Sigma rules for Madi / Mahdi
500 rules · scoped to actor · back to Madi / Mahdi
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.
title: Potential GobRAT File Discovery Via Grep
id: e34cfa0c-0a50-4210-9cb3-5632d08eb041
status: test
description: Detects the use of grep to discover specific files created by the GobRAT malware
references:
- https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2023/05/gobrat.html
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/60bcd645450e4c846238cf0e7226dc40c84c96eba99f6b2cffcd0ab4a391c8b3/detection
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3e44c807a25a56f4068b5b8186eee5002eed6f26d665a8b791c472ad154585d1/detection
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-06-02
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1082
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/grep'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'apached'
- 'frpc'
- 'sshd.sh'
- 'zone.arm'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: HackTool - WinPwn Execution - ScriptBlock
id: 851fd622-b675-4d26-b803-14bc7baa517a
related:
- id: d557dc06-62e8-4468-a8e8-7984124908ce
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects scriptblock text keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-12-04
references:
- https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn
- https://www.publicnow.com/view/EB87DB49C654D9B63995FAD4C9DE3D3CC4F6C3ED?1671634841
- https://reconshell.com/winpwn-tool-for-internal-windows-pentesting-and-ad-security/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/4d6c4e8e23d465af7a2388620cfe3f8c76e16cf0/atomics/T1082/T1082.md
- https://grep.app/search?q=winpwn&filter[repo][0]=redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.discovery
- attack.execution
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1046
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1106
- attack.t1518
- attack.t1548.002
- attack.t1552.001
- attack.t1555
- attack.t1555.003
logsource:
category: ps_script
product: windows
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- 'Offline_Winpwn'
- 'WinPwn '
- 'WinPwn.exe'
- 'WinPwn.ps1'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- As the script block is a blob of text. False positive may occur with scripts that contain the keyword as a reference or simply use it for detection.
level: high
title: Suspicious Kernel Dump Using Dtrace
id: 7124aebe-4cd7-4ccb-8df0-6d6b93c96795
status: test
description: Detects suspicious way to dump the kernel on Windows systems using dtrace.exe, which is available on Windows systems since Windows 10 19H1
references:
- https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1474899714290208777?s=12
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/devtest/dtrace
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-28
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1082
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_plain:
Image|endswith: '\dtrace.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'lkd(0)'
selection_obfuscated:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'syscall:::return'
- 'lkd('
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dtrace_kernel_dump/info.yml
title: HackTool - WinPwn Execution
id: d557dc06-62e8-4468-a8e8-7984124908ce
related:
- id: 851fd622-b675-4d26-b803-14bc7baa517a
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects commandline keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-12-04
references:
- https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn
- https://www.publicnow.com/view/EB87DB49C654D9B63995FAD4C9DE3D3CC4F6C3ED?1671634841
- https://reconshell.com/winpwn-tool-for-internal-windows-pentesting-and-ad-security/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/4d6c4e8e23d465af7a2388620cfe3f8c76e16cf0/atomics/T1082/T1082.md
- https://grep.app/search?q=winpwn&filter[repo][0]=redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.discovery
- attack.execution
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1046
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1106
- attack.t1518
- attack.t1548.002
- attack.t1552.001
- attack.t1555
- attack.t1555.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Offline_Winpwn'
- 'WinPwn '
- 'WinPwn.exe'
- 'WinPwn.ps1'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: HackTool - winPEAS Execution
id: 98b53e78-ebaf-46f8-be06-421aafd176d9
status: test
description: WinPEAS is a script that search for possible paths to escalate privileges on Windows hosts. The checks are explained on book.hacktricks.xyz
references:
- https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng
- https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation
author: Georg Lauenstein (sure[secure])
date: 2022-09-19
modified: 2023-03-23
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1087
- attack.t1046
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- OriginalFileName: 'winPEAS.exe'
- Image|endswith:
- '\winPEASany_ofs.exe'
- '\winPEASany.exe'
- '\winPEASx64_ofs.exe'
- '\winPEASx64.exe'
- '\winPEASx86_ofs.exe'
- '\winPEASx86.exe'
selection_cli_option:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' applicationsinfo' # Search installed applications information
- ' browserinfo' # Search browser information
- ' eventsinfo' # Display interesting events information
- ' fileanalysis' # Search specific files that can contains credentials and for regexes inside files
- ' filesinfo' # Search generic files that can contains credentials
- ' processinfo' # Search processes information
- ' servicesinfo' # Search services information
- ' windowscreds' # Search windows credentials
selection_cli_dl:
CommandLine|contains: 'https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/'
selection_cli_specific:
- ParentCommandLine|endswith: ' -linpeas'
- CommandLine|endswith: ' -linpeas'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Network Reconnaissance Activity
id: e6313acd-208c-44fc-a0ff-db85d572e90e
status: test
description: Detects a set of suspicious network related commands often used in recon stages
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-07
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1087
- attack.t1082
- car.2016-03-001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'nslookup'
- '_ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high
title: Shell Execution GCC - Linux
id: 9b5de532-a757-4d70-946c-1f3e44f48b4d
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of the "gcc" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/gcc/#shell
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/c89/#shell
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/c99/#shell
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1083
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '/c89'
- '/c99'
- '/gcc'
CommandLine|contains: '-wrapper'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- '/bin/bash,-s'
- '/bin/dash,-s'
- '/bin/fish,-s'
- '/bin/sh,-s'
- '/bin/zsh,-s'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Shell Execution via Find - Linux
id: 6adfbf8f-52be-4444-9bac-81b539624146
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of the find command to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or exploitation attempt.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/find/#shell
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1083
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '/find'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' . '
- '-exec'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- '/bin/bash'
- '/bin/dash'
- '/bin/fish'
- '/bin/sh'
- '/bin/zsh'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Shell Execution via Flock - Linux
id: 4b09c71e-4269-4111-9cdd-107d8867f0cc
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of the "flock" command to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/flock/#shell
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1083
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '/flock'
CommandLine|contains: ' -u '
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- '/bin/bash'
- '/bin/dash'
- '/bin/fish'
- '/bin/sh'
- '/bin/zsh'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Shell Execution via Nice - Linux
id: 093d68c7-762a-42f4-9f46-95e79142571a
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of the "nice" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/nice/#shell
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1083
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/nice'
CommandLine|endswith:
- '/bin/bash'
- '/bin/dash'
- '/bin/fish'
- '/bin/sh'
- '/bin/zsh'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Vim GTFOBin Abuse - Linux
id: 7ab8f73a-fcff-428b-84aa-6a5ff7877dea
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of "vim" and it's siblings commands to execute a shell or proxy commands.
Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/vim/
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/rvim/
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/vimdiff/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-28
modified: 2024-09-02
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1083
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '/rvim'
- '/vim'
- '/vimdiff'
CommandLine|contains:
- ' --cmd'
- ' -c '
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- ':!/'
- ':lua '
- ':py '
- '/bin/bash'
- '/bin/dash'
- '/bin/fish'
- '/bin/sh'
- '/bin/zsh'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: PUA - Seatbelt Execution
id: 38646daa-e78f-4ace-9de0-55547b2d30da
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the PUA/Recon tool Seatbelt via PE information of command line parameters
references:
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt
- https://www.bluetangle.dev/2022/08/fastening-seatbelt-on-threat-hunting.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-18
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1526
- attack.t1087
- attack.t1083
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\Seatbelt.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Seatbelt.exe'
- Description: 'Seatbelt'
- CommandLine|contains:
# This just a list of the commands that will produce the least amount of FP in "theory"
# Comment out/in as needed in your environment
# To get the full list of commands see reference section
- ' DpapiMasterKeys'
- ' InterestingProcesses'
- ' InterestingFiles'
- ' CertificateThumbprints'
- ' ChromiumBookmarks'
- ' ChromiumHistory'
- ' ChromiumPresence'
- ' CloudCredentials'
- ' CredEnum'
- ' CredGuard'
- ' FirefoxHistory'
- ' ProcessCreationEvents'
# - ' RDPSessions'
# - ' PowerShellHistory'
selection_group_list:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -group=misc'
- ' -group=remote'
- ' -group=chromium'
- ' -group=slack'
- ' -group=system'
- ' -group=user'
- ' -group=all'
selection_group_output:
CommandLine|contains: ' -outputfile='
condition: selection_img or all of selection_group_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: SharpHound Recon Account Discovery
id: 65f77b1e-8e79-45bf-bb67-5988a8ce45a5
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls useb by SharpHound to map remote connections and local group membership.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-wkst/55118c55-2122-4ef9-8664-0c1ff9e168f3
- https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-WKST.md
- https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
- https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
- attack.t1087
- attack.discovery
logsource:
product: rpc_firewall
category: application
definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:6bffd098-a112-3610-9833-46c3f87e345a opnum:2'
detection:
selection:
EventLog: RPCFW
EventID: 3
InterfaceUuid: 6bffd098-a112-3610-9833-46c3f87e345a
OpNum: 2
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: HackTool - SOAPHound Execution
id: e92a4287-e072-4a40-9739-370c106bb750
status: test
description: |
Detects the execution of SOAPHound, a .NET tool for collecting Active Directory data, using specific command-line arguments that may indicate an attempt to extract sensitive AD information.
references:
- https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
- https://medium.com/falconforce/soaphound-tool-to-collect-active-directory-data-via-adws-165aca78288c
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2024-01-26
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1087
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_1:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' --buildcache '
- ' --bhdump '
- ' --certdump '
- ' --dnsdump '
selection_2:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -c '
- ' --cachefilename '
- ' -o '
- ' --outputdirectory'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: OpenCanary - HTTPPROXY Login Attempt
id: 5498fc09-adc6-4804-b9d9-5cca1f0b8760
status: test
description: |
Detects instances where an HTTPPROXY service on an OpenCanary node has had an attempt to proxy another page.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 7001
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Malicious IP Address Sign-In Failure Rate
id: a3f55ebd-0c01-4ed6-adc0-8fb76d8cd3cd
status: test
description: Indicates sign-in from a malicious IP address based on high failure rates.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#malicious-ip-address
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-07
tags:
- attack.t1090
- attack.command-and-control
logsource:
product: azure
service: riskdetection
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'maliciousIPAddress'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high
title: Malicious IP Address Sign-In Suspicious
id: 36440e1c-5c22-467a-889b-593e66498472
status: test
description: Indicates sign-in from a malicious IP address known to be malicious at time of sign-in.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#malicious-ip-address
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-07
tags:
- attack.t1090
- attack.command-and-control
logsource:
product: azure
service: riskdetection
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'suspiciousIPAddress'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high
title: Sign-In From Malware Infected IP
id: 821b4dc3-1295-41e7-b157-39ab212dd6bd
status: test
description: Indicates sign-ins from IP addresses infected with malware that is known to actively communicate with a bot server.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#malware-linked-ip-address-deprecated
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
- attack.t1090
- attack.command-and-control
logsource:
product: azure
service: riskdetection
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'malwareInfectedIPAddress'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Using an IP address that is shared by many users
level: high
title: Communication To LocaltoNet Tunneling Service Initiated - Linux
id: c4568f5d-131f-4e78-83d4-45b2da0ec4f1
status: test
description: |
Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "LocaltoNet" tunneling sub-domains.
LocaltoNet is a reverse proxy that enables localhost services to be exposed to the Internet.
Attackers have been seen to use this service for command-and-control activities to bypass MFA and perimeter controls.
references:
- https://localtonet.com/documents/supported-tunnels
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc3944-targets-saas-applications
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2024-06-17
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1572
- attack.t1090
- attack.t1102
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: linux
detection:
selection:
DestinationHostname|endswith:
- '.localto.net'
- '.localtonet.com'
Initiated: 'true'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of the LocaltoNet service.
level: high
title: Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service - Linux
id: 19bf6fdb-7721-4f3d-867f-53467f6a5db6
status: test
description: Detects an executable accessing an ngrok tunneling endpoint, which could be a sign of forbidden exfiltration of data exfiltration by malicious actors
references:
- https://twitter.com/hakluke/status/1587733971814977537/photo/1
- https://ngrok.com/docs/secure-tunnels/tunnels/ssh-reverse-tunnel-agent
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-03
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1567
- attack.t1568.002
- attack.t1572
- attack.t1090
- attack.t1102
- attack.s0508
logsource:
product: linux
category: network_connection
detection:
selection:
DestinationHostname|contains:
- 'tunnel.us.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.eu.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.ap.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.au.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.sa.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.jp.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.in.ngrok.com'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of ngrok
level: high
title: Communication To LocaltoNet Tunneling Service Initiated
id: 3ab65069-d82a-4d44-a759-466661a082d1
status: test
description: |
Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "LocaltoNet" tunneling sub-domains.
LocaltoNet is a reverse proxy that enables localhost services to be exposed to the Internet.
Attackers have been seen to use this service for command-and-control activities to bypass MFA and perimeter controls.
references:
- https://localtonet.com/documents/supported-tunnels
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc3944-targets-saas-applications
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2024-06-17
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1572
- attack.t1090
- attack.t1102
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection:
DestinationHostname|endswith:
- '.localto.net'
- '.localtonet.com'
Initiated: 'true'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of the LocaltoNet service.
level: high
title: Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service Initiated
id: 1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849
related:
- id: 18249279-932f-45e2-b37a-8925f2597670
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" tunneling domains.
Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware.
While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download.
references:
- https://twitter.com/hakluke/status/1587733971814977537/photo/1
- https://ngrok.com/docs/secure-tunnels/tunnels/ssh-reverse-tunnel-agent
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-03
modified: 2024-02-02
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1567
- attack.t1568.002
- attack.t1572
- attack.t1090
- attack.t1102
- attack.s0508
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection:
DestinationHostname|contains:
- 'tunnel.us.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.eu.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.ap.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.au.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.sa.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.jp.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.in.ngrok.com'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of the ngrok service.
level: high
title: RDP Port Forwarding Rule Added Via Netsh.EXE
id: 782d6f3e-4c5d-4b8c-92a3-1d05fed72e63
status: test
description: Detects the execution of netsh to configure a port forwarding of port 3389 (RDP) rule
references:
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community
date: 2019-01-29
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\netsh.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'netsh.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' i'
- ' p'
- '=3389'
- ' c'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administration activity
level: high
title: PUA - NPS Tunneling Tool Execution
id: 68d37776-61db-42f5-bf54-27e87072d17e
status: test
description: Detects the use of NPS, a port forwarding and intranet penetration proxy server
references:
- https://github.com/ehang-io/nps
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-08
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '\npc.exe'
selection_cli_1:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' -server='
- ' -vkey='
- ' -password='
selection_cli_2:
CommandLine|contains: ' -config=npc'
selection_hashes:
# v0.26.10
Hashes|contains:
- "MD5=AE8ACF66BFE3A44148964048B826D005"
- "SHA1=CEA49E9B9B67F3A13AD0BE1C2655293EA3C18181"
- "SHA256=5A456283392FFCEEEACA3D3426C306EB470304637520D72FED1CC1FEBBBD6856"
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use
level: high
title: HackTool - Htran/NATBypass Execution
id: f5e3b62f-e577-4e59-931e-0a15b2b94e1e
status: test
description: Detects executable names or flags used by Htran or Htran-like tools (e.g. NATBypass)
references:
- https://github.com/HiwinCN/HTran
- https://github.com/cw1997/NATBypass
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-27
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090
- attack.s0040
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\htran.exe'
- '\lcx.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- '.exe -tran '
- '.exe -slave '
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: PUA - Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) Execution
id: 32410e29-5f94-4568-b6a3-d91a8adad863
status: test
description: Detects the use of Fast Reverse Proxy. frp is a fast reverse proxy to help you expose a local server behind a NAT or firewall to the Internet.
references:
- https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/38156/
- https://github.com/fatedier/frp
author: frack113, Florian Roth
date: 2022-09-02
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\frpc.exe'
- '\frps.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains: '\frpc.ini'
selection_hashes:
# v0.44.0
Hashes|contains:
- "MD5=7D9C233B8C9E3F0EA290D2B84593C842"
- "SHA1=06DDC9280E1F1810677935A2477012960905942F"
- "SHA256=57B0936B8D336D8E981C169466A15A5FD21A7D5A2C7DAF62D5E142EE860E387C"
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use
level: high
title: PUA- IOX Tunneling Tool Execution
id: d7654f02-e04b-4934-9838-65c46f187ebc
status: test
description: Detects the use of IOX - a tool for port forwarding and intranet proxy purposes
references:
- https://github.com/EddieIvan01/iox
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-08
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\iox.exe'
selection_commandline:
CommandLine|contains:
- '.exe fwd -l '
- '.exe fwd -r '
- '.exe proxy -l '
- '.exe proxy -r '
selection_hashes:
# v0.4
Hashes|contains:
- "MD5=9DB2D314DD3F704A02051EF5EA210993"
- "SHA1=039130337E28A6623ECF9A0A3DA7D92C5964D8DD"
- "SHA256=C6CF82919B809967D9D90EA73772A8AA1C1EB3BC59252D977500F64F1A0D6731"
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use
level: high
title: Ngrok Usage with Remote Desktop Service
id: 64d51a51-32a6-49f0-9f3d-17e34d640272
status: test
description: Detects cases in which ngrok, a reverse proxy tool, forwards events to the local RDP port, which could be a sign of malicious behaviour
references:
- https://twitter.com/tekdefense/status/1519711183162556416?s=12&t=OTsHCBkQOTNs1k3USz65Zg
- https://ngrok.com/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-29
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090
logsource:
product: windows
service: terminalservices-localsessionmanager
detection:
selection:
EventID: 21
Address|contains: '16777216'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: HackTool - SharpChisel Execution
id: cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf
related:
- id: 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Sharp Chisel via the commandline arguments
references:
- https://github.com/shantanu561993/SharpChisel
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/wading-through-muddy-waters-recent-activity-of-an-iranian-state-sponsored-threat-actor/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-05
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Image|endswith: '\SharpChisel.exe'
- Product: 'SharpChisel'
# See rule 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5 for Chisel.exe coverage
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Renamed Cloudflared.EXE Execution
id: e0c69ebd-b54f-4aed-8ae3-e3467843f3f0
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed "cloudflared" binary.
references:
- https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared/releases
- https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-networks/do-more-with-tunnels/trycloudflare/
- https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared
- https://www.intrinsec.com/akira_ransomware/
- https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/tunnel-vision-cloudflared-abused-in-the-wild/
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090.001
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-12-20
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_cleanup:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' tunnel '
- 'cleanup '
CommandLine|contains:
- '-config '
- '-connector-id '
selection_tunnel:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' tunnel '
- ' run '
CommandLine|contains:
- '-config '
- '-credentials-contents '
- '-credentials-file '
- '-token '
selection_accountless:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-url'
- 'tunnel'
selection_hashes:
Hashes|contains:
- 'SHA256=2fb6c04c4f95fb8d158af94c137f90ac820716deaf88d8ebec956254e046cb29'
- 'SHA256=b3d21940a10fdef5e415ad70331ce257c24fe3bcf7722262302e0421791f87e8'
- 'SHA256=1fbd8362b2d2d2e6a5750ae3db69cd1815e6c1d31da48a98b796450971a8e039'
- 'SHA256=0409c9b12f9d0eda86e461ed9bdabeefb00172b26322079681a0bdf48e68dc28'
- 'SHA256=7cfb411d04bac42ef93d1f0c93c0a481e38c6f4612b97ae89d4702595988edc7'
- 'SHA256=5b3c2d846ab162dc6bc595cce3a49de5731afde5d6060be7066d21b013a28373'
- 'SHA256=ce95df7f69664c3df19b76028e115931919a71517b776da7b42d353e2ff4a670'
- 'SHA256=1293525a19cfe3bc8296b62fbfe19f083632ed644a1c18c10b045a1d3030d81a'
- 'SHA256=af2b9161cfcb654b16408cd6b098afe9d1fb61a037d18d7090a119d4c0c8e0f0'
- 'SHA256=39ddceb56a15798826a5fc4892fa2b474c444bb4d7a8bf2fa95e41cab10fa7a1'
- 'SHA256=ccd11f2328023a0e7929e845d5b6e7bc783fb4650d65faef3ae090239d4bbce2'
- 'SHA256=b6e5c5d2567ae8c69cc012ebcae30e6c9b5359d64a58d17ba75ec89f8bce71ac'
- 'SHA256=f813484ea441404f18caad96f28138e8aaf0cb256163c09c2ab8a3acab87f69f'
- 'SHA256=fc4a0802ab9c7409b892ca00636bec61e2acfc911bccfdeb9978b8ab5a2f828d'
- 'SHA256=083150724b49604c8765c1ba19541fa260b133be0acb0647fcd936d81f054499'
- 'SHA256=44303d6572956f28a0f2e4b188934fb9874f2584f5c81fa431a463cfbf28083b'
- 'SHA256=5d38c46032a58e28ae5f7d174d8761ec3d64d186677f3ec53af5f51afb9bfd2f'
- 'SHA256=e1e70fa42059911bc6685fafef957f9a73fc66f214d0704a9b932683a5204032'
- 'SHA256=c01356092a365b84f84f0e66870bd1a05ba3feb53cafd973fa5fea2534bee234'
- 'SHA256=b3f9c06151e30ee43d39e788a79cd918a314f24e04fe87f3de8272a2057b624f'
- 'SHA256=cd81b2792f0739f473c31c9cb7cf2313154bfa28b839975802b90e8790bb5058'
- 'SHA256=9ec7e6c8e1bfd883663d8d9d62c9e4f9ae373b731407181e32491b27a7218a2c'
- 'SHA256=c2cfd23fdc6c0e1b1ffa0e545cbe556f18d11b362b4a89ba0713f6ab01c4827f'
- 'SHA256=53f8adbd76c0eb16f5e43cadde422474d8a06f9c8f959389c1930042ad8beaa5'
- 'SHA256=648c8d2f8001c113d2986dd00b7bbd181593d462bef73522cee212c4f71f95b3'
- 'SHA256=ae047e2095e46c3f9c518b2be67ec753f4f0aad23b261a361fcb6144dcdb63b4'
- 'SHA256=3153d2baa462978dd22ab33d1c2274ecc88c200225d6a3327f98d5b752d08f5c'
- 'SHA256=f49cde976e628012c9db73e1c8d76081944ecf2297cdafeb78bb13290da274c4'
- 'SHA256=d2513e58bb03ccc83affde685c6ef987924c37ce6707d8e9857e2524b0d7e90f'
- 'SHA256=bb67c7623ba92fe64ffd9816b8d5b3b1ea3013960a30bd4cf6e295b3eb5b1bad'
- 'SHA256=b34b3c3a91e3165d1481f0b3ec23eab93a1cfba94345a6cbfe5b18ddbd48eac7'
- 'SHA256=f7848034e010d55f15e474ca998f96391e320ff29b00cfcc4c5e536529703e75'
- 'SHA256=b6fc9493778cbe3bfc062d73f5cc604bc0ff058bc5e5dc6aac87f3a4008b54b6'
- 'SHA256=f5c5e962577e2293c4ad10603816dce7cc273585969615fbf4e4bfa9eaff1688'
- 'SHA256=d14c52d9220b606f428a8fe9f7c108b0d6f14cf71e7384749e98e6a95962e68f'
- 'SHA256=d3a0e1a79158f3985cd49607ebe0cdfcc49cb9af96b8f43aefd0cdfe2f22e663'
- 'SHA256=2fbbfc8299537ff80cadf9d0e27c223fe0ccb9052bf9d8763ad717bbfa521c77'
- 'SHA256=19074674c6fbdaa573b3081745e5e26144fdf7a086d14e0e220d1814f1f13078'
filter_main_known_names:
Image|endswith:
- '\cloudflared.exe'
- '\cloudflared-windows-386.exe'
- '\cloudflared-windows-amd64.exe'
condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: PUA - Chisel Tunneling Tool Execution
id: 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5
related:
- id: cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Chisel tunneling tool via the commandline arguments
references:
- https://github.com/jpillora/chisel/
- https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/lorenz-ransomware-chiseling-in/
- https://blog.sekoia.io/lucky-mouse-incident-response-to-detection-engineering/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-13
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '\chisel.exe'
selection_param1:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'exe client '
- 'exe server '
selection_param2:
CommandLine|contains:
- '-socks5'
- '-reverse'
- ' r:'
- ':127.0.0.1:'
- '-tls-skip-verify '
- ':socks'
condition: selection_img or all of selection_param*
falsepositives:
- Some false positives may occur with other tools with similar commandlines
level: high
title: RDP over Reverse SSH Tunnel WFP
id: 5bed80b6-b3e8-428e-a3ae-d3c757589e41
status: test
description: Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating with the loopback address
references:
- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1096148422984384514
- https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/blob/44fbe85f72ee91582876b49678f9a26292a155fb/Command%20and%20Control/DE_RDP_Tunnel_5156.evtx
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-02-16
modified: 2022-09-02
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1090.001
- attack.t1090.002
- attack.t1021.001
- car.2013-07-002
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5156
sourceRDP:
SourcePort: 3389
DestAddress:
- '127.*'
- '::1'
destinationRDP:
DestPort: 3389
SourceAddress:
- '127.*'
- '::1'
filter_app_container:
FilterOrigin: 'AppContainer Loopback'
filter_thor: # checking BlueKeep vulnerability
Application|endswith:
- '\thor.exe'
- '\thor64.exe'
condition: selection and ( sourceRDP or destinationRDP ) and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
- Programs that connect locally to the RDP port
level: high
title: PUA - Netcat Suspicious Execution
id: e31033fc-33f0-4020-9a16-faf9b31cbf08
status: test
description: Detects execution of Netcat. Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network
references:
- https://nmap.org/ncat/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1095/T1095.md
- https://www.revshells.com/
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-21
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1095
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
# can not use OriginalFileName as is empty
Image|endswith:
- '\nc.exe'
- '\ncat.exe'
- '\netcat.exe'
selection_cmdline:
# Typical command lines
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -lvp '
- ' -lvnp'
- ' -l -v -p '
- ' -lv -p '
- ' -l --proxy-type http '
# - ' --exec cmd.exe ' # Not specific enough for netcat
- ' -vnl --exec '
- ' -vnl -e '
- ' --lua-exec '
- ' --sh-exec '
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate ncat use
level: high
title: Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine
id: ba3f5c1b-6272-4119-9dbd-0bc8d21c2702
related:
- id: 03d83090-8cba-44a0-b02f-0b756a050306
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the use of WinAPI Functions via the commandline. As seen used by threat actors via the tool winapiexec
references:
- https://twitter.com/m417z/status/1566674631788007425
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-06
modified: 2025-03-06
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1106
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'AddSecurityPackage'
- 'AdjustTokenPrivileges'
- 'Advapi32'
- 'CloseHandle'
- 'CreateProcessWithToken'
- 'CreatePseudoConsole'
- 'CreateRemoteThread'
- 'CreateThread'
- 'CreateUserThread'
- 'DangerousGetHandle'
- 'DuplicateTokenEx'
- 'EnumerateSecurityPackages'
- 'FreeHGlobal'
- 'FreeLibrary'
- 'GetDelegateForFunctionPointer'
- 'GetLogonSessionData'
- 'GetModuleHandle'
- 'GetProcAddress'
- 'GetProcessHandle'
- 'GetTokenInformation'
- 'ImpersonateLoggedOnUser'
- 'kernel32'
- 'LoadLibrary'
- 'memcpy'
- 'MiniDumpWriteDump'
# - 'msvcrt'
- 'ntdll'
- 'OpenDesktop'
- 'OpenProcess'
- 'OpenProcessToken'
- 'OpenThreadToken'
- 'OpenWindowStation'
- 'PtrToString'
- 'QueueUserApc'
- 'ReadProcessMemory'
- 'RevertToSelf'
- 'RtlCreateUserThread'
- 'secur32'
- 'SetThreadToken'
# - 'user32'
- 'VirtualAlloc'
- 'VirtualFree'
- 'VirtualProtect'
- 'WaitForSingleObject'
- 'WriteInt32'
- 'WriteProcessMemory'
- 'ZeroFreeGlobalAllocUnicode'
filter_optional_mpcmdrun:
Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'GetLoadLibraryWAddress32'
filter_optional_compatTelRunner:
ParentImage|endswith: '\CompatTelRunner.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'FreeHGlobal'
- 'PtrToString'
- 'kernel32'
- 'CloseHandle'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Some legitimate action or applications may use these functions. Investigate further to determine the legitimacy of the activity.
level: high
title: Suspicious Mshta.EXE Execution Patterns
id: e32f92d1-523e-49c3-9374-bdb13b46a3ba
status: test
description: Detects suspicious mshta process execution patterns
references:
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application
- https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/mshta.exe
- https://app.any.run/tasks/34221348-072d-4b70-93f3-aa71f6ebecad/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-17
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1106
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'MSHTA.EXE'
selection_susp:
# Suspicious parents
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
# Suspicious folders
CommandLine|contains:
- '\AppData\Local\'
- 'C:\ProgramData\'
- 'C:\Users\Public\'
- 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
filter_img:
# Filter legit Locations
- Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
# Suspicious extensions
- CommandLine|contains:
- '.htm'
- '.hta'
# Filter simple execution
- CommandLine|endswith:
- 'mshta.exe'
- 'mshta'
condition: all of selection_* or (selection_img and not filter_img)
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: HackTool - CobaltStrike BOF Injection Pattern
id: 09706624-b7f6-455d-9d02-adee024cee1d
status: test
description: Detects a typical pattern of a CobaltStrike BOF which inject into other processes
references:
- https://github.com/boku7/injectAmsiBypass
- https://github.com/boku7/spawn
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-04
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1106
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_access
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CallTrace|re: '^C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll\.dll\+[a-z0-9]{4,6}\|C:\\Windows\\System32\\KERNELBASE\.dll\+[a-z0-9]{4,6}\|UNKNOWN\([A-Z0-9]{16}\)$'
GrantedAccess:
- '0x1028'
- '0x1fffff'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: HackTool - HandleKatz Duplicating LSASS Handle
id: b1bd3a59-c1fd-4860-9f40-4dd161a7d1f5
status: test
description: Detects HandleKatz opening LSASS to duplicate its handle to later dump the memory without opening any new handles
references:
- https://github.com/codewhitesec/HandleKatz
author: Bhabesh Raj (rule), @thefLinkk
date: 2022-06-27
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1106
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.credential-access
logsource:
category: process_access
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe' # Theoretically, can be any benign process holding handle to LSASS
GrantedAccess: '0x1440' # Only PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION
# Example: C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+9d234\|UNKNOWN(00000000001C119B)
CallTrace|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll+'
CallTrace|contains: '|UNKNOWN('
CallTrace|endswith: ')'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: OpenCanary - SIP Request
id: e30de276-68ec-435c-ab99-ef3befec6c61
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SIP service on an OpenCanary node has had a SIP request.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1123
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 15001
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Suspicious Camera and Microphone Access
id: 62120148-6b7a-42be-8b91-271c04e281a3
status: test
description: Detects Processes accessing the camera and microphone from suspicious folder
references:
- https://medium.com/@7a616368/can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone-7e6885b37072
author: Den Iuzvyk
date: 2020-06-07
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1125
- attack.t1123
logsource:
category: registry_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_1:
TargetObject|contains|all:
- '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\'
- '\NonPackaged'
selection_2:
TargetObject|contains:
- microphone
- webcam
selection_3:
TargetObject|contains:
- ':#Windows#Temp#'
- ':#$Recycle.bin#'
- ':#Temp#'
- ':#Users#Public#'
- ':#Users#Default#'
- ':#Users#Desktop#'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely, there could be conferencing software running from a Temp folder accessing the devices
level: high
title: Potential Base64 Decoded From Images
id: 09a910bf-f71f-4737-9c40-88880ba5913d
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of tail to extract bytes at an offset from an image and then decode the base64 value to create a new file with the decoded content. The detected execution is a bash one-liner.
references:
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/16bafdf741e7a13137c489f3c8db1334f171c7cb13b62617d691b0a64783cc48/behavior
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/483fafc64a2b84197e1ef6a3f51e443f84dc5742602e08b9e8ec6ad690b34ed0/behavior
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-12-20
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1140
logsource:
product: macos
category: process_creation
detection:
# Example: /bin/bash sh -c tail -c +21453 '/Volumes/Installer/Installer.app/Contents/Resources/workout-logo.jpeg' | base64 --decode > /tmp/54A0A2CD-FAD1-4D4D-AAF5-5266F6344ABE.zip
# VT Query: 'behavior_processes:"tail" (behavior_processes:"jpeg" or behavior_processes:"jpg" or behavior_processes:"png" or behavior_processes:"gif") behavior_processes:"base64" behavior_processes:"--decode >" and tag:dmg'
selection_image:
Image|endswith: '/bash'
selection_view:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'tail'
- '-c'
selection_b64:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'base64'
- '-d' # Also covers "--decode"
- '>'
selection_files:
CommandLine|contains:
- '.avif'
- '.gif'
- '.jfif'
- '.jpeg'
- '.jpg'
- '.pjp'
- '.pjpeg'
- '.png'
- '.svg'
- '.webp'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Inbox Manipulation Rules
id: ceb55fd0-726e-4656-bf4e-b585b7f7d572
status: test
description: Detects suspicious rules that delete or move messages or folders are set on a user's inbox.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#suspicious-inbox-manipulation-rules
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1140
logsource:
product: azure
service: riskdetection
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'mcasSuspiciousInboxManipulationRules'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Actual mailbox rules that are moving items based on their workflow.
level: high
title: MSHTA Execution with Suspicious File Extensions
id: cc7abbd0-762b-41e3-8a26-57ad50d2eea3
status: test
description: |
Detects execution of mshta.exe with file types that looks like they do not typically represent HTA (HTML Application) content,
such as .png, .jpg, .zip, .pdf, and others, which are often polyglots. MSHTA is a legitimate Windows utility for executing HTML Applications
containing VBScript or JScript. Threat actors often abuse this lolbin utility to download and
execute malicious scripts disguised as benign files or hosted under misleading extensions to evade detection.
references:
- http://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files
- https://0x00sec.org/t/clientside-exploitation-in-2018-how-pentesting-has-changed/7356
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/framework/data/xml/xslt/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script
- https://medium.com/tsscyber/pentesting-and-hta-bypassing-powershell-constrained-language-mode-53a42856c997
- https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1326228491302563846
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c1f27d9795a2eba630db8a043580a0761798f06370fb1317067805f8a845b00c
author: Diego Perez (@darkquassar), Markus Neis, Swisscom (Improve Rule), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-02-22
modified: 2025-05-12
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1140
- attack.t1218.005
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.007
- cve.2020-1599
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'mshta.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- '.7z'
- '.avi'
- '.bat'
- '.bmp'
- '.conf'
- '.csv'
- '.dll'
- '.doc'
- '.gif'
- '.gz'
- '.ini'
- '.jpe'
- '.jpg'
- '.json'
- '.lnk'
- '.log'
- '.mkv'
- '.mp3'
- '.mp4'
- '.pdf'
- '.png'
- '.ppt'
- '.rar'
- '.rtf'
- '.svg'
- '.tar'
- '.tmp'
- '.txt'
- '.xls'
- '.xml'
- '.yaml'
- '.yml'
- '.zip'
- 'vbscript'
# - '.chm' # could be prone to false positives
# - '.exe'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high
title: Antivirus Hacktool Detection
id: fa0c05b6-8ad3-468d-8231-c1cbccb64fba
status: stable
description: |
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a hack tool or other attack tool.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/2021/08/16/antivirus-event-analysis-cheat-sheet-v1-8-2/
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2021-08-16
modified: 2024-11-02
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204
logsource:
category: antivirus
detection:
selection:
- Signature|startswith:
- 'ATK/' # Sophos
- 'Exploit.Script.CVE'
- 'HKTL'
- 'HTOOL'
- 'PWS.'
- 'PWSX'
- 'SecurityTool'
# - 'FRP.'
- Signature|contains:
- 'Adfind'
- 'Brutel'
- 'BruteR'
- 'Cobalt'
- 'COBEACON'
- 'Cometer'
- 'DumpCreds'
- 'FastReverseProxy'
- 'Hacktool'
- 'Havoc'
- 'Impacket'
- 'Keylogger'
- 'Koadic'
- 'Mimikatz'
- 'Nighthawk'
- 'PentestPowerShell'
- 'Potato'
- 'PowerSploit'
- 'PowerSSH'
- 'PshlSpy'
- 'PSWTool'
- 'PWCrack'
- 'PWDump'
- 'Rozena'
- 'Rusthound'
- 'Sbelt'
- 'Seatbelt'
- 'SecurityTool'
- 'SharpDump'
- 'SharpHound'
- 'Shellcode'
- 'Sliver'
- 'Snaffler'
- 'SOAPHound'
- 'Splinter'
- 'Swrort'
- 'TurtleLoader'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Suspicious Binaries and Scripts in Public Folder
id: b447f7de-1e53-4cbf-bfb4-f1f6d0b04e4e
status: experimental
description: Detects the creation of a file with a suspicious extension in the public folder, which could indicate potential malicious activity.
references:
- https://intel.thedfirreport.com/events/view/30032 # Private Report
- https://intel.thedfirreport.com/eventReports/view/70 # Private Report
- https://thedfirreport.com/2025/01/27/cobalt-strike-and-a-pair-of-socks-lead-to-lockbit-ransomware/
author: 'The DFIR Report'
date: 2025-01-23
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|contains: ':\Users\Public\'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.bat'
- '.dll'
- '.exe'
- '.hta'
- '.js'
- '.ps1'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrators deploying legitimate binaries to public folders.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_public_folder_extension/info.yml
title: Symlink Etc Passwd
id: c67fc22a-0be5-4b4f-aad5-2b32c4b69523
status: test
description: Detects suspicious command lines that look as if they would create symbolic links to /etc/passwd
references:
- https://www.qualys.com/2021/05/04/21nails/21nails.txt
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-04-05
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.t1204.001
- attack.execution
logsource:
product: linux
detection:
keywords:
- 'ln -s -f /etc/passwd'
- 'ln -s /etc/passwd'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious ClickFix/FileFix Execution Pattern
id: d487ed4a-fd24-436d-a0b2-f4e95f7b2635
related:
- id: f5fe36cf-f1ec-4c23-903d-09a3110f6bbb
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects suspicious execution patterns where users are tricked into running malicious commands via clipboard manipulation, either through the Windows Run dialog (ClickFix) or File Explorer address bar (FileFix).
Attackers leverage social engineering campaigns—such as fake CAPTCHA challenges or urgent alerts—encouraging victims to paste clipboard contents, often executing mshta.exe, powershell.exe, or similar commands to infect systems.
references:
- https://github.com/JohnHammond/recaptcha-phish
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/deepseek-lure-using-captchas-spread-malware
- https://www.threatdown.com/blog/clipboard-hijacker-tries-to-install-a-trojan/
- https://app.any.run/tasks/5c16b4db-4b36-4039-a0ed-9b09abff8be2
- https://www.esentire.com/security-advisories/netsupport-rat-clickfix-distribution
- https://www.scpx.com.au/2025/11/16/decades-old-finger-protocol-abused-in-clickfix-malware-attacks/ # filefix variant
author: montysecurity, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-19
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.001
- attack.t1204.004
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '#'
selection_cli_captcha:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'account'
- 'anti-bot'
- 'botcheck'
- 'captcha'
- 'challenge'
- 'confirmation'
- 'fraud'
- 'human'
- 'identification'
- 'identificator'
- 'identity'
- 'robot'
- 'validation'
- 'verification'
- 'verify'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Potential ClickFix Execution Pattern - Registry
id: f5fe36cf-f1ec-4c23-903d-09a3110f6bbb
related:
- id: d487ed4a-fd24-436d-a0b2-f4e95f7b2635
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects potential ClickFix malware execution patterns by monitoring registry modifications in RunMRU keys containing HTTP/HTTPS links.
ClickFix is known to be distributed through phishing campaigns and uses techniques like clipboard hijacking and fake CAPTCHA pages.
Through the fakecaptcha pages, the adversary tricks users into opening the Run dialog box and pasting clipboard-hijacked content,
such as one-liners that execute remotely hosted malicious files or scripts.
references:
- https://github.com/JohnHammond/recaptcha-phish
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/deepseek-lure-using-captchas-spread-malware
- https://www.threatdown.com/blog/clipboard-hijacker-tries-to-install-a-trojan/
- https://app.any.run/tasks/5c16b4db-4b36-4039-a0ed-9b09abff8be2
- https://www.esentire.com/security-advisories/netsupport-rat-clickfix-distribution
- https://medium.com/@boutnaru/the-windows-foreniscs-journey-run-mru-run-dialog-box-most-recently-used-57375a02d724
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/preventing-clickfix-attack-vector/
- https://medium.com/@poudelswachchhanda123/preventing-lnk-and-fakecaptcha-threats-a-system-hardening-approach-2f7b7ed2e493
- https://www.scpx.com.au/2025/11/16/decades-old-finger-protocol-abused-in-clickfix-malware-attacks/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-03-25
modified: 2025-11-19
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.001
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection_registry:
TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU\'
selection_details:
Details|contains:
- 'http://'
- 'https://'
selection_susp_pattern:
- Details|contains:
# Add more suspicious keywords
- 'account'
- 'anti-bot'
- 'botcheck'
- 'captcha'
- 'challenge'
- 'confirmation'
- 'fraud'
- 'human'
- 'identification'
- 'identificator'
- 'identity'
- 'robot'
- 'validation'
- 'verification'
- 'verify'
- Details|contains:
- '%comspec%'
- 'bitsadmin'
- 'certutil'
- 'cmd'
- 'cscript'
- 'curl'
- 'finger'
- 'mshta'
- 'powershell'
- 'pwsh'
- 'regsvr32'
- 'rundll32'
- 'schtasks'
- 'wget'
- 'wscript'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate applications using RunMRU with HTTP links
level: high
title: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process - MacOS
id: 69483748-1525-4a6c-95ca-90dc8d431b68
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes spawning from microsoft office suite applications such as word or excel. This could indicates malicious macro execution
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/applescript/
- https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x4B.html
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-01-31
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1059.002
- attack.t1137.002
- attack.t1204.002
logsource:
product: macos
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|contains:
- 'Microsoft Word'
- 'Microsoft Excel'
- 'Microsoft PowerPoint'
- 'Microsoft OneNote'
Image|endswith:
- '/bash'
- '/curl'
- '/dash'
- '/fish'
- '/osacompile'
- '/osascript'
- '/sh'
- '/zsh'
- '/python'
- '/python3'
- '/wget'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
id: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
status: test
description: Detects the creation of files with an executable or script extension by an Office application.
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
- https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
author: Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng (Rule), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
- attack.t1204.002
- attack.execution
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
# Note: Please add more file extensions to the logic of your choice.
selection1:
Image|endswith:
- '\excel.exe'
- '\msaccess.exe'
- '\mspub.exe'
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\visio.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
selection2:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.bat'
- '.cmd'
- '.com'
- '.dll'
- '.exe'
- '.hta'
- '.ocx'
- '.proj'
- '.ps1'
- '.scf'
- '.scr'
- '.sys'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
- '.wsf'
- '.wsh'
filter_main_localassembly:
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\assembly\tmp\'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.dll'
filter_optional_webservicecache: # matches e.g. directory with name *.microsoft.com
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- 'C:\Users\'
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\'
- '\WebServiceCache\AllUsers'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.com'
filter_optional_webex:
Image|endswith: '\winword.exe'
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\webexdelta\'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.dll'
- '.exe'
filter_optional_backstageinappnavcache: # matches e.g. C:\Users\xxxxx\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\BackstageInAppNavCache\ODB-user@domain.com
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- 'C:\Users\'
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\'
- '\BackstageInAppNavCache\'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.com'
condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Startup Folder Persistence
id: 28208707-fe31-437f-9a7f-4b1108b94d2e
related:
- id: 2aa0a6b4-a865-495b-ab51-c28249537b75
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects the creation of potentially malicious script and executable files in Windows startup folders, which is a common persistence technique used by threat actors.
These files (.ps1, .vbs, .js, .bat, etc.) are automatically executed when a user logs in, making the Startup folder an attractive target for attackers.
This technique is frequently observed in malvertising campaigns and malware distribution where attackers attempt to maintain long-term access to compromised systems.
references:
- https://github.com/last-byte/PersistenceSniper
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/03/06/malvertising-campaign-leads-to-info-stealers-hosted-on-github/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5ede8f21e42ebe37e0a6eff757dba60bcfa85859/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-10
modified: 2025-10-12
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.002
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|contains: '\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
TargetFilename|endswith:
# Add or remove suspicious extensions according to your env needs
- '.bat'
- '.cmd'
- '.dll'
- '.hta'
- '.jar'
- '.js'
- '.jse'
- '.msi'
- '.ps1'
- '.psd1'
- '.psm1'
- '.scr'
- '.url'
- '.vba'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
- '.wsf'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Rare legitimate usage of some of the extensions mentioned in the rule
level: high