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Sigma rules for Flame

500 rules · scoped to actor · back to Flame
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.
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Detection rules

50 of 500
related high
Time Travel Debugging Utility Usage
Detects usage of Time Travel Debugging Utility. Adversaries can execute malicious processes and dump processes, such as lsass.exe, via tttracer.exe.
status test author Ensar Şamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative id 0b4ae027-2a2d-4b93-8c7e-962caaba5b2a license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Time Travel Debugging Utility Usage
id: 0b4ae027-2a2d-4b93-8c7e-962caaba5b2a
related:
    - id: e76c8240-d68f-4773-8880-5c6f63595aaf
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects usage of Time Travel Debugging Utility. Adversaries can execute malicious processes and dump processes, such as lsass.exe, via tttracer.exe.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Tttracer/
    - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1196390321783025666
    - https://twitter.com/oulusoyum/status/1191329746069655553
author: 'Ensar Şamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative'
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\tttracer.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage by software developers/testers
level: high
related high
Suspicious Provlaunch.EXE Child Process
Detects suspicious child processes of "provlaunch.exe" which might indicate potential abuse to proxy execution.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id f9999590-1f94-4a34-a91e-951e47bedefd license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Provlaunch.EXE Child Process
id: f9999590-1f94-4a34-a91e-951e47bedefd
related:
    - id: 7f5d1c9a-3e83-48df-95a7-2b98aae6c13c # CLI Generic
      type: similar
    - id: 2a4b3e61-9d22-4e4a-b60f-6e8f0cde6f25 # CLI Registry
      type: similar
    - id: 7021255e-5db3-4946-a8b9-0ba7a4644a69 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of "provlaunch.exe" which might indicate potential abuse to proxy execution.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Provlaunch/
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1674399582162153472
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\provlaunch.exe'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\calc.exe'
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\notepad.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - Image|contains:
              - ':\PerfLogs\'
              - ':\Temp\'
              - ':\Users\Public\'
              - '\AppData\Temp\'
              - '\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
              - '\Windows\Tasks\'
              - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Renamed MegaSync Execution
Detects the execution of a renamed MegaSync.exe as seen used by ransomware families like Nefilim, Sodinokibi, Pysa, and Conti.
status test author Sittikorn S id 643bdcac-8b82-49f4-9fd9-25a90b929f3b license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Renamed MegaSync Execution
id: 643bdcac-8b82-49f4-9fd9-25a90b929f3b
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed MegaSync.exe as seen used by ransomware families like Nefilim, Sodinokibi, Pysa, and Conti.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/
author: Sittikorn S
date: 2021-06-22
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        OriginalFileName: 'megasync.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\megasync.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Software that illegally integrates MegaSync in a renamed form
    - Administrators that have renamed MegaSync
level: high
related high
Uncommon Child Process Of Setres.EXE
Detects uncommon child process of Setres.EXE. Setres.EXE is a Windows server only process and tool that can be used to set the screen resolution. It can potentially be abused in order to launch any arbitrary file with a name containing the word "choice" from the current execution path.
status test author @gott_cyber, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 835e75bf-4bfd-47a4-b8a6-b766cac8bcb7 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Uncommon Child Process Of Setres.EXE
id: 835e75bf-4bfd-47a4-b8a6-b766cac8bcb7
status: test
description: |
    Detects uncommon child process of Setres.EXE.
    Setres.EXE is a Windows server only process and tool that can be used to set the screen resolution.
    It can potentially be abused in order to launch any arbitrary file with a name containing the word "choice" from the current execution path.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Setres/
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1583356502340870144
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setres.exe-0E30E4C09637D7A128A37B59A3BC4D09.html
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc731033(v=ws.11)
author: '@gott_cyber, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)'
date: 2022-12-11
modified: 2024-06-26
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\setres.exe'
        Image|contains: '\choice'
    filter_main_legit_location:
        Image|endswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\choice.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\choice.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
related high
Suspicious AddinUtil.EXE CommandLine Execution
Detects execution of the Add-In deployment cache updating utility (AddInutil.exe) with suspicious Addinroot or Pipelineroot paths. An adversary may execute AddinUtil.exe with uncommon Addinroot/Pipelineroot paths that point to the adversaries Addins.Store payload.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Michael McKinley (@McKinleyMike), Tony Latteri (@TheLatteri) id 631b22a4-70f4-4e2f-9ea8-42f84d9df6d8 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious AddinUtil.EXE CommandLine Execution
id: 631b22a4-70f4-4e2f-9ea8-42f84d9df6d8
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of the Add-In deployment cache updating utility (AddInutil.exe) with suspicious Addinroot or Pipelineroot paths. An adversary may execute AddinUtil.exe with uncommon Addinroot/Pipelineroot paths that point to the adversaries Addins.Store payload.
references:
    - https://www.blue-prints.blog/content/blog/posts/lolbin/addinutil-lolbas.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Michael McKinley (@McKinleyMike), Tony Latteri (@TheLatteri)
date: 2023-09-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\addinutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'AddInUtil.exe'
    selection_susp_1_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-AddInRoot:'
            - '-PipelineRoot:'
    selection_susp_1_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    selection_susp_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-AddInRoot:.'
            - '-AddInRoot:"."'
            - '-PipelineRoot:.'
            - '-PipelineRoot:"."'
        CurrentDirectory|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: selection_img and (all of selection_susp_1_* or selection_susp_2)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Execution via stordiag.exe
Detects the use of stordiag.exe to execute schtasks.exe systeminfo.exe and fltmc.exe
status test author Austin Songer (@austinsonger) id 961e0abb-1b1e-4c84-a453-aafe56ad0d34 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Execution via stordiag.exe
id: 961e0abb-1b1e-4c84-a453-aafe56ad0d34
status: test
description: Detects the use of stordiag.exe to execute schtasks.exe systeminfo.exe and fltmc.exe
references:
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/stordiag.exe-1F08FC87C373673944F6A7E8B18CD845.html
    - https://twitter.com/eral4m/status/1451112385041911809
author: Austin Songer (@austinsonger)
date: 2021-10-21
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\stordiag.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\fltmc.exe'
    filter:
        ParentImage|startswith: # as first is "Copy c:\windows\system32\stordiag.exe to a folder"
            - 'c:\windows\system32\'
            - 'c:\windows\syswow64\'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of stordiag.exe.
level: high
related high
Potentially Suspicious Child Processes Spawned by ConHost
Detects suspicious child processes related to Windows Shell utilities spawned by `conhost.exe`, which could indicate malicious activity using trusted system components.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id dfa03a09-8b92-4d83-8e74-f72839b1c407 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potentially Suspicious Child Processes Spawned by ConHost
id: dfa03a09-8b92-4d83-8e74-f72839b1c407
related:
    - id: 7dc2dedd-7603-461a-bc13-15803d132355
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious child processes related to Windows Shell utilities spawned by `conhost.exe`, which could indicate malicious activity using trusted system components.
references:
    - https://tria.ge/241015-l98snsyeje/behavioral2
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-02-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1202
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\conhost.exe'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'             # Windows Command Prompt
              - '\cscript.exe'         # Windows Script Host (used for scripting exploits)
              - '\mshta.exe'           # MSHTA (HTML Application Host, often abused)
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'  # PowerShell ISE
              - '\powershell.exe'      # Windows PowerShell
              - '\pwsh.exe'            # PowerShell Core
              - '\regsvr32.exe'        # Windows Registry Server (commonly used for exploits)
              - '\wscript.exe'         # Windows Script Host (for executing scripts)
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'cmd.exe'
              - 'cscript.exe'
              - 'mshta.exe'
              - 'powershell_ise.exe'
              - 'powershell.exe'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'regsvr32.exe'
              - 'wscript.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative tasks using `conhost.exe` to spawn child processes such as `cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, or `regsvr32.exe`.
level: high
related high
Suspicious AgentExecutor PowerShell Execution
Detects execution of the AgentExecutor.exe binary. Which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute powershell scripts with the ExecutionPolicy "Bypass" or any binary named "powershell.exe" located in the path provided by 6th positional argument
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), memory-shards id c0b40568-b1e9-4b03-8d6c-b096da6da9ab license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious AgentExecutor PowerShell Execution
id: c0b40568-b1e9-4b03-8d6c-b096da6da9ab
related:
    - id: 7efd2c8d-8b18-45b7-947d-adfe9ed04f61
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of the AgentExecutor.exe binary. Which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute powershell scripts with the ExecutionPolicy "Bypass" or any binary named "powershell.exe" located in the path provided by 6th positional argument
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), memory-shards
references:
    - https://twitter.com/lefterispan/status/1286259016436514816
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Agentexecutor/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/intune-management-extension
    - https://twitter.com/jseerden/status/1247985304667066373/photo/1
date: 2022-12-24
modified: 2024-08-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\AgentExecutor.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'AgentExecutor.exe'
    selection_cli:
        # Example:
        #   AgentExecutor.exe -powershell [scriptPath] [outputFilePath] [errorFilePath] [timeoutFilePath] [timeoutSeconds] [powershellPath] [enforceSignatureCheck] [runAs32BitOn64]
        # Note:
        #   - If [timeoutSeconds] is NULL then it defaults to 60000
        #   - If [enforceSignatureCheck] is:
        #       - "NULL" or "1" then a PowerShell instance is spawned with the args: "-NoProfile -executionPolicy allsigned -file "
        #       - Else a PowerShell instance is spawned with the args: "-NoProfile -executionPolicy bypass -file "
        #   - [powershellPath] is always concatendated to "powershell.exe"
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -powershell' # Also covers the "-powershellDetection" flag
            - ' -remediationScript'
    filter_main_pwsh:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\'
    filter_main_intune:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\Microsoft.Management.Services.IntuneWindowsAgent.exe'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Potential Suspicious Mofcomp Execution
Detects execution of the "mofcomp" utility as a child of a suspicious shell or script running utility or by having a suspicious path in the commandline. The "mofcomp" utility parses a file containing MOF statements and adds the classes and class instances defined in the file to the WMI repository. Attackers abuse this utility to install malicious MOF scripts
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 1dd05363-104e-4b4a-b963-196a534b03a1 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential Suspicious Mofcomp Execution
id: 1dd05363-104e-4b4a-b963-196a534b03a1
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of the "mofcomp" utility as a child of a suspicious shell or script running utility or by having a suspicious path in the commandline.
    The "mofcomp" utility parses a file containing MOF statements and adds the classes and class instances defined in the file to the WMI repository.
    Attackers abuse this utility to install malicious MOF scripts
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
    - https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Sigma-Rules/blob/75260568a7ffe61b2458ca05f6f25914efb44337/win_mofcomp_execution.yml
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/mofcomp
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-12
modified: 2023-04-11
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\mofcomp.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'mofcomp.exe'
    selection_case:
        - ParentImage|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\wsl.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
              - '\Users\Public\'
              - '\WINDOWS\Temp\'
              - '%temp%'
              - '%tmp%'
              - '%appdata%'
    filter_main_wmiprvse:
        ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'C:\Windows\TEMP\'
        CommandLine|endswith: '.mof'
    filter_optional_null_parent:
        # Sometimes the parent information isn't available from the Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing provider.
        CommandLine|contains: 'C:\Windows\TEMP\'
        CommandLine|endswith: '.mof'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
File Download Via Windows Defender MpCmpRun.EXE
Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files
status test author Matthew Matchen id 46123129-1024-423e-9fae-43af4a0fa9a5 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: File Download Via Windows Defender MpCmpRun.EXE
id: 46123129-1024-423e-9fae-43af4a0fa9a5
status: test
description: Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200903194959/https://twitter.com/djmtshepana/status/1301608169496612866
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/MpCmdRun/
author: Matthew Matchen
date: 2020-09-04
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
        - Description: 'Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'DownloadFile'
            - 'url'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Sensitive File Dump Via Print.EXE
Detects the abuse of the Print.exe utility for credential harvesting which involves using Print.Exe to copy sensitive files such as ntds.dit, SAM, SECURITY, or SYSTEM from the Windows directory in order to extract credentials, locally or remotely.
status test author Ayush Anand (Securityinbits) id 2fcda7e2-8c57-4904-86ac-37fc3157e09d license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Sensitive File Dump Via Print.EXE
id: 2fcda7e2-8c57-4904-86ac-37fc3157e09d
status: test
description: |
    Detects the abuse of the Print.exe utility for credential harvesting which involves using Print.Exe to copy sensitive files such as ntds.dit, SAM, SECURITY, or SYSTEM from the Windows directory in order to extract credentials, locally or remotely.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/02/06/active-exploitation-solarwinds-web-help-desk/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/credential-theft-expanding-your-reach-pt-2
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Print/
author: Ayush Anand (Securityinbits)
date: 2026-04-28
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1003.003
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\print.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Print.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '/D'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\config\SAM'
            - '\config\SECURITY'
            - '\config\SYSTEM'
            - '\windows\ntds\ntds.dit'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_print_dump_sensitive_files/info.yml
related high
Potential Provisioning Registry Key Abuse For Binary Proxy Execution
Detects potential abuse of the provisioning registry key for indirect command execution through "Provlaunch.exe".
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel id 2a4b3e61-9d22-4e4a-b60f-6e8f0cde6f25 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential Provisioning Registry Key Abuse For Binary Proxy Execution
id: 2a4b3e61-9d22-4e4a-b60f-6e8f0cde6f25
related:
    - id: 7f5d1c9a-3e83-48df-95a7-2b98aae6c13c # CLI Generic
      type: similar
    - id: f9999590-1f94-4a34-a91e-951e47bedefd # CLI Abuse
      type: similar
    - id: 7021255e-5db3-4946-a8b9-0ba7a4644a69 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential abuse of the provisioning registry key for indirect command execution through "Provlaunch.exe".
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Provlaunch/
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1674399582162153472
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-08-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
RemoteFXvGPUDisablement Abuse Via AtomicTestHarnesses
Detects calls to the AtomicTestHarnesses "Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand" which is designed to abuse the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary to run custom PowerShell code via module load-order hijacking.
status test author frack113 id a6fc3c46-23b8-4996-9ea2-573f4c4d88c5 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: RemoteFXvGPUDisablement Abuse Via AtomicTestHarnesses
id: a6fc3c46-23b8-4996-9ea2-573f4c4d88c5
related:
    - id: f65e22f9-819e-4f96-9c7b-498364ae7a25 # PS Classic
      type: similar
    - id: 38a7625e-b2cb-485d-b83d-aff137d859f4 # PS Module
      type: similar
    - id: cacef8fc-9d3d-41f7-956d-455c6e881bc5 # PS ScriptBlock
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects calls to the AtomicTestHarnesses "Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand" which is designed to abuse the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary to run custom PowerShell code via module load-order hijacking.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/7e1e4da116801e3d6fcc6bedb207064577e40572/TestHarnesses/T1218_SignedBinaryProxyExecution/InvokeRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand.ps1
author: frack113
date: 2021-07-13
modified: 2023-05-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand'
            - 'Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisableme'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Self Extracting Package Creation Via Iexpress.EXE From Potentially Suspicious Location
Detects the use of iexpress.exe to create binaries via Self Extraction Directive (SED) files located in potentially suspicious locations. This behavior has been observed in-the-wild by different threat actors.
status test author Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id b2b048b0-7857-4380-b0fb-d3f0ab820b71 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Self Extracting Package Creation Via Iexpress.EXE From Potentially Suspicious Location
id: b2b048b0-7857-4380-b0fb-d3f0ab820b71
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of iexpress.exe to create binaries via Self Extraction Directive (SED) files located in potentially suspicious locations.
    This behavior has been observed in-the-wild by different threat actors.
references:
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/iexpress.exe-D594B2A33EFAFD0EABF09E3FDC05FCEA.html
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IExpress
    - https://decoded.avast.io/janvojtesek/raspberry-robins-roshtyak-a-little-lesson-in-trickery/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/602f4ae507fa8de57ada079adff25a6c2a899bd25cd092d0af7e62cdb619c93c/behavior
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-02-05
modified: 2024-06-04
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # VT Query: behavior_processes:"iexpress.exe" and behavior_processes:"/n /q /m" and behavior_processes:"*.sed*" and p:5+
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\iexpress.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'IEXPRESS.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /n '
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: Add more uncommon paths that fit your organizational needs.
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrators building packages using iexpress.exe
level: high
related high
Arbitrary File Download Via IMEWDBLD.EXE
Detects usage of "IMEWDBLD.exe" to download arbitrary files
status test author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel id 863218bd-c7d0-4c52-80cd-0a96c09f54af license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Arbitrary File Download Via IMEWDBLD.EXE
id: 863218bd-c7d0-4c52-80cd-0a96c09f54af
related:
    - id: 8d7e392e-9b28-49e1-831d-5949c6281228
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects usage of "IMEWDBLD.exe" to download arbitrary files
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-10---windows---powershell-download
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/IMEWDBLD/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\IMEWDBLD.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'imewdbld.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
# Note: Please reduce this to medium if you find legitimate use case of this utility with a URL
level: high
related high
MSDT Execution Via Answer File
Detects execution of "msdt.exe" using an answer file which is simulating the legitimate way of calling msdt via "pcwrun.exe" (For example from the compatibility tab).
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 9c8c7000-3065-44a8-a555-79bcba5d9955 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: MSDT Execution Via Answer File
id: 9c8c7000-3065-44a8-a555-79bcba5d9955
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of "msdt.exe" using an answer file which is simulating the legitimate way of calling msdt via "pcwrun.exe" (For example from the compatibility tab).
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msdt/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-13
modified: 2025-10-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\msdt.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '\WINDOWS\diagnostics\index\PCWDiagnostic.xml'
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -af '
    filter_main_pcwrun:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\pcwrun.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Possible undocumented parents of "msdt" other than "pcwrun".
level: high
related high
Suspicious BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility Execution
Detects the execution of the BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) which is not a common parent process for other processes. Suspicious child processes spawned by baaupdate.exe could indicate an attempt at lateral movement via BitLocker DCOM & COM Hijacking.
status experimental author andrewdanis, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 9f38c1db-e2ae-40bf-81d0-5b68f73fb512 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility Execution
id: 9f38c1db-e2ae-40bf-81d0-5b68f73fb512
related:
    - id: 6e8fe0a8-ba0b-4a93-8f9e-82657e7a5984 # BaaUpdate.exe Suspicious DLL Load
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of the BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) which is not a common parent process for other processes.
    Suspicious child processes spawned by baaupdate.exe could indicate an attempt at lateral movement via BitLocker DCOM & COM Hijacking.
references:
    - https://github.com/rtecCyberSec/BitlockMove
author: andrewdanis, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\baaupdate.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Suspicious DLL Loaded via CertOC.EXE
Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to load the target DLL file.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 84232095-ecca-4015-b0d7-7726507ee793 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious DLL Loaded via CertOC.EXE
id: 84232095-ecca-4015-b0d7-7726507ee793
related:
    - id: 242301bc-f92f-4476-8718-78004a6efd9f
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to load the target DLL file.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/sblmsrsn/status/1445758411803480072?s=20
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-fe98e74189873d6df72a15df2eaa0315c59ba9cdaca93ecd68afc4ea09194ef2
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certoc/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-15
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certoc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertOC.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -LoadDLL '
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Appdata\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Tasks\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Devtoolslauncher.exe Executes Specified Binary
The Devtoolslauncher.exe executes other binary
status test author Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @_felamos (idea) id cc268ac1-42d9-40fd-9ed3-8c4e1a5b87e6 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Devtoolslauncher.exe Executes Specified Binary
id: cc268ac1-42d9-40fd-9ed3-8c4e1a5b87e6
status: test
description: The Devtoolslauncher.exe executes other binary
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Devtoolslauncher/
    - https://twitter.com/_felamos/status/1179811992841797632
author: Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @_felamos (idea)
date: 2019-10-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\devtoolslauncher.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'LaunchForDeploy'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of devtoolslauncher.exe by legitimate user
level: high
related high
MpiExec Lolbin
Detects a certain command line flag combination used by mpiexec.exe LOLBIN from HPC pack that can be used to execute any other binary
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 729ce0ea-5d8f-4769-9762-e35de441586d license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: MpiExec Lolbin
id: 729ce0ea-5d8f-4769-9762-e35de441586d
status: test
description: Detects a certain command line flag combination used by mpiexec.exe LOLBIN from HPC pack that can be used to execute any other binary
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1465058133303246867
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/high-performance-computing/mpiexec?view=hpc19-ps
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-11
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_binary:
        - Image|endswith: '\mpiexec.exe'
        - Hashes|contains: 'IMPHASH=d8b52ef6aaa3a81501bdfff9dbb96217'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /n 1 '
            - ' -n 1 '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Potential NTLM Coercion Via Certutil.EXE
Detects possible NTLM coercion via certutil using the 'syncwithWU' flag
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 6c6d9280-e6d0-4b9d-80ac-254701b64916 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential NTLM Coercion Via Certutil.EXE
id: 6c6d9280-e6d0-4b9d-80ac-254701b64916
status: test
description: Detects possible NTLM coercion via certutil using the 'syncwithWU' flag
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/issues/243
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-01
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -syncwithWU '
            - ' \\\\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_ntlm_coercion/info.yml
related high
OpenWith.exe Executes Specified Binary
The OpenWith.exe executes other binary
status test author Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @harr0ey (idea) id cec8e918-30f7-4e2d-9bfa-a59cc97ae60f license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: OpenWith.exe Executes Specified Binary
id: cec8e918-30f7-4e2d-9bfa-a59cc97ae60f
status: test
description: The OpenWith.exe executes other binary
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/4db780e0f0b2e2bb8cb1fa13e09196da9b9f1834/yml/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Openwith.yml
    - https://twitter.com/harr0ey/status/991670870384021504
author: Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @harr0ey (idea)
date: 2019-10-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\OpenWith.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '/c'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Proxy Execution Via Wuauclt.EXE
Detects the use of the Windows Update Client binary (wuauclt.exe) for proxy execution.
status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Sreeman, FPT.EagleEye Team id af77cf95-c469-471c-b6a0-946c685c4798 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Proxy Execution Via Wuauclt.EXE
id: af77cf95-c469-471c-b6a0-946c685c4798
related:
    - id: ba1bb0cb-73da-42de-ad3a-de10c643a5d0
      type: obsolete
    - id: d7825193-b70a-48a4-b992-8b5b3015cc11
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the use of the Windows Update Client binary (wuauclt.exe) for proxy execution.
references:
    - https://dtm.uk/wuauclt/
    - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Sreeman, FPT.EagleEye Team
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2023-11-11
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wuauclt.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wuauclt.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'UpdateDeploymentProvider'
            - 'RunHandlerComServer'
    filter_main_generic:
        # Note: Please enhance this if you find the full path
        CommandLine|contains: ' /UpdateDeploymentProvider UpdateDeploymentProvider.dll '
    filter_main_wuaueng:
        # Note: Please enhance this if you find the full path
        CommandLine|contains: ' wuaueng.dll '
    filter_main_uus:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\Windows\UUS\Packages\Preview\amd64\updatedeploy.dll /ClassId'
            - ':\Windows\UUS\amd64\UpdateDeploy.dll /ClassId'
    filter_main_winsxs:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
            - '\UpdateDeploy.dll /ClassId '
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Curl Download And Execute Combination
Adversaries can use curl to download payloads remotely and execute them. Curl is included by default in Windows 10 build 17063 and later.
status test author Sreeman, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 21dd6d38-2b18-4453-9404-a0fe4a0cc288 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Curl Download And Execute Combination
id: 21dd6d38-2b18-4453-9404-a0fe4a0cc288
status: test
description: Adversaries can use curl to download payloads remotely and execute them. Curl is included by default in Windows 10 build 17063 and later.
references:
    - https://medium.com/@reegun/curl-exe-is-the-new-rundll32-exe-lolbin-3f79c5f35983 # Dead Link
author: Sreeman, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-01-13
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -c '
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'curl '
            - 'http'
            - '-o'
            - '&'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Time Travel Debugging Utility Usage - Image
Detects usage of Time Travel Debugging Utility. Adversaries can execute malicious processes and dump processes, such as lsass.exe, via tttracer.exe.
status test author Ensar Şamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative id e76c8240-d68f-4773-8880-5c6f63595aaf license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Time Travel Debugging Utility Usage - Image
id: e76c8240-d68f-4773-8880-5c6f63595aaf
status: test
description: Detects usage of Time Travel Debugging Utility. Adversaries can execute malicious processes and dump processes, such as lsass.exe, via tttracer.exe.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Tttracer/
    - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1196390321783025666
    - https://twitter.com/oulusoyum/status/1191329746069655553
author: 'Ensar Şamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative'
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\ttdrecord.dll'
            - '\ttdwriter.dll'
            - '\ttdloader.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage by software developers/testers
level: high
related high
BaaUpdate.exe Suspicious DLL Load
Detects BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) loading DLLs from suspicious locations that are publicly writable which could indicate an attempt to lateral movement via BitLocker DCOM & COM Hijacking. This technique abuses COM Classes configured as INTERACTIVE USER to spawn processes in the context of the logged-on user's session. Specifically, it targets the BDEUILauncher Class (CLSID ab93b6f1-be76-4185-a488-a9001b105b94) which can launch BaaUpdate.exe, which is vulnerable to COM Hijacking when started with input parameters. This allows attackers to execute code in the user's context without needing to steal credentials or use additional techniques to compromise the account.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 6e8fe0a8-ba0b-4a93-8f9e-82657e7a5984 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: BaaUpdate.exe Suspicious DLL Load
id: 6e8fe0a8-ba0b-4a93-8f9e-82657e7a5984
related:
    - id: 9f38c1db-e2ae-40bf-81d0-5b68f73fb512 # Suspicious BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility Execution
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) loading DLLs from suspicious locations that are publicly writable which could indicate an attempt to lateral movement via BitLocker DCOM & COM Hijacking.
    This technique abuses COM Classes configured as INTERACTIVE USER to spawn processes in the context of the logged-on user's session. Specifically, it targets the BDEUILauncher Class (CLSID ab93b6f1-be76-4185-a488-a9001b105b94)
    which can launch BaaUpdate.exe, which is vulnerable to COM Hijacking when started with input parameters. This allows attackers to execute code in the user's context without needing to steal credentials or use additional techniques to compromise the account.
references:
    - https://github.com/rtecCyberSec/BitlockMove
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\BaaUpdate.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '.dll'
        ImageLoaded|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Users\Default\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Contacts\'
            - '\Favorites\'
            - '\Favourites\'
            - '\Links\'
            - '\Music\'
            - '\Pictures\'
            - '\ProgramData\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
            - '\Videos\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Execution DLL of Choice Using WAB.EXE
This rule detects that the path to the DLL written in the registry is different from the default one. Launched WAB.exe tries to load the DLL from Registry.
status test author oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova id fc014922-5def-4da9-a0fc-28c973f41bfb license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Execution DLL of Choice Using WAB.EXE
id: fc014922-5def-4da9-a0fc-28c973f41bfb
status: test
description: This rule detects that the path to the DLL written in the registry is different from the default one. Launched WAB.exe tries to load the DLL from Registry.
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/8283d8d91552213ded165fd36deb6cb9534cb443/yml/OSBinaries/Wab.yml
    - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/991447379864932352
    - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/05/01/wab-exe-as-a-lolbin/
author: oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Software\Microsoft\WAB\DLLPath'
    filter:
        Details: '%CommonProgramFiles%\System\wab32.dll'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Potential Provisioning Registry Key Abuse For Binary Proxy Execution - REG
Detects potential abuse of the provisioning registry key for indirect command execution through "Provlaunch.exe".
status test author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel id 7021255e-5db3-4946-a8b9-0ba7a4644a69 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential Provisioning Registry Key Abuse For Binary Proxy Execution - REG
id: 7021255e-5db3-4946-a8b9-0ba7a4644a69
related:
    - id: 7f5d1c9a-3e83-48df-95a7-2b98aae6c13c # CLI Generic
      type: similar
    - id: f9999590-1f94-4a34-a91e-951e47bedefd # CLI Abuse
      type: similar
    - id: 2a4b3e61-9d22-4e4a-b60f-6e8f0cde6f25 # CLI Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential abuse of the provisioning registry key for indirect command execution through "Provlaunch.exe".
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Provlaunch/
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1674399582162153472
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-08-02
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: The registry key "\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\" and its subkey must be monitored'
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
PUA - Process Hacker Driver Load
Detects driver load of the Process Hacker tool
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 67add051-9ee7-4ad3-93ba-42935615ae8d license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: PUA - Process Hacker Driver Load
id: 67add051-9ee7-4ad3-93ba-42935615ae8d
related:
    - id: 10cb6535-b31d-4512-9962-513dcbc42cc1
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects driver load of the Process Hacker tool
references:
    - https://processhacker.sourceforge.io/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-16
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - cve.2021-21551
    - attack.t1543
logsource:
    category: driver_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - ImageLoaded|endswith: '\kprocesshacker.sys'
        - Hashes|contains:
              - 'IMPHASH=821D74031D3F625BCBD0DF08B70F1E77'
              - 'IMPHASH=F86759BB4DE4320918615DC06E998A39'
              - 'IMPHASH=0A64EEB85419257D0CE32BD5D55C3A18'
              - 'IMPHASH=6E7B34DFC017700B1517B230DF6FF0D0'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of process hacker or system informer by developers or system administrators
level: high
related high
CodeIntegrity - Blocked Driver Load With Revoked Certificate
Detects blocked load attempts of revoked drivers
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 9b72b82d-f1c5-4632-b589-187159bc6ec1 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: CodeIntegrity - Blocked Driver Load With Revoked Certificate
id: 9b72b82d-f1c5-4632-b589-187159bc6ec1
status: test
description: Detects blocked load attempts of revoked drivers
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-06
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: codeintegrity-operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 3023 # The driver %2 is blocked from loading as the driver has been revoked by Microsoft.
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
CodeIntegrity - Blocked Image/Driver Load For Policy Violation
Detects blocked load events that did not meet the authenticode signing level requirements or violated the code integrity policy.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id e4be5675-4a53-426a-8c81-a8bb2387e947 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: CodeIntegrity - Blocked Image/Driver Load For Policy Violation
id: e4be5675-4a53-426a-8c81-a8bb2387e947
status: test
description: Detects blocked load events that did not meet the authenticode signing level requirements or violated the code integrity policy.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1590434950335320065
    - https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs/blob/40fe118976734578f83e5e839b9c63ae7a4af82d/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/event-id-explanations.md#windows-codeintegrity-operational-log
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-10
modified: 2023-06-07
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: codeintegrity-operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 3077 # Code Integrity determined that a process (%4) attempted to load %2 that did not meet the %5 signing level requirements or violated code integrity policy (Policy ID:%XX).
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Service Installed By Unusual Client - Security
Detects a service installed by a client which has PID 0 or whose parent has PID 0
status test author Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea) id c4e92a97-a9ff-4392-9d2d-7a4c642768ca license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Service Installed By Unusual Client - Security
id: c4e92a97-a9ff-4392-9d2d-7a4c642768ca
related:
    - id: 71c276aa-49cd-43d2-b920-2dcd3e6962d5
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects a service installed by a client which has PID 0 or whose parent has PID 0
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client.html
    - https://www.x86matthew.com/view_post?id=create_svc_rpc
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1490608838701166596
author: Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-15
modified: 2023-01-04
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543
logsource:
    service: security
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: The System Security Extension audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697'
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 4697
    selection_pid:
        - ClientProcessId: 0
        - ParentProcessId: 0
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
KrbRelayUp Service Installation
Detects service creation from KrbRelayUp tool used for privilege escalation in Windows domain environments where LDAP signing is not enforced (the default settings)
status test author Sittikorn S, Tim Shelton id e97d9903-53b2-41fc-8cb9-889ed4093e80 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: KrbRelayUp Service Installation
id: e97d9903-53b2-41fc-8cb9-889ed4093e80
status: test
description: Detects service creation from KrbRelayUp tool used for privilege escalation in Windows domain environments where LDAP signing is not enforced (the default settings)
references:
    - https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp
author: Sittikorn S, Tim Shelton
date: 2022-05-11
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 7045
        ServiceName: 'KrbSCM'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Service Installed By Unusual Client - System
Detects a service installed by a client which has PID 0 or whose parent has PID 0
status test author Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea) id 71c276aa-49cd-43d2-b920-2dcd3e6962d5 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Service Installed By Unusual Client - System
id: 71c276aa-49cd-43d2-b920-2dcd3e6962d5
related:
    - id: c4e92a97-a9ff-4392-9d2d-7a4c642768ca
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects a service installed by a client which has PID 0 or whose parent has PID 0
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client.html
author: Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-15
modified: 2023-01-04
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ProcessId: 0
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related medium
PUA - AWS TruffleHog Execution
Detects the execution of TruffleHog, a popular open-source tool used for scanning repositories for secrets and sensitive information, within an AWS environment. It has been reported to be used by threat actors for credential harvesting. All detections should be investigated to determine if the usage is authorized by security teams or potentially malicious.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id a840e606-7c8c-4684-9bc1-eb6b6155127f license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: PUA - AWS TruffleHog Execution
id: a840e606-7c8c-4684-9bc1-eb6b6155127f
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of TruffleHog, a popular open-source tool used for scanning repositories for secrets and sensitive information, within an AWS environment.
    It has been reported to be used by threat actors for credential harvesting. All detections should be investigated to determine if the usage is authorized by security teams or potentially malicious.
references:
    - https://github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog
    - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-crimson-collective-a-new-threat-group-observed-operating-in-the-cloud/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-21
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1555
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        userAgent: 'TruffleHog'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of TruffleHog by security teams for credential scanning.
level: medium
related medium
Rare Subscription-level Operations In Azure
Identifies IPs from which users grant access to other users on azure resources and alerts when a previously unseen source IP address is used.
status test author sawwinnnaung id c1182e02-49a3-481c-b3de-0fadc4091488 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Rare Subscription-level Operations In Azure
id: c1182e02-49a3-481c-b3de-0fadc4091488
status: test
description: Identifies IPs from which users grant access to other users on azure resources and alerts when a previously unseen source IP address is used.
references:
    - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/e534407884b1ec5371efc9f76ead282176c9e8bb/Detections/AzureActivity/RareOperations.yaml
author: sawwinnnaung
date: 2020-05-07
modified: 2023-10-11
tags:
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    keywords:
        - Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts/listKeys/action
        - Microsoft.Maps/accounts/listKeys/action
        - Microsoft.Media/mediaservices/listKeys/action
        - Microsoft.CognitiveServices/accounts/listKeys/action
        - Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listKeys/action
        - Microsoft.Compute/snapshots/write
        - Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/write
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Valid change
level: medium
related medium
Access To Crypto Currency Wallets By Uncommon Applications
Detects file access requests to crypto currency files by uncommon processes. Could indicate potential attempt of crypto currency wallet stealing.
status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems) id f41b0311-44f9-44f0-816d-dd45e39d4bc8 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Access To Crypto Currency Wallets By Uncommon Applications
id: f41b0311-44f9-44f0-816d-dd45e39d4bc8
status: test
description: |
    Detects file access requests to crypto currency files by uncommon processes.
    Could indicate potential attempt of crypto currency wallet stealing.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-07-29
tags:
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: file_access
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider'
detection:
    selection:
        - FileName|contains:
              - '\AppData\Roaming\Ethereum\keystore\'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\EthereumClassic\keystore\'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\monero\wallets\'
        - FileName|endswith:
              - '\AppData\Roaming\Bitcoin\wallet.dat'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\BitcoinABC\wallet.dat'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\BitcoinSV\wallet.dat'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\DashCore\wallet.dat'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\DogeCoin\wallet.dat'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\Litecoin\wallet.dat'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\Ripple\wallet.dat'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\Zcash\wallet.dat'
    filter_main_system:
        Image: System
    filter_main_generic:
        # This filter is added to avoid large amount of FP with 3rd party software. You should remove this in favour of specific filter per-application
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Windows\system32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
    filter_optional_defender:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\MpCopyAccelerator.exe'
            - '\MsMpEng.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Antivirus, Anti-Spyware, Anti-Malware Software
    - Backup software
    - Legitimate software installed on partitions other than "C:\"
    - Searching software such as "everything.exe"
level: medium
related medium
Credential Manager Access By Uncommon Applications
Detects suspicious processes based on name and location that access the windows credential manager and vault. Which can be a sign of credential stealing. Example case would be usage of mimikatz "dpapi::cred" function
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 407aecb1-e762-4acf-8c7b-d087bcff3bb6 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Credential Manager Access By Uncommon Applications
id: 407aecb1-e762-4acf-8c7b-d087bcff3bb6
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious processes based on name and location that access the windows credential manager and vault.
    Which can be a sign of credential stealing. Example case would be usage of mimikatz "dpapi::cred" function
references:
    - https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/privilege-escalation/mimikatz
    - https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-11
modified: 2024-07-29
tags:
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: file_access
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider'
detection:
    selection:
        FileName|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\'
            - '\ProgramData\Microsoft\Vault\'
    filter_system_folders:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
            - 'C:\Windows\system32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software installed by the users for example in the "AppData" directory may access these files (for any reason).
# Increase level after false positives filters are good enough
level: medium
related medium
Esentutl Gather Credentials
Conti recommendation to its affiliates to use esentutl to access NTDS dumped file. Trickbot also uses this utilities to get MSEdge info via its module pwgrab.
status test author sam0x90 id 7df1713a-1a5b-4a4b-a071-dc83b144a101 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Esentutl Gather Credentials
id: 7df1713a-1a5b-4a4b-a071-dc83b144a101
status: test
description: Conti recommendation to its affiliates to use esentutl to access NTDS dumped file. Trickbot also uses this utilities to get MSEdge info via its module pwgrab.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1423336151860002816
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/01/bazarcall-to-conti-ransomware-via-trickbot-and-cobalt-strike/
author: sam0x90
date: 2021-08-06
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1003.003
    - attack.s0404
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'esentutl'
            - ' /p'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - To be determined
level: medium
related medium
Shadow Copies Creation Using Operating Systems Utilities
Shadow Copies creation using operating systems utilities, possible credential access
status test author Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community id b17ea6f7-6e90-447e-a799-e6c0a493d6ce license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Shadow Copies Creation Using Operating Systems Utilities
id: b17ea6f7-6e90-447e-a799-e6c0a493d6ce
status: test
description: Shadow Copies creation using operating systems utilities, possible credential access
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/tutorial-for-ntds-goodness-vssadmin-wmis-ntdsdit-system/
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-22
modified: 2022-11-10
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\wmic.exe'
              - '\vssadmin.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'wmic.exe'
              - 'VSSADMIN.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'shadow'
            - 'create'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrator working with shadow copies, access for backup purposes
level: medium
related medium
Loaded Module Enumeration Via Tasklist.EXE
Detects the enumeration of a specific DLL or EXE being used by a binary via "tasklist.exe". This is often used by attackers in order to find the specific process identifier (PID) that is using the DLL in question. In order to dump the process memory or perform other nefarious actions.
status test author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel id 34275eb8-fa19-436b-b959-3d9ecd53fa1f license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Loaded Module Enumeration Via Tasklist.EXE
id: 34275eb8-fa19-436b-b959-3d9ecd53fa1f
status: test
description: |
    Detects the enumeration of a specific DLL or EXE being used by a binary via "tasklist.exe".
    This is often used by attackers in order to find the specific process identifier (PID) that is using the DLL in question.
    In order to dump the process memory or perform other nefarious actions.
references:
    - https://www.n00py.io/2021/05/dumping-plaintext-rdp-credentials-from-svchost-exe/
    - https://pentestlab.blog/tag/svchost/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2024-02-12
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\tasklist.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'tasklist.exe'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-m'
    selection_module:
        # Note: add other interesting modules or binaries
        CommandLine|contains: 'rdpcorets.dll'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
related medium
Capture Credentials with Rpcping.exe
Detects using Rpcping.exe to send a RPC test connection to the target server (-s) and force the NTLM hash to be sent in the process.
status test author Julia Fomina, oscd.community id 93671f99-04eb-4ab4-a161-70d446a84003 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Capture Credentials with Rpcping.exe
id: 93671f99-04eb-4ab4-a161-70d446a84003
status: test
description: Detects using Rpcping.exe to send a RPC test connection to the target server (-s) and force the NTLM hash to be sent in the process.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rpcping/
    - https://twitter.com/vysecurity/status/974806438316072960
    - https://twitter.com/vysecurity/status/873181705024266241
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh875578(v=ws.11)
author: Julia Fomina, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2025-10-31
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_main_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\RpcPing.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: '\RpcPing.exe'
    selection_main_flag:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-s'
    selection_cli_ntlm:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-u'
        CommandLine|contains: 'NTLM'
    selection_cli_ncacn:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-t'
        CommandLine|contains: 'ncacn_np'
    condition: all of selection_main_* and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: medium
related medium
File Access Of Signal Desktop Sensitive Data
Detects access to Signal Desktop's sensitive data files: db.sqlite and config.json. The db.sqlite file in Signal Desktop stores all locally saved messages in an encrypted SQLite database, while the config.json contains the decryption key needed to access that data. Since the key is stored in plain text, a threat actor who gains access to both files can decrypt and read sensitive messages without needing the users credentials. Currently the rule only covers the default Signal installation path in AppData\Roaming. Signal Portable installations may use different paths based on user configuration. Additional paths can be added to the selection as needed.
status experimental author Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io) id 5d6c375a-18ae-4952-b4f6-8b803f6c8555 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: File Access Of Signal Desktop Sensitive Data
id: 5d6c375a-18ae-4952-b4f6-8b803f6c8555
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects access to Signal Desktop's sensitive data files: db.sqlite and config.json.
    The db.sqlite file in Signal Desktop stores all locally saved messages in an encrypted SQLite database, while the config.json contains the decryption key needed to access that data.
    Since the key is stored in plain text, a threat actor who gains access to both files can decrypt and read sensitive messages without needing the users credentials.
    Currently the rule only covers the default Signal installation path in AppData\Roaming. Signal Portable installations may use different paths based on user configuration. Additional paths can be added to the selection as needed.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/russia-targeting-signal-messenger/
    - https://vmois.dev/query-signal-desktop-messages-sqlite/
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: System Access Control List (SACL) policy with attributes List folder/read data on Objects'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4663
        ObjectType: 'File'
        ObjectName|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Signal\'
        ObjectName|endswith:
            - '\config.json'
            - '\db.sqlite'
    filter_main_signal:
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\signal-portable.exe'
            - '\signal.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, but possible from AV or backup software accessing the files.
level: medium
related medium
Potential Credential Dumping Attempt Using New NetworkProvider - REG
Detects when an attacker tries to add a new network provider in order to dump clear text credentials, similar to how the NPPSpy tool does it
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 0442defa-b4a2-41c9-ae2c-ea7042fc4701 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential Credential Dumping Attempt Using New NetworkProvider - REG
id: 0442defa-b4a2-41c9-ae2c-ea7042fc4701
related:
    - id: baef1ec6-2ca9-47a3-97cc-4cf2bda10b77
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when an attacker tries to add a new network provider in order to dump clear text credentials, similar to how the NPPSpy tool does it
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/setup-upgrade-and-drivers/network-provider-settings-removed-in-place-upgrade
    - https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/PasswordStealing/NPPSpy
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-23
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\'
            - '\NetworkProvider'
    filter:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\WebClient\NetworkProvider'
            - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanWorkstation\NetworkProvider'
            - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RDPNP\NetworkProvider'
            # - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\P9NP\NetworkProvider' # Related to WSL remove the comment if you use WSL in your ENV
    filter_valid_procs:
        Image: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
    - Other legitimate network providers used and not filtred in this rule
level: medium
related medium
ADFS Database Named Pipe Connection By Uncommon Tool
Detects suspicious local connections via a named pipe to the AD FS configuration database (Windows Internal Database). Used to access information such as the AD FS configuration settings which contains sensitive information used to sign SAML tokens.
status test author Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g id 1ea13e8c-03ea-409b-877d-ce5c3d2c1cb3 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: ADFS Database Named Pipe Connection By Uncommon Tool
id: 1ea13e8c-03ea-409b-877d-ce5c3d2c1cb3
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious local connections via a named pipe to the AD FS configuration database (Windows Internal Database).
    Used to access information such as the AD FS configuration settings which contains sensitive information used to sign SAML tokens.
references:
    - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/f99542b94afe0ad2f19a82cc08262e7ac8e1428e/Detections/SecurityEvent/ADFSDBNamedPipeConnection.yaml
    - https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/
    - https://github.com/Azure/SimuLand
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2021-10-08
modified: 2023-11-30
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: pipe_created
    definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName: '\MICROSOFT##WID\tsql\query'
    filter_main_generic:
        Image|endswith:
            - ':\Windows\System32\mmc.exe'
            - ':\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
            - ':\Windows\System32\wsmprovhost.exe'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\mmc.exe'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\wsmprovhost.exe'
            - ':\Windows\WID\Binn\sqlwriter.exe'
            - '\AzureADConnect.exe'
            - '\Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe'
            - '\Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe'
            - '\Microsoft.Tri.Sensor.exe'
            - '\sqlservr.exe'
            - '\tssdis.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
related medium
Esentutl Steals Browser Information
One way Qbot steals sensitive information is by extracting browser data from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge by using the built-in utility esentutl.exe
status test author frack113 id 6a69f62d-ce75-4b57-8dce-6351eb55b362 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Esentutl Steals Browser Information
id: 6a69f62d-ce75-4b57-8dce-6351eb55b362
status: test
description: One way Qbot steals sensitive information is by extracting browser data from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge by using the built-in utility esentutl.exe
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/
    - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/qbot/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/10/31/follina-exploit-leads-to-domain-compromise/
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-13
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\esentutl.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'esentutl.exe'
    selection_flag:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-r'
    selection_webcache:
        CommandLine|contains: '\Windows\WebCache'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use
level: medium
related medium
Veeam Backup Database Suspicious Query
Detects potentially suspicious SQL queries using SQLCmd targeting the Veeam backup databases in order to steal information.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 696bfb54-227e-4602-ac5b-30d9d2053312 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Veeam Backup Database Suspicious Query
id: 696bfb54-227e-4602-ac5b-30d9d2053312
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious SQL queries using SQLCmd targeting the Veeam backup databases in order to steal information.
references:
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-04
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_sql:
        Image|endswith: '\sqlcmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'VeeamBackup'
            - 'From '
    selection_db:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'BackupRepositories'
            - 'Backups'
            - 'Credentials'
            - 'HostCreds'
            - 'SmbFileShares'
            - 'Ssh_creds'
            - 'VSphereInfo'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
related medium
Crash Dump Created By Operating System
Detects "BugCheck" errors indicating the system rebooted due to a crash, capturing the bugcheck code, dump file path, and report ID.
status experimental author Jason Mull id 882fbe50-d8d7-4e29-ae80-0648a8556866 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Crash Dump Created By Operating System
id: 882fbe50-d8d7-4e29-ae80-0648a8556866
related:
    - id: 2ff692c2-4594-41ec-8fcb-46587de769e0
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: Detects "BugCheck" errors indicating the system rebooted due to a crash, capturing the bugcheck code, dump file path, and report ID.
references:
    - https://www.sans.edu/cyber-research/from-crash-compromise-unlocking-potential-windows-crash-dumps-offensive-security/
    - https://jasonmull.com/articles/offensive/2025-05-12-windows-crash-dumps-offensive-security/
author: Jason Mull
date: 2025-05-12
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Microsoft-Windows-WER-SystemErrorReporting'
        EventID: 1001
    condition: selection
level: medium
related medium
SCM Database Handle Failure
Detects non-system users failing to get a handle of the SCM database.
status test author Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g id 13addce7-47b2-4ca0-a98f-1de964d1d669 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: SCM Database Handle Failure
id: 13addce7-47b2-4ca0-a98f-1de964d1d669
status: test
description: Detects non-system users failing to get a handle of the SCM database.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190826-RemoteSCMHandle/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2019-08-12
modified: 2022-07-11
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1010
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4656
        ObjectType: 'SC_MANAGER OBJECT'
        ObjectName: 'ServicesActive'
        AccessMask: '0xf003f'  # is used in the reference; otherwise too many FPs
        # Keywords: 'Audit Failure' <-> in the ref 'Keywords':-9214364837600034816
    filter:
        SubjectLogonId: '0x3e4'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
# triggering on many hosts in some environments
level: medium
related medium
Suspicious Network Connection to IP Lookup Service APIs
Detects external IP address lookups by non-browser processes via services such as "api.ipify.org". This could be indicative of potential post compromise internet test activity.
status test author Janantha Marasinghe, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id edf3485d-dac4-4d50-90e4-b0e5813f7e60 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Network Connection to IP Lookup Service APIs
id: edf3485d-dac4-4d50-90e4-b0e5813f7e60
related:
    - id: ec82e2a5-81ea-4211-a1f8-37a0286df2c2
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects external IP address lookups by non-browser processes via services such as "api.ipify.org". This could be indicative of potential post compromise internet test activity.
references:
    - https://github.com/rsp/scripts/blob/c8bb272d68164a9836e4f273d8f924927f39b8c6/externalip-benchmark.md
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-302a
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/11/28/emotet-strikes-again-lnk-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/e/managed-xdr-investigation-of-ducktail-in-trend-micro-vision-one.html
author: Janantha Marasinghe, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-24
modified: 2024-03-22
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1016
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - DestinationHostname:
              - 'www.ip.cn'
              - 'l2.io'
        - DestinationHostname|contains:
              - 'api.2ip.ua'
              - 'api.bigdatacloud.net'
              - 'api.ipify.org'
              - 'bot.whatismyipaddress.com'
              - 'canireachthe.net'
              - 'checkip.amazonaws.com'
              - 'checkip.dyndns.org'
              - 'curlmyip.com'
              - 'db-ip.com'
              - 'edns.ip-api.com'
              - 'eth0.me'
              - 'freegeoip.app'
              - 'geoipy.com'
              - 'getip.pro'
              - 'icanhazip.com'
              - 'ident.me'
              - 'ifconfig.io'
              - 'ifconfig.me'
              - 'ip-api.com'
              - 'ip.360.cn'
              - 'ip.anysrc.net'
              - 'ip.taobao.com'
              - 'ip.tyk.nu'
              - 'ipaddressworld.com'
              - 'ipapi.co'
              - 'ipconfig.io'
              - 'ipecho.net'
              - 'ipinfo.io'
              - 'ipip.net'
              - 'ipof.in'
              - 'ipv4.icanhazip.com'
              - 'ipv4bot.whatismyipaddress.com'
              - 'ipv6-test.com'
              - 'ipwho.is'
              - 'jsonip.com'
              - 'myexternalip.com'
              - 'seeip.org'
              - 'wgetip.com'
              - 'whatismyip.akamai.com'
              - 'whois.pconline.com.cn'
              - 'wtfismyip.com'
    filter_optional_brave:
        Image|endswith: '\brave.exe'
    filter_optional_chrome:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
    filter_optional_firefox:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
    filter_optional_ie:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
    filter_optional_maxthon:
        Image|endswith: '\maxthon.exe'
    filter_optional_edge_1:
        - Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\'
        - Image|endswith: '\WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
        - Image:
              - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
              - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
    filter_optional_edge_2:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\msedgewebview2.exe'
    filter_optional_opera:
        Image|endswith: '\opera.exe'
    filter_optional_safari:
        Image|endswith: '\safari.exe'
    filter_optional_seamonkey:
        Image|endswith: '\seamonkey.exe'
    filter_optional_vivaldi:
        Image|endswith: '\vivaldi.exe'
    filter_optional_whale:
        Image|endswith: '\whale.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the external websites for troubleshooting or network monitoring
level: medium
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