F9A28C458284584A93B14216308D31BD # JuicyPotatoNG
            - IMPHASH=6118619783FC175BC7EBECFF0769B46E # RoguePotato
            - IMPHASH=959A83047E80AB68B368FDB3F4C6E4EA # RoguePotato
            - IMPHASH=563233BFA169ACC7892451F71AD5850A # RoguePotato
            - IMPHASH=87575CB7A0E0700EB37F2E3668671A08 # RoguePotato
            - IMPHASH=13F08707F759AF6003837A150A371BA1 # Pwdump
            - IMPHASH=1781F06048A7E58B323F0B9259BE798B # Pwdump
            - IMPHASH=233F85F2D4BC9D6521A6CAAE11A1E7F5 # Pwdump
            - IMPHASH=24AF2584CBF4D60BBE5C6D1B31B3BE6D # Pwdump
            - IMPHASH=632969DDF6DBF4E0F53424B75E4B91F2 # Pwdump
            - IMPHASH=713C29B396B907ED71A72482759ED757 # Pwdump
            - IMPHASH=749A7BB1F0B4C4455949C0B2BF7F9E9F # Pwdump
            - IMPHASH=8628B2608957A6B0C6330AC3DE28CE2E # Pwdump
            - IMPHASH=8B114550386E31895DFAB371E741123D # Pwdump
            - IMPHASH=94CB940A1A6B65BED4D5A8F849CE9793 # PwDumpX
            - IMPHASH=9D68781980370E00E0BD939EE5E6C141 # Pwdump
            - IMPHASH=B18A1401FF8F444056D29450FBC0A6CE # Pwdump
            - IMPHASH=CB567F9498452721D77A451374955F5F # Pwdump
            - IMPHASH=730073214094CD328547BF1F72289752 # Htran
            - IMPHASH=17B461A082950FC6332228572138B80C # Cobalt Strike beacons
            - IMPHASH=DC25EE78E2EF4D36FAA0BADF1E7461C9 # Cobalt Strike beacons
            - IMPHASH=819B19D53CA6736448F9325A85736792 # Cobalt Strike beacons
            - IMPHASH=829DA329CE140D873B4A8BDE2CBFAA7E # Cobalt Strike beacons
            - IMPHASH=C547F2E66061A8DFFB6F5A3FF63C0A74 # PPLDump
            - IMPHASH=0588081AB0E63BA785938467E1B10CCA # PPLDump
            - IMPHASH=0D9EC08BAC6C07D9987DFD0F1506587C # NanoDump
            - IMPHASH=BC129092B71C89B4D4C8CDF8EA590B29 # NanoDump
            - IMPHASH=4DA924CF622D039D58BCE71CDF05D242 # NanoDump
            - IMPHASH=E7A3A5C377E2D29324093377D7DB1C66 # NanoDump
            - IMPHASH=9A9DBEC5C62F0380B4FA5FD31DEFFEDF # NanoDump
            - IMPHASH=AF8A3976AD71E5D5FDFB67DDB8DADFCE # NanoDump
            - IMPHASH=0C477898BBF137BBD6F2A54E3B805FF4 # NanoDump
            - IMPHASH=0CA9F02B537BCEA20D4EA5EB1A9FE338 # NanoDump
            - IMPHASH=3AB3655E5A14D4EEFC547F4781BF7F9E # NanoDump
            - IMPHASH=E6F9D5152DA699934B30DAAB206471F6 # NanoDump
            - IMPHASH=3AD59991CCF1D67339B319B15A41B35D # NanoDump
            - IMPHASH=FFDD59E0318B85A3E480874D9796D872 # NanoDump
            - IMPHASH=0CF479628D7CC1EA25EC7998A92F5051 # NanoDump
            - IMPHASH=07A2D4DCBD6CB2C6A45E6B101F0B6D51 # NanoDump
            - IMPHASH=D6D0F80386E1380D05CB78E871BC72B1 # NanoDump
            - IMPHASH=38D9E015591BBFD4929E0D0F47FA0055 # HandleKatz
            - IMPHASH=0E2216679CA6E1094D63322E3412D650 # HandleKatz
            - IMPHASH=ADA161BF41B8E5E9132858CB54CAB5FB # DripLoader
            - IMPHASH=2A1BC4913CD5ECB0434DF07CB675B798 # DripLoader
            - IMPHASH=11083E75553BAAE21DC89CE8F9A195E4 # DripLoader
            - IMPHASH=A23D29C9E566F2FA8FFBB79267F5DF80 # DripLoader
            - IMPHASH=4A07F944A83E8A7C2525EFA35DD30E2F # CreateMiniDump
            - IMPHASH=767637C23BB42CD5D7397CF58B0BE688 # UACMe Akagi
            - IMPHASH=14C4E4C72BA075E9069EE67F39188AD8 # UACMe Akagi
            - IMPHASH=3C782813D4AFCE07BBFC5A9772ACDBDC # UACMe Akagi
            - IMPHASH=7D010C6BB6A3726F327F7E239166D127 # UACMe Akagi
            - IMPHASH=89159BA4DD04E4CE5559F132A9964EB3 # UACMe Akagi
            - IMPHASH=6F33F4A5FC42B8CEC7314947BD13F30F # UACMe Akagi
            - IMPHASH=5834ED4291BDEB928270428EBBAF7604 # UACMe Akagi
            - IMPHASH=5A8A8A43F25485E7EE1B201EDCBC7A38 # UACMe Akagi
            - IMPHASH=DC7D30B90B2D8ABF664FBED2B1B59894 # UACMe Akagi
            - IMPHASH=41923EA1F824FE63EA5BEB84DB7A3E74 # UACMe Akagi
            - IMPHASH=3DE09703C8E79ED2CA3F01074719906B # UACMe Akagi
            - IMPHASH=A53A02B997935FD8EEDCB5F7ABAB9B9F # WCE
            - IMPHASH=E96A73C7BF33A464C510EDE582318BF2 # WCE
            - IMPHASH=32089B8851BBF8BC2D014E9F37288C83 # Sliver Stagers
            - IMPHASH=09D278F9DE118EF09163C6140255C690 # Dumpert
            - IMPHASH=03866661686829d806989e2fc5a72606 # Dumpert
            - IMPHASH=e57401fbdadcd4571ff385ab82bd5d6d # Dumpert
            - IMPHASH=84B763C45C0E4A3E7CA5548C710DB4EE # SysmonEnte
            - IMPHASH=19584675D94829987952432E018D5056 # SysmonQuiet
            - IMPHASH=330768A4F172E10ACB6287B87289D83B # ShaprEvtMute Hook
            - IMPHASH=885C99CCFBE77D1CBFCB9C4E7C1A3313 # Forkatz
            - IMPHASH=22A22BC9E4E0D2F189F1EA01748816AC # PPLKiller
            - IMPHASH=7FA30E6BB7E8E8A69155636E50BF1B28 # PPLKiller
            - IMPHASH=96DF3A3731912449521F6F8D183279B1 # Backstab
            - IMPHASH=7E6CF3FF4576581271AC8A313B2AAB46 # Backstab
            - IMPHASH=51791678F351C03A0EB4E2A7B05C6E17 # Backstab
            - IMPHASH=25CE42B079282632708FC846129E98A5 # Forensia
            - IMPHASH=021BCCA20BA3381B11BDDE26B4E62F20 # EDRSandBlast
            - IMPHASH=59223B5F52D8799D38E0754855CBDF42 # EDRSandBlast
            - IMPHASH=81E75D8F1D276C156653D3D8813E4A43 # EDRSandBlast
            - IMPHASH=17244E8B6B8227E57FE709CCAD421420 # EDRSandBlast
            - IMPHASH=5B76DA3ACDEDC8A5CDF23A798B5936B4 # EDRSandBlast
            - IMPHASH=CB2B65BB77D995CC1C0E5DF1C860133C # EDRSandBlast
            - IMPHASH=40445337761D80CF465136FAFB1F63E6 # EDRSandBlast
            - IMPHASH=8A790F401B29FA87BC1E56F7272B3AA6 # EDRSilencer
            - IMPHASH=B50199E952C875241B9CE06C971CE3C1 # EventLogCrasher
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of one of these tools
level: critical

related critical

HackTool - Rubeus Execution

Detects the execution of the hacktool Rubeus via PE information of command line parameters

status stable author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 7ec2c172-dceb-4c10-92c9-87c1881b7e18 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: HackTool - Rubeus Execution
id: 7ec2c172-dceb-4c10-92c9-87c1881b7e18
related:
    - id: 7ec2c172-dceb-4c10-92c9-87c1881b7e18
      type: similar
status: stable
description: Detects the execution of the hacktool Rubeus via PE information of command line parameters
references:
    - https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus
    - https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-12-19
modified: 2023-04-20
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1558.003
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1550.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\Rubeus.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Rubeus.exe'
        - Description: 'Rubeus'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'asreproast '
              - 'dump /service:krbtgt '
              - 'dump /luid:0x'
              - 'kerberoast '
              - 'createnetonly /program:'
              - 'ptt /ticket:'
              - '/impersonateuser:'
              - 'renew /ticket:'
              - 'asktgt /user:'
              - 'harvest /interval:'
              - 's4u /user:'
              - 's4u /ticket:'
              - 'hash /password:'
              - 'golden /aes256:'
              - 'silver /user:'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

related critical

Potential Credential Dumping Via LSASS Process Clone

Detects a suspicious LSASS process process clone that could be a sign of credential dumping activity

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Samir Bousseaden id c8da0dfd-4ed0-4b68-962d-13c9c884384e license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: Potential Credential Dumping Via LSASS Process Clone
id: c8da0dfd-4ed0-4b68-962d-13c9c884384e
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious LSASS process process clone that could be a sign of credential dumping activity
references:
    - https://www.matteomalvica.com/blog/2019/12/02/win-defender-atp-cred-bypass/
    - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1420053502554951689
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1464566846594691073?s=20
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Samir Bousseaden
date: 2021-11-27
modified: 2023-03-02
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\Windows\System32\lsass.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\Windows\System32\lsass.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

related critical

WCE wceaux.dll Access

Detects wceaux.dll access while WCE pass-the-hash remote command execution on source host

status test author Thomas Patzke id 1de68c67-af5c-4097-9c85-fe5578e09e67 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: WCE wceaux.dll Access
id: 1de68c67-af5c-4097-9c85-fe5578e09e67
status: test
description: Detects wceaux.dll access while WCE pass-the-hash remote command execution on source host
references:
    - https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html
    - https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-06-14
modified: 2025-01-30
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.s0005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 4656
            - 4663
        ObjectName|endswith: '\wceaux.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

related critical

HackTool - Dumpert Process Dumper Default File

Detects the creation of the default dump file used by Outflank Dumpert tool. A process dumper, which dumps the lsass process memory

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 93d94efc-d7ad-4161-ad7d-1638c4f908d8 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: HackTool - Dumpert Process Dumper Default File
id: 93d94efc-d7ad-4161-ad7d-1638c4f908d8
related:
    - id: 2704ab9e-afe2-4854-a3b1-0c0706d03578
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the creation of the default dump file used by Outflank Dumpert tool. A process dumper, which dumps the lsass process memory
references:
    - https://github.com/outflanknl/Dumpert
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/actors-still-exploiting-sharepoint-vulnerability/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-02-04
modified: 2023-05-09
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: 'dumpert.dmp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Very unlikely
level: critical

related critical

HackTool - Credential Dumping Tools Named Pipe Created

Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via specific named pipe creation

status test author Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community id 961d0ba2-3eea-4303-a930-2cf78bbfcc5e license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: HackTool - Credential Dumping Tools Named Pipe Created
id: 961d0ba2-3eea-4303-a930-2cf78bbfcc5e
status: test
description: Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via specific named pipe creation
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
    - https://image.slidesharecdn.com/zeronights2017kheirkhabarov-171118103000/75/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment-57-2048.jpg?cb=1666035799
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
date: 2019-11-01
modified: 2023-08-07
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: pipe_created
    definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName|contains:
            - '\cachedump'
            - '\lsadump'
            - '\wceservicepipe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Administrator using tool for password recovery
level: critical

related critical

HackTool - Inveigh Execution

Detects the use of Inveigh a cross-platform .NET IPv4/IPv6 machine-in-the-middle tool

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id b99a1518-1ad5-4f65-bc95-1ffff97a8fd0 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: HackTool - Inveigh Execution
id: b99a1518-1ad5-4f65-bc95-1ffff97a8fd0
status: test
description: Detects the use of Inveigh a cross-platform .NET IPv4/IPv6 machine-in-the-middle tool
references:
    - https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/11/23/pysa-mespinoza-ransomware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-24
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\Inveigh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - '\Inveigh.exe'
              - '\Inveigh.dll'
        - Description: 'Inveigh'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - ' -SpooferIP'
              - ' -ReplyToIPs '
              - ' -ReplyToDomains '
              - ' -ReplyToMACs '
              - ' -SnifferIP'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Very unlikely
level: critical

related critical

HackTool - SafetyKatz Execution

Detects the execution of the hacktool SafetyKatz via PE information and default Image name

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id b1876533-4ed5-4a83-90f3-b8645840a413 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: HackTool - SafetyKatz Execution
id: b1876533-4ed5-4a83-90f3-b8645840a413
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the hacktool SafetyKatz via PE information and default Image name
references:
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/SafetyKatz
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-20
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\SafetyKatz.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'SafetyKatz.exe'
        - Description: 'SafetyKatz'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

related critical

HackTool - Dumpert Process Dumper Execution

Detects the use of Dumpert process dumper, which dumps the lsass.exe process memory

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 2704ab9e-afe2-4854-a3b1-0c0706d03578 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: HackTool - Dumpert Process Dumper Execution
id: 2704ab9e-afe2-4854-a3b1-0c0706d03578
status: test
description: Detects the use of Dumpert process dumper, which dumps the lsass.exe process memory
references:
    - https://github.com/outflanknl/Dumpert
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/actors-still-exploiting-sharepoint-vulnerability/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-02-04
modified: 2025-01-22
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Hashes|contains: 'MD5=09D278F9DE118EF09163C6140255C690'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'Dumpert.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Very unlikely
level: critical

related critical

HackTool - Windows Credential Editor (WCE) Execution

Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE), a popular post-exploitation tool used to extract plaintext passwords, hash, PIN code and Kerberos tickets from memory. It is often used by threat actors for credential dumping and lateral movement within compromised networks.

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 7aa7009a-28b9-4344-8c1f-159489a390df license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: HackTool - Windows Credential Editor (WCE) Execution
id: 7aa7009a-28b9-4344-8c1f-159489a390df
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE), a popular post-exploitation tool used to extract plaintext passwords, hash, PIN code and Kerberos tickets from memory.
    It is often used by threat actors for credential dumping and lateral movement within compromised networks.
references:
    - https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-12-31
modified: 2025-10-21
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.s0005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\WCE.exe'
            - '\WCE64.exe'
    selection_hash:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'IMPHASH=136F0A8572C058A96436C82E541E4C41'
            - 'IMPHASH=589657C64DDE88533186C39F82FA1F50'
            - 'IMPHASH=6BFE09EFCB4FFDE061EBDBAFC4DB84CF'
            - 'IMPHASH=7D490037BF450877E6D0287BDCFF8D2E'
            - 'IMPHASH=8AB93B061287C79F3088C5BC7E7D97ED'
            - 'IMPHASH=A53A02B997935FD8EEDCB5F7ABAB9B9F'
            - 'IMPHASH=BA434A7A729EEC20E136CA4C32D6C740'
            - 'IMPHASH=BD1D1547DA13C0FCB6C15E86217D5EB8'
            - 'IMPHASH=E96A73C7BF33A464C510EDE582318BF2'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

related critical

Windows Credential Editor Registry

Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE)

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id a6b33c02-8305-488f-8585-03cb2a7763f2 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Windows Credential Editor Registry
id: a6b33c02-8305-488f-8585-03cb2a7763f2
status: test
description: Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE)
references:
    - https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-12-31
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.s0005
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: Services\WCESERVICE\Start
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

related critical

Potential Credential Dumping Via LSASS SilentProcessExit Technique

Detects changes to the Registry in which a monitor program gets registered to dump the memory of the lsass.exe process

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 55e29995-75e7-451a-bef0-6225e2f13597 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Credential Dumping Via LSASS SilentProcessExit Technique
id: 55e29995-75e7-451a-bef0-6225e2f13597
related:
    - id: 36803969-5421-41ec-b92f-8500f79c23b0
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects changes to the Registry in which a monitor program gets registered to dump the memory of the lsass.exe process
references:
    - https://www.deepinstinct.com/2021/02/16/lsass-memory-dumps-are-stealthier-than-ever-before-part-2/
    - https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-02-26
modified: 2022-12-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: 'Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\lsass.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

related critical

Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account

Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS) from a non machine account to request credentials.

status test author Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g id 17d619c1-e020-4347-957e-1d1207455c93 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account
id: 17d619c1-e020-4347-957e-1d1207455c93
status: test
description: Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS) from a non machine account to request credentials.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/180815-ADObjectAccessReplication/notebook.html
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/library/windows/active_directory_replication.html
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190101-ADModDirectoryReplication/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2019-07-26
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.006
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4662
        AccessMask: '0x100'
        Properties|contains:
            - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
            - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
            - '89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c'
    filter:
        - SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
        - SubjectUserName|startswith: 'MSOL_' # https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/reference-connect-accounts-permissions#ad-ds-connector-account
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

related critical

Renamed Whoami Execution

Detects the execution of whoami that has been renamed to a different name to avoid detection

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id f1086bf7-a0c4-4a37-9102-01e573caf4a0 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Renamed Whoami Execution
id: f1086bf7-a0c4-4a37-9102-01e573caf4a0
status: test
description: Detects the execution of whoami that has been renamed to a different name to avoid detection
references:
    - https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1247926/agent-tesla-keylogger-delivered-inside-a-power-iso-daa-archive/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/7eaba74e-c1ea-400f-9c17-5e30eee89906/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-12
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
    - car.2016-03-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        OriginalFileName: 'whoami.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\whoami.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

related critical

HackTool - Sliver C2 Implant Activity Pattern

Detects process activity patterns as seen being used by Sliver C2 framework implants

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 42333b2c-b425-441c-b70e-99404a17170f license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: HackTool - Sliver C2 Implant Activity Pattern
id: 42333b2c-b425-441c-b70e-99404a17170f
status: test
description: Detects process activity patterns as seen being used by Sliver C2 framework implants
references:
    - https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/79f2d48fcdfc2bee4713b78d431ea4b27f733f30/implant/sliver/shell/shell_windows.go#L36
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/looking-for-the-sliver-lining-hunting-for-emerging-command-and-control-frameworks/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-25
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: '-NoExit -Command [Console]::OutputEncoding=[Text.UTF8Encoding]::UTF8'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

related critical

Bad Opsec Powershell Code Artifacts

focuses on trivial artifacts observed in variants of prevalent offensive ps1 payloads, including Cobalt Strike Beacon, PoshC2, Powerview, Letmein, Empire, Powersploit, and other attack payloads that often undergo minimal changes by attackers due to bad opsec.

status test author ok @securonix invrep_de, oscd.community id 8d31a8ce-46b5-4dd6-bdc3-680931f1db86 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Bad Opsec Powershell Code Artifacts
id: 8d31a8ce-46b5-4dd6-bdc3-680931f1db86
related:
    - id: 73e733cc-1ace-3212-a107-ff2523cc9fc3
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    focuses on trivial artifacts observed in variants of prevalent offensive ps1 payloads, including
    Cobalt Strike Beacon, PoshC2, Powerview, Letmein, Empire, Powersploit, and other attack payloads
    that often undergo minimal changes by attackers due to bad opsec.
references:
    - https://newtonpaul.com/analysing-fileless-malware-cobalt-strike-beacon/
    - https://labs.sentinelone.com/top-tier-russian-organized-cybercrime-group-unveils-fileless-stealthy-powertrick-backdoor-for-high-value-targets/
    - https://www.mdeditor.tw/pl/pgRt
author: 'ok @securonix invrep_de, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_4103:
        Payload|contains:
            - '$DoIt'
            - 'harmj0y'
            - 'mattifestation'
            - '_RastaMouse'
            - 'tifkin_'
            - '0xdeadbeef'
    condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
    - 'Moderate-to-low; Despite the shorter length/lower entropy for some of these, because of high specificity, fp appears to be fairly limited in many environments.'
level: critical

related critical

Silence.EDA Detection

Detects Silence EmpireDNSAgent as described in the Group-IP report

status test author Alina Stepchenkova, Group-IB, oscd.community id 3ceb2083-a27f-449a-be33-14ec1b7cc973 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Silence.EDA Detection
id: 3ceb2083-a27f-449a-be33-14ec1b7cc973
status: test
description: Detects Silence EmpireDNSAgent as described in the Group-IP report
references:
    - https://www.group-ib.com/resources/threat-research/silence_2.0.going_global.pdf
author: Alina Stepchenkova, Group-IB, oscd.community
date: 2019-11-01
modified: 2023-04-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1529
    - attack.g0091
    - attack.s0363
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    empire:
        # better to randomise the order
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'System.Diagnostics.Process'
            - 'Stop-Computer'
            - 'Restart-Computer'
            - 'Exception in execution'
            - '$cmdargs'
            - 'Close-Dnscat2Tunnel'
    dnscat:
        # better to randomise the order
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'set type=$LookupType`nserver'
            - '$Command | nslookup 2>&1 | Out-String'
            - 'New-RandomDNSField'
            - '[Convert]::ToString($SYNOptions, 16)'
            - '$Session.Dead = $True'
            - '$Session["Driver"] -eq'
    condition: empire and dnscat
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

related critical

Possible Coin Miner CPU Priority Param

Detects command line parameter very often used with coin miners

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 071d5e5a-9cef-47ec-bc4e-a42e34d8d0ed license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Possible Coin Miner CPU Priority Param
id: 071d5e5a-9cef-47ec-bc4e-a42e34d8d0ed
status: test
description: Detects command line parameter very often used with coin miners
references:
    - https://xmrig.com/docs/miner/command-line-options
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-10-09
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    cmd1:
        a1|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
    cmd2:
        a2|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
    cmd3:
        a3|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
    cmd4:
        a4|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
    cmd5:
        a5|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
    cmd6:
        a6|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
    cmd7:
        a7|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
    condition: 1 of cmd*
falsepositives:
    - Other tools that use a --cpu-priority flag
level: critical

related critical

HackTool - SysmonEOP Execution

Detects the execution of the PoC that can be used to exploit Sysmon CVE-2022-41120

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 8a7e90c5-fe6e-45dc-889e-057fe4378bd9 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: HackTool - SysmonEOP Execution
id: 8a7e90c5-fe6e-45dc-889e-057fe4378bd9
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the PoC that can be used to exploit Sysmon CVE-2022-41120
references:
    - https://github.com/Wh04m1001/SysmonEoP
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-04
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - cve.2022-41120
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\SysmonEOP.exe'
    selection_hash:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'IMPHASH=22F4089EB8ABA31E1BB162C6D9BF72E5'
            - 'IMPHASH=5123FA4C4384D431CD0D893EEB49BBEC'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

related critical

Audit CVE Event

Detects events generated by user-mode applications when they call the CveEventWrite API when a known vulnerability is trying to be exploited. MS started using this log in Jan. 2020 with CVE-2020-0601 (a Windows CryptoAPI vulnerability. Unfortunately, that is about the only instance of CVEs being written to this log.

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Zach Mathis id 48d91a3a-2363-43ba-a456-ca71ac3da5c2 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Audit CVE Event
id: 48d91a3a-2363-43ba-a456-ca71ac3da5c2
status: test
description: |
    Detects events generated by user-mode applications when they call the CveEventWrite API when a known vulnerability is trying to be exploited.
    MS started using this log in Jan. 2020 with CVE-2020-0601 (a Windows CryptoAPI vulnerability.
    Unfortunately, that is about the only instance of CVEs being written to this log.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/VM_vivisector/status/1217190929330655232
    - https://twitter.com/DidierStevens/status/1217533958096924676
    - https://twitter.com/FlemmingRiis/status/1217147415482060800
    - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ebmW42YYveI # "CVEs in Windows Event Logs? What You Need to Know" by 13Cubed.
    - https://nullsec.us/windows-event-log-audit-cve/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Zach Mathis
date: 2020-01-15
modified: 2022-10-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.t1211
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1212
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1210
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1499.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name:
            - 'Microsoft-Windows-Audit-CVE'
            - 'Audit-CVE'
        EventID: 1
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

related critical

HackTool - BabyShark Agent Default URL Pattern

Detects Baby Shark C2 Framework default communication patterns

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 304810ed-8853-437f-9e36-c4975c3dfd7e license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: HackTool - BabyShark Agent Default URL Pattern
id: 304810ed-8853-437f-9e36-c4975c3dfd7e
status: test
description: Detects Baby Shark C2 Framework default communication patterns
references:
    - https://nasbench.medium.com/understanding-detecting-c2-frameworks-babyshark-641be4595845
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-09
modified: 2024-02-15
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri|contains: 'momyshark\?key='
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

related critical

PwnDrp Access

Detects downloads from PwnDrp web servers developed for red team testing and most likely also used for criminal activity

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 2b1ee7e4-89b6-4739-b7bb-b811b6607e5e license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: PwnDrp Access
id: 2b1ee7e4-89b6-4739-b7bb-b811b6607e5e
status: test
description: Detects downloads from PwnDrp web servers developed for red team testing and most likely also used for criminal activity
references:
    - https://breakdev.org/pwndrop/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-04-15
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1102.001
    - attack.t1102.003
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri|contains: '/pwndrop/'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

related critical

Win Susp Computer Name Containing Samtheadmin

Detects suspicious computer name samtheadmin-{1..100}$ generated by hacktool

status test author elhoim id 39698b3f-da92-4bc6-bfb5-645a98386e45 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Win Susp Computer Name Containing Samtheadmin
id: 39698b3f-da92-4bc6-bfb5-645a98386e45
status: test
description: Detects suspicious computer name samtheadmin-{1..100}$ generated by hacktool
references:
    - https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1511760068743766026
    - https://github.com/helloexp/0day/blob/614227a7b9beb0e91e7e2c6a5e532e6f7a8e883c/00-CVE_EXP/CVE-2021-42287/sam-the-admin/sam_the_admin.py
author: elhoim
date: 2022-09-09
modified: 2023-01-04
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - cve.2021-42278
    - cve.2021-42287
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    service: security
    product: windows
detection:
    # Not adding an EventID on purpose to try to match on any event in security (including use of account), not just 4741 (computer account created)
    selection1:
        SamAccountName|startswith: 'SAMTHEADMIN-'
        SamAccountName|endswith: '$'
    selection2:
        TargetUserName|startswith: 'SAMTHEADMIN-'
        TargetUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

related critical

Registry Entries For Azorult Malware

Detects the presence of a registry key created during Azorult execution

status test author Trent Liffick id f7f9ab88-7557-4a69-b30e-0a8f91b3a0e7 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Registry Entries For Azorult Malware
id: f7f9ab88-7557-4a69-b30e-0a8f91b3a0e7
status: test
description: Detects the presence of a registry key created during Azorult execution
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.win32.azoruit.a
author: Trent Liffick
date: 2020-05-08
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_event
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 12
            - 13
        TargetObject|contains: 'SYSTEM\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\services\localNETService'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

related critical

Antivirus Exploitation Framework Detection

Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports an exploitation framework. This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.

status stable author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp id 238527ad-3c2c-4e4f-a1f6-92fd63adb864 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Antivirus Exploitation Framework Detection
id: 238527ad-3c2c-4e4f-a1f6-92fd63adb864
status: stable
description: |
    Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports an exploitation framework.
    This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/925b0b28472d4d79b4bf92050e38cc2b8f722691c713fc28743ac38551bc3797
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/8f8daabe1c8ceb5710949283818e16c4aa8059bf2ce345e2f2c90b8692978424
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d9669f7e3eb3a9cdf6a750eeb2ba303b5ae148a43e36546896f1d1801e912466
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2024-11-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    category: antivirus
detection:
    selection:
        Signature|contains:
            - 'Backdoor.Cobalt'
            - 'Brutel'
            - 'BruteR'
            - 'CobaltStr'
            - 'CobaltStrike'
            - 'COBEACON'
            - 'Cometer'
            - 'Exploit.Script.CVE'
            - 'IISExchgSpawnCMD'
            - 'Metasploit'
            - 'Meterpreter'
            - 'MeteTool'
            - 'Mpreter'
            - 'MsfShell'
            - 'PowerSploit'
            - 'Razy'
            - 'Rozena'
            - 'Sbelt'
            - 'Seatbelt'
            - 'Sliver'
            - 'Swrort'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

related high

OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via Windows Authentication

Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using Windows Authentication.

status test author Security Onion Solutions id 6e78f90f-0043-4a01-ac41-f97681613a66 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via Windows Authentication
id: 6e78f90f-0043-4a01-ac41-f97681613a66
status: test
description: |
    Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using Windows Authentication.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1213
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 9002
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

related high

OpenCanary - MySQL Login Attempt

Detects instances where a MySQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.

status test author Security Onion Solutions id e7d79a1b-25ed-4956-bd56-bd344fa8fd06 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: OpenCanary - MySQL Login Attempt
id: e7d79a1b-25ed-4956-bd56-bd344fa8fd06
status: test
description: Detects instances where a MySQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1213
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 8001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

related high

OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via SQLAuth

Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using SQLAuth.

status test author Security Onion Solutions id 3ec9a16d-0b4f-4967-9542-ebf38ceac7dd license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via SQLAuth
id: 3ec9a16d-0b4f-4967-9542-ebf38ceac7dd
status: test
description: |
    Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using SQLAuth.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1213
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 9001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

related high

OpenCanary - REDIS Action Command Attempt

Detects instances where a REDIS service on an OpenCanary node has had an action command attempted.

status test author Security Onion Solutions id 547dfc53-ebf6-4afe-8d2e-793d9574975d license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: OpenCanary - REDIS Action Command Attempt
id: 547dfc53-ebf6-4afe-8d2e-793d9574975d
status: test
description: Detects instances where a REDIS service on an OpenCanary node has had an action command attempted.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1213
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 17001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

related high

Linux Keylogging with Pam.d

Detect attempt to enable auditing of TTY input

status test author Pawel Mazur id 49aae26c-450e-448b-911d-b3c13d178dfc license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: Linux Keylogging with Pam.d
id: 49aae26c-450e-448b-911d-b3c13d178dfc
status: test
description: Detect attempt to enable auditing of TTY input
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.md
    - https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_tty_audit
    - https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/sec-configuring_pam_for_auditing
    - https://access.redhat.com/articles/4409591#audit-record-types-2
author: 'Pawel Mazur'
date: 2021-05-24
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1056.001
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection_path_events:
        type: PATH
        name:
            - '/etc/pam.d/system-auth'
            - '/etc/pam.d/password-auth'
    selection_tty_events:
        type:
            - 'TTY'
            - 'USER_TTY'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative work
level: high

related high

Potential Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell Script

Detects Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell script and alike. Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords.

status test author Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea) id 189e3b02-82b2-4b90-9662-411eb64486d4 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: Potential Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell Script
id: 189e3b02-82b2-4b90-9662-411eb64486d4
status: test
description: Detects Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell script and alike. Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords.
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script.html#potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script
author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-28
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    category: ps_script
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'DumpCreds'
            - 'DumpCerts'
    selection_2:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'sekurlsa::logonpasswords'
    selection_3:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'crypto::certificates'
            - 'CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Mimikatz can be useful for testing the security of networks
level: high

related high

Live Memory Dump Using Powershell

Detects usage of a PowerShell command to dump the live memory of a Windows machine

status test author Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems) id cd185561-4760-45d6-a63e-a51325112cae license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: Live Memory Dump Using Powershell
id: cd185561-4760-45d6-a63e-a51325112cae
status: test
description: Detects usage of a PowerShell command to dump the live memory of a Windows machine
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/storage/get-storagediagnosticinfo?view=windowsserver2022-ps
author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-09-21
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Get-StorageDiagnosticInfo'
            - '-IncludeLiveDump'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Diagnostics
level: high

related high

HackTool - Rubeus Execution - ScriptBlock

Detects the execution of the hacktool Rubeus using specific command line flags

status test author Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 3245cd30-e015-40ff-a31d-5cadd5f377ec license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: HackTool - Rubeus Execution - ScriptBlock
id: 3245cd30-e015-40ff-a31d-5cadd5f377ec
related:
    - id: 7ec2c172-dceb-4c10-92c9-87c1881b7e18
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the hacktool Rubeus using specific command line flags
references:
    - https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus
    - https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1558.003
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1550.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'asreproast '
            - 'dump /service:krbtgt '
            - 'dump /luid:0x'
            - 'kerberoast '
            - 'createnetonly /program:'
            - 'ptt /ticket:'
            - '/impersonateuser:'
            - 'renew /ticket:'
            - 'asktgt /user:'
            - 'harvest /interval:'
            - 's4u /user:'
            - 's4u /ticket:'
            - 'hash /password:'
            - 'golden /aes256:'
            - 'silver /user:'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

related high

HackTool - Potential Remote Credential Dumping Activity Via CrackMapExec Or Impacket-Secretsdump

Detects default filenames output from the execution of CrackMapExec and Impacket-secretsdump against an endpoint.

status test author SecurityAura id 6e2a900a-ced9-4e4a-a9c2-13e706f9518a license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: HackTool - Potential Remote Credential Dumping Activity Via CrackMapExec Or Impacket-Secretsdump
id: 6e2a900a-ced9-4e4a-a9c2-13e706f9518a
status: test
description: Detects default filenames output from the execution of CrackMapExec and Impacket-secretsdump against an endpoint.
references:
    - https://github.com/Porchetta-Industries/CrackMapExec
    - https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/ff8c200fd040b04d3b5ff05449646737f836235d/examples/secretsdump.py
author: SecurityAura
date: 2022-11-16
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        # CommandLine|contains: 'RemoteRegistry' # Uncomment this line if you collect CommandLine data for files events from more accuracy
        TargetFilename|re: '\\Windows\\System32\\[a-zA-Z0-9]{8}\.tmp$'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Potential Credential Dumping Attempt Using New NetworkProvider - CLI

Detects when an attacker tries to add a new network provider in order to dump clear text credentials, similar to how the NPPSpy tool does it

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id baef1ec6-2ca9-47a3-97cc-4cf2bda10b77 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Credential Dumping Attempt Using New NetworkProvider - CLI
id: baef1ec6-2ca9-47a3-97cc-4cf2bda10b77
related:
    - id: 0442defa-b4a2-41c9-ae2c-ea7042fc4701
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when an attacker tries to add a new network provider in order to dump clear text credentials, similar to how the NPPSpy tool does it
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/setup-upgrade-and-drivers/network-provider-settings-removed-in-place-upgrade
    - https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/PasswordStealing/NPPSpy
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-23
modified: 2023-02-02
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\'
            - '\NetworkProvider'
    # filter:
    #     CommandLine|contains:
    #         - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\WebClient\NetworkProvider'
    #         - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanWorkstation\NetworkProvider'
    #         - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RDPNP\NetworkProvider'
    #         - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\P9NP\NetworkProvider' # Related to WSL remove the comment if you use WSL in your ENV
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Other legitimate network providers used and not filtred in this rule
level: high

related high

Microsoft IIS Service Account Password Dumped

Detects the Internet Information Services (IIS) command-line tool, AppCmd, being used to list passwords

status test author Tim Rauch, Janantha Marasinghe, Elastic (original idea) id 2d3cdeec-c0db-45b4-aa86-082f7eb75701 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Microsoft IIS Service Account Password Dumped
id: 2d3cdeec-c0db-45b4-aa86-082f7eb75701
status: test
description: Detects the Internet Information Services (IIS) command-line tool, AppCmd, being used to list passwords
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/microsoft-iis-service-account-password-dumped.html
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1588815661085917186?cxt=HHwWhIDUyaDbzYwsAAAA
    - https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/decrypting-iis-passwords-to-break-out-of-the-dmz-part-2/
author: Tim Rauch, Janantha Marasinghe, Elastic (original idea)
date: 2022-11-08
modified: 2023-01-22
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_base_name:
        - Image|endswith: '\appcmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'appcmd.exe'
    selection_base_list:
        CommandLine|contains: 'list '
    selection_standalone:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /config' # https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FgydDAJWIAEio34?format=png&name=900x900
            - ' /xml'
            # We cover the "-" version just in case :)
            - ' -config'
            - ' -xml'
    selection_cmd_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /@t' # Covers both "/@text:*" and "/@t:*"
            - ' /text'
            - ' /show'
            # We cover the "-" version just in case :)
            - ' -@t'
            - ' -text'
            - ' -show'
    selection_cmd_grep:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\*'
            - 'password'
    condition: all of selection_base_* and (selection_standalone or all of selection_cmd_*)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Microsoft IIS Connection Strings Decryption

Detects use of aspnet_regiis to decrypt Microsoft IIS connection strings. An attacker with Microsoft IIS web server access via a webshell or alike can decrypt and dump any hardcoded connection strings, such as the MSSQL service account password using aspnet_regiis command.

status test author Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea) id 97dbf6e2-e436-44d8-abee-4261b24d3e41 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Microsoft IIS Connection Strings Decryption
id: 97dbf6e2-e436-44d8-abee-4261b24d3e41
status: test
description: Detects use of aspnet_regiis to decrypt Microsoft IIS connection strings. An attacker with Microsoft IIS web server access via a webshell or alike can decrypt and dump any hardcoded connection strings, such as the MSSQL service account password using aspnet_regiis command.
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/microsoft-iis-connection-strings-decryption.html
author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-28
modified: 2022-12-30
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_name:
        - Image|endswith: '\aspnet_regiis.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'aspnet_regiis.exe'
    selection_args:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'connectionStrings'
            - ' -pdf'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Hacktool Execution - PE Metadata

Detects the execution of different Windows based hacktools via PE metadata (company, product, etc.) even if the files have been renamed

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 37c1333a-a0db-48be-b64b-7393b2386e3b license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: Hacktool Execution - PE Metadata
id: 37c1333a-a0db-48be-b64b-7393b2386e3b
status: test
description: Detects the execution of different Windows based hacktools via PE metadata (company, product, etc.) even if the files have been renamed
references:
    - https://github.com/cube0x0
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/search/metadata%253ACube0x0/files
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-27
modified: 2024-01-15
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1588.002
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Company: 'Cube0x0' # Detects the use of tools created by a well-known hacktool producer named "Cube0x0", which includes his handle in all binaries as company information in the PE headers (SharpPrintNightmare, KrbRelay, SharpMapExec, etc.)
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

related high

PUA - Memory Dump Mount Via MemProcFS

Detects execution of MemProcFS a memory forensics tool with the '-device' parameter. MemProcFS mounts physical memory as a virtual file system, allowing direct access to process memory and system structures. Threat actors were seen abusing this utility to mount memory dumps and then extract sensitive information from processes like LSASS or extract registry hives to obtain credentials, LSA secrets, SAM data, and cached domain credentials. MemProcFS usage that is not part of authorized forensic analysis should be treated as suspicious and warrants further investigation.

status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 8a1b2c3d-4e5f-6789-abcd-ef1234567890 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

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title: PUA - Memory Dump Mount Via MemProcFS
id: 8a1b2c3d-4e5f-6789-abcd-ef1234567890
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects execution of MemProcFS a memory forensics tool with the '-device' parameter.
    MemProcFS mounts physical memory as a virtual file system, allowing direct access to process memory and system structures.
    Threat actors were seen abusing this utility to mount memory dumps and then extract sensitive information from processes like LSASS or extract registry hives to obtain credentials, LSA secrets, SAM data, and cached domain credentials.
    MemProcFS usage that is not part of authorized forensic analysis should be treated as suspicious and warrants further investigation.
references:
    - https://github.com/ufrisk/MemProcFS
    - https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2024/10/05/htb-freelancer.html#
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/curling-for-data-a-dive-into-a-threat-actors-malicious-ttps
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\MemProcFS.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'MemProcFS.exe'
        - Description: 'MemProcFS'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '-device'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use during memory forensics; if not part of authorized analysis, warrants urgent investigation
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_memprocfs/info.yml

related high

Suspicious SYSTEM User Process Creation

Detects a suspicious process creation as SYSTEM user (suspicious program or command line parameter)

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE (additional keywords) id 2617e7ed-adb7-40ba-b0f3-8f9945fe6c09 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious SYSTEM User Process Creation
id: 2617e7ed-adb7-40ba-b0f3-8f9945fe6c09
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process creation as SYSTEM user (suspicious program or command line parameter)
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE (additional keywords)
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'System'
            - 'S-1-16-16384'
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
    selection_special:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\calc.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\forfiles.exe'
              - '\hh.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\ping.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - CommandLine|re: 'net\s+user\s+'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              # - 'sc stop ' # stops a system service # causes FPs
              - ' -NoP '  # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
              - ' -W Hidden '  # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
              - ' -decode '  # Used with certutil
              - ' /decode '  # Used with certutil
              - ' /urlcache '  # Used with certutil
              - ' -urlcache '  # Used with certutil
              - ' -e* JAB'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - ' -e* SUVYI'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - ' -e* SQBFAFgA'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - ' -e* aWV4I'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - ' -e* IAB'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - ' -e* PAA'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - ' -e* aQBlAHgA'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - 'vssadmin delete shadows'  # Ransomware
              - 'reg SAVE HKLM'  # save registry SAM - syskey extraction
              - ' -ma '  # ProcDump
              - 'Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'  # Run key in command line - often in combination with REG ADD
              - '.downloadstring('  # PowerShell download command
              - '.downloadfile('  # PowerShell download command
              - ' /ticket:'  # Rubeus
              - 'dpapi::'     # Mimikatz
              - 'event::clear'        # Mimikatz
              - 'event::drop'     # Mimikatz
              - 'id::modify'      # Mimikatz
              - 'kerberos::'       # Mimikatz
              - 'lsadump::'      # Mimikatz
              - 'misc::'     # Mimikatz
              - 'privilege::'       # Mimikatz
              - 'rpc::'      # Mimikatz
              - 'sekurlsa::'       # Mimikatz
              - 'sid::'        # Mimikatz
              - 'token::'      # Mimikatz
              - 'vault::cred'     # Mimikatz
              - 'vault::list'     # Mimikatz
              - ' p::d '  # Mimikatz
              - ';iex('  # PowerShell IEX
              - 'MiniDump'  # Process dumping method apart from procdump
    filter_main_ping:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ping'
            - '127.0.0.1'
            - ' -n '
    filter_vs:
        Image|endswith: '\PING.EXE'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: '\DismFoDInstall.cmd'
    filter_config_mgr:
        ParentImage|contains: ':\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.GuestConfiguration.ConfigurationforWindows\'
    filter_java:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\Java\'
            - ':\Program Files\Java\'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\bin\javaws.exe'
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\Java\'
            - ':\Program Files\Java\'
        Image|endswith: '\bin\jp2launcher.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -ma '
    condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
    - Scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
    - Monitoring activity
level: high

related high

Suspicious Loading of Dbgcore/Dbghelp DLLs from Uncommon Location

Detects loading of dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll from uncommon locations such as user directories. These DLLs contain the MiniDumpWriteDump function, which can be abused for credential dumping purposes or in some cases for evading EDR/AV detection by suspending processes.

status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 416bc4a2-7217-4519-8dc7-c3271817f1d5 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Loading of Dbgcore/Dbghelp DLLs from Uncommon Location
id: 416bc4a2-7217-4519-8dc7-c3271817f1d5
related:
    - id: 9f5c1d59-33be-4e60-bcab-85d2f566effd
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects loading of dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll from uncommon locations such as user directories.
    These DLLs contain the MiniDumpWriteDump function, which can be abused for credential dumping purposes or in some cases for evading EDR/AV detection by suspending processes.
references:
    - https://blog.axelarator.net/hunting-for-edr-freeze/
    - https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/09/EDR-Freeze-Puts-EDRs-Antivirus-Into-Coma.html
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/you-bet-your-lsass-hunting-lsass-access.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-27
modified: 2026-01-09
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - '\$Recycle.Bin\'
            - '\Contacts\'
            # - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Documents\'
            # - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Favorites\'
            - '\Favourites\'
            - '\inetpub\wwwroot\'
            - '\Music\'
            - '\Pictures\'
            - '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - '\Users\Default\'
            - '\Videos\'
            #  - '\AppData\Local\Temp\' some installers may load from here
    selection_dll:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\dbgcore.dll'
            - '\dbghelp.dll'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_win_susp_dbgcore_dbghelp_load/info.yml

related high

Potentially Suspicious ODBC Driver Registered

Detects the registration of a new ODBC driver where the driver is located in a potentially suspicious location

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id e4d22291-f3d5-4b78-9a0c-a1fbaf32a6a4 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Potentially Suspicious ODBC Driver Registered
id: e4d22291-f3d5-4b78-9a0c-a1fbaf32a6a4
status: test
description: Detects the registration of a new ODBC driver where the driver is located in a potentially suspicious location
references:
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/odbcconf-lolbin-trifecta/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-23
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\ODBC\ODBCINST.INI\'
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\Driver'
            - '\Setup'
        Details|contains:
            - ':\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Registration\CRMLog'
            - ':\Windows\System32\com\dmp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\FxsTmp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\spool\SERVERS\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks_Migrated\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\SyncCenter\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\com\dmp\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\FxsTmp\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\System\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\SyncCenter\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - ':\Windows\Tracing\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

related high

PowerShell Get-Process LSASS in ScriptBlock

Detects a Get-Process command on lsass process, which is in almost all cases a sign of malicious activity

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 84c174ab-d3ef-481f-9c86-a50d0b8e3edb license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: PowerShell Get-Process LSASS in ScriptBlock
id: 84c174ab-d3ef-481f-9c86-a50d0b8e3edb
status: test
description: Detects a Get-Process command on lsass process, which is in almost all cases a sign of malicious activity
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220205033028/https://twitter.com/PythonResponder/status/1385064506049630211
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-04-23
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Get-Process lsass'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate certificate exports invoked by administrators or users (depends on processes in the environment - filter if unusable)
level: high

related high

Cred Dump Tools Dropped Files

Files with well-known filenames (parts of credential dump software or files produced by them) creation

status test author Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community id 8fbf3271-1ef6-4e94-8210-03c2317947f6 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Cred Dump Tools Dropped Files
id: 8fbf3271-1ef6-4e94-8210-03c2317947f6
status: test
description: Files with well-known filenames (parts of credential dump software or files produced by them) creation
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
date: 2019-11-01
modified: 2025-10-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.003
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.005
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - TargetFilename|contains:
              - '\fgdump-log'
              - '\kirbi'
              - '\pwdump'
              - '\pwhashes'
              - '\wce_ccache'
              - '\wce_krbtkts'
        - TargetFilename|endswith:
              - '\cachedump.exe'
              - '\cachedump64.exe'
              - '\DumpExt.dll'
              - '\DumpSvc.exe'
              - '\Dumpy.exe'
              - '\fgexec.exe'
              - '\lsremora.dll'
              - '\lsremora64.dll'
              - '\NTDS.out'
              - '\procdump.exe'
              - '\procdump64.exe'
              - '\procdump64a.exe'
              - '\pstgdump.exe'
              - '\pwdump.exe'
              - '\SAM.out'
              - '\SECURITY.out'
              - '\servpw.exe'
              - '\servpw64.exe'
              - '\SYSTEM.out'
              - '\test.pwd'
              - '\wceaux.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Administrator using tool for password recovery
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_cred_dump_tools_dropped_files/info.yml

related high

LSASS Process Memory Dump Creation Via Taskmgr.EXE

Detects the creation of an "lsass.dmp" file by the taskmgr process. This indicates a manual dumping of the LSASS.exe process memory using Windows Task Manager.

status test author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel id 69ca12af-119d-44ed-b50f-a47af0ebc364 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: LSASS Process Memory Dump Creation Via Taskmgr.EXE
id: 69ca12af-119d-44ed-b50f-a47af0ebc364
status: test
description: Detects the creation of an "lsass.dmp" file by the taskmgr process. This indicates a manual dumping of the LSASS.exe process memory using Windows Task Manager.
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-10-19
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/987e3ca988ae3cff4b9f6e388c139c05bf44bbb8/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#L1
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - ':\Windows\system32\taskmgr.exe'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\taskmgr.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\lsass'
            - '.DMP'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare case of troubleshooting by an administrator or support that has to be investigated regardless
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_taskmgr_lsass_dump/info.yml

related high

LSASS Process Dump Artefact In CrashDumps Folder

Detects the presence of an LSASS dump file in the "CrashDumps" folder. This could be a sign of LSASS credential dumping. Techniques such as the LSASS Shtinkering have been seen abusing the Windows Error Reporting to dump said process.

status test author @pbssubhash id 6902955a-01b7-432c-b32a-6f5f81d8f625 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: LSASS Process Dump Artefact In CrashDumps Folder
id: 6902955a-01b7-432c-b32a-6f5f81d8f625
status: test
description: Detects the presence of an LSASS dump file in the "CrashDumps" folder. This could be a sign of LSASS credential dumping. Techniques such as the LSASS Shtinkering have been seen abusing the Windows Error Reporting to dump said process.
references:
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering
    - https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Asaf%20Gilboa%20-%20LSASS%20Shtinkering%20Abusing%20Windows%20Error%20Reporting%20to%20Dump%20LSASS.pdf
author: '@pbssubhash'
date: 2022-12-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\CrashDumps\'
        TargetFilename|contains: 'lsass.exe.'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.dmp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate dump of the process by the operating system due to a crash of lsass
level: high

related high

HackTool - CrackMapExec File Indicators

Detects file creation events with filename patterns used by CrackMapExec.

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 736ffa74-5f6f-44ca-94ef-1c0df4f51d2a license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: HackTool - CrackMapExec File Indicators
id: 736ffa74-5f6f-44ca-94ef-1c0df4f51d2a
related:
    - id: 9433ff9c-5d3f-4269-99f8-95fc826ea489
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects file creation events with filename patterns used by CrackMapExec.
references:
    - https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-03-11
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_path:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\' # The disk extension is hardcoded in the tool.
    selection_names_str:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\temp.ps1' # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/3c3e412193cb6d3237abe90c543e5d995bfa4447/cme/modules/keepass_trigger.py#L42C41-L42C68
            - '\msol.ps1' # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/3c3e412193cb6d3237abe90c543e5d995bfa4447/cme/modules/msol.py#L48C98-L48C106
    selection_names_re:
        - TargetFilename|re: '\\[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}\.txt$' # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/3c3e412193cb6d3237abe90c543e5d995bfa4447/cme/protocols/wmi/wmiexec.py#L86
        - TargetFilename|re: '\\[a-zA-Z]{8}\.tmp$' # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/3c3e412193cb6d3237abe90c543e5d995bfa4447/cme/protocols/smb/atexec.py#L145C19-L146
    condition: selection_path and 1 of selection_names_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

LSASS Process Memory Dump Files

Detects creation of files with names used by different memory dumping tools to create a memory dump of the LSASS process memory, which contains user credentials.

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id a5a2d357-1ab8-4675-a967-ef9990a59391 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: LSASS Process Memory Dump Files
id: a5a2d357-1ab8-4675-a967-ef9990a59391
related:
    - id: db2110f3-479d-42a6-94fb-d35bc1e46492
      type: obsolete
    - id: 5e3d3601-0662-4af0-b1d2-36a05e90c40a
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects creation of files with names used by different memory dumping tools to create a memory dump of the LSASS process memory, which contains user credentials.
references:
    - https://www.google.com/search?q=procdump+lsass
    - https://medium.com/@markmotig/some-ways-to-dump-lsass-exe-c4a75fdc49bf
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_memdump_file_created.toml
    - https://www.whiteoaksecurity.com/blog/attacks-defenses-dumping-lsass-no-mimikatz/
    - https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump
    - https://github.com/CCob/MirrorDump
    - https://github.com/safedv/RustiveDump/blob/1a9b026b477587becfb62df9677cede619d42030/src/main.rs#L35
    - https://github.com/ricardojoserf/NativeDump/blob/01d8cd17f31f51f5955a38e85cd3c83a17596175/NativeDump/Program.cs#L258
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-15
modified: 2024-10-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_1:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\Andrew.dmp'
            - '\Coredump.dmp'
            - '\lsass.dmp'
            - '\lsass.rar'
            - '\lsass.zip'
            - '\NotLSASS.zip'  # https://github.com/CCob/MirrorDump
            - '\PPLBlade.dmp'  # https://github.com/tastypepperoni/PPLBlade
            - '\rustive.dmp' # https://github.com/safedv/RustiveDump/blob/main/src/main.rs#L35
    selection_2:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\lsass_2'  # default format of procdump v9.0 is lsass_YYMMDD_HHmmss.dmp
            - '\lsassdmp'
            - '\lsassdump'
    selection_3:
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\lsass'
            - '.dmp'
    selection_4:
        TargetFilename|contains: 'SQLDmpr'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.mdmp'
    selection_5:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\nanodump'
            - '\proc_' # NativeDump pattern https://github.com/ricardojoserf/NativeDump/blob/01d8cd17f31f51f5955a38e85cd3c83a17596175/NativeDump/Program.cs#L258
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.dmp'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

HackTool - SafetyKatz Dump Indicator

Detects default lsass dump filename generated by SafetyKatz.

status test author Markus Neis id e074832a-eada-4fd7-94a1-10642b130e16 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: HackTool - SafetyKatz Dump Indicator
id: e074832a-eada-4fd7-94a1-10642b130e16
status: test
description: Detects default lsass dump filename generated by SafetyKatz.
references:
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/SafetyKatz
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/SafetyKatz/blob/715b311f76eb3a4c8d00a1bd29c6cd1899e450b7/SafetyKatz/Program.cs#L63
author: Markus Neis
date: 2018-07-24
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\Temp\debug.bin'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate files with similar filename structure
level: high

Sigma rules for Qilin

Detection rules