Sigma

Sigma rules for Intellexa / Predator / Cytrox

500 rules · scoped to actor · back to Intellexa / Predator / Cytrox
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.

Detection rules

50 of 500
related high
Suspicious Kernel Dump Using Dtrace
Detects suspicious way to dump the kernel on Windows systems using dtrace.exe, which is available on Windows systems since Windows 10 19H1
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 7124aebe-4cd7-4ccb-8df0-6d6b93c96795 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Suspicious Kernel Dump Using Dtrace
id: 7124aebe-4cd7-4ccb-8df0-6d6b93c96795
status: test
description: Detects suspicious way to dump the kernel on Windows systems using dtrace.exe, which is available on Windows systems since Windows 10 19H1
references:
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1474899714290208777?s=12
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/devtest/dtrace
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-28
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1082
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_plain:
        Image|endswith: '\dtrace.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'lkd(0)'
    selection_obfuscated:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'syscall:::return'
            - 'lkd('
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dtrace_kernel_dump/info.yml
related high
HackTool - WinPwn Execution
Detects commandline keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.
status test author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel id d557dc06-62e8-4468-a8e8-7984124908ce license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - WinPwn Execution
id: d557dc06-62e8-4468-a8e8-7984124908ce
related:
    - id: 851fd622-b675-4d26-b803-14bc7baa517a
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects commandline keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-12-04
references:
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn
    - https://www.publicnow.com/view/EB87DB49C654D9B63995FAD4C9DE3D3CC4F6C3ED?1671634841
    - https://reconshell.com/winpwn-tool-for-internal-windows-pentesting-and-ad-security/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/4d6c4e8e23d465af7a2388620cfe3f8c76e16cf0/atomics/T1082/T1082.md
    - https://grep.app/search?q=winpwn&filter[repo][0]=redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1046
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1518
    - attack.t1548.002
    - attack.t1552.001
    - attack.t1555
    - attack.t1555.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Offline_Winpwn'
            - 'WinPwn '
            - 'WinPwn.exe'
            - 'WinPwn.ps1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
HackTool - winPEAS Execution
WinPEAS is a script that search for possible paths to escalate privileges on Windows hosts. The checks are explained on book.hacktricks.xyz
status test author Georg Lauenstein (sure[secure]) id 98b53e78-ebaf-46f8-be06-421aafd176d9 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - winPEAS Execution
id: 98b53e78-ebaf-46f8-be06-421aafd176d9
status: test
description: WinPEAS is a script that search for possible paths to escalate privileges on Windows hosts. The checks are explained on book.hacktricks.xyz
references:
    - https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng
    - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation
author: Georg Lauenstein (sure[secure])
date: 2022-09-19
modified: 2023-03-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'winPEAS.exe'
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\winPEASany_ofs.exe'
              - '\winPEASany.exe'
              - '\winPEASx64_ofs.exe'
              - '\winPEASx64.exe'
              - '\winPEASx86_ofs.exe'
              - '\winPEASx86.exe'
    selection_cli_option:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' applicationsinfo' # Search installed applications information
            - ' browserinfo' # Search browser information
            - ' eventsinfo' # Display interesting events information
            - ' fileanalysis' # Search specific files that can contains credentials and for regexes inside files
            - ' filesinfo' # Search generic files that can contains credentials
            - ' processinfo' # Search processes information
            - ' servicesinfo' # Search services information
            - ' windowscreds' # Search windows credentials
    selection_cli_dl:
        CommandLine|contains: 'https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/'
    selection_cli_specific:
        - ParentCommandLine|endswith: ' -linpeas'
        - CommandLine|endswith: ' -linpeas'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
related high
Network Reconnaissance Activity
Detects a set of suspicious network related commands often used in recon stages
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id e6313acd-208c-44fc-a0ff-db85d572e90e license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Network Reconnaissance Activity
id: e6313acd-208c-44fc-a0ff-db85d572e90e
status: test
description: Detects a set of suspicious network related commands often used in recon stages
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-07
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.t1082
    - car.2016-03-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'nslookup'
            - '_ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high
related high
Shell Execution GCC - Linux
Detects the use of the "gcc" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
status test author Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.) id 9b5de532-a757-4d70-946c-1f3e44f48b4d license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Shell Execution GCC  - Linux
id: 9b5de532-a757-4d70-946c-1f3e44f48b4d
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "gcc" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/gcc/#shell
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/c89/#shell
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/c99/#shell
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/c89'
            - '/c99'
            - '/gcc'
        CommandLine|contains: '-wrapper'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash,-s'
            - '/bin/dash,-s'
            - '/bin/fish,-s'
            - '/bin/sh,-s'
            - '/bin/zsh,-s'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Shell Execution via Find - Linux
Detects the use of the find command to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or exploitation attempt.
status test author Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.) id 6adfbf8f-52be-4444-9bac-81b539624146 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Shell Execution via Find - Linux
id: 6adfbf8f-52be-4444-9bac-81b539624146
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the find command to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or exploitation attempt.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/find/#shell
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '/find'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' . '
            - '-exec'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Shell Execution via Flock - Linux
Detects the use of the "flock" command to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
status test author Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.) id 4b09c71e-4269-4111-9cdd-107d8867f0cc license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Shell Execution via Flock - Linux
id: 4b09c71e-4269-4111-9cdd-107d8867f0cc
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "flock" command to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/flock/#shell
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '/flock'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -u '
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Shell Execution via Nice - Linux
Detects the use of the "nice" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
status test author Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.) id 093d68c7-762a-42f4-9f46-95e79142571a license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Shell Execution via Nice - Linux
id: 093d68c7-762a-42f4-9f46-95e79142571a
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "nice" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/nice/#shell
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/nice'
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Vim GTFOBin Abuse - Linux
Detects the use of "vim" and it's siblings commands to execute a shell or proxy commands. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 7ab8f73a-fcff-428b-84aa-6a5ff7877dea license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Vim GTFOBin Abuse - Linux
id: 7ab8f73a-fcff-428b-84aa-6a5ff7877dea
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of "vim" and it's siblings commands to execute a shell or proxy commands.
    Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/vim/
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/rvim/
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/vimdiff/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-28
modified: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/rvim'
            - '/vim'
            - '/vimdiff'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' --cmd'
            - ' -c '
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':!/'
            - ':lua '
            - ':py '
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
PUA - Seatbelt Execution
Detects the execution of the PUA/Recon tool Seatbelt via PE information of command line parameters
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 38646daa-e78f-4ace-9de0-55547b2d30da license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: PUA - Seatbelt Execution
id: 38646daa-e78f-4ace-9de0-55547b2d30da
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the PUA/Recon tool Seatbelt via PE information of command line parameters
references:
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt
    - https://www.bluetangle.dev/2022/08/fastening-seatbelt-on-threat-hunting.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-18
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1526
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\Seatbelt.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Seatbelt.exe'
        - Description: 'Seatbelt'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              # This just a list of the commands that will produce the least amount of FP in "theory"
              # Comment out/in as needed in your environment
              # To get the full list of commands see reference section
              - ' DpapiMasterKeys'
              - ' InterestingProcesses'
              - ' InterestingFiles'
              - ' CertificateThumbprints'
              - ' ChromiumBookmarks'
              - ' ChromiumHistory'
              - ' ChromiumPresence'
              - ' CloudCredentials'
              - ' CredEnum'
              - ' CredGuard'
              - ' FirefoxHistory'
              - ' ProcessCreationEvents'
              # - ' RDPSessions'
              # - ' PowerShellHistory'
    selection_group_list:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -group=misc'
            - ' -group=remote'
            - ' -group=chromium'
            - ' -group=slack'
            - ' -group=system'
            - ' -group=user'
            - ' -group=all'
    selection_group_output:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -outputfile='
    condition: selection_img or all of selection_group_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
related high
SharpHound Recon Account Discovery
Detects remote RPC calls useb by SharpHound to map remote connections and local group membership.
status test author Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz id 65f77b1e-8e79-45bf-bb67-5988a8ce45a5 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: SharpHound Recon Account Discovery
id: 65f77b1e-8e79-45bf-bb67-5988a8ce45a5
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls useb by SharpHound to map remote connections and local group membership.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-wkst/55118c55-2122-4ef9-8664-0c1ff9e168f3
    - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-WKST.md
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.discovery
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:6bffd098-a112-3610-9833-46c3f87e345a opnum:2'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid: 6bffd098-a112-3610-9833-46c3f87e345a
        OpNum: 2
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - PoshModule
Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 7d0d0329-0ef1-4e84-a9f5-49500f9d7c6c license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - PoshModule
id: 7d0d0329-0ef1-4e84-a9f5-49500f9d7c6c
related:
    - id: 89819aa4-bbd6-46bc-88ec-c7f7fe30efa6
      type: similar
    - id: 02030f2f-6199-49ec-b258-ea71b07e03dc
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=2921
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/tree/master/PowerSharpBinaries
    - https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Invoke-ZeroLogon/blob/111d17c7fec486d9bb23387e2e828b09a26075e4/Invoke-ZeroLogon.ps1
    - https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/848c919bfce4e2d67b626cbcf4404341cfe3d3b6/Get-DXWebcamVideo.ps1
    - https://github.com/rvrsh3ll/Misc-Powershell-Scripts/blob/6f23bb41f9675d7e2d32bacccff75e931ae00554/OfficeMemScraper.ps1
    - https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray/blob/b13d64a5834694aa73fd2aea9911a83027c465a7/DomainPasswordSpray.ps1
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-assessment-black-basta-ransomware/ # Invoke-TotalExec
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/06/06/shining-the-light-on-black-basta/ # Invoke-TotalExec
    - https://github.com/calebstewart/CVE-2021-1675 # Invoke-Nightmare
    - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/blob/0927441f67161cc6dc08a53c63ceb8e333f55874/Collectors/AzureHound.ps1
    - https://bloodhound.readthedocs.io/en/latest/data-collection/azurehound.html
    - https://github.com/HarmJ0y/DAMP
    - https://github.com/samratashok/nishang
    - https://github.com/DarkCoderSc/PowerRunAsSystem/
    - https://github.com/besimorhino/powercat
    - https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Powermad
    - https://github.com/adrecon/ADRecon
    - https://github.com/adrecon/AzureADRecon
    - https://github.com/sadshade/veeam-creds/blob/6010eaf31ba41011b58d6af3950cffbf6f5cea32/Veeam-Get-Creds.ps1
    - https://github.com/The-Viper-One/Invoke-PowerDPAPI/
    - https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-20
modified: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.t1087.001
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1069.001
    - attack.t1069.002
    - attack.t1069
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection:
        Payload|contains:
            # Note: Please ensure alphabetical order when adding new entries
            - 'Add-Exfiltration'
            - 'Add-Persistence'
            - 'Add-RegBackdoor'
            - 'Add-RemoteRegBackdoor'
            - 'Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor'
            - 'BadSuccessor'
            - 'Check-VM'
            - 'ConvertTo-Rc4ByteStream'
            - 'Decrypt-Hash'
            - 'Disable-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Disable-MachineAccount'
            - 'Do-Exfiltration'
            - 'Enable-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Enable-MachineAccount'
            - 'Enabled-DuplicateToken'
            - 'Exploit-Jboss'
            - 'Export-ADR' # # ADRecon related cmdlets
            - 'Export-ADRCSV' # # ADRecon related cmdlets
            - 'Export-ADRExcel' # # ADRecon related cmdlets
            - 'Export-ADRHTML' # # ADRecon related cmdlets
            - 'Export-ADRJSON' # # ADRecon related cmdlets
            - 'Export-ADRXML' # # ADRecon related cmdlets
            - 'Find-Fruit'
            - 'Find-GPOLocation'
            - 'Find-TrustedDocuments'
            - 'Get-ADIDNS' # Covers: Get-ADIDNSNodeAttribute, Get-ADIDNSNodeOwner, Get-ADIDNSNodeTombstoned, Get-ADIDNSPermission, Get-ADIDNSZone
            - 'Get-ApplicationHost'
            - 'Get-ChromeDump'
            - 'Get-ClipboardContents'
            - 'Get-FoxDump'
            - 'Get-GPPPassword'
            - 'Get-IndexedItem'
            - 'Get-KerberosAESKey'
            - 'Get-Keystrokes'
            - 'Get-LSASecret'
            - 'Get-MachineAccountAttribute'
            - 'Get-MachineAccountCreator'
            - 'Get-PassHashes'
            - 'Get-RegAlwaysInstallElevated'
            - 'Get-RegAutoLogon'
            - 'Get-RemoteBootKey'
            - 'Get-RemoteCachedCredential'
            - 'Get-RemoteLocalAccountHash'
            - 'Get-RemoteLSAKey'
            - 'Get-RemoteMachineAccountHash'
            - 'Get-RemoteNLKMKey'
            - 'Get-RickAstley'
            - 'Get-Screenshot'
            - 'Get-SecurityPackages'
            - 'Get-ServiceFilePermission'
            - 'Get-ServicePermission'
            - 'Get-ServiceUnquoted'
            - 'Get-SiteListPassword'
            - 'Get-System'
            - 'Get-TimedScreenshot'
            - 'Get-UnattendedInstallFile'
            - 'Get-Unconstrained'
            - 'Get-USBKeystrokes'
            - 'Get-VaultCredential'
            - 'Get-VulnAutoRun'
            - 'Get-VulnSchTask'
            - 'Grant-ADIDNSPermission'
            - 'Gupt-Backdoor'
            - 'HTTP-Login'
            - 'Install-ServiceBinary'
            - 'Install-SSP'
            - 'Invoke-ACLScanner'
            - 'Invoke-ADRecon' # # ADRecon related cmdlets
            - 'Invoke-ADSBackdoor'
            - 'Invoke-AgentSmith'
            - 'Invoke-AllChecks'
            - 'Invoke-ARPScan'
            - 'Invoke-AzureHound'
            - 'Invoke-BackdoorLNK'
            - 'Invoke-BadPotato'
            - 'Invoke-BetterSafetyKatz'
            - 'Invoke-BypassUAC'
            - 'Invoke-Carbuncle'
            - 'Invoke-Certify'
            - 'Invoke-ConPtyShell'
            - 'Invoke-CredentialInjection'
            - 'Invoke-DAFT'
            - 'Invoke-DCSync'
            - 'Invoke-DinvokeKatz'
            - 'Invoke-DllInjection'
            - 'Invoke-DNSUpdate'
            - 'Invoke-DNSExfiltrator'
            - 'Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray'
            - 'Invoke-DowngradeAccount'
            - 'Invoke-EgressCheck'
            - 'Invoke-Eyewitness'
            - 'Invoke-FakeLogonScreen'
            - 'Invoke-Farmer'
            - 'Invoke-Get-RBCD-Threaded'
            - 'Invoke-Gopher'
            - 'Invoke-Grouper' # Also Covers Invoke-GrouperX
            - 'Invoke-HandleKatz'
            - 'Invoke-ImpersonatedProcess'
            - 'Invoke-ImpersonateSystem'
            - 'Invoke-InteractiveSystemPowerShell'
            - 'Invoke-Internalmonologue'
            - 'Invoke-Inveigh'
            - 'Invoke-InveighRelay'
            - 'Invoke-KrbRelay'
            - 'Invoke-LdapSignCheck'
            - 'Invoke-Lockless'
            - 'Invoke-MalSCCM'
            - 'Invoke-Mimikatz'
            - 'Invoke-Mimikittenz'
            - 'Invoke-MITM6'
            - 'Invoke-NanoDump'
            - 'Invoke-NetRipper'
            - 'Invoke-Nightmare'
            - 'Invoke-NinjaCopy'
            - 'Invoke-OfficeScrape'
            - 'Invoke-OxidResolver'
            - 'Invoke-P0wnedshell'
            - 'Invoke-Paranoia'
            - 'Invoke-PortScan'
            - 'Invoke-PoshRatHttp' # Also Covers Invoke-PoshRatHttps
            - 'Invoke-PostExfil'
            - 'Invoke-PowerDump'
            - 'Invoke-PowerDPAPI'
            - 'Invoke-PowerShellTCP'
            - 'Invoke-PowerShellWMI'
            - 'Invoke-PPLDump'
            - 'Invoke-PsExec'
            - 'Invoke-PSInject'
            - 'Invoke-PsUaCme'
            - 'Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection'
            - 'Invoke-ReverseDNSLookup'
            - 'Invoke-Rubeus'
            - 'Invoke-RunAs'
            - 'Invoke-SafetyKatz'
            - 'Invoke-SauronEye'
            - 'Invoke-SCShell'
            - 'Invoke-Seatbelt'
            - 'Invoke-ServiceAbuse'
            - 'Invoke-ShadowSpray'
            - 'Invoke-Sharp' # Covers all "Invoke-Sharp" variants
            - 'Invoke-Shellcode'
            - 'Invoke-SMBScanner'
            - 'Invoke-Snaffler'
            - 'Invoke-Spoolsample'
            - 'Invoke-SpraySinglePassword'
            - 'Invoke-SSHCommand'
            - 'Invoke-StandIn'
            - 'Invoke-StickyNotesExtract'
            - 'Invoke-SystemCommand'
            - 'Invoke-Tasksbackdoor'
            - 'Invoke-Tater'
            - 'Invoke-Thunderfox'
            - 'Invoke-ThunderStruck'
            - 'Invoke-TokenManipulation'
            - 'Invoke-Tokenvator'
            - 'Invoke-TotalExec'
            - 'Invoke-UrbanBishop'
            - 'Invoke-UserHunter'
            - 'Invoke-VoiceTroll'
            - 'Invoke-Whisker'
            - 'Invoke-WinEnum'
            - 'Invoke-winPEAS'
            - 'Invoke-WireTap'
            - 'Invoke-WmiCommand'
            - 'Invoke-WMIExec'
            - 'Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC'
            - 'Invoke-Zerologon'
            - 'MailRaider'
            - 'New-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'New-DNSRecordArray'
            - 'New-HoneyHash'
            - 'New-InMemoryModule'
            - 'New-MachineAccount'
            - 'New-SOASerialNumberArray'
            - 'Out-Minidump'
            - 'Port-Scan'
            - 'PowerBreach'
            - 'powercat '
            - 'PowerUp'
            - 'PowerView'
            - 'Remove-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Remove-MachineAccount'
            - 'Remove-Update'
            - 'Rename-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Revoke-ADIDNSPermission'
            - 'Set-ADIDNSNode' # Covers: Set-ADIDNSNodeAttribute, Set-ADIDNSNodeOwner
            - 'Set-MacAttribute'
            - 'Set-MachineAccountAttribute'
            - 'Set-Wallpaper'
            - 'Show-TargetScreen'
            - 'Start-CaptureServer'
            - 'Start-Dnscat2'
            - 'Start-WebcamRecorder'
            - 'Veeam-Get-Creds'
            - 'VolumeShadowCopyTools'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ScriptBlock
Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
status test author Sean Metcalf, Florian Roth, Bartlomiej Czyz @bczyz1, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Tim Shelton, Mustafa Kaan Demir, Georg Lauenstein, Max Altgelt, Tobias Michalski, Austin Songer id 89819aa4-bbd6-46bc-88ec-c7f7fe30efa6 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ScriptBlock
id: 89819aa4-bbd6-46bc-88ec-c7f7fe30efa6
related:
    - id: 7d0d0329-0ef1-4e84-a9f5-49500f9d7c6c
      type: similar
    - id: 02030f2f-6199-49ec-b258-ea71b07e03dc
      type: similar
    - id: 6d3f1399-a81c-4409-aff3-1ecfe9330baf
      type: obsolete
    - id: 83083ac6-1816-4e76-97d7-59af9a9ae46e
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=2921
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/tree/master/PowerSharpBinaries
    - https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Invoke-ZeroLogon/blob/111d17c7fec486d9bb23387e2e828b09a26075e4/Invoke-ZeroLogon.ps1
    - https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/848c919bfce4e2d67b626cbcf4404341cfe3d3b6/Get-DXWebcamVideo.ps1
    - https://github.com/rvrsh3ll/Misc-Powershell-Scripts/blob/6f23bb41f9675d7e2d32bacccff75e931ae00554/OfficeMemScraper.ps1
    - https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray/blob/b13d64a5834694aa73fd2aea9911a83027c465a7/DomainPasswordSpray.ps1
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-assessment-black-basta-ransomware/ # Invoke-TotalExec
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/06/06/shining-the-light-on-black-basta/ # Invoke-TotalExec
    - https://github.com/calebstewart/CVE-2021-1675 # Invoke-Nightmare
    - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/blob/0927441f67161cc6dc08a53c63ceb8e333f55874/Collectors/AzureHound.ps1
    - https://bloodhound.readthedocs.io/en/latest/data-collection/azurehound.html
    - https://github.com/HarmJ0y/DAMP
    - https://github.com/samratashok/nishang
    - https://github.com/DarkCoderSc/PowerRunAsSystem/
    - https://github.com/besimorhino/powercat
    - https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Powermad
    - https://github.com/adrecon/ADRecon
    - https://github.com/adrecon/AzureADRecon
    - https://github.com/The-Viper-One/Invoke-PowerDPAPI/
    - https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator/
author: Sean Metcalf, Florian Roth, Bartlomiej Czyz @bczyz1, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Tim Shelton, Mustafa Kaan Demir, Georg Lauenstein, Max Altgelt, Tobias Michalski, Austin Songer
date: 2017-03-05
modified: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.t1087.001
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1069.001
    - attack.t1069.002
    - attack.t1069
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            # Note: Please ensure alphabetical order when adding new entries
            - 'Add-Exfiltration'
            - 'Add-Persistence'
            - 'Add-RegBackdoor'
            - 'Add-RemoteRegBackdoor'
            - 'Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor'
            - 'ConvertTo-Rc4ByteStream'
            - 'Decrypt-Hash'
            - 'Disable-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Do-Exfiltration'
            - 'Enable-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Enabled-DuplicateToken'
            - 'Exploit-Jboss'
            - 'Export-ADRCSV'
            - 'Export-ADRExcel'
            - 'Export-ADRHTML'
            - 'Export-ADRJSON'
            - 'Export-ADRXML'
            - 'Find-Fruit'
            - 'Find-GPOLocation'
            - 'Find-TrustedDocuments'
            - 'Get-ADIDNSNodeAttribute'
            - 'Get-ADIDNSNodeOwner'
            - 'Get-ADIDNSNodeTombstoned'
            - 'Get-ADIDNSPermission'
            - 'Get-ADIDNSZone'
            - 'Get-ChromeDump'
            - 'Get-ClipboardContents'
            - 'Get-FoxDump'
            - 'Get-GPPPassword'
            - 'Get-IndexedItem'
            - 'Get-KerberosAESKey'
            - 'Get-Keystrokes'
            - 'Get-LSASecret'
            - 'Get-PassHashes'
            - 'Get-RegAlwaysInstallElevated'
            - 'Get-RegAutoLogon'
            - 'Get-RemoteBootKey'
            - 'Get-RemoteCachedCredential'
            - 'Get-RemoteLocalAccountHash'
            - 'Get-RemoteLSAKey'
            - 'Get-RemoteMachineAccountHash'
            - 'Get-RemoteNLKMKey'
            - 'Get-RickAstley'
            - 'Get-SecurityPackages'
            - 'Get-ServiceFilePermission'
            - 'Get-ServicePermission'
            - 'Get-ServiceUnquoted'
            - 'Get-SiteListPassword'
            - 'Get-System'
            - 'Get-TimedScreenshot'
            - 'Get-UnattendedInstallFile'
            - 'Get-Unconstrained'
            - 'Get-USBKeystrokes'
            - 'Get-VaultCredential'
            - 'Get-VulnAutoRun'
            - 'Get-VulnSchTask'
            - 'Grant-ADIDNSPermission'
            - 'Gupt-Backdoor'
            - 'Invoke-ACLScanner'
            - 'Invoke-ADRecon'
            - 'Invoke-ADSBackdoor'
            - 'Invoke-AgentSmith'
            - 'Invoke-AllChecks'
            - 'Invoke-ARPScan'
            - 'Invoke-AzureHound'
            - 'Invoke-BackdoorLNK'
            - 'Invoke-BadPotato'
            - 'Invoke-BetterSafetyKatz'
            - 'Invoke-BypassUAC'
            - 'Invoke-Carbuncle'
            - 'Invoke-Certify'
            - 'Invoke-ConPtyShell'
            - 'Invoke-CredentialInjection'
            - 'Invoke-DAFT'
            - 'Invoke-DCSync'
            - 'Invoke-DinvokeKatz'
            - 'Invoke-DllInjection'
            - 'Invoke-DNSUpdate'
            - 'Invoke-DNSExfiltrator'
            - 'Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray'
            - 'Invoke-DowngradeAccount'
            - 'Invoke-EgressCheck'
            - 'Invoke-Eyewitness'
            - 'Invoke-FakeLogonScreen'
            - 'Invoke-Farmer'
            - 'Invoke-Get-RBCD-Threaded'
            - 'Invoke-Gopher'
            - 'Invoke-Grouper' # Also Covers Invoke-GrouperX
            - 'Invoke-HandleKatz'
            - 'Invoke-ImpersonatedProcess'
            - 'Invoke-ImpersonateSystem'
            - 'Invoke-InteractiveSystemPowerShell'
            - 'Invoke-Internalmonologue'
            - 'Invoke-Inveigh'
            - 'Invoke-InveighRelay'
            - 'Invoke-KrbRelay'
            - 'Invoke-LdapSignCheck'
            - 'Invoke-Lockless'
            - 'Invoke-MalSCCM'
            - 'Invoke-Mimikatz'
            - 'Invoke-Mimikittenz'
            - 'Invoke-MITM6'
            - 'Invoke-NanoDump'
            - 'Invoke-NetRipper'
            - 'Invoke-Nightmare'
            - 'Invoke-NinjaCopy'
            - 'Invoke-OfficeScrape'
            - 'Invoke-OxidResolver'
            - 'Invoke-P0wnedshell'
            - 'Invoke-Paranoia'
            - 'Invoke-PortScan'
            - 'Invoke-PoshRatHttp' # Also Covers Invoke-PoshRatHttps
            - 'Invoke-PostExfil'
            - 'Invoke-PowerDump'
            - 'Invoke-PowerDPAPI'
            - 'Invoke-PowerShellTCP'
            - 'Invoke-PowerShellWMI'
            - 'Invoke-PPLDump'
            - 'Invoke-PsExec'
            - 'Invoke-PSInject'
            - 'Invoke-PsUaCme'
            - 'Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection'
            - 'Invoke-ReverseDNSLookup'
            - 'Invoke-Rubeus'
            - 'Invoke-RunAs'
            - 'Invoke-SafetyKatz'
            - 'Invoke-SauronEye'
            - 'Invoke-SCShell'
            - 'Invoke-Seatbelt'
            - 'Invoke-ServiceAbuse'
            - 'Invoke-ShadowSpray'
            - 'Invoke-Sharp' # Covers all "Invoke-Sharp" variants
            - 'Invoke-Shellcode'
            - 'Invoke-SMBScanner'
            - 'Invoke-Snaffler'
            - 'Invoke-Spoolsample'
            - 'Invoke-SpraySinglePassword'
            - 'Invoke-SSHCommand'
            - 'Invoke-StandIn'
            - 'Invoke-StickyNotesExtract'
            - 'Invoke-SystemCommand'
            - 'Invoke-Tasksbackdoor'
            - 'Invoke-Tater'
            - 'Invoke-Thunderfox'
            - 'Invoke-ThunderStruck'
            - 'Invoke-TokenManipulation'
            - 'Invoke-Tokenvator'
            - 'Invoke-TotalExec'
            - 'Invoke-UrbanBishop'
            - 'Invoke-UserHunter'
            - 'Invoke-VoiceTroll'
            - 'Invoke-Whisker'
            - 'Invoke-WinEnum'
            - 'Invoke-winPEAS'
            - 'Invoke-WireTap'
            - 'Invoke-WmiCommand'
            - 'Invoke-WMIExec'
            - 'Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC'
            - 'Invoke-Zerologon'
            - 'MailRaider'
            - 'New-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'New-HoneyHash'
            - 'New-InMemoryModule'
            - 'New-SOASerialNumberArray'
            - 'Out-Minidump'
            - 'PowerBreach'
            - 'powercat '
            - 'PowerUp'
            - 'PowerView'
            - 'Remove-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Remove-Update'
            - 'Rename-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Revoke-ADIDNSPermission'
            - 'Set-ADIDNSNode' # Covers: Set-ADIDNSNodeAttribute, Set-ADIDNSNodeOwner
            - 'Show-TargetScreen'
            - 'Start-CaptureServer'
            - 'Start-Dnscat2'
            - 'Start-WebcamRecorder'
            - 'VolumeShadowCopyTools'
            # - 'Check-VM'
            # - 'Disable-MachineAccount'
            # - 'Enable-MachineAccount'
            # - 'Get-ApplicationHost'
            # - 'Get-MachineAccountAttribute'
            # - 'Get-MachineAccountCreator'
            # - 'Get-Screenshot'
            # - 'HTTP-Login'
            # - 'Install-ServiceBinary'
            # - 'Install-SSP'
            # - 'New-DNSRecordArray'
            # - 'New-MachineAccount'
            # - 'Port-Scan'
            # - 'Remove-MachineAccount'
            # - 'Set-MacAttribute'
            # - 'Set-MachineAccountAttribute'
            # - 'Set-Wallpaper'
    filter_optional_amazon_ec2:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - Get-SystemDriveInfo  # http://bheltborg.dk/Windows/WinSxS/amd64_microsoft-windows-maintenancediagnostic_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.10240.16384_none_91ef7543a4514b5e/CL_Utility.ps1
            - C:\ProgramData\Amazon\EC2-Windows\Launch\Module\  # false positive form Amazon EC2
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ProcessCreation
Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 02030f2f-6199-49ec-b258-ea71b07e03dc license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ProcessCreation
id: 02030f2f-6199-49ec-b258-ea71b07e03dc
related:
    - id: 89819aa4-bbd6-46bc-88ec-c7f7fe30efa6
      type: derived
    - id: 7d0d0329-0ef1-4e84-a9f5-49500f9d7c6c
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=2921
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/tree/master/PowerSharpBinaries
    - https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Invoke-ZeroLogon/blob/111d17c7fec486d9bb23387e2e828b09a26075e4/Invoke-ZeroLogon.ps1
    - https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/848c919bfce4e2d67b626cbcf4404341cfe3d3b6/Get-DXWebcamVideo.ps1
    - https://github.com/rvrsh3ll/Misc-Powershell-Scripts/blob/6f23bb41f9675d7e2d32bacccff75e931ae00554/OfficeMemScraper.ps1
    - https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray/blob/b13d64a5834694aa73fd2aea9911a83027c465a7/DomainPasswordSpray.ps1
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-assessment-black-basta-ransomware/ # Invoke-TotalExec
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/06/06/shining-the-light-on-black-basta/ # Invoke-TotalExec
    - https://github.com/calebstewart/CVE-2021-1675 # Invoke-Nightmare
    - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/blob/0927441f67161cc6dc08a53c63ceb8e333f55874/Collectors/AzureHound.ps1
    - https://bloodhound.readthedocs.io/en/latest/data-collection/azurehound.html
    - https://github.com/HarmJ0y/DAMP
    - https://github.com/samratashok/nishang
    - https://github.com/DarkCoderSc/PowerRunAsSystem/
    - https://github.com/besimorhino/powercat
    - https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Powermad
    - https://github.com/adrecon/ADRecon
    - https://github.com/adrecon/AzureADRecon
    - https://github.com/sadshade/veeam-creds/blob/6010eaf31ba41011b58d6af3950cffbf6f5cea32/Veeam-Get-Creds.ps1
    - https://github.com/The-Viper-One/Invoke-PowerDPAPI/
    - https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-02
modified: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.t1087.001
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1069.001
    - attack.t1069.002
    - attack.t1069
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Note: Please ensure alphabetical order when adding new entries
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Add-Exfiltration'
            - 'Add-Persistence'
            - 'Add-RegBackdoor'
            - 'Add-RemoteRegBackdoor'
            - 'Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor'
            - 'Check-VM'
            - 'ConvertTo-Rc4ByteStream'
            - 'Decrypt-Hash'
            - 'Disable-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Disable-MachineAccount'
            - 'Do-Exfiltration'
            - 'Enable-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Enable-MachineAccount'
            - 'Enabled-DuplicateToken'
            - 'Exploit-Jboss'
            - 'Export-ADR'
            - 'Export-ADRCSV'
            - 'Export-ADRExcel'
            - 'Export-ADRHTML'
            - 'Export-ADRJSON'
            - 'Export-ADRXML'
            - 'Find-Fruit'
            - 'Find-GPOLocation'
            - 'Find-TrustedDocuments'
            - 'Get-ADIDNS' # Covers: Get-ADIDNSNodeAttribute, Get-ADIDNSNodeOwner, Get-ADIDNSNodeTombstoned, Get-ADIDNSPermission, Get-ADIDNSZone
            - 'Get-ApplicationHost'
            - 'Get-ChromeDump'
            - 'Get-ClipboardContents'
            - 'Get-FoxDump'
            - 'Get-GPPPassword'
            - 'Get-IndexedItem'
            - 'Get-KerberosAESKey'
            - 'Get-Keystrokes'
            - 'Get-LSASecret'
            - 'Get-MachineAccountAttribute'
            - 'Get-MachineAccountCreator'
            - 'Get-PassHashes'
            - 'Get-RegAlwaysInstallElevated'
            - 'Get-RegAutoLogon'
            - 'Get-RemoteBootKey'
            - 'Get-RemoteCachedCredential'
            - 'Get-RemoteLocalAccountHash'
            - 'Get-RemoteLSAKey'
            - 'Get-RemoteMachineAccountHash'
            - 'Get-RemoteNLKMKey'
            - 'Get-RickAstley'
            - 'Get-Screenshot'
            - 'Get-SecurityPackages'
            - 'Get-ServiceFilePermission'
            - 'Get-ServicePermission'
            - 'Get-ServiceUnquoted'
            - 'Get-SiteListPassword'
            - 'Get-System'
            - 'Get-TimedScreenshot'
            - 'Get-UnattendedInstallFile'
            - 'Get-Unconstrained'
            - 'Get-USBKeystrokes'
            - 'Get-VaultCredential'
            - 'Get-VulnAutoRun'
            - 'Get-VulnSchTask'
            - 'Grant-ADIDNSPermission'
            - 'Gupt-Backdoor'
            - 'HTTP-Login'
            - 'Install-ServiceBinary'
            - 'Install-SSP'
            - 'Invoke-ACLScanner'
            - 'Invoke-ADRecon'
            - 'Invoke-ADSBackdoor'
            - 'Invoke-AgentSmith'
            - 'Invoke-AllChecks'
            - 'Invoke-ARPScan'
            - 'Invoke-AzureHound'
            - 'Invoke-BackdoorLNK'
            - 'Invoke-BadPotato'
            - 'Invoke-BetterSafetyKatz'
            - 'Invoke-BypassUAC'
            - 'Invoke-Carbuncle'
            - 'Invoke-Certify'
            - 'Invoke-ConPtyShell'
            - 'Invoke-CredentialInjection'
            - 'Invoke-DAFT'
            - 'Invoke-DCSync'
            - 'Invoke-DinvokeKatz'
            - 'Invoke-DllInjection'
            - 'Invoke-DNSUpdate'
            - 'Invoke-DNSExfiltrator'
            - 'Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray'
            - 'Invoke-DowngradeAccount'
            - 'Invoke-EgressCheck'
            - 'Invoke-Eyewitness'
            - 'Invoke-FakeLogonScreen'
            - 'Invoke-Farmer'
            - 'Invoke-Get-RBCD-Threaded'
            - 'Invoke-Gopher'
            - 'Invoke-Grouper' # Also Covers Invoke-GrouperX
            - 'Invoke-HandleKatz'
            - 'Invoke-ImpersonatedProcess'
            - 'Invoke-ImpersonateSystem'
            - 'Invoke-InteractiveSystemPowerShell'
            - 'Invoke-Internalmonologue'
            - 'Invoke-Inveigh'
            - 'Invoke-InveighRelay'
            - 'Invoke-KrbRelay'
            - 'Invoke-LdapSignCheck'
            - 'Invoke-Lockless'
            - 'Invoke-MalSCCM'
            - 'Invoke-Mimikatz'
            - 'Invoke-Mimikittenz'
            - 'Invoke-MITM6'
            - 'Invoke-NanoDump'
            - 'Invoke-NetRipper'
            - 'Invoke-Nightmare'
            - 'Invoke-NinjaCopy'
            - 'Invoke-OfficeScrape'
            - 'Invoke-OxidResolver'
            - 'Invoke-P0wnedshell'
            - 'Invoke-Paranoia'
            - 'Invoke-PortScan'
            - 'Invoke-PoshRatHttp' # Also Covers Invoke-PoshRatHttps
            - 'Invoke-PostExfil'
            - 'Invoke-PowerDump'
            - 'Invoke-PowerDPAPI'
            - 'Invoke-PowerShellTCP'
            - 'Invoke-PowerShellWMI'
            - 'Invoke-PPLDump'
            - 'Invoke-PsExec'
            - 'Invoke-PSInject'
            - 'Invoke-PsUaCme'
            - 'Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection'
            - 'Invoke-ReverseDNSLookup'
            - 'Invoke-Rubeus'
            - 'Invoke-RunAs'
            - 'Invoke-SafetyKatz'
            - 'Invoke-SauronEye'
            - 'Invoke-SCShell'
            - 'Invoke-Seatbelt'
            - 'Invoke-ServiceAbuse'
            - 'Invoke-ShadowSpray'
            - 'Invoke-Sharp' # Covers all "Invoke-Sharp" variants
            - 'Invoke-Shellcode'
            - 'Invoke-SMBScanner'
            - 'Invoke-Snaffler'
            - 'Invoke-Spoolsample'
            - 'Invoke-SpraySinglePassword'
            - 'Invoke-SSHCommand'
            - 'Invoke-StandIn'
            - 'Invoke-StickyNotesExtract'
            - 'Invoke-SystemCommand'
            - 'Invoke-Tasksbackdoor'
            - 'Invoke-Tater'
            - 'Invoke-Thunderfox'
            - 'Invoke-ThunderStruck'
            - 'Invoke-TokenManipulation'
            - 'Invoke-Tokenvator'
            - 'Invoke-TotalExec'
            - 'Invoke-UrbanBishop'
            - 'Invoke-UserHunter'
            - 'Invoke-VoiceTroll'
            - 'Invoke-Whisker'
            - 'Invoke-WinEnum'
            - 'Invoke-winPEAS'
            - 'Invoke-WireTap'
            - 'Invoke-WmiCommand'
            - 'Invoke-WMIExec'
            - 'Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC'
            - 'Invoke-Zerologon'
            - 'MailRaider'
            - 'New-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'New-DNSRecordArray'
            - 'New-HoneyHash'
            - 'New-InMemoryModule'
            - 'New-MachineAccount'
            - 'New-SOASerialNumberArray'
            - 'Out-Minidump'
            - 'Port-Scan'
            - 'PowerBreach'
            - 'powercat '
            - 'PowerUp'
            - 'PowerView'
            - 'Remove-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Remove-MachineAccount'
            - 'Remove-Update'
            - 'Rename-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Revoke-ADIDNSPermission'
            - 'Set-ADIDNSNode' # Covers: Set-ADIDNSNodeAttribute, Set-ADIDNSNodeOwner
            - 'Set-MacAttribute'
            - 'Set-MachineAccountAttribute'
            - 'Set-Wallpaper'
            - 'Show-TargetScreen'
            - 'Start-CaptureServer'
            - 'Start-Dnscat2'
            - 'Start-WebcamRecorder'
            - 'Veeam-Get-Creds'
            - 'VolumeShadowCopyTools'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
HackTool - SOAPHound Execution
Detects the execution of SOAPHound, a .NET tool for collecting Active Directory data, using specific command-line arguments that may indicate an attempt to extract sensitive AD information.
status test author @kostastsale id e92a4287-e072-4a40-9739-370c106bb750 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - SOAPHound Execution
id: e92a4287-e072-4a40-9739-370c106bb750
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of SOAPHound, a .NET tool for collecting Active Directory data, using specific command-line arguments that may indicate an attempt to extract sensitive AD information.
references:
    - https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
    - https://medium.com/falconforce/soaphound-tool-to-collect-active-directory-data-via-adws-165aca78288c
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2024-01-26
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' --buildcache '
            - ' --bhdump '
            - ' --certdump '
            - ' --dnsdump '
    selection_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -c '
            - ' --cachefilename '
            - ' -o '
            - ' --outputdirectory'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
OpenCanary - HTTPPROXY Login Attempt
Detects instances where an HTTPPROXY service on an OpenCanary node has had an attempt to proxy another page.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id 5498fc09-adc6-4804-b9d9-5cca1f0b8760 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - HTTPPROXY Login Attempt
id: 5498fc09-adc6-4804-b9d9-5cca1f0b8760
status: test
description: |
    Detects instances where an HTTPPROXY service on an OpenCanary node has had an attempt to proxy another page.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 7001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
related high
Malicious IP Address Sign-In Failure Rate
Indicates sign-in from a malicious IP address based on high failure rates.
status test author Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo' id a3f55ebd-0c01-4ed6-adc0-8fb76d8cd3cd license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Malicious IP Address Sign-In Failure Rate
id: a3f55ebd-0c01-4ed6-adc0-8fb76d8cd3cd
status: test
description: Indicates sign-in from a malicious IP address based on high failure rates.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#malicious-ip-address
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-07
tags:
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.command-and-control
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'maliciousIPAddress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high
related high
Malicious IP Address Sign-In Suspicious
Indicates sign-in from a malicious IP address known to be malicious at time of sign-in.
status test author Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo' id 36440e1c-5c22-467a-889b-593e66498472 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Malicious IP Address Sign-In Suspicious
id: 36440e1c-5c22-467a-889b-593e66498472
status: test
description: Indicates sign-in from a malicious IP address known to be malicious at time of sign-in.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#malicious-ip-address
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-07
tags:
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.command-and-control
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'suspiciousIPAddress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high
related high
Sign-In From Malware Infected IP
Indicates sign-ins from IP addresses infected with malware that is known to actively communicate with a bot server.
status test author Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo' id 821b4dc3-1295-41e7-b157-39ab212dd6bd license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Sign-In From Malware Infected IP
id: 821b4dc3-1295-41e7-b157-39ab212dd6bd
status: test
description: Indicates sign-ins from IP addresses infected with malware that is known to actively communicate with a bot server.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#malware-linked-ip-address-deprecated
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.command-and-control
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'malwareInfectedIPAddress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Using an IP address that is shared by many users
level: high
related high
Communication To LocaltoNet Tunneling Service Initiated - Linux
Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "LocaltoNet" tunneling sub-domains. LocaltoNet is a reverse proxy that enables localhost services to be exposed to the Internet. Attackers have been seen to use this service for command-and-control activities to bypass MFA and perimeter controls.
status test author Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io) id c4568f5d-131f-4e78-83d4-45b2da0ec4f1 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Communication To LocaltoNet Tunneling Service Initiated - Linux
id: c4568f5d-131f-4e78-83d4-45b2da0ec4f1
status: test
description: |
    Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "LocaltoNet" tunneling sub-domains.
    LocaltoNet is a reverse proxy that enables localhost services to be exposed to the Internet.
    Attackers have been seen to use this service for command-and-control activities to bypass MFA and perimeter controls.
references:
    - https://localtonet.com/documents/supported-tunnels
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc3944-targets-saas-applications
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2024-06-17
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1102
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.localto.net'
            - '.localtonet.com'
        Initiated: 'true'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the LocaltoNet service.
level: high
related high
Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service - Linux
Detects an executable accessing an ngrok tunneling endpoint, which could be a sign of forbidden exfiltration of data exfiltration by malicious actors
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 19bf6fdb-7721-4f3d-867f-53467f6a5db6 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service - Linux
id: 19bf6fdb-7721-4f3d-867f-53467f6a5db6
status: test
description: Detects an executable accessing an ngrok tunneling endpoint, which could be a sign of forbidden exfiltration of data exfiltration by malicious actors
references:
    - https://twitter.com/hakluke/status/1587733971814977537/photo/1
    - https://ngrok.com/docs/secure-tunnels/tunnels/ssh-reverse-tunnel-agent
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-03
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.t1568.002
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1102
    - attack.s0508
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: network_connection
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|contains:
            - 'tunnel.us.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.eu.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.ap.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.au.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.sa.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.jp.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.in.ngrok.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of ngrok
level: high
related high
Communication To LocaltoNet Tunneling Service Initiated
Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "LocaltoNet" tunneling sub-domains. LocaltoNet is a reverse proxy that enables localhost services to be exposed to the Internet. Attackers have been seen to use this service for command-and-control activities to bypass MFA and perimeter controls.
status test author Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io) id 3ab65069-d82a-4d44-a759-466661a082d1 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Communication To LocaltoNet Tunneling Service Initiated
id: 3ab65069-d82a-4d44-a759-466661a082d1
status: test
description: |
    Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "LocaltoNet" tunneling sub-domains.
    LocaltoNet is a reverse proxy that enables localhost services to be exposed to the Internet.
    Attackers have been seen to use this service for command-and-control activities to bypass MFA and perimeter controls.
references:
    - https://localtonet.com/documents/supported-tunnels
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc3944-targets-saas-applications
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2024-06-17
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1102
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.localto.net'
            - '.localtonet.com'
        Initiated: 'true'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the LocaltoNet service.
level: high
related high
Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service Initiated
Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" tunneling domains. Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware. While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download.
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service Initiated
id: 1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849
related:
    - id: 18249279-932f-45e2-b37a-8925f2597670
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" tunneling domains.
    Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware.
    While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/hakluke/status/1587733971814977537/photo/1
    - https://ngrok.com/docs/secure-tunnels/tunnels/ssh-reverse-tunnel-agent
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-03
modified: 2024-02-02
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.t1568.002
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1102
    - attack.s0508
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|contains:
            - 'tunnel.us.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.eu.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.ap.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.au.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.sa.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.jp.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.in.ngrok.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the ngrok service.
level: high
related high
RDP Port Forwarding Rule Added Via Netsh.EXE
Detects the execution of netsh to configure a port forwarding of port 3389 (RDP) rule
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community id 782d6f3e-4c5d-4b8c-92a3-1d05fed72e63 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: RDP Port Forwarding Rule Added Via Netsh.EXE
id: 782d6f3e-4c5d-4b8c-92a3-1d05fed72e63
status: test
description: Detects the execution of netsh to configure a port forwarding of port 3389 (RDP) rule
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community
date: 2019-01-29
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\netsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'netsh.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' i'
            - ' p'
            - '=3389'
            - ' c'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activity
level: high
related high
PUA - NPS Tunneling Tool Execution
Detects the use of NPS, a port forwarding and intranet penetration proxy server
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 68d37776-61db-42f5-bf54-27e87072d17e license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: PUA - NPS Tunneling Tool Execution
id: 68d37776-61db-42f5-bf54-27e87072d17e
status: test
description: Detects the use of NPS, a port forwarding and intranet penetration proxy server
references:
    - https://github.com/ehang-io/nps
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-08
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\npc.exe'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -server='
            - ' -vkey='
            - ' -password='
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -config=npc'
    selection_hashes:
        # v0.26.10
        Hashes|contains:
            - "MD5=AE8ACF66BFE3A44148964048B826D005"
            - "SHA1=CEA49E9B9B67F3A13AD0BE1C2655293EA3C18181"
            - "SHA256=5A456283392FFCEEEACA3D3426C306EB470304637520D72FED1CC1FEBBBD6856"
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use
level: high
related high
HackTool - Htran/NATBypass Execution
Detects executable names or flags used by Htran or Htran-like tools (e.g. NATBypass)
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id f5e3b62f-e577-4e59-931e-0a15b2b94e1e license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Htran/NATBypass Execution
id: f5e3b62f-e577-4e59-931e-0a15b2b94e1e
status: test
description: Detects executable names or flags used by Htran or Htran-like tools (e.g. NATBypass)
references:
    - https://github.com/HiwinCN/HTran
    - https://github.com/cw1997/NATBypass
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-27
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.s0040
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\htran.exe'
            - '\lcx.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.exe -tran '
            - '.exe -slave '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
PUA - Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) Execution
Detects the use of Fast Reverse Proxy. frp is a fast reverse proxy to help you expose a local server behind a NAT or firewall to the Internet.
status test author frack113, Florian Roth id 32410e29-5f94-4568-b6a3-d91a8adad863 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: PUA - Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) Execution
id: 32410e29-5f94-4568-b6a3-d91a8adad863
status: test
description: Detects the use of Fast Reverse Proxy. frp is a fast reverse proxy to help you expose a local server behind a NAT or firewall to the Internet.
references:
    - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/38156/
    - https://github.com/fatedier/frp
author: frack113, Florian Roth
date: 2022-09-02
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\frpc.exe'
            - '\frps.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '\frpc.ini'
    selection_hashes:
        # v0.44.0
        Hashes|contains:
            - "MD5=7D9C233B8C9E3F0EA290D2B84593C842"
            - "SHA1=06DDC9280E1F1810677935A2477012960905942F"
            - "SHA256=57B0936B8D336D8E981C169466A15A5FD21A7D5A2C7DAF62D5E142EE860E387C"
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use
level: high
related high
PUA- IOX Tunneling Tool Execution
Detects the use of IOX - a tool for port forwarding and intranet proxy purposes
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id d7654f02-e04b-4934-9838-65c46f187ebc license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: PUA- IOX Tunneling Tool Execution
id: d7654f02-e04b-4934-9838-65c46f187ebc
status: test
description: Detects the use of IOX - a tool for port forwarding and intranet proxy purposes
references:
    - https://github.com/EddieIvan01/iox
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-08
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\iox.exe'
    selection_commandline:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.exe fwd -l '
            - '.exe fwd -r '
            - '.exe proxy -l '
            - '.exe proxy -r '
    selection_hashes:
        # v0.4
        Hashes|contains:
            - "MD5=9DB2D314DD3F704A02051EF5EA210993"
            - "SHA1=039130337E28A6623ECF9A0A3DA7D92C5964D8DD"
            - "SHA256=C6CF82919B809967D9D90EA73772A8AA1C1EB3BC59252D977500F64F1A0D6731"
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use
level: high
related high
Ngrok Usage with Remote Desktop Service
Detects cases in which ngrok, a reverse proxy tool, forwards events to the local RDP port, which could be a sign of malicious behaviour
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 64d51a51-32a6-49f0-9f3d-17e34d640272 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Ngrok Usage with Remote Desktop Service
id: 64d51a51-32a6-49f0-9f3d-17e34d640272
status: test
description: Detects cases in which ngrok, a reverse proxy tool, forwards events to the local RDP port, which could be a sign of malicious behaviour
references:
    - https://twitter.com/tekdefense/status/1519711183162556416?s=12&t=OTsHCBkQOTNs1k3USz65Zg
    - https://ngrok.com/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-29
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: terminalservices-localsessionmanager
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 21
        Address|contains: '16777216'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
HackTool - SharpChisel Execution
Detects usage of the Sharp Chisel via the commandline arguments
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - SharpChisel Execution
id: cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf
related:
    - id: 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Sharp Chisel via the commandline arguments
references:
    - https://github.com/shantanu561993/SharpChisel
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/wading-through-muddy-waters-recent-activity-of-an-iranian-state-sponsored-threat-actor/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-05
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpChisel.exe'
        - Product: 'SharpChisel'
    # See rule 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5 for Chisel.exe coverage
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
related high
Renamed Cloudflared.EXE Execution
Detects the execution of a renamed "cloudflared" binary.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id e0c69ebd-b54f-4aed-8ae3-e3467843f3f0 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Renamed Cloudflared.EXE Execution
id: e0c69ebd-b54f-4aed-8ae3-e3467843f3f0
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed "cloudflared" binary.
references:
    - https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared/releases
    - https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-networks/do-more-with-tunnels/trycloudflare/
    - https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared
    - https://www.intrinsec.com/akira_ransomware/
    - https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/tunnel-vision-cloudflared-abused-in-the-wild/
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.001
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-12-20
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cleanup:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' tunnel '
            - 'cleanup '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-config '
            - '-connector-id '
    selection_tunnel:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' tunnel '
            - ' run '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-config '
            - '-credentials-contents '
            - '-credentials-file '
            - '-token '
    selection_accountless:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-url'
            - 'tunnel'
    selection_hashes:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'SHA256=2fb6c04c4f95fb8d158af94c137f90ac820716deaf88d8ebec956254e046cb29'
            - 'SHA256=b3d21940a10fdef5e415ad70331ce257c24fe3bcf7722262302e0421791f87e8'
            - 'SHA256=1fbd8362b2d2d2e6a5750ae3db69cd1815e6c1d31da48a98b796450971a8e039'
            - 'SHA256=0409c9b12f9d0eda86e461ed9bdabeefb00172b26322079681a0bdf48e68dc28'
            - 'SHA256=7cfb411d04bac42ef93d1f0c93c0a481e38c6f4612b97ae89d4702595988edc7'
            - 'SHA256=5b3c2d846ab162dc6bc595cce3a49de5731afde5d6060be7066d21b013a28373'
            - 'SHA256=ce95df7f69664c3df19b76028e115931919a71517b776da7b42d353e2ff4a670'
            - 'SHA256=1293525a19cfe3bc8296b62fbfe19f083632ed644a1c18c10b045a1d3030d81a'
            - 'SHA256=af2b9161cfcb654b16408cd6b098afe9d1fb61a037d18d7090a119d4c0c8e0f0'
            - 'SHA256=39ddceb56a15798826a5fc4892fa2b474c444bb4d7a8bf2fa95e41cab10fa7a1'
            - 'SHA256=ccd11f2328023a0e7929e845d5b6e7bc783fb4650d65faef3ae090239d4bbce2'
            - 'SHA256=b6e5c5d2567ae8c69cc012ebcae30e6c9b5359d64a58d17ba75ec89f8bce71ac'
            - 'SHA256=f813484ea441404f18caad96f28138e8aaf0cb256163c09c2ab8a3acab87f69f'
            - 'SHA256=fc4a0802ab9c7409b892ca00636bec61e2acfc911bccfdeb9978b8ab5a2f828d'
            - 'SHA256=083150724b49604c8765c1ba19541fa260b133be0acb0647fcd936d81f054499'
            - 'SHA256=44303d6572956f28a0f2e4b188934fb9874f2584f5c81fa431a463cfbf28083b'
            - 'SHA256=5d38c46032a58e28ae5f7d174d8761ec3d64d186677f3ec53af5f51afb9bfd2f'
            - 'SHA256=e1e70fa42059911bc6685fafef957f9a73fc66f214d0704a9b932683a5204032'
            - 'SHA256=c01356092a365b84f84f0e66870bd1a05ba3feb53cafd973fa5fea2534bee234'
            - 'SHA256=b3f9c06151e30ee43d39e788a79cd918a314f24e04fe87f3de8272a2057b624f'
            - 'SHA256=cd81b2792f0739f473c31c9cb7cf2313154bfa28b839975802b90e8790bb5058'
            - 'SHA256=9ec7e6c8e1bfd883663d8d9d62c9e4f9ae373b731407181e32491b27a7218a2c'
            - 'SHA256=c2cfd23fdc6c0e1b1ffa0e545cbe556f18d11b362b4a89ba0713f6ab01c4827f'
            - 'SHA256=53f8adbd76c0eb16f5e43cadde422474d8a06f9c8f959389c1930042ad8beaa5'
            - 'SHA256=648c8d2f8001c113d2986dd00b7bbd181593d462bef73522cee212c4f71f95b3'
            - 'SHA256=ae047e2095e46c3f9c518b2be67ec753f4f0aad23b261a361fcb6144dcdb63b4'
            - 'SHA256=3153d2baa462978dd22ab33d1c2274ecc88c200225d6a3327f98d5b752d08f5c'
            - 'SHA256=f49cde976e628012c9db73e1c8d76081944ecf2297cdafeb78bb13290da274c4'
            - 'SHA256=d2513e58bb03ccc83affde685c6ef987924c37ce6707d8e9857e2524b0d7e90f'
            - 'SHA256=bb67c7623ba92fe64ffd9816b8d5b3b1ea3013960a30bd4cf6e295b3eb5b1bad'
            - 'SHA256=b34b3c3a91e3165d1481f0b3ec23eab93a1cfba94345a6cbfe5b18ddbd48eac7'
            - 'SHA256=f7848034e010d55f15e474ca998f96391e320ff29b00cfcc4c5e536529703e75'
            - 'SHA256=b6fc9493778cbe3bfc062d73f5cc604bc0ff058bc5e5dc6aac87f3a4008b54b6'
            - 'SHA256=f5c5e962577e2293c4ad10603816dce7cc273585969615fbf4e4bfa9eaff1688'
            - 'SHA256=d14c52d9220b606f428a8fe9f7c108b0d6f14cf71e7384749e98e6a95962e68f'
            - 'SHA256=d3a0e1a79158f3985cd49607ebe0cdfcc49cb9af96b8f43aefd0cdfe2f22e663'
            - 'SHA256=2fbbfc8299537ff80cadf9d0e27c223fe0ccb9052bf9d8763ad717bbfa521c77'
            - 'SHA256=19074674c6fbdaa573b3081745e5e26144fdf7a086d14e0e220d1814f1f13078'
    filter_main_known_names:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cloudflared.exe'
            - '\cloudflared-windows-386.exe'
            - '\cloudflared-windows-amd64.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
PUA - Chisel Tunneling Tool Execution
Detects usage of the Chisel tunneling tool via the commandline arguments
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: PUA - Chisel Tunneling Tool Execution
id: 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5
related:
    - id: cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Chisel tunneling tool via the commandline arguments
references:
    - https://github.com/jpillora/chisel/
    - https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/lorenz-ransomware-chiseling-in/
    - https://blog.sekoia.io/lucky-mouse-incident-response-to-detection-engineering/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-13
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\chisel.exe'
    selection_param1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'exe client '
            - 'exe server '
    selection_param2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-socks5'
            - '-reverse'
            - ' r:'
            - ':127.0.0.1:'
            - '-tls-skip-verify '
            - ':socks'
    condition: selection_img or all of selection_param*
falsepositives:
    - Some false positives may occur with other tools with similar commandlines
level: high
related high
RDP over Reverse SSH Tunnel WFP
Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating with the loopback address
status test author Samir Bousseaden id 5bed80b6-b3e8-428e-a3ae-d3c757589e41 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: RDP over Reverse SSH Tunnel WFP
id: 5bed80b6-b3e8-428e-a3ae-d3c757589e41
status: test
description: Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating with the loopback address
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1096148422984384514
    - https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/blob/44fbe85f72ee91582876b49678f9a26292a155fb/Command%20and%20Control/DE_RDP_Tunnel_5156.evtx
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-02-16
modified: 2022-09-02
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1090.001
    - attack.t1090.002
    - attack.t1021.001
    - car.2013-07-002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5156
    sourceRDP:
        SourcePort: 3389
        DestAddress:
            - '127.*'
            - '::1'
    destinationRDP:
        DestPort: 3389
        SourceAddress:
            - '127.*'
            - '::1'
    filter_app_container:
        FilterOrigin: 'AppContainer Loopback'
    filter_thor:  # checking BlueKeep vulnerability
        Application|endswith:
            - '\thor.exe'
            - '\thor64.exe'
    condition: selection and ( sourceRDP or destinationRDP ) and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
    - Programs that connect locally to the RDP port
level: high
related high
Potential WinAPI Calls Via PowerShell Scripts
Detects use of WinAPI functions in PowerShell scripts
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community id 03d83090-8cba-44a0-b02f-0b756a050306 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential WinAPI Calls Via PowerShell Scripts
id: 03d83090-8cba-44a0-b02f-0b756a050306
related:
    - id: ba3f5c1b-6272-4119-9dbd-0bc8d21c2702
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects use of WinAPI functions in PowerShell scripts
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2023-06-20
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1106
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    # Note: Add more suspicious combinations in the form of different selections
    selection_injection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'VirtualAlloc'
            - 'OpenProcess'
            - 'WriteProcessMemory'
            - 'CreateRemoteThread'
    selection_token_steal:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'OpenProcessToken'
            - 'LookupPrivilegeValue'
            - 'AdjustTokenPrivileges'
    selection_duplicate_token:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'OpenProcessToken'
            - 'DuplicateTokenEx'
            - 'CloseHandle'
    selection_process_write_read:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'WriteProcessMemory'
            - 'VirtualAlloc'
            - 'ReadProcessMemory'
            - 'VirtualFree'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
HackTool - RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Execution
Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook a automated breach emulations utility
status test author Alexander Rausch id 95022b85-ff2a-49fa-939a-d7b8f56eeb9b license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Execution
id: 95022b85-ff2a-49fa-939a-d7b8f56eeb9b
status: test
description: Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook a automated breach emulations utility
references:
    - https://redmimicry.com/posts/redmimicry-winnti/
author: Alexander Rausch
date: 2020-06-24
modified: 2023-03-01
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1218.011
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'gthread-3.6.dll'
            - '\Windows\Temp\tmp.bat'
            - 'sigcmm-2.4.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine
Detects the use of WinAPI Functions via the commandline. As seen used by threat actors via the tool winapiexec
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id ba3f5c1b-6272-4119-9dbd-0bc8d21c2702 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine
id: ba3f5c1b-6272-4119-9dbd-0bc8d21c2702
related:
    - id: 03d83090-8cba-44a0-b02f-0b756a050306
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the use of WinAPI Functions via the commandline. As seen used by threat actors via the tool winapiexec
references:
    - https://twitter.com/m417z/status/1566674631788007425
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-06
modified: 2025-03-06
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'AddSecurityPackage'
            - 'AdjustTokenPrivileges'
            - 'Advapi32'
            - 'CloseHandle'
            - 'CreateProcessWithToken'
            - 'CreatePseudoConsole'
            - 'CreateRemoteThread'
            - 'CreateThread'
            - 'CreateUserThread'
            - 'DangerousGetHandle'
            - 'DuplicateTokenEx'
            - 'EnumerateSecurityPackages'
            - 'FreeHGlobal'
            - 'FreeLibrary'
            - 'GetDelegateForFunctionPointer'
            - 'GetLogonSessionData'
            - 'GetModuleHandle'
            - 'GetProcAddress'
            - 'GetProcessHandle'
            - 'GetTokenInformation'
            - 'ImpersonateLoggedOnUser'
            - 'kernel32'
            - 'LoadLibrary'
            - 'memcpy'
            - 'MiniDumpWriteDump'
            # - 'msvcrt'
            - 'ntdll'
            - 'OpenDesktop'
            - 'OpenProcess'
            - 'OpenProcessToken'
            - 'OpenThreadToken'
            - 'OpenWindowStation'
            - 'PtrToString'
            - 'QueueUserApc'
            - 'ReadProcessMemory'
            - 'RevertToSelf'
            - 'RtlCreateUserThread'
            - 'secur32'
            - 'SetThreadToken'
            # - 'user32'
            - 'VirtualAlloc'
            - 'VirtualFree'
            - 'VirtualProtect'
            - 'WaitForSingleObject'
            - 'WriteInt32'
            - 'WriteProcessMemory'
            - 'ZeroFreeGlobalAllocUnicode'
    filter_optional_mpcmdrun:
        Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'GetLoadLibraryWAddress32'
    filter_optional_compatTelRunner:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\CompatTelRunner.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'FreeHGlobal'
            - 'PtrToString'
            - 'kernel32'
            - 'CloseHandle'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Some legitimate action or applications may use these functions. Investigate further to determine the legitimacy of the activity.
level: high
related high
Suspicious Mshta.EXE Execution Patterns
Detects suspicious mshta process execution patterns
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id e32f92d1-523e-49c3-9374-bdb13b46a3ba license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Suspicious Mshta.EXE Execution Patterns
id: e32f92d1-523e-49c3-9374-bdb13b46a3ba
status: test
description: Detects suspicious mshta process execution patterns
references:
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application
    - https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/mshta.exe
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/34221348-072d-4b70-93f3-aa71f6ebecad/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-17
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'MSHTA.EXE'
    selection_susp:
        # Suspicious parents
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        # Suspicious folders
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    filter_img:
        # Filter legit Locations
        - Image|startswith:
              - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
              - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
        # Suspicious extensions
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '.htm'
              - '.hta'
        # Filter simple execution
        - CommandLine|endswith:
              - 'mshta.exe'
              - 'mshta'
    condition: all of selection_* or (selection_img and not filter_img)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
HackTool - CobaltStrike BOF Injection Pattern
Detects a typical pattern of a CobaltStrike BOF which inject into other processes
status test author Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) id 09706624-b7f6-455d-9d02-adee024cee1d license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - CobaltStrike BOF Injection Pattern
id: 09706624-b7f6-455d-9d02-adee024cee1d
status: test
description: Detects a typical pattern of a CobaltStrike BOF which inject into other processes
references:
    - https://github.com/boku7/injectAmsiBypass
    - https://github.com/boku7/spawn
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-04
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CallTrace|re: '^C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll\.dll\+[a-z0-9]{4,6}\|C:\\Windows\\System32\\KERNELBASE\.dll\+[a-z0-9]{4,6}\|UNKNOWN\([A-Z0-9]{16}\)$'
        GrantedAccess:
            - '0x1028'
            - '0x1fffff'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
HackTool - HandleKatz Duplicating LSASS Handle
Detects HandleKatz opening LSASS to duplicate its handle to later dump the memory without opening any new handles
status test author Bhabesh Raj (rule), @thefLinkk id b1bd3a59-c1fd-4860-9f40-4dd161a7d1f5 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - HandleKatz Duplicating LSASS Handle
id: b1bd3a59-c1fd-4860-9f40-4dd161a7d1f5
status: test
description: Detects HandleKatz opening LSASS to duplicate its handle to later dump the memory without opening any new handles
references:
    - https://github.com/codewhitesec/HandleKatz
author: Bhabesh Raj (rule), @thefLinkk
date: 2022-06-27
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe' # Theoretically, can be any benign process holding handle to LSASS
        GrantedAccess: '0x1440' # Only PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION
        # Example: C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+9d234\|UNKNOWN(00000000001C119B)
        CallTrace|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll+'
        CallTrace|contains: '|UNKNOWN('
        CallTrace|endswith: ')'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins Usage
Detects adding and using Exchange PowerShell snap-ins to export mailbox data. As seen used by HAFNIUM and APT27
status test author FPT.EagleEye, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 25676e10-2121-446e-80a4-71ff8506af47 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins Usage
id: 25676e10-2121-446e-80a4-71ff8506af47
status: test
description: Detects adding and using Exchange PowerShell snap-ins to export mailbox data. As seen used by HAFNIUM and APT27
references:
    - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/
    - https://www.intrinsec.com/apt27-analysis/
author: FPT.EagleEye, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-03-03
modified: 2023-03-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1114
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Add-PSSnapin'
    selection_module:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Microsoft.Exchange.Powershell.Snapin'
            - 'Microsoft.Exchange.Management.PowerShell.SnapIn'
    filter_msiexec:
        # ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\MsiExec.exe -Embedding C9138ECE2536CB4821EB5F55D300D88E E Global\MSI0000
        ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '$exserver=Get-ExchangeServer ([Environment]::MachineName) -ErrorVariable exerr 2> $null'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
OpenCanary - SIP Request
Detects instances where an SIP service on an OpenCanary node has had a SIP request.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id e30de276-68ec-435c-ab99-ef3befec6c61 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - SIP Request
id: e30de276-68ec-435c-ab99-ef3befec6c61
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SIP service on an OpenCanary node has had a SIP request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1123
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 15001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
related high
Suspicious Camera and Microphone Access
Detects Processes accessing the camera and microphone from suspicious folder
status test author Den Iuzvyk id 62120148-6b7a-42be-8b91-271c04e281a3 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Suspicious Camera and Microphone Access
id: 62120148-6b7a-42be-8b91-271c04e281a3
status: test
description: Detects Processes accessing the camera and microphone from suspicious folder
references:
    - https://medium.com/@7a616368/can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone-7e6885b37072
author: Den Iuzvyk
date: 2020-06-07
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1125
    - attack.t1123
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\'
            - '\NonPackaged'
    selection_2:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - microphone
            - webcam
    selection_3:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - ':#Windows#Temp#'
            - ':#$Recycle.bin#'
            - ':#Temp#'
            - ':#Users#Public#'
            - ':#Users#Default#'
            - ':#Users#Desktop#'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, there could be conferencing software running from a Temp folder accessing the devices
level: high
related high
OpenCanary - RDP New Connection Attempt
Detects instances where an RDP service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
status experimental author Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) id 598290cf-5932-45cd-9123-be1e05ab4f2e license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - RDP New Connection Attempt
id: 598290cf-5932-45cd-9123-be1e05ab4f2e
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an RDP service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1021.001
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 14001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
related high
Unusual File Deletion by Dns.exe
Detects an unexpected file being deleted by dns.exe which my indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)
status test author Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea) id 8f0b1fb1-9bd4-4e74-8cdf-a8de4d2adfd0 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Unusual File Deletion by Dns.exe
id: 8f0b1fb1-9bd4-4e74-8cdf-a8de4d2adfd0
related:
    - id: 9f383dc0-fdeb-4d56-acbc-9f9f4f8f20f3 # FileChange version
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects an unexpected file being deleted by dns.exe which my indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/unusual-file-modification-by-dns-exe.html
author: Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-27
modified: 2023-02-15
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1133
logsource:
    category: file_delete
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\dns.exe'
    filter:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\dns.log'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Unusual File Modification by dns.exe
Detects an unexpected file being modified by dns.exe which my indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)
status test author Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea) id 9f383dc0-fdeb-4d56-acbc-9f9f4f8f20f3 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Unusual File Modification by dns.exe
id: 9f383dc0-fdeb-4d56-acbc-9f9f4f8f20f3
related:
    - id: 8f0b1fb1-9bd4-4e74-8cdf-a8de4d2adfd0 # FileDelete version
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects an unexpected file being modified by dns.exe which my indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/unusual-file-modification-by-dns-exe.html
author: Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1133
logsource:
    category: file_change
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\dns.exe'
    filter:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\dns.log'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Suspicious File Created by ArcSOC.exe
Detects instances where the ArcGIS Server process ArcSOC.exe, which hosts REST services running on an ArcGIS server, creates a file with suspicious file type, indicating that it may be an executable, script file, or otherwise unusual.
status experimental author Micah Babinski id e890acee-d488-420e-8f20-d9b19b3c3d43 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Suspicious File Created by ArcSOC.exe
id: e890acee-d488-420e-8f20-d9b19b3c3d43
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects instances where the ArcGIS Server process ArcSOC.exe, which hosts REST services running on an ArcGIS
    server, creates a file with suspicious file type, indicating that it may be an executable, script file,
    or otherwise unusual.
references:
    - https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-inside-flax-typhoons-arcgis-compromise/
    - https://enterprise.arcgis.com/en/server/12.0/administer/windows/inside-an-arcgis-server-site.htm
author: Micah Babinski
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1127
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1133
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\ArcSOC.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.ahk'
            - '.aspx'
            - '.au3'
            - '.bat'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.js'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.py'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.wsf'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
related high
Unusual Child Process of dns.exe
Detects an unexpected process spawning from dns.exe which may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)
status test author Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea) id a4e3d776-f12e-42c2-8510-9e6ed1f43ec3 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Unusual Child Process of dns.exe
id: a4e3d776-f12e-42c2-8510-9e6ed1f43ec3
status: test
description: Detects an unexpected process spawning from dns.exe which may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/unusual-child-process-of-dns-exe.html
author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-27
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1133
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\dns.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\conhost.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
User Added to Remote Desktop Users Group
Detects addition of users to the local Remote Desktop Users group via "Net" or "Add-LocalGroupMember".
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id ffa28e60-bdb1-46e0-9f82-05f7a61cc06e license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: User Added to Remote Desktop Users Group
id: ffa28e60-bdb1-46e0-9f82-05f7a61cc06e
related:
    - id: ad720b90-25ad-43ff-9b5e-5c841facc8e5 # Admin groups
      type: similar
    - id: 10fb649c-3600-4d37-b1e6-56ea90bb7e09 # Privileged groups
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects addition of users to the local Remote Desktop Users group via "Net" or "Add-LocalGroupMember".
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/11/16/evolving-trends-in-iranian-threat-actor-activity-mstic-presentation-at-cyberwarcon-2021/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-06
modified: 2022-09-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1136.001
    - attack.t1021.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_main:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'localgroup '
              - ' /add'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'Add-LocalGroupMember '
              - ' -Group '
    selection_group:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Remote Desktop Users'
            - 'Utilisateurs du Bureau à distance' # French for "Remote Desktop Users"
            - 'Usuarios de escritorio remoto' # Spanish for "Remote Desktop Users"
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
level: high
related high
Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry 2 VPN Extension
Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry install 2 vpn extension
status test author frack113 id b64a026b-8deb-4c1d-92fd-98893209dff1 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry 2 VPN Extension
id: b64a026b-8deb-4c1d-92fd-98893209dff1
status: test
description: Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry install 2 vpn extension
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1133/T1133.md#atomic-test-1---running-chrome-vpn-extensions-via-the-registry-2-vpn-extension
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-28
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1133
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    chrome_ext:
        TargetObject|contains: 'Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions'
        TargetObject|endswith: 'update_url'
    chrome_vpn:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - fdcgdnkidjaadafnichfpabhfomcebme # ZenMate VPN
            - fcfhplploccackoneaefokcmbjfbkenj # 1clickVPN
            - bihmplhobchoageeokmgbdihknkjbknd # Touch VPN
            - gkojfkhlekighikafcpjkiklfbnlmeio # Hola Free VPN
            - jajilbjjinjmgcibalaakngmkilboobh # Astar VPN
            - gjknjjomckknofjidppipffbpoekiipm # VPN Free
            - nabbmpekekjknlbkgpodfndbodhijjem # Earth VPN
            - kpiecbcckbofpmkkkdibbllpinceiihk # DotVPN
            - nlbejmccbhkncgokjcmghpfloaajcffj # Hotspot Shield Free VPN
            - omghfjlpggmjjaagoclmmobgdodcjboh # Browsec VPN
            - bibjcjfmgapbfoljiojpipaooddpkpai # VPN-free.pro
            - mpcaainmfjjigeicjnlkdfajbioopjko # VPN Unlimited Free
            - jljopmgdobloagejpohpldgkiellmfnc # PP VPN
            - lochiccbgeohimldjooaakjllnafhaid # IP Unblock
            - nhnfcgpcbfclhfafjlooihdfghaeinfc # Surf VPN
            - ookhnhpkphagefgdiemllfajmkdkcaim # iNinja VPN
            - namfblliamklmeodpcelkokjbffgmeoo # Daily VPN
            - nbcojefnccbanplpoffopkoepjmhgdgh # Hoxx VPN Proxy
            - majdfhpaihoncoakbjgbdhglocklcgno # Free VPN
            - lnfdmdhmfbimhhpaeocncdlhiodoblbd # VPN PROXY MASTER
            - eppiocemhmnlbhjplcgkofciiegomcon # Urban Free VPN
            - cocfojppfigjeefejbpfmedgjbpchcng # SaferVPN Proxy
            - foiopecknacmiihiocgdjgbjokkpkohc # VPN Professional
            - hhdobjgopfphlmjbmnpglhfcgppchgje # AdGuard VPN
            - jgbaghohigdbgbolncodkdlpenhcmcge # Free VPN
            - inligpkjkhbpifecbdjhmdpcfhnlelja # Free One Touch VPN
            - higioemojdadgdbhbbbkfbebbdlfjbip # Unlimited VPN & Proxy by ibVPN
            - hipncndjamdcmphkgngojegjblibadbe # RusVPN
            - iolonopooapdagdemdoaihahlfkncfgg # Azino VPN
            - nhfjkakglbnnpkpldhjmpmmfefifedcj # Pron VPN
            - jpgljfpmoofbmlieejglhonfofmahini # Free Residential VPN
            - fgddmllnllkalaagkghckoinaemmogpe # ExpressVPN
            - ejkaocphofnobjdedneohbbiilggdlbi # Hotspot Shield Elite VPN Proxy
            - keodbianoliadkoelloecbhllnpiocoi # Hide My IP VPN
            - hoapmlpnmpaehilehggglehfdlnoegck # Tunnello VPN
            - poeojclicodamonabcabmapamjkkmnnk # HMA VPN Proxy Unblocker
            - dfkdflfgjdajbhocmfjolpjbebdkcjog # Free Avira Phantom VPN
            - kcdahmgmaagjhocpipbodaokikjkampi # Hola VPN
            - klnkiajpmpkkkgpgbogmcgfjhdoljacg # Free VPN for Chrome
            - lneaocagcijjdpkcabeanfpdbmapcjjg # Hub VPN
            - pgfpignfckbloagkfnamnolkeaecfgfh # Free Proxy VPN
            - jplnlifepflhkbkgonidnobkakhmpnmh # Private Internet Access
            - jliodmnojccaloajphkingdnpljdhdok # Turbo VPN for PC
            - hnmpcagpplmpfojmgmnngilcnanddlhb # Windscribe
            - ffbkglfijbcbgblgflchnbphjdllaogb # CyberGhost VPN
            - kcndmbbelllkmioekdagahekgimemejo # VPN.AC
            - jdgilggpfmjpbodmhndmhojklgfdlhob # Browser VPN
            - bihhflimonbpcfagfadcnbbdngpopnjb # DEEPRISM VPN
            - ppajinakbfocjfnijggfndbdmjggcmde # My Browser Vpn
            - oofgbpoabipfcfjapgnbbjjaenockbdp # SetupVPN
            - bhnhkdgoefpmekcgnccpnhjfdgicfebm # Wachee VPN
            - knmmpciebaoojcpjjoeonlcjacjopcpf # Thunder Proxy
            - dhadilbmmjiooceioladdphemaliiobo # Free Proxy VPN
            - jedieiamjmoflcknjdjhpieklepfglin # FastestVPN Proxy
            - mhngpdlhojliikfknhfaglpnddniijfh # WorkingVPN
            - omdakjcmkglenbhjadbccaookpfjihpa # TunnelBear VPN
            - npgimkapccfidfkfoklhpkgmhgfejhbj # BelkaVPN
            - akeehkgglkmpapdnanoochpfmeghfdln # VPN Master
            - gbmdmipapolaohpinhblmcnpmmlgfgje # Unblock Websites
            - aigmfoeogfnljhnofglledbhhfegannp # Lethean Proxy VPN
            - cgojmfochfikphincbhokimmmjenhhgk # Whoer VPN
            - ficajfeojakddincjafebjmfiefcmanc # Best VPN USA
            - ifnaibldjfdmaipaddffmgcmekjhiloa # FREE VPN DEWELOPMENT
            - jbnmpdkcfkochpanomnkhnafobppmccn # apkfold free vpn
            - apcfdffemoinopelidncddjbhkiblecc # Soul VPN
            - mjolnodfokkkaichkcjipfgblbfgojpa # DotVPN
            - oifjbnnafapeiknapihcmpeodaeblbkn # rderzh VPN Proxy
            - plpmggfglncceinmilojdkiijhmajkjh # Red Panda VPN
            - mjnbclmflcpookeapghfhapeffmpodij # Ultrareach VPN
            - bblcccknbdbplgmdjnnikffefhdlobhp # FastStunnel VPN
            - aojlhgbkmkahabcmcpifbolnoichfeep # VirtualShield VPN
            - lcmammnjlbmlbcaniggmlejfjpjagiia # Adblock Office VPN Proxy Server
            - knajdeaocbpmfghhmijicidfcmdgbdpm # Guru VPN & Proxy
            - bdlcnpceagnkjnjlbbbcepohejbheilk # Malus VPN
            - edknjdjielmpdlnllkdmaghlbpnmjmgb # Muscle VPN
            - eidnihaadmmancegllknfbliaijfmkgo # Push VPN
            - ckiahbcmlmkpfiijecbpflfahoimklke # Gom VPN
            - macdlemfnignjhclfcfichcdhiomgjjb # Free Fast VPN
            - chioafkonnhbpajpengbalkececleldf # BullVPN
            - amnoibeflfphhplmckdbiajkjaoomgnj # HideAll VPN
            - llbhddikeonkpbhpncnhialfbpnilcnc # ProxyFlow
            - pcienlhnoficegnepejpfiklggkioccm # Cloud VPN
            - iocnglnmfkgfedpcemdflhkchokkfeii # sVPN
            - igahhbkcppaollcjeaaoapkijbnphfhb # Social VPN
            - njpmifchgidinihmijhcfpbdmglecdlb # Trellonet Trellonet
            - ggackgngljinccllcmbgnpgpllcjepgc # WindmillVPN
            - kchocjcihdgkoplngjemhpplmmloanja # IPBurger Proxy & VPN
            - bnijmipndnicefcdbhgcjoognndbgkep # Veee
            - lklekjodgannjcccdlbicoamibgbdnmi # Anonymous Proxy Vpn Browser
            - dbdbnchagbkhknegmhgikkleoogjcfge # Hideman VPN
            - egblhcjfjmbjajhjhpmnlekffgaemgfh # Fornex VPN
            - ehbhfpfdkmhcpaehaooegfdflljcnfec # WeVPN
            - bkkgdjpomdnfemhhkalfkogckjdkcjkg # VPNMatic
            - almalgbpmcfpdaopimbdchdliminoign # Urban Shield
            - akkbkhnikoeojlhiiomohpdnkhbkhieh # Prime VPN
            - gbfgfbopcfokdpkdigfmoeaajfmpkbnh # westwind
            - bniikohfmajhdcffljgfeiklcbgffppl # Upnet
            - lejgfmmlngaigdmmikblappdafcmkndb # uVPN
            - ffhhkmlgedgcliajaedapkdfigdobcif # Nucleus VPN
            - gcknhkkoolaabfmlnjonogaaifnjlfnp # FoxyProxy Standard
            - pooljnboifbodgifngpppfklhifechoe # GeoProxy
            - fjoaledfpmneenckfbpdfhkmimnjocfa # NordVPN
            - aakchaleigkohafkfjfjbblobjifikek # ProxFlow
            - dpplabbmogkhghncfbfdeeokoefdjegm # Proxy SwitchySharp
            - padekgcemlokbadohgkifijomclgjgif # Proxy SwitchyOmega
            - bfidboloedlamgdmenmlbipfnccokknp # PureVPN
    condition: all of chrome_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Potential Base64 Decoded From Images
Detects the use of tail to extract bytes at an offset from an image and then decode the base64 value to create a new file with the decoded content. The detected execution is a bash one-liner.
status test author Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk id 09a910bf-f71f-4737-9c40-88880ba5913d license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential Base64 Decoded From Images
id: 09a910bf-f71f-4737-9c40-88880ba5913d
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of tail to extract bytes at an offset from an image and then decode the base64 value to create a new file with the decoded content. The detected execution is a bash one-liner.
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/16bafdf741e7a13137c489f3c8db1334f171c7cb13b62617d691b0a64783cc48/behavior
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/483fafc64a2b84197e1ef6a3f51e443f84dc5742602e08b9e8ec6ad690b34ed0/behavior
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-12-20
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1140
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    # Example:  /bin/bash sh -c tail -c +21453 '/Volumes/Installer/Installer.app/Contents/Resources/workout-logo.jpeg' | base64 --decode > /tmp/54A0A2CD-FAD1-4D4D-AAF5-5266F6344ABE.zip
    # VT Query: 'behavior_processes:"tail" (behavior_processes:"jpeg" or behavior_processes:"jpg" or behavior_processes:"png" or behavior_processes:"gif") behavior_processes:"base64" behavior_processes:"--decode >" and tag:dmg'
    selection_image:
        Image|endswith: '/bash'
    selection_view:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'tail'
            - '-c'
    selection_b64:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'base64'
            - '-d' # Also covers "--decode"
            - '>'
    selection_files:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.avif'
            - '.gif'
            - '.jfif'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.pjp'
            - '.pjpeg'
            - '.png'
            - '.svg'
            - '.webp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
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