title: User Discovery And Export Via Get-ADUser Cmdlet - PowerShell
id: c2993223-6da8-4b1a-88ee-668b8bf315e9
related:
    - id: 1114e048-b69c-4f41-bc20-657245ae6e3f
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Get-ADUser cmdlet to collect user information and output it to a file
references:
    - http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/18/defenders-beware-a-case-for-post-ransomware-investigations/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-17
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Get-ADUser '
            - ' -Filter \*'
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - ' > '
            - ' | Select '
            - 'Out-File'
            - 'Set-Content'
            - 'Add-Content'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin scripts may use the same technique, it's better to exclude specific computers or users who execute these commands or scripts often
level: medium

title: Enumerate All Information With Whoami.EXE
id: c248c896-e412-4279-8c15-1c558067b6fa
status: test
description: Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" with the "/all" flag
references:
    - https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1247926/agent-tesla-keylogger-delivered-inside-a-power-iso-daa-archive/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/7eaba74e-c1ea-400f-9c17-5e30eee89906/
    - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DsJ9ByX84o4&t=6s
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-12-04
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
    - car.2016-03-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_main_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\whoami.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'whoami.exe'
    selection_main_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -all'
    condition: all of selection_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Group Membership Reconnaissance Via Whoami.EXE
id: bd8b828d-0dca-48e1-8a63-8a58ecf2644f
status: test
description: Detects the execution of whoami.exe with the /group command line flag to show group membership for the current user, account type, security identifiers (SID), and attributes.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/whoami
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-28
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\whoami.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'whoami.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /groups'
            - ' -groups'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Whoami.EXE Execution With Output Option
id: c30fb093-1109-4dc8-88a8-b30d11c95a5d
status: test
description: Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" with the "/FO" flag to choose CSV as output format or with redirection options to export the results to a file for later use.
references:
    - https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1247926/agent-tesla-keylogger-delivered-inside-a-power-iso-daa-archive/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/7eaba74e-c1ea-400f-9c17-5e30eee89906/
    - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DsJ9ByX84o4&t=6s
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-28
modified: 2023-12-04
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
    - car.2016-03-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_main_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\whoami.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'whoami.exe'
    selection_main_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /FO CSV'
            - ' -FO CSV'
    selection_special:
        CommandLine|contains: 'whoami*>'
    condition: all of selection_main_* or selection_special
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: User Discovery And Export Via Get-ADUser Cmdlet
id: 1114e048-b69c-4f41-bc20-657245ae6e3f
related:
    - id: c2993223-6da8-4b1a-88ee-668b8bf315e9
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Get-ADUser cmdlet to collect user information and output it to a file
references:
    - http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/18/defenders-beware-a-case-for-post-ransomware-investigations/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-09
modified: 2022-11-17
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Get-ADUser '
            - ' -Filter \*'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' > '
            - ' | Select '
            - 'Out-File'
            - 'Set-Content'
            - 'Add-Content'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin scripts may use the same technique, it's better to exclude specific computers or users who execute these commands or scripts often
level: medium

title: Whoami.EXE Execution Anomaly
id: 8de1cbe8-d6f5-496d-8237-5f44a721c7a0
status: test
description: Detects the execution of whoami.exe with suspicious parent processes.
references:
    - https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1247926/agent-tesla-keylogger-delivered-inside-a-power-iso-daa-archive/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/7eaba74e-c1ea-400f-9c17-5e30eee89906/
    - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DsJ9ByX84o4&t=6s
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-12
modified: 2025-03-06
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
    - car.2016-03-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\whoami.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'whoami.exe'
    filter_main_known_parents:
        # This list can be any legitimate shell or application that you expect whoami to run from
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
    filter_optional_ms_monitoring_agent:
        ParentImage|endswith: ':\Program Files\Microsoft Monitoring Agent\Agent\MonitoringHost.exe'
    filter_main_parent_null:
        ParentImage: null
    filter_main_parent_empty:
        ParentImage:
            - ''
            - '-'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Admin activity
    - Scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
    - Monitoring activity
level: medium

title: Computer Discovery And Export Via Get-ADComputer Cmdlet
id: 435e10e4-992a-4281-96f3-38b11106adde
related:
    - id: db885529-903f-4c5d-9864-28fe199e6370
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Get-ADComputer cmdlet to collect computer information and output it to a file
references:
    - http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/18/defenders-beware-a-case-for-post-ransomware-investigations/
    - https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-320a_joint_csa_iranian_government-sponsored_apt_actors_compromise_federal%20network_deploy_crypto%20miner_credential_harvester.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-10
modified: 2022-11-17
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Get-ADComputer '
            - ' -Filter \*'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' > '
            - ' | Select '
            - 'Out-File'
            - 'Set-Content'
            - 'Add-Content'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin scripts may use the same technique, it's better to exclude specific computers or users who execute these commands or scripts often
level: medium

title: Interactive Bash Suspicious Children
id: ea3ecad2-db86-4a89-ad0b-132a10d2db55
status: test
description: Detects suspicious interactive bash as a parent to rather uncommon child processes
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.004
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentCommandLine: 'bash -i'
    anomaly1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-c import '
            - 'base64'
            - 'pty.spawn'
    anomaly2:
        Image|endswith:
            - 'whoami'
            - 'iptables'
            - '/ncat'
            - '/nc'
            - '/netcat'
    condition: selection and 1 of anomaly*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software that uses these patterns
level: medium

title: Potentially Suspicious Execution From Tmp Folder
id: 312b42b1-bded-4441-8b58-163a3af58775
status: test
description: Detects a potentially suspicious execution of a process located in the '/tmp/' folder
references:
    - https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2023/05/gobrat.html
    - https://jstnk9.github.io/jstnk9/research/GobRAT-Malware/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/60bcd645450e4c846238cf0e7226dc40c84c96eba99f6b2cffcd0ab4a391c8b3/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3e44c807a25a56f4068b5b8186eee5002eed6f26d665a8b791c472ad154585d1/detection
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-06-02
modified: 2025-08-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|startswith: '/tmp/'
    filter_optional_nextcloud:
        Image|endswith: '/usr/bin/nextcloud'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potential Homoglyph Attack Using Lookalike Characters in Filename
id: 4f1707b1-b50b-45b4-b5a2-3978b5a5d0d6
status: test
description: |
    Detects the presence of unicode characters which are homoglyphs, or identical in appearance, to ASCII letter characters.
    This is used as an obfuscation and masquerading techniques. Only "perfect" homoglyphs are included; these are characters that
    are indistinguishable from ASCII characters and thus may make excellent candidates for homoglyph attack characters.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/socgholish/#threat-socgholish
    - http://www.irongeek.com/homoglyph-attack-generator.php
author: Micah Babinski, @micahbabinski
date: 2023-05-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_upper:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - "\u0410" # А/A
            - "\u0412" # В/B
            - "\u0415" # Е/E
            - "\u041a" # К/K
            - "\u041c" # М/M
            - "\u041d" # Н/H
            - "\u041e" # О/O
            - "\u0420" # Р/P
            - "\u0421" # С/C
            - "\u0422" # Т/T
            - "\u0425" # Х/X
            - "\u0405" # Ѕ/S
            - "\u0406" # І/I
            - "\u0408" # Ј/J
            - "\u04ae" # Ү/Y
            - "\u04c0" # Ӏ/I
            - "\u050C" # Ԍ/G
            - "\u051a" # Ԛ/Q
            - "\u051c" # Ԝ/W
            - "\u0391" # Α/A
            - "\u0392" # Β/B
            - "\u0395" # Ε/E
            - "\u0396" # Ζ/Z
            - "\u0397" # Η/H
            - "\u0399" # Ι/I
            - "\u039a" # Κ/K
            - "\u039c" # Μ/M
            - "\u039d" # Ν/N
            - "\u039f" # Ο/O
            - "\u03a1" # Ρ/P
            - "\u03a4" # Τ/T
            - "\u03a5" # Υ/Y
            - "\u03a7" # Χ/X
    selection_lower:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - "\u0430" # а/a
            - "\u0435" # е/e
            - "\u043e" # о/o
            - "\u0440" # р/p
            - "\u0441" # с/c
            - "\u0445" # х/x
            - "\u0455" # ѕ/s
            - "\u0456" # і/i
            - "\u04cf" # ӏ/l
            - "\u0458" # ј/j
            - "\u04bb" # һ/h
            - "\u0501" # ԁ/d
            - "\u051b" # ԛ/q
            - "\u051d" # ԝ/w
            - "\u03bf" # ο/o
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - File names with legitimate Cyrillic text. Will likely require tuning (or not be usable) in countries where these alphabets are in use.
level: medium

title: DumpMinitool Execution
id: dee0a7a3-f200-4112-a99b-952196d81e42
status: test
description: Detects the use of "DumpMinitool.exe" a tool that allows the dump of process memory via the use of the "MiniDumpWriteDump"
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1511415432888131586
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1511489821247684615
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/DumpMinitool/
    - https://gist.github.com/nasbench/6d58c3c125e2fa1b8f7a09754c1b087f
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-06
modified: 2023-04-12
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\DumpMinitool.exe'
              - '\DumpMinitool.x86.exe'
              - '\DumpMinitool.arm64.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'DumpMinitool.exe'
              - 'DumpMinitool.x86.exe'
              - 'DumpMinitool.arm64.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' Full'
            - ' Mini'
            - ' WithHeap'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potential Homoglyph Attack Using Lookalike Characters
id: 32e280f1-8ad4-46ef-9e80-910657611fbc
status: test
description: |
    Detects the presence of unicode characters which are homoglyphs, or identical in appearance, to ASCII letter characters.
    This is used as an obfuscation and masquerading techniques. Only "perfect" homoglyphs are included; these are characters that
    are indistinguishable from ASCII characters and thus may make excellent candidates for homoglyph attack characters.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/socgholish/#threat-socgholish
    - http://www.irongeek.com/homoglyph-attack-generator.php
author: Micah Babinski, @micahbabinski
date: 2023-05-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_upper:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - "\u0410" # А/A
            - "\u0412" # В/B
            - "\u0415" # Е/E
            - "\u041a" # К/K
            - "\u041c" # М/M
            - "\u041d" # Н/H
            - "\u041e" # О/O
            - "\u0420" # Р/P
            - "\u0421" # С/C
            - "\u0422" # Т/T
            - "\u0425" # Х/X
            - "\u0405" # Ѕ/S
            - "\u0406" # І/I
            - "\u0408" # Ј/J
            - "\u04ae" # Ү/Y
            - "\u04c0" # Ӏ/I
            - "\u050C" # Ԍ/G
            - "\u051a" # Ԛ/Q
            - "\u051c" # Ԝ/W
            - "\u0391" # Α/A
            - "\u0392" # Β/B
            - "\u0395" # Ε/E
            - "\u0396" # Ζ/Z
            - "\u0397" # Η/H
            - "\u0399" # Ι/I
            - "\u039a" # Κ/K
            - "\u039c" # Μ/M
            - "\u039d" # Ν/N
            - "\u039f" # Ο/O
            - "\u03a1" # Ρ/P
            - "\u03a4" # Τ/T
            - "\u03a5" # Υ/Y
            - "\u03a7" # Χ/X
    selection_lower:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - "\u0430" # а/a
            - "\u0435" # е/e
            - "\u043e" # о/o
            - "\u0440" # р/p
            - "\u0441" # с/c
            - "\u0445" # х/x
            - "\u0455" # ѕ/s
            - "\u0456" # і/i
            - "\u04cf" # ӏ/l
            - "\u0458" # ј/j
            - "\u04bb" # һ/h
            - "\u0501" # ԁ/d
            - "\u051b" # ԛ/q
            - "\u051d" # ԝ/w
            - "\u03bf" # ο/o
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Commandlines with legitimate Cyrillic text; will likely require tuning (or not be usable) in countries where these alphabets are in use.
level: medium

title: Potential ReflectDebugger Content Execution Via WerFault.EXE
id: fabfb3a7-3ce1-4445-9c7c-3c27f1051cdd
related:
    - id: 0cf2e1c6-8d10-4273-8059-738778f981ad
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects execution of "WerFault.exe" with the "-pr" commandline flag that is used to run files stored in the ReflectDebugger key which could be used to store the path to the malware in order to masquerade the execution flow
references:
    - https://cocomelonc.github.io/malware/2022/11/02/malware-pers-18.html
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/08/31/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-85/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-30
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\WerFault.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'WerFault.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -pr '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Procdump Execution
id: 2e65275c-8288-4ab4-aeb7-6274f58b6b20
status: test
description: Detects usage of the SysInternals Procdump utility
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-16
modified: 2023-02-28
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\procdump.exe'
            - '\procdump64.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of procdump by a developer or administrator
level: medium

title: CodePage Modification Via MODE.COM To Russian Language
id: 12fbff88-16b5-4b42-9754-cd001a789fb3
related:
    - id: d48c5ffa-3b02-4c0f-9a9e-3c275650dd0e
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects a CodePage modification using the "mode.com" utility to Russian language.
    This behavior has been used by threat actors behind Dharma ransomware.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/intl/code-page-identifiers
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/mode
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/mode.com-59D1ED51ACB8C3D50F1306FD75F20E99.html
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5e75ef02517afd6e8ba6462b19217dc4a5a574abb33d10eb0f2bab49d8d48c22/behavior
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2024-01-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # VT Query: behavior:"mode con cp select=1251"
    # VT Query: behavior:"mode con cp select=866"
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\mode.com'
        - OriginalFileName: 'MODE.COM'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' con '
            - ' cp '
            - ' select='
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '=1251' # ANSI Cyrillic; Cyrillic (Windows) - Observed ITW by Dharma ransomware
            - '=866' # OEM Russian; Cyrillic (DOS) - Observed ITW by other malware
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Russian speaking people changing the CodePage
level: medium

title: Explorer Process Tree Break
id: 949f1ffb-6e85-4f00-ae1e-c3c5b190d605
status: test
description: |
  Detects a command line process that uses explorer.exe to launch arbitrary commands or binaries,
  which is similar to cmd.exe /c, only it breaks the process tree and makes its parent a new instance of explorer spawning from "svchost"
references:
    - https://twitter.com/CyberRaiju/status/1273597319322058752
    - https://twitter.com/bohops/status/1276357235954909188?s=12
    - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1535322450858233858
    - https://securityboulevard.com/2019/09/deobfuscating-ostap-trickbots-34000-line-javascript-downloader/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), @gott_cyber
date: 2019-06-29
modified: 2025-10-31
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # Note: See CLSID_SeparateMultipleProcessExplorerHost in the registry for reference
    selection_factory:
        CommandLine|contains: '/factory,{75dff2b7-6936-4c06-a8bb-676a7b00b24b}' # This will catch, the new explorer spawning which indicates a process/tree break. But you won't be able to catch the executing process. For that you need historical data
    selection_root:
        CommandLine|contains: 'explorer.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /root,'
        # There exists almost infinite possibilities to spawn from explorer. The "/root" flag is just an example
        # It's better to have the ability to look at the process tree and look for explorer processes with "weird" flags to be able to catch this technique.
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Suspicious Process Start Locations
id: 15b75071-74cc-47e0-b4c6-b43744a62a2b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious process run from unusual locations
references:
    - https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-05-002
author: juju4, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2022-01-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - car.2013-05-002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|contains:
              - ':\RECYCLER\'
              - ':\SystemVolumeInformation\'
        - Image|startswith:
              - 'C:\Windows\Tasks\'
              - 'C:\Windows\debug\'
              - 'C:\Windows\fonts\'
              - 'C:\Windows\help\'
              - 'C:\Windows\drivers\'
              - 'C:\Windows\addins\'
              - 'C:\Windows\cursors\'
              - 'C:\Windows\system32\tasks\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: medium

title: Findstr Launching .lnk File
id: 33339be3-148b-4e16-af56-ad16ec6c7e7b
status: test
description: Detects usage of findstr to identify and execute a lnk file as seen within the HHS redirect attack
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hhsgov-open-redirect-used-by-coronavirus-phishing-to-spread-malware/
author: Trent Liffick
date: 2020-05-01
modified: 2024-01-15
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1202
    - attack.t1027.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\find.exe'
              - '\findstr.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'FIND.EXE'
              - 'FINDSTR.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '.lnk'
            - '.lnk"'
            - ".lnk'"
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Suspicious CodePage Switch Via CHCP
id: c7942406-33dd-4377-a564-0f62db0593a3
status: test
description: Detects a code page switch in command line or batch scripts to a rare language
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/intl/code-page-identifiers
    - https://twitter.com/cglyer/status/1183756892952248325
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-14
modified: 2023-03-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\chcp.com'
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - ' 936'    # Chinese
            # - ' 1256' # Arabic
            - ' 1258'   # Vietnamese
            # - ' 855'  # Russian
            # - ' 866'  # Russian
            # - ' 864'  # Arabic
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity (adjust code pages according to your organization's region)
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_chcp_codepage_switch/info.yml

title: Potential Fake Instance Of Hxtsr.EXE Executed
id: 4e762605-34a8-406d-b72e-c1a089313320
status: test
description: |
    HxTsr.exe is a Microsoft compressed executable file called Microsoft Outlook Communications.
    HxTsr.exe is part of Outlook apps, because it resides in a hidden "WindowsApps" subfolder of "C:\Program Files".
    Any instances of hxtsr.exe not in this folder may be malware camouflaging itself as HxTsr.exe
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Sreeman
date: 2020-04-17
modified: 2024-02-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    # TODO: Link this to the more generic system process rule
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\hxtsr.exe'
    filter_main_hxtsr:
        Image|contains: ':\program files\windowsapps\microsoft.windowscommunicationsapps_'
        Image|endswith: '\hxtsr.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potential Command Line Path Traversal Evasion Attempt
id: 1327381e-6ab0-4f38-b583-4c1b8346a56b
status: test
description: Detects potential evasion or obfuscation attempts using bogus path traversal via the commandline
references:
    - https://twitter.com/hexacorn/status/1448037865435320323
    - https://twitter.com/Gal_B1t/status/1062971006078345217
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-10-26
modified: 2023-03-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        Image|contains: '\Windows\'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\..\Windows\'
            - '\..\System32\'
            - '\..\..\'
    selection_2:
        CommandLine|contains: '.exe\..\'
    filter_optional_google_drive:
        CommandLine|contains: '\Google\Drive\googledrivesync.exe\..\'
    filter_optional_citrix:
        CommandLine|contains: '\Citrix\Virtual Smart Card\Citrix.Authentication.VirtualSmartcard.Launcher.exe\..\'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Google Drive
    - Citrix
level: medium

title: New or Renamed User Account with '$' Character
id: cfeed607-6aa4-4bbd-9627-b637deb723c8
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of a user with the "$" character. This can be used by attackers to hide a user or trick detection systems that lack the parsing mechanisms.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1387743867663958021
author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2024-01-16
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_create:
        EventID: 4720 # create user
        SamAccountName|contains: '$'
    selection_rename:
        EventID: 4781 # rename user
        NewTargetUserName|contains: '$'
    filter_main_homegroup:
        EventID: 4720
        TargetUserName: 'HomeGroupUser$'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Creation Of Pod In System Namespace
id: a80d927d-ac6e-443f-a867-e8d6e3897318
status: test
description: |
    Detects deployments of pods within the kube-system namespace, which could be intended to imitate system pods.
    System pods, created by controllers such as Deployments or DaemonSets have random suffixes in their names.
    Attackers can use this fact and name their backdoor pods as if they were created by these controllers to avoid detection.
    Deployment of such a backdoor container e.g. named kube-proxy-bv61v, could be attempted in the kube-system namespace alongside the other administrative containers.
references:
    - https://microsoft.github.io/Threat-Matrix-for-Kubernetes/techniques/Pod%20or%20container%20name%20similarily/
author: Leo Tsaousis (@laripping)
date: 2024-03-26
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: application
    product: kubernetes
    service: audit
detection:
    selection:
        verb: 'create'
        objectRef.resource: 'pods'
        objectRef.namespace: kube-system
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - System components such as daemon-set-controller and kube-scheduler also create pods in the kube-system namespace
level: medium

title: Files With System DLL Name In Unsuspected Locations
id: 13c02350-4177-4e45-ac17-cf7ca628ff5e
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of a file with the ".dll" extension that has the name of a System DLL in uncommon or unsuspected locations. (Outisde of "System32", "SysWOW64", etc.).
    It is highly recommended to perform an initial baseline before using this rule in production.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-06-24
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            # Note: Add more System DLL that can be abused for DLL sideloading to increase coverage
            - '\secur32.dll'
            - '\tdh.dll'
    filter_main_generic:
        # Note: It is recommended to use a more robust filter instead of this generic one, to avoid false negatives.
        TargetFilename|contains:
            # - '\SystemRoot\System32\'
            - 'C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\'
            - 'C:\$WinREAgent\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
            - 'C:\Windows\uus\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Third party software might bundle specific versions of system DLLs.
# Note: Upgrade to high after an initial baseline to your environement.
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_creation_system_dll_files/info.yml

title: Suspicious Files in Default GPO Folder
id: 5f87308a-0a5b-4623-ae15-d8fa1809bc60
status: test
description: Detects the creation of copy of suspicious files (EXE/DLL) to the default GPO storage folder
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-november-2021/
author: elhoim
date: 2022-04-28
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\Policies\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Files With System Process Name In Unsuspected Locations
id: d5866ddf-ce8f-4aea-b28e-d96485a20d3d
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of an executable with a system process name in folders other than the system ones (System32, SysWOW64, etc.).
    It is highly recommended to perform an initial baseline before using this rule in production.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Sander Wiebing, Tim Shelton, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-05-26
modified: 2026-02-04
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\AtBroker.exe'
            - '\audiodg.exe'
            - '\backgroundTaskHost.exe'
            - '\bcdedit.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\cmdl32.exe'
            - '\cmstp.exe'
            - '\conhost.exe'
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\dasHost.exe'
            - '\dfrgui.exe'
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\dwm.exe'
            - '\eventcreate.exe'
            - '\eventvwr.exe'
            - '\explorer.exe'
            - '\extrac32.exe'
            - '\fontdrvhost.exe'
            - '\fsquirt.exe' # was seen used by sidewinder APT - https://securelist.com/sidewinder-apt/114089/
            - '\ipconfig.exe'
            - '\iscsicli.exe'
            - '\iscsicpl.exe'
            - '\logman.exe'
            - '\LogonUI.exe'
            - '\LsaIso.exe'
            - '\lsass.exe'
            - '\lsm.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\msinfo32.exe'
            - '\mstsc.exe'
            - '\nbtstat.exe'
            - '\odbcconf.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regini.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\RuntimeBroker.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\SearchFilterHost.exe'
            - '\SearchIndexer.exe'
            - '\SearchProtocolHost.exe'
            - '\SecurityHealthService.exe'
            - '\SecurityHealthSystray.exe'
            - '\services.exe'
            - '\ShellAppRuntime.exe'
            - '\sihost.exe'
            - '\smartscreen.exe'
            - '\smss.exe'
            - '\spoolsv.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
            - '\SystemSettingsBroker.exe'
            - '\taskhost.exe'
            - '\taskhostw.exe'
            - '\Taskmgr.exe'
            - '\TiWorker.exe'
            - '\vssadmin.exe'
            - '\w32tm.exe'
            - '\WerFault.exe'
            - '\WerFaultSecure.exe'
            - '\wermgr.exe'
            - '\wevtutil.exe'
            - '\wininit.exe'
            - '\winlogon.exe'
            - '\winrshost.exe'
            - '\WinRTNetMUAHostServer.exe'
            - '\wlanext.exe'
            - '\wlrmdr.exe'
            - '\WmiPrvSE.exe'
            - '\wslhost.exe'
            - '\WSReset.exe'
            - '\WUDFHost.exe'
            - '\WWAHost.exe'
    filter_main_generic:
        # Note: It is recommended to use a more robust filter instead of this generic one, to avoid false negatives.
        TargetFilename|contains:
            # - '\SystemRoot\System32\'
            - 'C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\'
            - 'C:\$WinREAgent\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
            - 'C:\Windows\uus\'
    filter_main_tiworker:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\TiWorker.exe'
            - '\wuaucltcore.exe'
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    filter_main_svchost:
        Image|endswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\WindowsApps\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\'
    filter_main_wuauclt:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\wuauclt.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\wuauclt.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\UUS\arm64\wuaucltcore.exe'
    filter_main_explorer:
        TargetFilename|endswith: 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
    filter_main_msiexec:
        # This filter handles system processes who are updated/installed using misexec.
        Image|endswith:
            - 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\msiexec.exe'
            - 'C:\WINDOWS\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe'
        # Add more processes if you find them or simply filter msiexec on its own. If the list grows big
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7\pwsh.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7-preview\pwsh.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview\'
    filter_main_healtray:
        TargetFilename|contains: 'C:\Windows\System32\SecurityHealth\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\SecurityHealthSystray.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\SecurityHealthSetup.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - System processes copied outside their default folders for testing purposes
    - Third party software naming their software with the same names as the processes mentioned here
# Note: Upgrade to high after an initial baseline to your environement.
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_creation_system_file/info.yml

title: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
id: 01d2e2a1-5f09-44f7-9fc1-24faa7479b6d
status: test
description: Detects an uncommon svchost parent process
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-08-15
modified: 2022-06-28
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    filter_main_generic:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\Mrt.exe'
            - '\MsMpEng.exe'
            - '\ngen.exe'
            - '\rpcnet.exe'
            - '\services.exe'
            - '\TiWorker.exe'
    filter_main_parent_null:
        ParentImage: null
    filter_main_parent_empty:
        ParentImage:
            - '-'
            - ''
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation via Masqueraded XML File
id: dd2a821e-3b07-4d3b-a9ac-929fe4c6ca0c
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a scheduled task using the "-XML" flag with a file without the '.xml' extension. This behavior could be indicative of potential defense evasion attempt during persistence
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/daily-trigger-example--xml-
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/blob/084067123d3328a823b1c3fdde305b694275c794/behavior/rules/persistence_suspicious_scheduled_task_creation_via_masqueraded_xml_file.toml
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Elastic (idea)
date: 2023-04-20
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    selection_cli_create:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/create'
            - '-create'
    selection_cli_xml:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/xml'
            - '-xml'
    filter_main_extension_xml:
        CommandLine|contains: '.xml'
    filter_main_system_process:
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'System'
            - 'S-1-16-16384'
    filter_main_rundll32:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - ':\WINDOWS\Installer\MSI'
            - '.tmp,zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc'
    filter_optional_third_party:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            # Consider removing any tools that you don't use to avoid blind spots
            - ':\ProgramData\OEM\UpgradeTool\CareCenter_*\BUnzip\Setup_msi.exe'
            - ':\Program Files\Axis Communications\AXIS Camera Station\SetupActions.exe'
            - ':\Program Files\Axis Communications\AXIS Device Manager\AdmSetupActions.exe'
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\Zemana\AntiMalware\AntiMalware.exe'
            - ':\Program Files\Dell\SupportAssist\pcdrcui.exe'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potential Binary Impersonating Sysinternals Tools
id: 7cce6fc8-a07f-4d84-a53e-96e1879843c9
status: test
description: |
    Detects binaries that use the same name as legitimate sysinternals tools to evade detection.
    This rule looks for the execution of binaries that are named similarly to Sysinternals tools.
    Adversary may rename their malicious tools as legitimate Sysinternals tools to evade detection.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysinternals-suite
author: frack113, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2025-04-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1202
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_exe:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\accesschk.exe'
            - '\accesschk64.exe'
            - '\AccessEnum.exe'
            - '\ADExplorer.exe'
            - '\ADExplorer64.exe'
            - '\ADInsight.exe'
            - '\ADInsight64.exe'
            - '\adrestore.exe'
            - '\adrestore64.exe'
            - '\Autologon.exe'
            - '\Autologon64.exe'
            - '\Autoruns.exe'
            - '\Autoruns64.exe'
            - '\autorunsc.exe'
            - '\autorunsc64.exe'
            - '\Bginfo.exe'
            - '\Bginfo64.exe'
            - '\Cacheset.exe'
            - '\Cacheset64.exe'
            - '\Clockres.exe'
            - '\Clockres64.exe'
            - '\Contig.exe'
            - '\Contig64.exe'
            - '\Coreinfo.exe'
            - '\Coreinfo64.exe'
            - '\CPUSTRES.EXE'
            - '\CPUSTRES64.EXE'
            - '\ctrl2cap.exe'
            - '\Dbgview.exe'
            - '\dbgview64.exe'
            - '\Desktops.exe'
            - '\Desktops64.exe'
            - '\disk2vhd.exe'
            - '\disk2vhd64.exe'
            - '\diskext.exe'
            - '\diskext64.exe'
            - '\Diskmon.exe'
            - '\Diskmon64.exe'
            - '\DiskView.exe'
            - '\DiskView64.exe'
            - '\du.exe'
            - '\du64.exe'
            - '\efsdump.exe'
            - '\FindLinks.exe'
            - '\FindLinks64.exe'
            - '\handle.exe'
            - '\handle64.exe'
            - '\hex2dec.exe'
            - '\hex2dec64.exe'
            - '\junction.exe'
            - '\junction64.exe'
            - '\ldmdump.exe'
            - '\listdlls.exe'
            - '\listdlls64.exe'
            - '\livekd.exe'
            - '\livekd64.exe'
            - '\loadOrd.exe'
            - '\loadOrd64.exe'
            - '\loadOrdC.exe'
            - '\loadOrdC64.exe'
            - '\logonsessions.exe'
            - '\logonsessions64.exe'
            - '\movefile.exe'
            - '\movefile64.exe'
            - '\notmyfault.exe'
            - '\notmyfault64.exe'
            - '\notmyfaultc.exe'
            - '\notmyfaultc64.exe'
            - '\ntfsinfo.exe'
            - '\ntfsinfo64.exe'
            - '\pendmoves.exe'
            - '\pendmoves64.exe'
            - '\pipelist.exe'
            - '\pipelist64.exe'
            - '\portmon.exe'
            - '\procdump.exe'
            - '\procdump64.exe'
            - '\procexp.exe'
            - '\procexp64.exe'
            - '\Procmon.exe'
            - '\Procmon64.exe'
            - '\psExec.exe'
            - '\psExec64.exe'
            - '\psfile.exe'
            - '\psfile64.exe'
            - '\psGetsid.exe'
            - '\psGetsid64.exe'
            - '\psInfo.exe'
            - '\psInfo64.exe'
            - '\pskill.exe'
            - '\pskill64.exe'
            - '\pslist.exe'
            - '\pslist64.exe'
            - '\psLoggedon.exe'
            - '\psLoggedon64.exe'
            - '\psloglist.exe'
            - '\psloglist64.exe'
            - '\pspasswd.exe'
            - '\pspasswd64.exe'
            - '\psping.exe'
            - '\psping64.exe'
            - '\psService.exe'
            - '\psService64.exe'
            - '\psshutdown.exe'
            - '\psshutdown64.exe'
            - '\pssuspend.exe'
            - '\pssuspend64.exe'
            - '\RAMMap.exe'
            - '\RAMMap64.exe'
            - '\RDCMan.exe'
            - '\RegDelNull.exe'
            - '\RegDelNull64.exe'
            - '\regjump.exe'
            - '\ru.exe'
            - '\ru64.exe'
            - '\sdelete.exe'
            - '\sdelete64.exe'
            - '\ShareEnum.exe'
            - '\ShareEnum64.exe'
            - '\shellRunas.exe'
            - '\sigcheck.exe'
            - '\sigcheck64.exe'
            - '\streams.exe'
            - '\streams64.exe'
            - '\strings.exe'
            - '\strings64.exe'
            - '\sync.exe'
            - '\sync64.exe'
            - '\Sysmon.exe'
            - '\Sysmon64.exe'
            - '\tcpvcon.exe'
            - '\tcpvcon64.exe'
            - '\tcpview.exe'
            - '\tcpview64.exe'
            - '\Testlimit.exe'
            - '\Testlimit64.exe'
            - '\vmmap.exe'
            - '\vmmap64.exe'
            - '\Volumeid.exe'
            - '\Volumeid64.exe'
            - '\whois.exe'
            - '\whois64.exe'
            - '\Winobj.exe'
            - '\Winobj64.exe'
            - '\ZoomIt.exe'
            - '\ZoomIt64.exe'
    selection_arm64:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\accesschk64a.exe'
            - '\ADExplorer64a.exe'
            - '\ADInsight64a.exe'
            - '\adrestore64a.exe'
            - '\Autologon64a.exe'
            - '\Autoruns64a.exe'
            - '\autorunsc64a.exe'
            - '\Clockres64a.exe'
            - '\Contig64a.exe'
            - '\Coreinfo64a.exe'
            - '\Dbgview64a.exe'
            - '\disk2vhd64a.exe'
            - '\diskext64a.exe'
            - '\DiskView64a.exe'
            - '\du64a.exe'
            - '\FindLinks64a.exe'
            - '\handle64a.exe'
            - '\hex2dec64a.exe'
            - '\junction64a.exe'
            - '\LoadOrd64a.exe'
            - '\LoadOrdC64a.exe'
            - '\logonsessions64a.exe'
            - '\movefile64a.exe'
            - '\notmyfault64a.exe'
            - '\notmyfaultc64a.exe'
            - '\pendmoves64a.exe'
            - '\pipelist64a.exe'
            - '\procdump64a.exe'
            - '\procexp64a.exe'
            - '\Procmon64a.exe'
            - '\PsExec64a.exe'
            - '\psfile64a.exe'
            - '\PsGetsid64a.exe'
            - '\PsInfo64a.exe'
            - '\pskill64a.exe'
            - '\psloglist64a.exe'
            - '\pspasswd64a.exe'
            - '\psping64a.exe'
            - '\PsService64a.exe'
            - '\pssuspend64a.exe'
            - '\RAMMap64a.exe'
            - '\RegDelNull64a.exe'
            - '\ru64a.exe'
            - '\sdelete64a.exe'
            - '\sigcheck64a.exe'
            - '\streams64a.exe'
            - '\strings64a.exe'
            - '\sync64a.exe'
            - '\Sysmon64a.exe'
            - '\tcpvcon64a.exe'
            - '\tcpview64a.exe'
            - '\vmmap64a.exe'
            - '\whois64a.exe'
            - '\Winobj64a.exe'
            - '\ZoomIt64a.exe'
    filter_valid:
        - Company:
              - 'Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com'
              - 'Sysinternals'
        - Product|startswith: 'Sysinternals'
    filter_empty:
        - Company: null
        - Product: null
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Unsigned .node File Loaded
id: e5f5c693-52d7-4de5-88ae-afbfbce85595
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the loading of unsigned .node files.
    Adversaries may abuse a lack of .node integrity checking to execute arbitrary code inside of trusted applications such as Slack.
    .node files are native add-ons for Electron-based applications, which are commonly used for desktop applications like Slack, Discord, and Visual Studio Code.
    This technique has been observed in the DripLoader malware, which uses unsigned .node files to load malicious native code into Electron applications.
references:
    - https://www.coreycburton.com/blog/driploader-case-study
    - https://github.com/CoreyCBurton/DripLoaderNG
    - https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/native-code-and-electron
author: Jonathan Beierle (@hullabrian)
date: 2025-11-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1129
    - attack.t1574.001
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_node_extension:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '.node'
    selection_status:
        - Signed: 'false'
        - SignatureStatus: 'Unavailable'
    filter_optional_vscode_jupyter:
        Image|endswith: '\Code.exe'
        ImageLoaded|contains: '.vscode\extensions\ms-toolsai.jupyter-'
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\electron.napi.node'
            - '\node.napi.glibc.node'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - VsCode extensions or similar legitimate tools might use unsigned .node files. These should be investigated on a case-by-case basis, and whitelisted if determined to be benign.
level: medium

title: Copy From Or To Admin Share Or Sysvol Folder
id: 855bc8b5-2ae8-402e-a9ed-b889e6df1900
status: test
description: Detects a copy command or a copy utility execution to or from an Admin share or remote
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1211636381086339073
    - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/remote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share.html
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/18/defenders-beware-a-case-for-post-ransomware-investigations/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, Zach Stanford @svch0st, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2019-12-30
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.collection
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1039
    - attack.t1048
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_target:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\\\\*\\*$' # example \\SVR_NAME\ADMIN$
            - '\Sysvol\'
    selection_other_tools:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\robocopy.exe'
              - '\xcopy.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'robocopy.exe'
              - 'XCOPY.EXE'
    selection_cmd_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
    selection_cmd_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: 'copy'
    selection_pwsh_img:
        - Image|contains:
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'powershell_ise.exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_pwsh_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'copy-item'
            - 'copy '
            - 'cpi '
            - ' cp '
            - 'move '
            - ' move-item'
            - ' mi '
            - ' mv '
    condition: selection_target and (selection_other_tools or all of selection_cmd_* or all of selection_pwsh_*)
falsepositives:
    - Administrative scripts
level: medium

title: Suspicious Access to Sensitive File Extensions
id: 91c945bc-2ad1-4799-a591-4d00198a1215
related:
    - id: 286b47ed-f6fe-40b3-b3a8-35129acd43bc
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects known sensitive file extensions accessed on a network share
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1039
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        RelativeTargetName|endswith:
            - '.bak'
            - '.dmp'
            - '.edb'
            - '.kirbi'
            - '.msg'
            - '.nsf'
            - '.nst'
            - '.oab'
            - '.ost'
            - '.pst'
            - '.rdp'
            # - '\groups.xml'  # Commented out: groups.xml is accessed legitimately by Group Policy processing; high FP rate in enterprise environments
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Help Desk operator doing backup or re-imaging end user machine or backup software
    - Users working with these data types or exchanging message files
level: medium

title: Network Communication Initiated To Portmap.IO Domain
id: 07837ab9-60e1-481f-a74d-c31fb496a94c
status: test
description: Detects an executable accessing the portmap.io domain, which could be a sign of forbidden C2 traffic or data exfiltration by malicious actors
references:
    - https://portmap.io/
    - https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/issues/11337
    - https://pro.twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/1795001037746761892/photo/2
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-05-31
tags:
    - attack.t1041
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.002
    - attack.exfiltration
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationHostname|endswith: '.portmap.io'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of portmap.io domains
level: medium

title: Cisco Modify Configuration
id: 671ffc77-50a7-464f-9e3d-9ea2b493b26b
status: test
description: Modifications to a config that will serve an adversary's impacts or persistence
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019-08-12
modified: 2025-04-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
    - attack.t1505
    - attack.t1565.002
    - attack.t1053
logsource:
    product: cisco
    service: aaa
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'ip http server'
        - 'ip https server'
        - 'kron policy-list'
        - 'kron occurrence'
        - 'policy-list'
        - 'access-list'
        - 'ip access-group'
        - 'archive maximum'
        - 'ntp server'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrators may run these commands
level: medium

title: Powershell Keylogging
id: 34f90d3c-c297-49e9-b26d-911b05a4866c
status: test
description: Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1056.001/src/Get-Keystrokes.ps1
author: frack113
date: 2021-07-30
modified: 2022-07-11
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1056.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_basic:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Get-Keystrokes'
    selection_high: # want to run in background and keyboard
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Get-ProcAddress user32.dll GetAsyncKeyState'
            - 'Get-ProcAddress user32.dll GetForegroundWindow'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potential Keylogger Activity
id: 965e2db9-eddb-4cf6-a986-7a967df651e4
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell scripts that contains reference to keystroke capturing functions
references:
    - https://twitter.com/ScumBots/status/1610626724257046529
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d4486b63512755316625230e0c9c81655093be93876e0d80732e7eeaf7d83476/content
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/720a7ee9f2178c70501d7e3f4bcc28a4f456e200486dbd401b25af6da3b4da62/content
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.windows.input.keyboard.iskeydown?view=windowsdesktop-7.0
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-04
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1056.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: '[Windows.Input.Keyboard]::IsKeyDown([System.Windows.Input.Key]::'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Recon Command Output Piped To Findstr.EXE
id: ccb5742c-c248-4982-8c5c-5571b9275ad3
related:
    - id: fe63010f-8823-4864-a96b-a7b4a0f7b929
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of a potential recon command where the results are piped to "findstr". This is meant to trigger on inline calls of "cmd.exe" via the "/c" or "/k" for example.
    Attackers often time use this technique to extract specific information they require in their reconnaissance phase.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/02cb591f75064ffe1e0df9ac3ed5972a2e491c97/atomics/T1057/T1057.md#atomic-test-6---discover-specific-process---tasklist
    - https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/manage-engine-vulnerability-sector-alert-tlpclear.pdf
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/d/spring4shell-exploited-to-deploy-cryptocurrency-miners.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2023-07-06
modified: 2025-10-08
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1057
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: Add additional CLI to increase and enhance coverage
            # Note: We use wildcards in this instance to avoid writing a lot of variations that can be avoided easily. You can switch to regex if its supported by your backend.
            - 'ipconfig*|*find'
            - 'net*|*find'
            - 'netstat*|*find'
            - 'ping*|*find'
            - 'systeminfo*|*find'
            - 'tasklist*|*find'
            - 'whoami*|*find'
    filter_optional_xampp:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cmd.exe /c TASKLIST /V |'
            - 'FIND /I'
            - '\xampp\'
            - '\catalina_start.bat'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_findstr_recon_pipe_output/info.yml

title: Payload Decoded and Decrypted via Built-in Utilities
id: 234dc5df-40b5-49d1-bf53-0d44ce778eca
status: test
description: Detects when a built-in utility is used to decode and decrypt a payload after a macOS disk image (DMG) is executed. Malware authors may attempt to evade detection and trick users into executing malicious code by encoding and encrypting their payload and placing it in a disk image file. This behavior is consistent with adware or malware families such as Bundlore and Shlayer.
references:
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-5d42c3d772e04f1e8d0eb60f5233bc79def1ea73105a2d8822f44164f77ef823
author: Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-10-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1204
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1140
    - attack.s0482
    - attack.s0402
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/openssl'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/Volumes/'
            - 'enc'
            - '-base64'
            - ' -d '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Suspicious Execution via macOS Script Editor
id: 6e4dcdd1-e48b-42f7-b2d8-3b413fc58cb4
status: test
description: Detects when the macOS Script Editor utility spawns an unusual child process.
author: Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea)
references:
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-7f541fbc4a4a28a92970e8bf53effea5bd934604429112c920affb457f5b2685
    - https://wojciechregula.blog/post/macos-red-teaming-initial-access-via-applescript-url/
date: 2022-10-21
modified: 2022-12-28
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1566
    - attack.t1566.002
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1059.002
    - attack.t1204
    - attack.t1204.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1553
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '/Script Editor'
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '/curl'
              - '/bash'
              - '/sh'
              - '/zsh'
              - '/dash'
              - '/fish'
              - '/osascript'
              - '/mktemp'
              - '/chmod'
              - '/php'
              - '/nohup'
              - '/openssl'
              - '/plutil'
              - '/PlistBuddy'
              - '/xattr'
              - '/sqlite'
              - '/funzip'
              - '/popen'
        - Image|contains:
              - 'python'
              - 'perl'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Suspicious Installer Package Child Process
id: e0cfaecd-602d-41af-988d-f6ccebb2af26
status: test
description: Detects the execution of suspicious child processes from macOS installer package parent process. This includes osascript, JXA, curl and wget amongst other interpreters
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/4312d8c9583be524578a14fe6295c3370b9a9307/rules/macos/execution_installer_package_spawned_network_event.toml
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-02-18
tags:
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.t1071
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.command-and-control
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection_installer:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '/package_script_service'
            - '/installer'
        Image|endswith:
            - '/sh'
            - '/bash'
            - '/dash'
            - '/python'
            - '/ruby'
            - '/perl'
            - '/php'
            - '/javascript'
            - '/osascript'
            - '/tclsh'
            - '/curl'
            - '/wget'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'preinstall'
            - 'postinstall'
    condition: selection_installer
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software uses the scripts (preinstall, postinstall)
level: medium

title: Suspicious Browser Child Process - MacOS
id: 0250638a-2b28-4541-86fc-ea4c558fa0c6
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes spawned from browsers. This could be a result of a potential web browser exploitation.
references:
    - https://fr.slideshare.net/codeblue_jp/cb19-recent-apt-attack-on-crypto-exchange-employees-by-heungsoo-kang
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/4312d8c9583be524578a14fe6295c3370b9a9307/rules/macos/execution_initial_access_suspicious_browser_childproc.toml
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-04-05
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1189
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - 'com.apple.WebKit.WebContent'
            - 'firefox'
            - 'Google Chrome Helper'
            - 'Google Chrome'
            - 'Microsoft Edge'
            - 'Opera'
            - 'Safari'
            - 'Tor Browser'
        Image|endswith:
            - '/bash'
            - '/curl'
            - '/dash'
            - '/ksh'
            - '/osascript'
            - '/perl'
            - '/php'
            - '/pwsh'
            - '/python'
            - '/sh'
            - '/tcsh'
            - '/wget'
            - '/zsh'
    filter_main_generic:
        CommandLine|contains: '--defaults-torrc' # Informs tor to use default config file
    filter_main_ms_autoupdate:
        CommandLine|contains: '/Library/Application Support/Microsoft/MAU*/Microsoft AutoUpdate.app/Contents/MacOS/msupdate' # Microsoft AutoUpdate utility
    filter_main_chrome:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - 'Google Chrome Helper'
            - 'Google Chrome'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/Volumes/Google Chrome/Google Chrome.app/Contents/Frameworks/*/Resources/install.sh' # Install the Google Chrome browser
            - '/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/Frameworks/Google Chrome Framework.framework/*/Resources/keystone_promote_preflight.sh' # Updates the Google Chrome branding configuration files
            - '/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/Frameworks/Google Chrome Framework.framework/*/Resources/keystone_promote_postflight.sh' # Script that performs the post-installation tasks
    filter_main_ms_edge:
        ParentImage|contains: 'Microsoft Edge'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'IOPlatformExpertDevice' # Retrieves the IOPlatformUUID (parent process - Microsoft Edge)
            - 'hw.model' # Retrieves model name of the computer's hardware (parent process - Microsoft Edge)
    filter_main_chromerecovery:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - 'Google Chrome Helper'
            - 'Google Chrome'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/Users/'
            - '/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/recovery/'
            - '/ChromeRecovery'
    filter_optional_null:
        # Aoids alerting for the events which do not have command-line arguments
        CommandLine: null
    filter_optional_empty:
        # Aoids alerting for the events which do not have command-line arguments
        CommandLine: ''
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate browser install, update and recovery scripts
level: medium

title: Azure New CloudShell Created
id: 72af37e2-ec32-47dc-992b-bc288a2708cb
status: test
description: Identifies when a new cloudshell is created inside of Azure portal.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations
author: Austin Songer
date: 2021-09-21
modified: 2022-08-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName: MICROSOFT.PORTAL/CONSOLES/WRITE
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - A new cloudshell may be created by a system administrator.
level: medium

title: Potential Xterm Reverse Shell
id: 4e25af4b-246d-44ea-8563-e42aacab006b
status: test
description: Detects usage of "xterm" as a potential reverse shell tunnel
references:
    - https://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet
    - https://www.revshells.com/
author: '@d4ns4n_'
date: 2023-04-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|contains: 'xterm'
        CommandLine|contains: '-display'
        CommandLine|endswith: ':1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Python Spawning Pretty TTY Via PTY Module
id: c4042d54-110d-45dd-a0e1-05c47822c937
related:
    - id: 32e62bc7-3de0-4bb1-90af-532978fe42c0
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects a python process calling to the PTY module in order to spawn a pretty tty which could be indicative of potential reverse shell activity.
references:
    - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/
author: Nextron Systems
date: 2022-06-03
modified: 2024-11-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '/python'
              - '/python2'
              - '/python3'
        - Image|contains:
              - '/python2.'  # python image is always of the form ../python3.10; ../python is just a symlink
              - '/python3.'
    selection_cli_import:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'import pty'
            - 'from pty '
    selection_cli_spawn:
        CommandLine|contains: 'spawn'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Windows Defender Exclusions Added - PowerShell
id: c1344fa2-323b-4d2e-9176-84b4d4821c88
related:
    - id: 17769c90-230e-488b-a463-e05c08e9d48f
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects modifications to the Windows Defender configuration settings using PowerShell to add exclusions
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/windows-defender-exclusions-added-via-powershell.html
author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-16
modified: 2022-11-26
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: ps_script
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_args_exc:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - ' -ExclusionPath '
            - ' -ExclusionExtension '
            - ' -ExclusionProcess '
            - ' -ExclusionIpAddress '
    selection_args_pref:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'Add-MpPreference '
            - 'Set-MpPreference '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Suspicious File Created In PerfLogs
id: bbb7e38c-0b41-4a11-b306-d2a457b7ac2b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious file based on their extension being created in "C:\PerfLogs\". Note that this directory mostly contains ".etl" files
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\PerfLogs\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.7z'
            - '.bat'
            - '.bin'
            - '.chm'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.lnk'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.psm1'
            - '.py'
            - '.scr'
            - '.sys'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.zip'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: medium

title: Renamed FTP.EXE Execution
id: 277a4393-446c-449a-b0ed-7fdc7795244c
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed "ftp.exe" binary based on the PE metadata fields
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ftp/
author: Victor Sergeev, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_original:
        OriginalFileName: 'ftp.exe'
    filter_img:
        Image|endswith: '\ftp.exe'
    condition: selection_original and not filter_img
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_ftp/info.yml

title: Sysprep on AppData Folder
id: d5b9ae7a-e6fc-405e-80ff-2ff9dcc64e7e
status: test
description: Detects suspicious sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec)
references:
    - https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/thrip-hits-satellite-telecoms-defense-targets
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/61a296bb-81ad-4fee-955f-3b399f4aaf4b
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-06-22
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\sysprep.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '\AppData\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: medium

title: Use of FSharp Interpreters
id: b96b2031-7c17-4473-afe7-a30ce714db29
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of FSharp Interpreters "FsiAnyCpu.exe" and "FSi.exe"
    Both can be used for AWL bypass and to execute F# code via scripts or inline.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/design/applications-that-can-bypass-wdac
    - https://bohops.com/2020/11/02/exploring-the-wdac-microsoft-recommended-block-rules-part-ii-wfc-fsi/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/FsiAnyCpu/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Fsi/
author: Christopher Peacock @SecurePeacock, SCYTHE @scythe_io
date: 2022-06-02
modified: 2024-04-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\fsi.exe'
              - '\fsianycpu.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'fsi.exe'
              - 'fsianycpu.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use by a software developer.
level: medium

title: Renamed CURL.EXE Execution
id: 7530cd3d-7671-43e3-b209-976966f6ea48
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed "CURL.exe" binary based on the PE metadata fields
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Kostastsale/status/1700965142828290260
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-11
modified: 2023-10-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - OriginalFileName: 'curl.exe'
        - Description: 'The curl executable'
    filter_main_img:
        Image|contains: '\curl'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_curl/info.yml