title: Ngrok Usage with Remote Desktop Service
id: 64d51a51-32a6-49f0-9f3d-17e34d640272
status: test
description: Detects cases in which ngrok, a reverse proxy tool, forwards events to the local RDP port, which could be a sign of malicious behaviour
references:
    - https://twitter.com/tekdefense/status/1519711183162556416?s=12&t=OTsHCBkQOTNs1k3USz65Zg
    - https://ngrok.com/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-29
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: terminalservices-localsessionmanager
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 21
        Address|contains: '16777216'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - SharpChisel Execution
id: cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf
related:
    - id: 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Sharp Chisel via the commandline arguments
references:
    - https://github.com/shantanu561993/SharpChisel
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/wading-through-muddy-waters-recent-activity-of-an-iranian-state-sponsored-threat-actor/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-05
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpChisel.exe'
        - Product: 'SharpChisel'
    # See rule 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5 for Chisel.exe coverage
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Renamed Cloudflared.EXE Execution
id: e0c69ebd-b54f-4aed-8ae3-e3467843f3f0
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed "cloudflared" binary.
references:
    - https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared/releases
    - https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-networks/do-more-with-tunnels/trycloudflare/
    - https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared
    - https://www.intrinsec.com/akira_ransomware/
    - https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/tunnel-vision-cloudflared-abused-in-the-wild/
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.001
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-12-20
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cleanup:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' tunnel '
            - 'cleanup '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-config '
            - '-connector-id '
    selection_tunnel:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' tunnel '
            - ' run '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-config '
            - '-credentials-contents '
            - '-credentials-file '
            - '-token '
    selection_accountless:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-url'
            - 'tunnel'
    selection_hashes:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'SHA256=2fb6c04c4f95fb8d158af94c137f90ac820716deaf88d8ebec956254e046cb29'
            - 'SHA256=b3d21940a10fdef5e415ad70331ce257c24fe3bcf7722262302e0421791f87e8'
            - 'SHA256=1fbd8362b2d2d2e6a5750ae3db69cd1815e6c1d31da48a98b796450971a8e039'
            - 'SHA256=0409c9b12f9d0eda86e461ed9bdabeefb00172b26322079681a0bdf48e68dc28'
            - 'SHA256=7cfb411d04bac42ef93d1f0c93c0a481e38c6f4612b97ae89d4702595988edc7'
            - 'SHA256=5b3c2d846ab162dc6bc595cce3a49de5731afde5d6060be7066d21b013a28373'
            - 'SHA256=ce95df7f69664c3df19b76028e115931919a71517b776da7b42d353e2ff4a670'
            - 'SHA256=1293525a19cfe3bc8296b62fbfe19f083632ed644a1c18c10b045a1d3030d81a'
            - 'SHA256=af2b9161cfcb654b16408cd6b098afe9d1fb61a037d18d7090a119d4c0c8e0f0'
            - 'SHA256=39ddceb56a15798826a5fc4892fa2b474c444bb4d7a8bf2fa95e41cab10fa7a1'
            - 'SHA256=ccd11f2328023a0e7929e845d5b6e7bc783fb4650d65faef3ae090239d4bbce2'
            - 'SHA256=b6e5c5d2567ae8c69cc012ebcae30e6c9b5359d64a58d17ba75ec89f8bce71ac'
            - 'SHA256=f813484ea441404f18caad96f28138e8aaf0cb256163c09c2ab8a3acab87f69f'
            - 'SHA256=fc4a0802ab9c7409b892ca00636bec61e2acfc911bccfdeb9978b8ab5a2f828d'
            - 'SHA256=083150724b49604c8765c1ba19541fa260b133be0acb0647fcd936d81f054499'
            - 'SHA256=44303d6572956f28a0f2e4b188934fb9874f2584f5c81fa431a463cfbf28083b'
            - 'SHA256=5d38c46032a58e28ae5f7d174d8761ec3d64d186677f3ec53af5f51afb9bfd2f'
            - 'SHA256=e1e70fa42059911bc6685fafef957f9a73fc66f214d0704a9b932683a5204032'
            - 'SHA256=c01356092a365b84f84f0e66870bd1a05ba3feb53cafd973fa5fea2534bee234'
            - 'SHA256=b3f9c06151e30ee43d39e788a79cd918a314f24e04fe87f3de8272a2057b624f'
            - 'SHA256=cd81b2792f0739f473c31c9cb7cf2313154bfa28b839975802b90e8790bb5058'
            - 'SHA256=9ec7e6c8e1bfd883663d8d9d62c9e4f9ae373b731407181e32491b27a7218a2c'
            - 'SHA256=c2cfd23fdc6c0e1b1ffa0e545cbe556f18d11b362b4a89ba0713f6ab01c4827f'
            - 'SHA256=53f8adbd76c0eb16f5e43cadde422474d8a06f9c8f959389c1930042ad8beaa5'
            - 'SHA256=648c8d2f8001c113d2986dd00b7bbd181593d462bef73522cee212c4f71f95b3'
            - 'SHA256=ae047e2095e46c3f9c518b2be67ec753f4f0aad23b261a361fcb6144dcdb63b4'
            - 'SHA256=3153d2baa462978dd22ab33d1c2274ecc88c200225d6a3327f98d5b752d08f5c'
            - 'SHA256=f49cde976e628012c9db73e1c8d76081944ecf2297cdafeb78bb13290da274c4'
            - 'SHA256=d2513e58bb03ccc83affde685c6ef987924c37ce6707d8e9857e2524b0d7e90f'
            - 'SHA256=bb67c7623ba92fe64ffd9816b8d5b3b1ea3013960a30bd4cf6e295b3eb5b1bad'
            - 'SHA256=b34b3c3a91e3165d1481f0b3ec23eab93a1cfba94345a6cbfe5b18ddbd48eac7'
            - 'SHA256=f7848034e010d55f15e474ca998f96391e320ff29b00cfcc4c5e536529703e75'
            - 'SHA256=b6fc9493778cbe3bfc062d73f5cc604bc0ff058bc5e5dc6aac87f3a4008b54b6'
            - 'SHA256=f5c5e962577e2293c4ad10603816dce7cc273585969615fbf4e4bfa9eaff1688'
            - 'SHA256=d14c52d9220b606f428a8fe9f7c108b0d6f14cf71e7384749e98e6a95962e68f'
            - 'SHA256=d3a0e1a79158f3985cd49607ebe0cdfcc49cb9af96b8f43aefd0cdfe2f22e663'
            - 'SHA256=2fbbfc8299537ff80cadf9d0e27c223fe0ccb9052bf9d8763ad717bbfa521c77'
            - 'SHA256=19074674c6fbdaa573b3081745e5e26144fdf7a086d14e0e220d1814f1f13078'
    filter_main_known_names:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cloudflared.exe'
            - '\cloudflared-windows-386.exe'
            - '\cloudflared-windows-amd64.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PUA - Chisel Tunneling Tool Execution
id: 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5
related:
    - id: cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Chisel tunneling tool via the commandline arguments
references:
    - https://github.com/jpillora/chisel/
    - https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/lorenz-ransomware-chiseling-in/
    - https://blog.sekoia.io/lucky-mouse-incident-response-to-detection-engineering/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-13
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\chisel.exe'
    selection_param1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'exe client '
            - 'exe server '
    selection_param2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-socks5'
            - '-reverse'
            - ' r:'
            - ':127.0.0.1:'
            - '-tls-skip-verify '
            - ':socks'
    condition: selection_img or all of selection_param*
falsepositives:
    - Some false positives may occur with other tools with similar commandlines
level: high

title: RDP over Reverse SSH Tunnel WFP
id: 5bed80b6-b3e8-428e-a3ae-d3c757589e41
status: test
description: Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating with the loopback address
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1096148422984384514
    - https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/blob/44fbe85f72ee91582876b49678f9a26292a155fb/Command%20and%20Control/DE_RDP_Tunnel_5156.evtx
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-02-16
modified: 2022-09-02
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1090.001
    - attack.t1090.002
    - attack.t1021.001
    - car.2013-07-002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5156
    sourceRDP:
        SourcePort: 3389
        DestAddress:
            - '127.*'
            - '::1'
    destinationRDP:
        DestPort: 3389
        SourceAddress:
            - '127.*'
            - '::1'
    filter_app_container:
        FilterOrigin: 'AppContainer Loopback'
    filter_thor:  # checking BlueKeep vulnerability
        Application|endswith:
            - '\thor.exe'
            - '\thor64.exe'
    condition: selection and ( sourceRDP or destinationRDP ) and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
    - Programs that connect locally to the RDP port
level: high

title: PUA - Netcat Suspicious Execution
id: e31033fc-33f0-4020-9a16-faf9b31cbf08
status: test
description: Detects execution of Netcat. Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network
references:
    - https://nmap.org/ncat/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1095/T1095.md
    - https://www.revshells.com/
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-21
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1095
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        # can not use OriginalFileName as is empty
        Image|endswith:
            - '\nc.exe'
            - '\ncat.exe'
            - '\netcat.exe'
    selection_cmdline:
        # Typical command lines
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -lvp '
            - ' -lvnp'
            - ' -l -v -p '
            - ' -lv -p '
            - ' -l --proxy-type http '
            # - ' --exec cmd.exe ' # Not specific enough for netcat
            - ' -vnl --exec '
            - ' -vnl -e '
            - ' --lua-exec '
            - ' --sh-exec '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate ncat use
level: high

title: New Connection Initiated To Potential Dead Drop Resolver Domain
id: 297ae038-edc2-4b2e-bb3e-7c5fc94dd5c7
related:
    - id: d7b09985-95a3-44be-8450-b6eadf49833e
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
    Detects an executable, which is not an internet browser or known application, initiating network connections to legit popular websites, which were seen to be used as dead drop resolvers in previous attacks.
    In this context attackers leverage known websites such as "facebook", "youtube", etc. In order to pass through undetected.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220830134315/https://content.fireeye.com/apt-41/rpt-apt41/
    - https://securelist.com/the-tetrade-brazilian-banking-malware/97779/
    - https://blog.bushidotoken.net/2021/04/dead-drop-resolvers-espionage-inspired.html
    - https://github.com/kleiton0x00/RedditC2
    - https://twitter.com/kleiton0x7e/status/1600567316810551296
    - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/kleiton-kurti_github-kleiton0x00redditc2-abusing-reddit-activity-7009939662462984192-5DbI/?originalSubdomain=al
author: Sorina Ionescu, X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-17
modified: 2024-10-21
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1102
    - attack.t1102.001
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.t.me'
            - '4shared.com'
            - 'abuse.ch'
            - 'anonfiles.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
            - 'cloudflare.com'
            - 'ddns.net'
            - 'discord.com'
            - 'docs.google.com'
            - 'drive.google.com'
            - 'dropbox.com'
            - 'dropmefiles.com'
            - 'facebook.com'
            - 'feeds.rapidfeeds.com'
            - 'fotolog.com'
            - 'ghostbin.co/'
            - 'githubusercontent.com'
            - 'gofile.io'
            - 'hastebin.com'
            - 'imgur.com'
            - 'livejournal.com'
            - 'mediafire.com'
            - 'mega.co.nz'
            - 'mega.nz'
            - 'onedrive.com'
            - 'pages.dev'
            - 'paste.ee'
            - 'pastebin.com'
            - 'pastebin.pl'
            - 'pastetext.net'
            - 'pixeldrain.com'
            - 'privatlab.com'
            - 'privatlab.net'
            - 'reddit.com'
            - 'send.exploit.in'
            - 'sendspace.com'
            - 'steamcommunity.com'
            - 'storage.googleapis.com'
            - 'technet.microsoft.com'
            - 'temp.sh'
            - 'transfer.sh'
            - 'trycloudflare.com'
            - 'twitter.com'
            - 'ufile.io'
            - 'vimeo.com'
            - 'w3spaces.com'
            - 'wetransfer.com'
            - 'workers.dev'
            - 'youtube.com'
    # Note: Add/Remove browsers/applications that you don't use or those that have custom install locations
    # Note: To avoid complex conditions the filters for some apps are generic by name only. A custom tuning is recommended for best results
    filter_main_chrome:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
    filter_main_chrome_appdata:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        Image|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
    filter_main_firefox:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
    filter_main_firefox_appdata:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        Image|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
    filter_main_ie:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
    filter_main_edge_1:
        - Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\'
        - Image|endswith: '\WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
        - Image:
              - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
              - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
    filter_main_edge_2:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\msedgewebview2.exe'
    filter_main_safari:
        Image|contains:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Safari\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Safari\'
        Image|endswith: '\safari.exe'
    filter_main_defender:
        Image|contains:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\MsMpEng.exe' # Microsoft Defender executable
            - '\MsSense.exe' # Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection Service Executable
    filter_main_prtg:
        # Paessler's PRTG Network Monitor
        Image|endswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\PRTG Network Monitor\PRTG Probe.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\PRTG Network Monitor\PRTG Probe.exe'
    filter_main_brave:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\BraveSoftware\'
        Image|endswith: '\brave.exe'
    filter_main_maxthon:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Maxthon\'
        Image|endswith: '\maxthon.exe'
    filter_main_opera:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Programs\Opera\'
        Image|endswith: '\opera.exe'
    filter_main_seamonkey:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\SeaMonkey\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\SeaMonkey\'
        Image|endswith: '\seamonkey.exe'
    filter_main_vivaldi:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Vivaldi\'
        Image|endswith: '\vivaldi.exe'
    filter_main_whale:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Naver\Naver Whale\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Naver\Naver Whale\'
        Image|endswith: '\whale.exe'
    # Note: The TOR browser shouldn't be something you allow in your corporate network.
    # filter_main_tor:
    #     Image|contains: '\Tor Browser\'
    filter_main_whaterfox:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Waterfox\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Waterfox\'
        Image|endswith: '\Waterfox.exe'
    filter_main_midori:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Programs\midori-ng\'
        Image|endswith: '\Midori Next Generation.exe'
    filter_main_slimbrowser:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\SlimBrowser\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\SlimBrowser\'
        Image|endswith: '\slimbrowser.exe'
    filter_main_flock:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Flock\'
        Image|endswith: '\Flock.exe'
    filter_main_phoebe:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Phoebe\'
        Image|endswith: '\Phoebe.exe'
    filter_main_falkon:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Falkon\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Falkon\'
        Image|endswith: '\falkon.exe'
    filter_main_qtweb:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\QtWeb\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\QtWeb\'
        Image|endswith: '\QtWeb.exe'
    filter_main_avant:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Avant Browser\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Avant Browser\'
        Image|endswith: '\avant.exe'
    filter_main_whatsapp:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\WindowsApps\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\'
        Image|endswith: '\WhatsApp.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith: 'facebook.com'
    filter_main_telegram:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Telegram Desktop\'
        Image|endswith: '\Telegram.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith: '.t.me'
    filter_main_onedrive:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\'
        Image|endswith: '\OneDrive.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith: 'onedrive.com'
    filter_main_dropbox:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\Client\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Dropbox\Client\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\Dropbox.exe'
            - '\DropboxInstaller.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith: 'dropbox.com'
    filter_main_mega:
        Image|endswith:
            # Note: This is a basic/best effort filter in order to avoid FP with the MEGA installer and executable.
            #       In practice please apply exact path to avoid basic path bypass techniques.
            - '\MEGAsync.exe'
            - '\MEGAsyncSetup32_*RC.exe' # Beta versions
            - '\MEGAsyncSetup32.exe' # Installers 32bit
            - '\MEGAsyncSetup64.exe' # Installers 64bit
            - '\MEGAupdater.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - 'mega.co.nz'
            - 'mega.nz'
    filter_main_googledrive:
        Image|contains:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Google\Drive File Stream\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Drive File Stream\'
        Image|endswith: 'GoogleDriveFS.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith: 'drive.google.com'
    filter_main_discord:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Discord\'
        Image|endswith: '\Discord.exe'
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - 'discord.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
    filter_main_null:
        Image: null
    filter_main_empty:
        Image: ''
    # filter_optional_qlik:
    #     Image|endswith: '\Engine.exe' # Process from qlik.com app
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - One might need to exclude other internet browsers found in it's network or other applications like ones mentioned above from Microsoft Defender.
    - Ninite contacting githubusercontent.com
level: high

title: Process Initiated Network Connection To Ngrok Domain
id: 18249279-932f-45e2-b37a-8925f2597670
related:
    - id: 1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" domains.
    Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware.
    While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download.
references:
    - https://ngrok.com/
    - https://ngrok.com/blog-post/new-ngrok-domains
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cca0c1182ac114b44dc52dd2058fcd38611c20bb6b5ad84710681d38212f835a/
    - https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/files/2023_YEAR/CYBERCENTER/november/APT29%20attacks%20Embassies%20using%20CVE-2023-38831%20-%20report%20en.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-16
modified: 2025-07-30
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1102
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.ngrok-free.app'
            - '.ngrok-free.dev'
            - '.ngrok.app'
            - '.ngrok.dev'
            - '.ngrok.io'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the ngrok service.
# Note: The level of this rule is related to your internal policy.
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process Of Manage Engine ServiceDesk
id: cea2b7ea-792b-405f-95a1-b903ea06458f
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of the "Manage Engine ServiceDesk Plus" Java web service
references:
    - https://www.horizon3.ai/manageengine-cve-2022-47966-technical-deep-dive/
    - https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2022-47966/blob/3a51c6b72ebbd87392babd955a8fbeaee2090b35/CVE-2022-47966.py
    - https://blog.viettelcybersecurity.com/saml-show-stopper/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-18
modified: 2023-08-29
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1102
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|contains|all:
            - '\ManageEngine\ServiceDesk\'
            - '\java.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\AppVLP.exe'
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\calc.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\curl.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\mftrace.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\notepad.exe'  # Often used in POCs
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\query.exe'
            - '\reg.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\scrcons.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\whoami.exe'  # Often used in POCs
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            # - '\hh.exe'
            # - '\regsvr32.exe'
            # - '\rundll32.exe'
            # - '\scriptrunner.exe'
    filter_main_net:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' stop'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate sub processes started by Manage Engine ServiceDesk Pro
level: high

title: Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine
id: ba3f5c1b-6272-4119-9dbd-0bc8d21c2702
related:
    - id: 03d83090-8cba-44a0-b02f-0b756a050306
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the use of WinAPI Functions via the commandline. As seen used by threat actors via the tool winapiexec
references:
    - https://twitter.com/m417z/status/1566674631788007425
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-06
modified: 2025-03-06
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'AddSecurityPackage'
            - 'AdjustTokenPrivileges'
            - 'Advapi32'
            - 'CloseHandle'
            - 'CreateProcessWithToken'
            - 'CreatePseudoConsole'
            - 'CreateRemoteThread'
            - 'CreateThread'
            - 'CreateUserThread'
            - 'DangerousGetHandle'
            - 'DuplicateTokenEx'
            - 'EnumerateSecurityPackages'
            - 'FreeHGlobal'
            - 'FreeLibrary'
            - 'GetDelegateForFunctionPointer'
            - 'GetLogonSessionData'
            - 'GetModuleHandle'
            - 'GetProcAddress'
            - 'GetProcessHandle'
            - 'GetTokenInformation'
            - 'ImpersonateLoggedOnUser'
            - 'kernel32'
            - 'LoadLibrary'
            - 'memcpy'
            - 'MiniDumpWriteDump'
            # - 'msvcrt'
            - 'ntdll'
            - 'OpenDesktop'
            - 'OpenProcess'
            - 'OpenProcessToken'
            - 'OpenThreadToken'
            - 'OpenWindowStation'
            - 'PtrToString'
            - 'QueueUserApc'
            - 'ReadProcessMemory'
            - 'RevertToSelf'
            - 'RtlCreateUserThread'
            - 'secur32'
            - 'SetThreadToken'
            # - 'user32'
            - 'VirtualAlloc'
            - 'VirtualFree'
            - 'VirtualProtect'
            - 'WaitForSingleObject'
            - 'WriteInt32'
            - 'WriteProcessMemory'
            - 'ZeroFreeGlobalAllocUnicode'
    filter_optional_mpcmdrun:
        Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'GetLoadLibraryWAddress32'
    filter_optional_compatTelRunner:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\CompatTelRunner.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'FreeHGlobal'
            - 'PtrToString'
            - 'kernel32'
            - 'CloseHandle'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Some legitimate action or applications may use these functions. Investigate further to determine the legitimacy of the activity.
level: high

title: Suspicious Mshta.EXE Execution Patterns
id: e32f92d1-523e-49c3-9374-bdb13b46a3ba
status: test
description: Detects suspicious mshta process execution patterns
references:
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application
    - https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/mshta.exe
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/34221348-072d-4b70-93f3-aa71f6ebecad/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-17
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'MSHTA.EXE'
    selection_susp:
        # Suspicious parents
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        # Suspicious folders
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    filter_img:
        # Filter legit Locations
        - Image|startswith:
              - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
              - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
        # Suspicious extensions
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '.htm'
              - '.hta'
        # Filter simple execution
        - CommandLine|endswith:
              - 'mshta.exe'
              - 'mshta'
    condition: all of selection_* or (selection_img and not filter_img)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - CobaltStrike BOF Injection Pattern
id: 09706624-b7f6-455d-9d02-adee024cee1d
status: test
description: Detects a typical pattern of a CobaltStrike BOF which inject into other processes
references:
    - https://github.com/boku7/injectAmsiBypass
    - https://github.com/boku7/spawn
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-04
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CallTrace|re: '^C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll\.dll\+[a-z0-9]{4,6}\|C:\\Windows\\System32\\KERNELBASE\.dll\+[a-z0-9]{4,6}\|UNKNOWN\([A-Z0-9]{16}\)$'
        GrantedAccess:
            - '0x1028'
            - '0x1fffff'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Remote Registry Lateral Movement
id: 35c55673-84ca-4e99-8d09-e334f3c29539
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls to modify the registry and possible execute code
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rrp/0fa3191d-bb79-490a-81bd-54c2601b7a78
    - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-RRP.md
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:338cd001-2244-31f1-aaaa-900038001003"'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid: 338cd001-2244-31f1-aaaa-900038001003
        OpNum:
            - 6
            - 7
            - 8
            - 13
            - 18
            - 19
            - 21
            - 22
            - 23
            - 35
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Remote administration of registry values
level: high

title: User Shell Folders Registry Modification via CommandLine
id: 8f3ab69a-aa22-4943-aa58-e0a52fdf6818
related:
    - id: 9c226817-8dc9-46c2-a58d-66655aafd7dc
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects modifications to User Shell Folders registry values via reg.exe or PowerShell, which could indicate persistence attempts.
    Attackers may modify User Shell Folders registry values to point to malicious executables or scripts that will be executed during startup.
    This technique is often used to maintain persistence on a compromised system by ensuring that malicious payloads are executed automatically.
references:
    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/muddywater-snakes-riverbank/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-01-05
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'powershell.exe'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'reg.exe'
    selection_cli_action:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' add ' # reg.exe modification
            - 'New-ItemProperty'
            - 'Set-ItemProperty'
            - 'si ' # short for Set-ItemProperty
    selection_cli_paths_root:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders'
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders'
    selection_cli_paths_suffix:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Startup' # covers both 'Startup' and 'Common Startup'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Usage of reg.exe or PowerShell to modify User Shell Folders for legitimate purposes; but rare.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_user_shell_folders_registry_modification/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Change Startup Folder - HKLM Modify User Shell Folders Common Startup Value
      technique: T1547.001
      atomic_guid: acfef903-7662-447e-a391-9c91c2f00f7b

title: ShimCache Flush
id: b0524451-19af-4efa-a46f-562a977f792e
status: stable
description: Detects actions that clear the local ShimCache and remove forensic evidence
references:
    - https://medium.com/@blueteamops/shimcache-flush-89daff28d15e
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-02-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1a:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'apphelp.dll'
    selection1b:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ShimFlushCache'
            - '#250'
    selection2a:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'kernel32.dll'
    selection2b:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'BaseFlushAppcompatCache'
            - '#46'
    condition: ( selection1a and selection1b ) or ( selection2a and selection2b )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Reg Add Suspicious Paths
id: b7e2a8d4-74bb-4b78-adc9-3f92af2d4829
status: test
description: Detects when an adversary uses the reg.exe utility to add or modify new keys or subkeys
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1112/T1112.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
    - https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-19
modified: 2022-10-10
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_reg:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more suspicious registry locations below
            - '\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\'
            - '\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE'
            - '\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon'
            - '\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate add to registry via cli (to these locations)
level: high

title: Enable LM Hash Storage - ProcCreation
id: 98dedfdd-8333-49d4-9f23-d7018cccae53
related:
    - id: c420410f-c2d8-4010-856b-dffe21866437 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the "NoLMHash" registry value in order to allow Windows to store LM Hashes.
    By setting this registry value to "0" (DWORD), Windows will be allowed to store a LAN manager hash of your password in Active Directory and local SAM databases.
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/prevent-windows-store-lm-hash-password
    - https://www.sans.org/blog/protecting-privileged-domain-accounts-lm-hashes-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-12-15
modified: 2023-12-22
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa'
            - 'NoLMHash'
            - ' 0'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: New DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installed Via Dnscmd.EXE
id: f63b56ee-3f79-4b8a-97fb-5c48007e8573
related:
    - id: e61e8a88-59a9-451c-874e-70fcc9740d67
      type: derived
    - id: cbe51394-cd93-4473-b555-edf0144952d9
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the installation of a DNS plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required)
references:
    - https://medium.com/@esnesenon/feature-not-bug-dnsadmin-to-dc-compromise-in-one-line-a0f779b8dc83
    - https://blog.3or.de/hunting-dns-server-level-plugin-dll-injection.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-05-08
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1574.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\dnscmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/config'
            - '/serverlevelplugindll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Tampering With RDP Related Registry Keys Via Reg.EXE
id: 0d5675be-bc88-4172-86d3-1e96a4476536
status: test
description: Detects the execution of "reg.exe" for enabling/disabling the RDP service on the host by tampering with the 'CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' values
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/
    - http://etutorials.org/Microsoft+Products/microsoft+windows+server+2003+terminal+services/Chapter+6+Registry/Registry+Keys+for+Terminal+Services/ # Contain description for most of the keys mentioned here (check it out if you want more information
    - http://woshub.com/rds-shadow-how-to-connect-to-a-user-session-in-windows-server-2012-r2/ # Related to the Shadow RPD technique
    - https://admx.help/HKLM/SOFTWARE/Policies/Microsoft/Windows%20NT/Terminal%20Services # Contain description for most of the keys mentioned here (check it out if you want more information)
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/6f3aa9362d72e806490a8abce245331030d1ab5ac77e400dd475748236a6cc81/
    - https://blog.sekoia.io/darkgate-internals/
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/understanding-the-phobos-affiliate-structure/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/02c7d02fe1f1feb0fc7944550408ea8224273994/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-63---disable-remote-desktop-anti-alias-setting-through-registry
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/02c7d02fe1f1feb0fc7944550408ea8224273994/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-64---disable-remote-desktop-security-settings-through-registry
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/dd526047b8c399c312fee47d1e6fb531164da54d/atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml#L790
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/customize/desktop/unattend/microsoft-windows-terminalservices-rdp-winstationextensions-securitylayer
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190407-RegModEnableRDPConnections/notebook.html
    - https://twitter.com/SagieSec/status/1469001618863624194?t=HRf0eA0W1YYzkTSHb-Ky1A&s=03 # Related to the Shadow RPD technique
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200929062532/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-rdp-hijacking-via.html # Related to RDP hijacking via the "ServiceDll" key
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/i/unmasking-the-gentlemen-ransomware.html
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), @Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport
date: 2022-02-12
modified: 2025-11-22
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1021.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_main_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_main_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' add '
            - '\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server'
            - 'REG_DWORD'
            - ' /f'
    selection_values_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Licensing Core'
            - 'EnableConcurrentSessions'
    selection_values_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'AllowTSConnections'
            - 'fDenyTSConnections'
            - 'fEnableWinStation'
            - 'fSingleSessionPerUser'
            - 'IdleWinStationPoolCount'
            - 'MaxInstanceCount'
            - 'SecurityLayer'
            - 'TSAdvertise'
            - 'TSAppCompat'
            - 'TSEnabled'
            - 'TSUserEnabled'
            - 'WinStations\RDP-Tcp'
    filter_main_values_tls:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'SecurityLayer'
            - '02'  # TLS Enabled
    condition: all of selection_main_* and 1 of selection_values_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: RestrictedAdminMode Registry Value Tampering - ProcCreation
id: 28ac00d6-22d9-4a3c-927f-bbd770104573
related:
    - id: d6ce7ebd-260b-4323-9768-a9631c8d4db2 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the "DisableRestrictedAdmin" registry value in order to disable or enable RestrictedAdmin mode.
    RestrictedAdmin mode prevents the transmission of reusable credentials to the remote system to which you connect using Remote Desktop.
    This prevents your credentials from being harvested during the initial connection process if the remote server has been compromise
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/a8e3cf63e97b973a25903d3df9fd55da6252e564/atomics/T1112/T1112.md
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/32905.remote-desktop-services-enable-restricted-admin-mode.aspx
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/
author: frack113
date: 2023-01-13
modified: 2025-08-28
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa'
            - 'DisableRestrictedAdmin'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Imports Registry Key From an ADS
id: 0b80ade5-6997-4b1d-99a1-71701778ea61
related:
    - id: 73bba97f-a82d-42ce-b315-9182e76c57b1
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the import of a alternate datastream to the registry with regedit.exe.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regedit/
    - https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f
author: Oddvar Moe, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\regedit.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'REGEDIT.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /i '
            - '.reg'
        CommandLine|re: ':[^ \\]'
    filter:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' -e '
            - ' -a '
            - ' -c '
    condition: all of selection_* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Non-privileged Usage of Reg or Powershell
id: 8f02c935-effe-45b3-8fc9-ef8696a9e41d
status: test
description: Search for usage of reg or Powershell by non-privileged users to modify service configuration in registry
references:
    - https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment-20-638.jpg
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Ryan Plas (rule), oscd.community
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cli:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'reg '
              - 'add'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'powershell'
              - 'set-itemproperty'
              - ' sp '
              - 'new-itemproperty'
    selection_data:
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'Medium'
            - 'S-1-16-8192'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ControlSet'
            - 'Services'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ImagePath'
            - 'FailureCommand'
            - 'ServiceDLL'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Registry Modification From ADS Via Regini.EXE
id: 77946e79-97f1-45a2-84b4-f37b5c0d8682
related:
    - id: 5f60740a-f57b-4e76-82a1-15b6ff2cb134
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the import of an alternate data stream with regini.exe, regini.exe can be used to modify registry keys.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regini/
    - https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/regini
author: Eli Salem, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\regini.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'REGINI.EXE'
    selection_re:
        CommandLine|re: ':[^ \\]'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Security Event Logging Disabled via MiniNt Registry Key - Process
id: 1a4bd6af-99ac-4466-b5b2-7b72b4a05462
related:
    - id: 8839e550-52d7-4958-9f2f-e13c1e736838 # Disable Security Events Logging Adding Reg Key MiniNt - Registry Set
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects attempts to disable security event logging by adding the `MiniNt` registry key.
    This key is used to disable the Windows Event Log service, which collects and stores event logs from the operating system and applications.
    Adversaries may want to disable this service to prevent logging of security events that could be used to detect their activities.
references:
    - https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-04-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
    - attack.t1112
    - car.2022-03-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_reg_img:
        # Example: reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt"
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_reg_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' add '
            - '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt'
    selection_powershell_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_powershell_cmd1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'New-Item '
            - 'ni '
    selection_powershell_cmd2:
        CommandLine|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt'
    condition: all of selection_reg_* or all of selection_powershell_*
falsepositives:
    - Highly Unlikely
level: high

title: ETW Logging Disabled In .NET Processes - Registry
id: a4c90ea1-2634-4ca0-adbb-35eae169b6fc
related:
    - id: bf4fc428-dcc3-4bbd-99fe-2422aeee2544
      type: similar
status: test
description: Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368
    - https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_
    - https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a
    - http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code
    - https://i.blackhat.com/EU-21/Wednesday/EU-21-Teodorescu-Veni-No-Vidi-No-Vici-Attacks-On-ETW-Blind-EDRs.pdf
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-06-05
modified: 2022-12-20
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_etw_enabled:
        EventID: 4657
        ObjectName|endswith: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework'
        ObjectValueName: 'ETWEnabled'
        NewValue: 0
    selection_complus:
        EventID: 4657
        ObjectName|contains: '\Environment'
        ObjectValueName:
            - 'COMPlus_ETWEnabled'
            - 'COMPlus_ETWFlags'
        NewValue: 0
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: NetNTLM Downgrade Attack
id: d3abac66-f11c-4ed0-8acb-50cc29c97eed
related:
    - id: d67572a0-e2ec-45d6-b8db-c100d14b8ef2
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects NetNTLM downgrade attack
references:
    - https://www.optiv.com/blog/post-exploitation-using-netntlm-downgrade-attacks
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), wagga
date: 2018-03-20
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Object Access > Audit Registry (Success)'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4657
        ObjectName|contains|all:
            - '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM'
            - 'ControlSet'
            - '\Control\Lsa'
        ObjectValueName:
            - 'LmCompatibilityLevel'
            - 'NtlmMinClientSec'
            - 'RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Sysmon Channel Reference Deletion
id: 18beca67-ab3e-4ee3-ba7a-a46ca8d7d0cc
status: test
description: Potential threat actor tampering with Sysmon manifest and eventually disabling it
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Flangvik/status/1283054508084473861
    - https://twitter.com/SecurityJosh/status/1283027365770276866
    - https://securityjosh.github.io/2020/04/23/Mute-Sysmon.html
    - https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/cf08c38c61f7e46e8404b38201ca01c8
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-07-14
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID: 4657
        ObjectName|contains:
            - 'WINEVT\Publishers\{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}'
            - 'WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'
        ObjectValueName: 'Enabled'
        NewValue: 0
    selection2:
        EventID: 4663
        ObjectName|contains:
            - 'WINEVT\Publishers\{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}'
            - 'WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'
        AccessMask: '0x10000'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Change User Account Associated with the FAX Service
id: e3fdf743-f05b-4051-990a-b66919be1743
status: test
description: Detect change of the user account associated with the FAX service to avoid the escalation problem.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/dottor_morte/status/1544652325570191361
    - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/RiccardoAncarani/talks/master/F-Secure/unorthodox-lateral-movement.pdf
author: frack113
date: 2022-07-17
modified: 2022-12-30
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject: HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Fax\ObjectName
    filter:
        Details|contains: NetworkService
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Office Macros Warning Disabled
id: 91239011-fe3c-4b54-9f24-15c86bb65913
related:
    - id: 9b894e57-033f-46cf-b7fa-a52804181973
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects registry changes to Microsoft Office "VBAWarning" to a value of "1" which enables the execution of all macros, whether signed or unsigned.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397
    - https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/zloader-with-a-new-infection-technique/
    - https://securelist.com/scarcruft-surveilling-north-korean-defectors-and-human-rights-activists/105074/
author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2024-03-19
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Security\VBAWarnings'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: New DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installed
id: e61e8a88-59a9-451c-874e-70fcc9740d67
related:
    - id: cbe51394-cd93-4473-b555-edf0144952d9
      type: derived
    - id: f63b56ee-3f79-4b8a-97fb-5c48007e8573
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the installation of a DNS plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required)
references:
    - https://medium.com/@esnesenon/feature-not-bug-dnsadmin-to-dc-compromise-in-one-line-a0f779b8dc83
    - https://blog.3or.de/hunting-dns-server-level-plugin-dll-injection.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-05-08
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1574.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\services\DNS\Parameters\ServerLevelPluginDll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell Logging Disabled Via Registry Key Tampering
id: fecfd1a1-cc78-4313-a1ea-2ee2e8ec27a7
status: test
description: Detects changes to the registry for the currently logged-in user. In order to disable PowerShell module logging, script block logging or transcription and script execution logging
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-32---windows-powershell-logging-disabled
author: frack113
date: 2022-04-02
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1564.001
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\' # PowerShell 5
            - '\Microsoft\PowerShellCore\' # PowerShell 7
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\ModuleLogging\EnableModuleLogging'
            - '\ScriptBlockLogging\EnableScriptBlockLogging'
            - '\ScriptBlockLogging\EnableScriptBlockInvocationLogging'
            - '\Transcription\EnableTranscripting'
            - '\Transcription\EnableInvocationHeader'
            - '\EnableScripts'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_powershell_logging_disabled/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable PowerShell Logging via Registry
      technique: T1112
      atomic_guid: 95b25212-91a7-42ff-9613-124aca6845a8

title: Potential Persistence Via Outlook Today Page
id: 487bb375-12ef-41f6-baae-c6a1572b4dd1
related:
    - id: ddd171b5-2cc6-4975-9e78-f0eccd08cc76
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential persistence activity via outlook today page.
    An attacker can set a custom page to execute arbitrary code and link to it via the registry values "URL" and "UserDefinedUrl".
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=74
    - https://trustedsec.com/blog/specula-turning-outlook-into-a-c2-with-one-registry-change
author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems), David Bertho (@dbertho) & Eirik Sveen (@0xSV1), Storebrand
date: 2021-06-10
modified: 2024-08-07
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection_main:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - 'Software\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\Outlook\Today\'
    selection_value_stamp:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Stamp'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    selection_value_url:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\URL'
            - '\UserDefinedUrl'
    filter_main_office:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\Updates\'
        Image|endswith: '\OfficeClickToRun.exe'
    condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_value_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Wdigest Enable UseLogonCredential
id: d6a9b252-c666-4de6-8806-5561bbbd3bdc
status: test
description: Detects potential malicious modification of the property value of UseLogonCredential from HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest to enable clear-text credentials
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190510-RegModWDigestDowngrade/notebook.html
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/microsoft-security-advisory-update-to-improve-credentials-protection-and-management-may-13-2014-93434251-04ac-b7f3-52aa-9f951c14b649
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/73fcfa1d4863f6a4e17f90e54401de6e30a312bb/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-3---modify-registry-to-store-logon-credentials
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2019-09-12
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: 'WDigest\UseLogonCredential'
        Details: DWORD (0x00000001)
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: RDP Sensitive Settings Changed
id: 3f6b7b62-61aa-45db-96bd-9c31b36b653c
related:
    - id: 171b67e1-74b4-460e-8d55-b331f3e32d67
      type: obsolete
    - id: 41904ebe-d56c-4904-b9ad-7a77bdf154b3
      type: obsolete
    - id: a2863fbc-d5cb-48d5-83fb-d976d4b1743b
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects tampering of RDP Terminal Service/Server sensitive settings.
    Such as allowing unauthorized users access to a system via the 'fAllowUnsolicited' or enabling RDP via 'fDenyTSConnections', etc.

    Below is a list of registry keys/values that are monitored by this rule:

    - Shadow: Used to enable Remote Desktop shadowing, which allows an administrator to view or control a user's session.
    - DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias: Disables anti-aliasing for remote desktop sessions.
    - DisableSecuritySettings: Disables certain security settings for Remote Desktop connections.
    - fAllowUnsolicited: Allows unsolicited remote assistance offers.
    - fAllowUnsolicitedFullControl: Allows unsolicited remote assistance offers with full control.
    - InitialProgram: Specifies a program to run automatically when a user logs on to a remote computer.
    - ServiceDll: Used in RDP hijacking techniques to specify a custom DLL to be loaded by the Terminal Services service.
    - SecurityLayer: Specifies the security layer used for RDP connections.
references:
    - http://etutorials.org/Microsoft+Products/microsoft+windows+server+2003+terminal+services/Chapter+6+Registry/Registry+Keys+for+Terminal+Services/ # Contains description for most of the keys mentioned here (check it out if you want more information)
    - http://woshub.com/rds-shadow-how-to-connect-to-a-user-session-in-windows-server-2012-r2/ # Related to the Shadow RPD technique
    - https://admx.help/HKLM/SOFTWARE/Policies/Microsoft/Windows%20NT/Terminal%20Services # Contains description for most of the keys mentioned here (check it out if you want more information)
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/6f3aa9362d72e806490a8abce245331030d1ab5ac77e400dd475748236a6cc81/
    - https://blog.sekoia.io/darkgate-internals/
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/understanding-the-phobos-affiliate-structure/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/02c7d02fe1f1feb0fc7944550408ea8224273994/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-63---disable-remote-desktop-anti-alias-setting-through-registry
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/02c7d02fe1f1feb0fc7944550408ea8224273994/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-64---disable-remote-desktop-security-settings-through-registry
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/dd526047b8c399c312fee47d1e6fb531164da54d/atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml#L790
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/customize/desktop/unattend/microsoft-windows-terminalservices-rdp-winstationextensions-securitylayer
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190407-RegModEnableRDPConnections/notebook.html
    - https://twitter.com/SagieSec/status/1469001618863624194?t=HRf0eA0W1YYzkTSHb-Ky1A&s=03 # Related to the Shadow RPD technique
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200929062532/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-rdp-hijacking-via.html # Related to RDP hijacking via the "ServiceDll" key
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/i/unmasking-the-gentlemen-ransomware.html
author: Samir Bousseaden, David ANDRE, Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2022-08-06
modified: 2025-11-22
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_shadow:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Control\Terminal Server\'
            - '\Windows NT\Terminal Services\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Shadow'
        Details:
            - 'DWORD (0x00000001)' # Full Control with user’s permission
            - 'DWORD (0x00000002)' # Full Control without user’s permission
            - 'DWORD (0x00000003)' # View Session with user’s permission
            - 'DWORD (0x00000004)' # View Session without user’s permission
    selection_terminal_services_key:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Control\Terminal Server\'
            - '\Windows NT\Terminal Services\'
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias' # Disable anti-aliasing for remote desktop (DarkGate malware)
            - '\DisableSecuritySettings' # Disable security settings, allowing access to programs/entire desktop (DarkGate malware)
            - '\fAllowUnsolicited' # Allow unsolicited remote assistance offers
            - '\fAllowUnsolicitedFullControl'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    selection_tamper_only:
        # Any changes to these keys should be suspicious and looked at
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Control\Terminal Server\InitialProgram' # This value can be set to specify a program to run automatically when a user logs on to a remote computer.
            - '\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\InitialProgram' # This value can be set to specify a program to run automatically when a user logs on to a remote computer.
            - '\services\TermService\Parameters\ServiceDll' # RDP hijacking
            - '\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\SecurityLayer'
            - '\Windows NT\Terminal Services\InitialProgram' # This value can be set to specify a program to run automatically when a user logs on to a remote computer.
    filter_main_securitylayer_tls:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\SecurityLayer'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000002)' # TLS Enabled
    condition: (selection_shadow or selection_terminal_services_key or selection_tamper_only) and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Some of the keys mentioned here could be modified by an administrator while setting group policy (it should be investigated either way)
level: high

title: NET NGenAssemblyUsageLog Registry Key Tamper
id: 28036918-04d3-423d-91c0-55ecf99fb892
status: test
description: |
  Detects changes to the NGenAssemblyUsageLog registry key.
  .NET Usage Log output location can be controlled by setting the NGenAssemblyUsageLog CLR configuration knob in the Registry or by configuring an environment variable (as described in the next section).
  By simplify specifying an arbitrary value (e.g. fake output location or junk data) for the expected value, a Usage Log file for the .NET execution context will not be created.
references:
    - https://bohops.com/2021/03/16/investigating-net-clr-usage-log-tampering-techniques-for-edr-evasion/
author: frack113
date: 2022-11-18
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework\NGenAssemblyUsageLog'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Enable LM Hash Storage
id: c420410f-c2d8-4010-856b-dffe21866437
related:
    - id: 98dedfdd-8333-49d4-9f23-d7018cccae53 # process_creation
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the "NoLMHash" registry value in order to allow Windows to store LM Hashes.
    By setting this registry value to "0" (DWORD), Windows will be allowed to store a LAN manager hash of your password in Active Directory and local SAM databases.
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/prevent-windows-store-lm-hash-password
    - https://www.sans.org/blog/protecting-privileged-domain-accounts-lm-hashes-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-12-15
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: 'System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\NoLMHash'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Trust Access Disable For VBApplications
id: 1a5c46e9-f32f-42f7-b2bc-6e9084db7fbf
related:
    - id: 9b894e57-033f-46cf-b7fa-a52804181973
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects registry changes to Microsoft Office "AccessVBOM" to a value of "1" which disables trust access for VBA on the victim machine and lets attackers execute malicious macros without any Microsoft Office warnings.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397
    - https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/zloader-with-a-new-infection-technique/
    - https://securelist.com/scarcruft-surveilling-north-korean-defectors-and-human-rights-activists/105074/
author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Security\AccessVBOM'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Outlook Home Page
id: ddd171b5-2cc6-4975-9e78-f0eccd08cc76
related:
    - id: 487bb375-12ef-41f6-baae-c6a1572b4dd1
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential persistence activity via outlook home page.
    An attacker can set a home page to achieve code execution and persistence by editing the WebView registry keys.
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=70
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/outlook-home-page-feature-is-missing-in-folder-properties-d207edb7-aa02-46c5-b608-5d9dbed9bd04?ui=en-us&rs=en-us&ad=us
    - https://trustedsec.com/blog/specula-turning-outlook-into-a-c2-with-one-registry-change
author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems), David Bertho (@dbertho) & Eirik Sveen (@0xSV1), Storebrand
date: 2021-06-09
modified: 2024-08-07
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\Outlook\WebView\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\URL'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Event Log Access Tampering Via Registry
id: ba226dcf-d390-4642-b9af-b534872f1156
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string, as modifications to these values can restrict access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel. Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or via utilities such as "Get-EventLog" or "wevtutil".
references:
    - https://www.atomicredteam.io/atomic-red-team/atomics/T1562.002#atomic-test-8---modify-event-log-channel-access-permissions-via-registry---powershell
    - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uSYvHUVU8xY
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/security-descriptor-definition-language
author: X__Junior
date: 2025-01-16
modified: 2025-08-16
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    # O:SYG:SYD:(D;;0x1;;;WD)
    # O:BAG:SYD:(A;;0x2;;;S-1-15-2-1)(D;;0x1;;;WD)
    selection_key_1:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\CustomSD'
    selection_key_2:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\ChannelAccess'
    selection_details:
        - Details|contains: 'D:(D;'
        - Details|contains|all:
              - 'D:('
              - ')(D;'
    filter_main_trustedinstaller:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe'
    filter_main_tiworker:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
        Image|endswith: '\TiWorker.exe'
    filter_optional_empty:
        Image: ''
    filter_optional_null:
        Image: null
    condition: 1 of selection_key_* and selection_details and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity, still unlikely
level: high

title: Uncommon Microsoft Office Trusted Location Added
id: f742bde7-9528-42e5-bd82-84f51a8387d2
related:
    - id: a0bed973-45fa-4625-adb5-6ecdf9be70ac
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects changes to registry keys related to "Trusted Location" of Microsoft Office where the path is set to something uncommon. Attackers might add additional trusted locations to avoid macro security restrictions.
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://admx.help/?Category=Office2016&Policy=excel16.Office.Microsoft.Policies.Windows::L_TrustedLoc01
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-21
modified: 2023-09-29
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: 'Security\Trusted Locations\Location'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Path'
    filter_exclude_known_paths:
        Details|contains:
            - '%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Templates'
            - '%%APPDATA%%\Microsoft\Templates'
            - '%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Word\Startup'
            - '%%APPDATA%%\Microsoft\Word\Startup'
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Templates\'
            - ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office (x86)\Templates'
            - ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Templates\'
            - ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Templates\'
    filter_main_office_click_to_run:
        Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\'
        Image|endswith: '\OfficeClickToRun.exe'
    filter_main_office_apps:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_exclude_*
falsepositives:
    - Other unknown legitimate or custom paths need to be filtered to avoid false positives
level: high

title: ETW Logging Disabled In .NET Processes - Sysmon Registry
id: bf4fc428-dcc3-4bbd-99fe-2422aeee2544
related:
    - id: a4c90ea1-2634-4ca0-adbb-35eae169b6fc
      type: similar
status: test
description: Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368
    - https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_
    - https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a
    - http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code
    - https://blog.xpnsec.com/hiding-your-dotnet-complus-etwenabled/
    - https://i.blackhat.com/EU-21/Wednesday/EU-21-Teodorescu-Veni-No-Vidi-No-Vici-Attacks-On-ETW-Blind-EDRs.pdf
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-06-05
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection_etw_enabled:
        TargetObject|endswith: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework\ETWEnabled'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    selection_complus:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\COMPlus_ETWEnabled'
            - '\COMPlus_ETWFlags'
        Details:
            - 0 # For REG_SZ type
            - 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Change the Fax Dll
id: 9e3357ba-09d4-4fbd-a7c5-ad6386314513
status: test
description: Detect possible persistence using Fax DLL load when service restart
references:
    - https://twitter.com/dottor_morte/status/1544652325570191361
    - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/RiccardoAncarani/talks/master/F-Secure/unorthodox-lateral-movement.pdf
author: frack113
date: 2022-07-17
modified: 2022-12-30
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Fax\Device Providers\'
            - '\ImageName'
    filter:
        Details: '%systemroot%\system32\fxst30.dll' # Windows 10
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Security Event Logging Disabled via MiniNt Registry Key - Registry Set
id: 8839e550-52d7-4958-9f2f-e13c1e736838
related:
    - id: 1a4bd6af-99ac-4466-b5b2-7b72b4a05462 # Security Event Logging Disabled Via MiniNt Registry Key
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the addition of the 'MiniNt' key to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stop writing events.
    Windows Event Log is a service that collects and stores event logs from the operating system and applications. It is an important component of Windows security and auditing.
    Adversary may want to disable this service to disable logging of security events which could be used to detect their activities.
references:
    - https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-04-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
    - attack.t1112
    - car.2022-03-001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject: 'HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt\(Default)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Highly Unlikely
level: high

title: Outlook EnableUnsafeClientMailRules Setting Enabled - Registry
id: 6763c6c8-bd01-4687-bc8d-4fa52cf8ba08
related:
    - id: c3cefdf4-6703-4e1c-bad8-bf422fc5015a
      type: similar
    - id: 55f0a3a1-846e-40eb-8273-677371b8d912 # ProcCreation variation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects an attacker trying to enable the outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows outlook to run applications or execute macros
references:
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-control-the-rule-actions-to-start-an-application-or-run-a-macro-in-outlook-2016-and-outlook-2013-e4964b72-173c-959d-5d7b-ead562979048
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=44
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-08
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Outlook\Security\EnableUnsafeClientMailRules'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: DHCP Callout DLL Installation
id: 9d3436ef-9476-4c43-acca-90ce06bdf33a
status: test
description: Detects the installation of a Callout DLL via CalloutDlls and CalloutEnabled parameter in Registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DHCP server (restart required)
references:
    - https://blog.3or.de/mimilib-dhcp-server-callout-dll-injection.html
    - https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc726884(v=ws.10).aspx
    - https://msdn.microsoft.com/de-de/library/windows/desktop/aa363389(v=vs.85).aspx
author: Dimitrios Slamaris
date: 2017-05-15
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1574.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\Services\DHCPServer\Parameters\CalloutDlls'
            - '\Services\DHCPServer\Parameters\CalloutEnabled'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Macro Enabled In A Potentially Suspicious Document
id: a166f74e-bf44-409d-b9ba-ea4b2dd8b3cd
related:
    - id: 295a59c1-7b79-4b47-a930-df12c15fc9c2
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects registry changes to Office trust records where the path is located in a potentially suspicious location
references:
    - https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-21
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_value:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Security\Trusted Documents\TrustRecords'
    selection_paths:
        TargetObject|contains:
            # Note: add more locations where you don't expect a user to executed macro enabled docs
            - '/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/'
            - '/AppData/Local/Temp/'
            - '/PerfLogs/'
            - 'C:/Users/Public/'
            - 'file:///D:/'
            - 'file:///E:/'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: RestrictedAdminMode Registry Value Tampering
id: d6ce7ebd-260b-4323-9768-a9631c8d4db2
related:
    - id: 28ac00d6-22d9-4a3c-927f-bbd770104573 # process_creation
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the "DisableRestrictedAdmin" registry value in order to disable or enable RestrictedAdmin mode.
    RestrictedAdmin mode prevents the transmission of reusable credentials to the remote system to which you connect using Remote Desktop.
    This prevents your credentials from being harvested during the initial connection process if the remote server has been compromise
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/a8e3cf63e97b973a25903d3df9fd55da6252e564/atomics/T1112/T1112.md
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/32905.remote-desktop-services-enable-restricted-admin-mode.aspx
author: frack113
date: 2023-01-13
modified: 2024-08-23
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: 'System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\DisableRestrictedAdmin'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Registry Modification for OCI DLL Redirection
id: c0e0bdec-3e3d-47aa-9974-05539c999c89
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects registry modifications related to 'OracleOciLib' and 'OracleOciLibPath' under 'MSDTC' settings.
    Threat actors may modify these registry keys to redirect the loading of 'oci.dll' to a malicious DLL, facilitating phantom DLL hijacking via the MSDTC service.
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/4-ways-adversaries-hijack-dlls/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-01-24
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_ocilib:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSDTC\MTxOCI\OracleOciLib'
    filter_main_ocilib_file:
        # it is looking when oci.dll name is changed to something else like evil.dll
        Details|contains: 'oci.dll'
    selection_ocilibpath:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSDTC\MTxOCI\OracleOciLibPath'
    filter_main_ocilibpath:
        # it is looking when oci.dll path is changed to something else like 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
        Details|contains: '%SystemRoot%\System32\'
    condition: (selection_ocilib and not filter_main_ocilib_file) or (selection_ocilibpath and not filter_main_ocilibpath)
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Service Binary in Suspicious Folder
id: a07f0359-4c90-4dc4-a681-8ffea40b4f47
related:
    - id: c0abc838-36b0-47c9-b3b3-a90c39455382
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detect the creation of a service with a service binary located in a suspicious directory
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2022-05-02
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_service_start:
        TargetObject|startswith: 'HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Start'
        Image|contains:
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Perflogs\'
            - '\ADMIN$\'
            - '\Temp\'
        Details:
            - 'DWORD (0x00000000)'  # boot
            - 'DWORD (0x00000001)'  # System
            - 'DWORD (0x00000002)'  # Automatic
            # 3 - Manual , 4 - Disabled
    selection_service_imagepath:
        TargetObject|startswith: 'HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\ImagePath'
        Details|contains:
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Perflogs\'
            - '\ADMIN$\'
            - '\Temp\'
    filter_optional_avast:
        Image|contains|all: # Filter FP with Avast software
            - '\Common Files\'
            - '\Temp\'
    filter_optional_mbamservice:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\CurrentControlSet\Services\MBAMInstallerService\ImagePath'
        Details|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Temp\MBAMInstallerService.exe"'
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\services.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Qakbot Registry Activity
id: 1c8e96cd-2bed-487d-9de0-b46c90cade56
status: test
description: Detects a registry key used by IceID in a campaign that distributes malicious OneNote files
references:
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/onenote-growing-threat-malware-distribution
author: Hieu Tran
date: 2023-03-13
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Software\firm\soft\Name'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high