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Sigma rules for Dark Pink

500 rules · scoped to actor · back to Dark Pink
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.
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Detection rules

50 of 500
related high
File Download Via Windows Defender MpCmpRun.EXE
Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files
status test author Matthew Matchen id 46123129-1024-423e-9fae-43af4a0fa9a5 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: File Download Via Windows Defender MpCmpRun.EXE
id: 46123129-1024-423e-9fae-43af4a0fa9a5
status: test
description: Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200903194959/https://twitter.com/djmtshepana/status/1301608169496612866
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/MpCmdRun/
author: Matthew Matchen
date: 2020-09-04
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
        - Description: 'Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'DownloadFile'
            - 'url'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Finger.EXE Execution
Detects execution of the "finger.exe" utility. Finger.EXE or "TCPIP Finger Command" is an old utility that is still present on modern Windows installation. It Displays information about users on a specified remote computer (typically a UNIX computer) that is running the finger service or daemon. Due to the old nature of this utility and the rareness of machines having the finger service. Any execution of "finger.exe" can be considered "suspicious" and worth investigating.
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), omkar72, oscd.community id af491bca-e752-4b44-9c86-df5680533dbc license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Finger.EXE Execution
id: af491bca-e752-4b44-9c86-df5680533dbc
related:
    - id: c082c2b0-525b-4dbc-9a26-a57dc4692074
      type: similar
    - id: 2fdaf50b-9fd5-449f-ba69-f17248119af6
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of the "finger.exe" utility.
    Finger.EXE or "TCPIP Finger Command" is an old utility that is still present on modern Windows installation. It Displays information about users on a specified remote computer (typically a UNIX computer) that is running the finger service or daemon.
    Due to the old nature of this utility and the rareness of machines having the finger service. Any execution of "finger.exe" can be considered "suspicious" and worth investigating.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/bigmacjpg/status/1349727699863011328?s=12
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/40115012-a919-4208-bfed-41e82cb3dadf/
    - http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/Windows_TCPIP_Finger_Command_C2_Channel_and_Bypassing_Security_Software.txt
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), omkar72, oscd.community
date: 2021-02-24
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - OriginalFileName: 'finger.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\finger.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Admin activity (unclear what they do nowadays with finger.exe)
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_finger_execution/info.yml
related high
File Download From IP Based URL Via CertOC.EXE
Detects when a user downloads a file from an IP based URL using CertOC.exe
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id b86f6dea-0b2f-41f5-bdcc-a057bd19cd6a license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: File Download From IP Based URL Via CertOC.EXE
id: b86f6dea-0b2f-41f5-bdcc-a057bd19cd6a
related:
    - id: 70ad0861-d1fe-491c-a45f-fa48148a300d
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when a user downloads a file from an IP based URL using CertOC.exe
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certoc/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-18
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certoc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertOC.exe'
    selection_ip:
        CommandLine|re: '://[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '-GetCACAPS'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Suspicious Download from Office Domain
Detects suspicious ways to download files from Microsoft domains that are used to store attachments in Emails or OneNote documents
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 00d49ed5-4491-4271-a8db-650a4ef6f8c1 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Download from Office Domain
id: 00d49ed5-4491-4271-a8db-650a4ef6f8c1
status: test
description: Detects suspicious ways to download files from Microsoft domains that are used to store attachments in Emails or OneNote documents
references:
    - https://twitter.com/an0n_r0/status/1474698356635193346?s=12
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1475085452784844803?s=12
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-27
modified: 2022-08-02
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1608
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_download:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\curl.exe'
              - '\wget.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
              - 'iwr '
              - 'curl '
              - 'wget '
              - 'Start-BitsTransfer'
              - '.DownloadFile('
              - '.DownloadString('
    selection_domains:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'https://attachment.outlook.live.net/owa/'
            - 'https://onenoteonlinesync.onenote.com/onenoteonlinesync/'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Scripts or tools that download attachments from these domains (OneNote, Outlook 365)
level: high
related high
File Download Using Notepad++ GUP Utility
Detects execution of the Notepad++ updater (gup) from a process other than Notepad++ to download files.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 44143844-0631-49ab-97a0-96387d6b2d7c license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: File Download Using Notepad++ GUP Utility
id: 44143844-0631-49ab-97a0-96387d6b2d7c
status: test
description: Detects execution of the Notepad++ updater (gup) from a process other than Notepad++ to download files.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1535322182863179776
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-10
modified: 2023-03-02
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\GUP.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'gup.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -unzipTo '
            - 'http'
    filter:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\notepad++.exe'
    condition: all of selection* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Other parent processes other than notepad++ using GUP that are not currently identified
level: high
related high
File With Suspicious Extension Downloaded Via Bitsadmin
Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file with a suspicious extension
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 5b80a791-ad9b-4b75-bcc1-ad4e1e89c200 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: File With Suspicious Extension Downloaded Via Bitsadmin
id: 5b80a791-ad9b-4b75-bcc1-ad4e1e89c200
status: test
description: Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file with a suspicious extension
references:
    - https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin
    - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-28
modified: 2023-05-30
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1197
    - attack.s0190
    - attack.t1036.003
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\bitsadmin.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'bitsadmin.exe'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /transfer '
            - ' /create '
            - ' /addfile '
    selection_extension:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.7z'
            - '.asax'
            - '.ashx'
            - '.asmx'
            - '.asp'
            - '.aspx'
            - '.bat'
            - '.cfm'
            - '.cgi'
            - '.chm'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.dll'
            - '.gif'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.jsp'
            - '.jspx'
            - '.log'
            - '.png'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.psm1'
            - '.rar'
            - '.scf'
            - '.sct'
            - '.txt'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.war'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
            - '.xll'
            - '.zip'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_susp_extensions/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Windows - BITSAdmin BITS Download
      technique: T1105
      atomic_guid: a1921cd3-9a2d-47d5-a891-f1d0f2a7a31b
related high
Suspicious CertReq Command to Download
Detects a suspicious CertReq execution downloading a file. This behavior is often used by attackers to download additional payloads or configuration files. Certreq is a built-in Windows utility used to request and retrieve certificates from a certification authority (CA). However, it can be abused by threat actors for malicious purposes.
status experimental author Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) id 4480827a-9799-4232-b2c4-ccc6c4e9e12b license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious CertReq Command to Download
id: 4480827a-9799-4232-b2c4-ccc6c4e9e12b
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a suspicious CertReq execution downloading a file.
    This behavior is often used by attackers to download additional payloads or configuration files.
    Certreq is a built-in Windows utility used to request and retrieve certificates from a certification authority (CA). However, it can be abused by threat actors for malicious purposes.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certreq/
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-24
modified: 2025-10-29
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certreq.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertReq.exe'
    selection_cli_flag_post:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-Post'
    selection_cli_flag_config:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-config'
    selection_cli_http:
        CommandLine|contains: 'http'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
related high
Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Command
Detects a suspicious Microsoft desktopimgdownldr execution with parameters used to download files from the Internet
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id bb58aa4a-b80b-415a-a2c0-2f65a4c81009 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Command
id: bb58aa4a-b80b-415a-a2c0-2f65a4c81009
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious Microsoft desktopimgdownldr execution with parameters used to download files from the Internet
references:
    - https://labs.sentinelone.com/living-off-windows-land-a-new-native-file-downldr/
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1278977301745741825
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-07-03
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        CommandLine|contains: ' /lockscreenurl:'
    selection1_filter:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.jpg'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.png'
    selection_reg:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'reg delete'
            - '\PersonalizationCSP'
    condition: ( selection1 and not selection1_filter ) or selection_reg
falsepositives:
    - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high
related high
PUA - Nimgrab Execution
Detects the usage of nimgrab, a tool bundled with the Nim programming framework and used for downloading files.
status test author frack113 id 74a12f18-505c-4114-8d0b-8448dd5485c6 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: PUA - Nimgrab Execution
id: 74a12f18-505c-4114-8d0b-8448dd5485c6
status: test
description: Detects the usage of nimgrab, a tool bundled with the Nim programming framework and used for downloading files.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/28d190330fe44de6ff4767fc400cc10fa7cd6540/atomics/T1105/T1105.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-08-28
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_name:
        Image|endswith: '\nimgrab.exe'
    selection_hashes:
        Hashes|contains:
            - MD5=2DD44C3C29D667F5C0EF5F9D7C7FFB8B
            - SHA256=F266609E91985F0FE3E31C5E8FAEEEC4FFA5E0322D8B6F15FE69F4C5165B9559
            - IMPHASH=C07FDDD21D123EA9B3A08EEF44AAAC45
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of Nim on a developer systems
level: high
related high
Suspicious Invoke-WebRequest Execution
Detects a suspicious call to Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet where the and output is located in a suspicious location
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 5e3cc4d8-3e68-43db-8656-eaaeefdec9cc license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Invoke-WebRequest Execution
id: 5e3cc4d8-3e68-43db-8656-eaaeefdec9cc
related:
    - id: e218595b-bbe7-4ee5-8a96-f32a24ad3468
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious call to Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet where the and output is located in a suspicious location
references:
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/living-off-windows-defender-lockbit-ransomware-sideloads-cobalt-strike-through-microsoft-security-tool/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-02
modified: 2025-07-18
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'powershell_ise.EXE'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_commands:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # These are all aliases of Invoke-WebRequest
            - 'curl '
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
            - 'iwr '
            - 'wget '
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -ur'
            - ' -o'
    selection_susp_locations:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '%AppData%'
            - '%Public%'
            - '%Temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - ':\Windows\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Suspicious Download From File-Sharing Website Via Bitsadmin
Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file from a suspicious domain
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 8518ed3d-f7c9-4601-a26c-f361a4256a0c license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Download From File-Sharing Website Via Bitsadmin
id: 8518ed3d-f7c9-4601-a26c-f361a4256a0c
status: test
description: Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file from a suspicious domain
references:
    - https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin
    - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
    - https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/17/new-ttps-observed-in-mint-sandstorm-campaign-targeting-high-profile-individuals-at-universities-and-research-orgs/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-28
modified: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1197
    - attack.s0190
    - attack.t1036.003
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\bitsadmin.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'bitsadmin.exe'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /transfer '
            - ' /create '
            - ' /addfile '
    selection_domain:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.githubusercontent.com'       # Includes both gists and github repositories / Michael Haag (idea)
            - 'anonfiles.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
            - 'ddns.net'
            - 'dl.dropboxusercontent.com'
            - 'ghostbin.co'
            - 'github.com' # bitsadmin /transfer n https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1047/bin/calc.dll %PUBLIC%\calc.dll
            - 'glitch.me'
            - 'gofile.io'
            - 'hastebin.com'
            - 'mediafire.com'
            - 'mega.nz'
            - 'onrender.com'
            - 'pages.dev'
            - 'paste.ee'
            - 'pastebin.com'
            - 'pastebin.pl'
            - 'pastetext.net'
            - 'privatlab.com'
            - 'privatlab.net'
            - 'send.exploit.in'
            - 'sendspace.com'
            - 'storage.googleapis.com'
            - 'storjshare.io'
            - 'supabase.co'
            - 'temp.sh'
            - 'transfer.sh'
            - 'trycloudflare.com'
            - 'ufile.io'
            - 'w3spaces.com'
            - 'workers.dev'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Some legitimate apps use this, but limited.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_file_sharing_domains/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Windows - BITSAdmin BITS Download
      technique: T1105
      atomic_guid: a1921cd3-9a2d-47d5-a891-f1d0f2a7a31b
related high
PrintBrm ZIP Creation of Extraction
Detects the execution of the LOLBIN PrintBrm.exe, which can be used to create or extract ZIP files. PrintBrm.exe should not be run on a normal workstation.
status test author frack113 id cafeeba3-01da-4ab4-b6c4-a31b1d9730c7 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: PrintBrm ZIP Creation of Extraction
id: cafeeba3-01da-4ab4-b6c4-a31b1d9730c7
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the LOLBIN PrintBrm.exe, which can be used to create or extract ZIP files. PrintBrm.exe should not be run on a normal workstation.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/PrintBrm/
author: frack113
date: 2022-05-02
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1564.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\PrintBrm.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -f'
            - '.zip'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Curl Download And Execute Combination
Adversaries can use curl to download payloads remotely and execute them. Curl is included by default in Windows 10 build 17063 and later.
status test author Sreeman, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 21dd6d38-2b18-4453-9404-a0fe4a0cc288 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Curl Download And Execute Combination
id: 21dd6d38-2b18-4453-9404-a0fe4a0cc288
status: test
description: Adversaries can use curl to download payloads remotely and execute them. Curl is included by default in Windows 10 build 17063 and later.
references:
    - https://medium.com/@reegun/curl-exe-is-the-new-rundll32-exe-lolbin-3f79c5f35983 # Dead Link
author: Sreeman, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-01-13
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -c '
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'curl '
            - 'http'
            - '-o'
            - '&'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Suspicious Curl.EXE Download
Detects a suspicious curl process start on Windows and outputs the requested document to a local file
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id e218595b-bbe7-4ee5-8a96-f32a24ad3468 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Curl.EXE Download
id: e218595b-bbe7-4ee5-8a96-f32a24ad3468
related:
    - id: bbeaed61-1990-4773-bf57-b81dbad7db2d # Basic curl execution
      type: derived
    - id: 9a517fca-4ba3-4629-9278-a68694697b81 # Curl download
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious curl process start on Windows and outputs the requested document to a local file
references:
    - https://twitter.com/max_mal_/status/1542461200797163522
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200128160046/https://twitter.com/reegun21/status/1222093798009790464
    - https://github.com/pr0xylife/Qakbot/blob/4f0795d79dabee5bc9dd69f17a626b48852e7869/Qakbot_AA_23.06.2022.txt
    - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/07/28/sharptongue-deploys-clever-mail-stealing-browser-extension-sharpext/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-18---curl-download-file
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-07-03
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_curl:
        - Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
        - Product: 'The curl executable'
    selection_susp_locations:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '%AppData%'
            - '%Public%'
            - '%Temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\PerfLogs\'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    selection_susp_extensions:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '.dll'
            - '.gif'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.png'
            - '.temp'
            - '.tmp'
            - '.txt'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    filter_optional_git_windows:
        # Example FP
        #   CommandLine: "C:\Program Files\Git\mingw64\bin\curl.exe" --silent --show-error --output C:/Users/test/AppData/Local/Temp/gfw-httpget-jVOEoxbS.txt --write-out %{http_code} https://gitforwindows.org/latest-tag.txt
        ParentImage: 'C:\Program Files\Git\usr\bin\sh.exe'
        Image: 'C:\Program Files\Git\mingw64\bin\curl.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '--silent --show-error --output '
            - 'gfw-httpget-'
            - 'AppData'
    condition: selection_curl and 1 of selection_susp_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_susp_download/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Curl Download File
      technique: T1105
      atomic_guid: 2b080b99-0deb-4d51-af0f-833d37c4ca6a
related high
Lolbas OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe Proxy Download
Detects setting a custom URL for OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe to download a file from the Internet without executing any anomalous executables with suspicious arguments. The downloaded file will be in C:\Users\redacted\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\StandaloneUpdaterreSignInSettingsConfig.json
status test author frack113 id 3aff0be0-7802-4a7e-a4fa-c60c74bc5e1d license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Lolbas OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe Proxy Download
id: 3aff0be0-7802-4a7e-a4fa-c60c74bc5e1d
status: test
description: |
    Detects setting a custom URL for OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe to download a file from the Internet without executing any
    anomalous executables with suspicious arguments. The downloaded file will be in C:\Users\redacted\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\StandaloneUpdaterreSignInSettingsConfig.json
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/OneDriveStandaloneUpdater/
author: frack113
date: 2022-05-28
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\OneDrive\UpdateOfficeConfig\UpdateRingSettingURLFromOC'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Remote Registry Lateral Movement
Detects remote RPC calls to modify the registry and possible execute code
status test author Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz id 35c55673-84ca-4e99-8d09-e334f3c29539 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Remote Registry Lateral Movement
id: 35c55673-84ca-4e99-8d09-e334f3c29539
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls to modify the registry and possible execute code
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rrp/0fa3191d-bb79-490a-81bd-54c2601b7a78
    - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-RRP.md
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:338cd001-2244-31f1-aaaa-900038001003"'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid: 338cd001-2244-31f1-aaaa-900038001003
        OpNum:
            - 6
            - 7
            - 8
            - 13
            - 18
            - 19
            - 21
            - 22
            - 23
            - 35
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Remote administration of registry values
level: high
related high
User Shell Folders Registry Modification via CommandLine
Detects modifications to User Shell Folders registry values via reg.exe or PowerShell, which could indicate persistence attempts. Attackers may modify User Shell Folders registry values to point to malicious executables or scripts that will be executed during startup. This technique is often used to maintain persistence on a compromised system by ensuring that malicious payloads are executed automatically.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 8f3ab69a-aa22-4943-aa58-e0a52fdf6818 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: User Shell Folders Registry Modification via CommandLine
id: 8f3ab69a-aa22-4943-aa58-e0a52fdf6818
related:
    - id: 9c226817-8dc9-46c2-a58d-66655aafd7dc
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects modifications to User Shell Folders registry values via reg.exe or PowerShell, which could indicate persistence attempts.
    Attackers may modify User Shell Folders registry values to point to malicious executables or scripts that will be executed during startup.
    This technique is often used to maintain persistence on a compromised system by ensuring that malicious payloads are executed automatically.
references:
    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/muddywater-snakes-riverbank/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-01-05
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'powershell.exe'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'reg.exe'
    selection_cli_action:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' add ' # reg.exe modification
            - 'New-ItemProperty'
            - 'Set-ItemProperty'
            - 'si ' # short for Set-ItemProperty
    selection_cli_paths_root:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders'
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders'
    selection_cli_paths_suffix:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Startup' # covers both 'Startup' and 'Common Startup'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Usage of reg.exe or PowerShell to modify User Shell Folders for legitimate purposes; but rare.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_user_shell_folders_registry_modification/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Change Startup Folder - HKLM Modify User Shell Folders Common Startup Value
      technique: T1547.001
      atomic_guid: acfef903-7662-447e-a391-9c91c2f00f7b
related high
ShimCache Flush
Detects actions that clear the local ShimCache and remove forensic evidence
status stable author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id b0524451-19af-4efa-a46f-562a977f792e license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: ShimCache Flush
id: b0524451-19af-4efa-a46f-562a977f792e
status: stable
description: Detects actions that clear the local ShimCache and remove forensic evidence
references:
    - https://medium.com/@blueteamops/shimcache-flush-89daff28d15e
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-02-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1a:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'apphelp.dll'
    selection1b:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ShimFlushCache'
            - '#250'
    selection2a:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'kernel32.dll'
    selection2b:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'BaseFlushAppcompatCache'
            - '#46'
    condition: ( selection1a and selection1b ) or ( selection2a and selection2b )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Reg Add Suspicious Paths
Detects when an adversary uses the reg.exe utility to add or modify new keys or subkeys
status test author frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id b7e2a8d4-74bb-4b78-adc9-3f92af2d4829 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Reg Add Suspicious Paths
id: b7e2a8d4-74bb-4b78-adc9-3f92af2d4829
status: test
description: Detects when an adversary uses the reg.exe utility to add or modify new keys or subkeys
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1112/T1112.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
    - https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-19
modified: 2022-10-10
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_reg:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more suspicious registry locations below
            - '\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\'
            - '\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE'
            - '\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon'
            - '\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate add to registry via cli (to these locations)
level: high
related high
Enable LM Hash Storage - ProcCreation
Detects changes to the "NoLMHash" registry value in order to allow Windows to store LM Hashes. By setting this registry value to "0" (DWORD), Windows will be allowed to store a LAN manager hash of your password in Active Directory and local SAM databases.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 98dedfdd-8333-49d4-9f23-d7018cccae53 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Enable LM Hash Storage - ProcCreation
id: 98dedfdd-8333-49d4-9f23-d7018cccae53
related:
    - id: c420410f-c2d8-4010-856b-dffe21866437 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the "NoLMHash" registry value in order to allow Windows to store LM Hashes.
    By setting this registry value to "0" (DWORD), Windows will be allowed to store a LAN manager hash of your password in Active Directory and local SAM databases.
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/prevent-windows-store-lm-hash-password
    - https://www.sans.org/blog/protecting-privileged-domain-accounts-lm-hashes-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-12-15
modified: 2023-12-22
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa'
            - 'NoLMHash'
            - ' 0'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
New DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installed Via Dnscmd.EXE
Detects the installation of a DNS plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required)
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id f63b56ee-3f79-4b8a-97fb-5c48007e8573 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: New DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installed Via Dnscmd.EXE
id: f63b56ee-3f79-4b8a-97fb-5c48007e8573
related:
    - id: e61e8a88-59a9-451c-874e-70fcc9740d67
      type: derived
    - id: cbe51394-cd93-4473-b555-edf0144952d9
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the installation of a DNS plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required)
references:
    - https://medium.com/@esnesenon/feature-not-bug-dnsadmin-to-dc-compromise-in-one-line-a0f779b8dc83
    - https://blog.3or.de/hunting-dns-server-level-plugin-dll-injection.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-05-08
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1574.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\dnscmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/config'
            - '/serverlevelplugindll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Potential Tampering With RDP Related Registry Keys Via Reg.EXE
Detects the execution of "reg.exe" for enabling/disabling the RDP service on the host by tampering with the 'CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' values
status test author pH-T (Nextron Systems), @Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport id 0d5675be-bc88-4172-86d3-1e96a4476536 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential Tampering With RDP Related Registry Keys Via Reg.EXE
id: 0d5675be-bc88-4172-86d3-1e96a4476536
status: test
description: Detects the execution of "reg.exe" for enabling/disabling the RDP service on the host by tampering with the 'CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' values
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/
    - http://etutorials.org/Microsoft+Products/microsoft+windows+server+2003+terminal+services/Chapter+6+Registry/Registry+Keys+for+Terminal+Services/ # Contain description for most of the keys mentioned here (check it out if you want more information
    - http://woshub.com/rds-shadow-how-to-connect-to-a-user-session-in-windows-server-2012-r2/ # Related to the Shadow RPD technique
    - https://admx.help/HKLM/SOFTWARE/Policies/Microsoft/Windows%20NT/Terminal%20Services # Contain description for most of the keys mentioned here (check it out if you want more information)
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/6f3aa9362d72e806490a8abce245331030d1ab5ac77e400dd475748236a6cc81/
    - https://blog.sekoia.io/darkgate-internals/
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/understanding-the-phobos-affiliate-structure/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/02c7d02fe1f1feb0fc7944550408ea8224273994/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-63---disable-remote-desktop-anti-alias-setting-through-registry
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/02c7d02fe1f1feb0fc7944550408ea8224273994/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-64---disable-remote-desktop-security-settings-through-registry
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/dd526047b8c399c312fee47d1e6fb531164da54d/atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml#L790
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/customize/desktop/unattend/microsoft-windows-terminalservices-rdp-winstationextensions-securitylayer
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190407-RegModEnableRDPConnections/notebook.html
    - https://twitter.com/SagieSec/status/1469001618863624194?t=HRf0eA0W1YYzkTSHb-Ky1A&s=03 # Related to the Shadow RPD technique
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200929062532/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-rdp-hijacking-via.html # Related to RDP hijacking via the "ServiceDll" key
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/i/unmasking-the-gentlemen-ransomware.html
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), @Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport
date: 2022-02-12
modified: 2025-11-22
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1021.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_main_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_main_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' add '
            - '\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server'
            - 'REG_DWORD'
            - ' /f'
    selection_values_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Licensing Core'
            - 'EnableConcurrentSessions'
    selection_values_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'AllowTSConnections'
            - 'fDenyTSConnections'
            - 'fEnableWinStation'
            - 'fSingleSessionPerUser'
            - 'IdleWinStationPoolCount'
            - 'MaxInstanceCount'
            - 'SecurityLayer'
            - 'TSAdvertise'
            - 'TSAppCompat'
            - 'TSEnabled'
            - 'TSUserEnabled'
            - 'WinStations\RDP-Tcp'
    filter_main_values_tls:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'SecurityLayer'
            - '02'  # TLS Enabled
    condition: all of selection_main_* and 1 of selection_values_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
RestrictedAdminMode Registry Value Tampering - ProcCreation
Detects changes to the "DisableRestrictedAdmin" registry value in order to disable or enable RestrictedAdmin mode. RestrictedAdmin mode prevents the transmission of reusable credentials to the remote system to which you connect using Remote Desktop. This prevents your credentials from being harvested during the initial connection process if the remote server has been compromise
status test author frack113 id 28ac00d6-22d9-4a3c-927f-bbd770104573 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: RestrictedAdminMode Registry Value Tampering - ProcCreation
id: 28ac00d6-22d9-4a3c-927f-bbd770104573
related:
    - id: d6ce7ebd-260b-4323-9768-a9631c8d4db2 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the "DisableRestrictedAdmin" registry value in order to disable or enable RestrictedAdmin mode.
    RestrictedAdmin mode prevents the transmission of reusable credentials to the remote system to which you connect using Remote Desktop.
    This prevents your credentials from being harvested during the initial connection process if the remote server has been compromise
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/a8e3cf63e97b973a25903d3df9fd55da6252e564/atomics/T1112/T1112.md
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/32905.remote-desktop-services-enable-restricted-admin-mode.aspx
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/
author: frack113
date: 2023-01-13
modified: 2025-08-28
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa'
            - 'DisableRestrictedAdmin'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Imports Registry Key From an ADS
Detects the import of a alternate datastream to the registry with regedit.exe.
status test author Oddvar Moe, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community id 0b80ade5-6997-4b1d-99a1-71701778ea61 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Imports Registry Key From an ADS
id: 0b80ade5-6997-4b1d-99a1-71701778ea61
related:
    - id: 73bba97f-a82d-42ce-b315-9182e76c57b1
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the import of a alternate datastream to the registry with regedit.exe.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regedit/
    - https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f
author: Oddvar Moe, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\regedit.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'REGEDIT.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /i '
            - '.reg'
        CommandLine|re: ':[^ \\]'
    filter:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' -e '
            - ' -a '
            - ' -c '
    condition: all of selection_* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Non-privileged Usage of Reg or Powershell
Search for usage of reg or Powershell by non-privileged users to modify service configuration in registry
status test author Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Ryan Plas (rule), oscd.community id 8f02c935-effe-45b3-8fc9-ef8696a9e41d license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Non-privileged Usage of Reg or Powershell
id: 8f02c935-effe-45b3-8fc9-ef8696a9e41d
status: test
description: Search for usage of reg or Powershell by non-privileged users to modify service configuration in registry
references:
    - https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment-20-638.jpg
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Ryan Plas (rule), oscd.community
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cli:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'reg '
              - 'add'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'powershell'
              - 'set-itemproperty'
              - ' sp '
              - 'new-itemproperty'
    selection_data:
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'Medium'
            - 'S-1-16-8192'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ControlSet'
            - 'Services'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ImagePath'
            - 'FailureCommand'
            - 'ServiceDLL'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Suspicious Registry Modification From ADS Via Regini.EXE
Detects the import of an alternate data stream with regini.exe, regini.exe can be used to modify registry keys.
status test author Eli Salem, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community id 77946e79-97f1-45a2-84b4-f37b5c0d8682 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Registry Modification From ADS Via Regini.EXE
id: 77946e79-97f1-45a2-84b4-f37b5c0d8682
related:
    - id: 5f60740a-f57b-4e76-82a1-15b6ff2cb134
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the import of an alternate data stream with regini.exe, regini.exe can be used to modify registry keys.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regini/
    - https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/regini
author: Eli Salem, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\regini.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'REGINI.EXE'
    selection_re:
        CommandLine|re: ':[^ \\]'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Security Event Logging Disabled via MiniNt Registry Key - Process
Detects attempts to disable security event logging by adding the `MiniNt` registry key. This key is used to disable the Windows Event Log service, which collects and stores event logs from the operating system and applications. Adversaries may want to disable this service to prevent logging of security events that could be used to detect their activities.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 1a4bd6af-99ac-4466-b5b2-7b72b4a05462 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Security Event Logging Disabled via MiniNt Registry Key - Process
id: 1a4bd6af-99ac-4466-b5b2-7b72b4a05462
related:
    - id: 8839e550-52d7-4958-9f2f-e13c1e736838 # Disable Security Events Logging Adding Reg Key MiniNt - Registry Set
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects attempts to disable security event logging by adding the `MiniNt` registry key.
    This key is used to disable the Windows Event Log service, which collects and stores event logs from the operating system and applications.
    Adversaries may want to disable this service to prevent logging of security events that could be used to detect their activities.
references:
    - https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-04-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
    - attack.t1112
    - car.2022-03-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_reg_img:
        # Example: reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt"
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_reg_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' add '
            - '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt'
    selection_powershell_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_powershell_cmd1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'New-Item '
            - 'ni '
    selection_powershell_cmd2:
        CommandLine|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt'
    condition: all of selection_reg_* or all of selection_powershell_*
falsepositives:
    - Highly Unlikely
level: high
related high
ETW Logging Disabled In .NET Processes - Registry
Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.
status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) id a4c90ea1-2634-4ca0-adbb-35eae169b6fc license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: ETW Logging Disabled In .NET Processes - Registry
id: a4c90ea1-2634-4ca0-adbb-35eae169b6fc
related:
    - id: bf4fc428-dcc3-4bbd-99fe-2422aeee2544
      type: similar
status: test
description: Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368
    - https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_
    - https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a
    - http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code
    - https://i.blackhat.com/EU-21/Wednesday/EU-21-Teodorescu-Veni-No-Vidi-No-Vici-Attacks-On-ETW-Blind-EDRs.pdf
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-06-05
modified: 2022-12-20
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_etw_enabled:
        EventID: 4657
        ObjectName|endswith: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework'
        ObjectValueName: 'ETWEnabled'
        NewValue: 0
    selection_complus:
        EventID: 4657
        ObjectName|contains: '\Environment'
        ObjectValueName:
            - 'COMPlus_ETWEnabled'
            - 'COMPlus_ETWFlags'
        NewValue: 0
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
NetNTLM Downgrade Attack
Detects NetNTLM downgrade attack
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), wagga id d3abac66-f11c-4ed0-8acb-50cc29c97eed license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: NetNTLM Downgrade Attack
id: d3abac66-f11c-4ed0-8acb-50cc29c97eed
related:
    - id: d67572a0-e2ec-45d6-b8db-c100d14b8ef2
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects NetNTLM downgrade attack
references:
    - https://www.optiv.com/blog/post-exploitation-using-netntlm-downgrade-attacks
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), wagga
date: 2018-03-20
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Object Access > Audit Registry (Success)'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4657
        ObjectName|contains|all:
            - '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM'
            - 'ControlSet'
            - '\Control\Lsa'
        ObjectValueName:
            - 'LmCompatibilityLevel'
            - 'NtlmMinClientSec'
            - 'RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Sysmon Channel Reference Deletion
Potential threat actor tampering with Sysmon manifest and eventually disabling it
status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) id 18beca67-ab3e-4ee3-ba7a-a46ca8d7d0cc license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Sysmon Channel Reference Deletion
id: 18beca67-ab3e-4ee3-ba7a-a46ca8d7d0cc
status: test
description: Potential threat actor tampering with Sysmon manifest and eventually disabling it
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Flangvik/status/1283054508084473861
    - https://twitter.com/SecurityJosh/status/1283027365770276866
    - https://securityjosh.github.io/2020/04/23/Mute-Sysmon.html
    - https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/cf08c38c61f7e46e8404b38201ca01c8
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-07-14
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID: 4657
        ObjectName|contains:
            - 'WINEVT\Publishers\{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}'
            - 'WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'
        ObjectValueName: 'Enabled'
        NewValue: 0
    selection2:
        EventID: 4663
        ObjectName|contains:
            - 'WINEVT\Publishers\{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}'
            - 'WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'
        AccessMask: '0x10000'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Change User Account Associated with the FAX Service
Detect change of the user account associated with the FAX service to avoid the escalation problem.
status test author frack113 id e3fdf743-f05b-4051-990a-b66919be1743 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Change User Account Associated with the FAX Service
id: e3fdf743-f05b-4051-990a-b66919be1743
status: test
description: Detect change of the user account associated with the FAX service to avoid the escalation problem.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/dottor_morte/status/1544652325570191361
    - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/RiccardoAncarani/talks/master/F-Secure/unorthodox-lateral-movement.pdf
author: frack113
date: 2022-07-17
modified: 2022-12-30
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject: HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Fax\ObjectName
    filter:
        Details|contains: NetworkService
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Office Macros Warning Disabled
Detects registry changes to Microsoft Office "VBAWarning" to a value of "1" which enables the execution of all macros, whether signed or unsigned.
status test author Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 91239011-fe3c-4b54-9f24-15c86bb65913 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Office Macros Warning Disabled
id: 91239011-fe3c-4b54-9f24-15c86bb65913
related:
    - id: 9b894e57-033f-46cf-b7fa-a52804181973
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects registry changes to Microsoft Office "VBAWarning" to a value of "1" which enables the execution of all macros, whether signed or unsigned.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397
    - https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/zloader-with-a-new-infection-technique/
    - https://securelist.com/scarcruft-surveilling-north-korean-defectors-and-human-rights-activists/105074/
author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2024-03-19
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Security\VBAWarnings'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
related high
New DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installed
Detects the installation of a DNS plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required)
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id e61e8a88-59a9-451c-874e-70fcc9740d67 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: New DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installed
id: e61e8a88-59a9-451c-874e-70fcc9740d67
related:
    - id: cbe51394-cd93-4473-b555-edf0144952d9
      type: derived
    - id: f63b56ee-3f79-4b8a-97fb-5c48007e8573
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the installation of a DNS plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required)
references:
    - https://medium.com/@esnesenon/feature-not-bug-dnsadmin-to-dc-compromise-in-one-line-a0f779b8dc83
    - https://blog.3or.de/hunting-dns-server-level-plugin-dll-injection.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-05-08
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1574.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\services\DNS\Parameters\ServerLevelPluginDll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
PowerShell Logging Disabled Via Registry Key Tampering
Detects changes to the registry for the currently logged-in user. In order to disable PowerShell module logging, script block logging or transcription and script execution logging
status test author frack113 id fecfd1a1-cc78-4313-a1ea-2ee2e8ec27a7 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: PowerShell Logging Disabled Via Registry Key Tampering
id: fecfd1a1-cc78-4313-a1ea-2ee2e8ec27a7
status: test
description: Detects changes to the registry for the currently logged-in user. In order to disable PowerShell module logging, script block logging or transcription and script execution logging
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-32---windows-powershell-logging-disabled
author: frack113
date: 2022-04-02
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1564.001
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\' # PowerShell 5
            - '\Microsoft\PowerShellCore\' # PowerShell 7
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\ModuleLogging\EnableModuleLogging'
            - '\ScriptBlockLogging\EnableScriptBlockLogging'
            - '\ScriptBlockLogging\EnableScriptBlockInvocationLogging'
            - '\Transcription\EnableTranscripting'
            - '\Transcription\EnableInvocationHeader'
            - '\EnableScripts'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_powershell_logging_disabled/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable PowerShell Logging via Registry
      technique: T1112
      atomic_guid: 95b25212-91a7-42ff-9613-124aca6845a8
related high
Potential Persistence Via Outlook Today Page
Detects potential persistence activity via outlook today page. An attacker can set a custom page to execute arbitrary code and link to it via the registry values "URL" and "UserDefinedUrl".
status test author Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems), David Bertho (@dbertho) & Eirik Sveen (@0xSV1), Storebrand id 487bb375-12ef-41f6-baae-c6a1572b4dd1 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential Persistence Via Outlook Today Page
id: 487bb375-12ef-41f6-baae-c6a1572b4dd1
related:
    - id: ddd171b5-2cc6-4975-9e78-f0eccd08cc76
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential persistence activity via outlook today page.
    An attacker can set a custom page to execute arbitrary code and link to it via the registry values "URL" and "UserDefinedUrl".
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=74
    - https://trustedsec.com/blog/specula-turning-outlook-into-a-c2-with-one-registry-change
author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems), David Bertho (@dbertho) & Eirik Sveen (@0xSV1), Storebrand
date: 2021-06-10
modified: 2024-08-07
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection_main:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - 'Software\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\Outlook\Today\'
    selection_value_stamp:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Stamp'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    selection_value_url:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\URL'
            - '\UserDefinedUrl'
    filter_main_office:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\Updates\'
        Image|endswith: '\OfficeClickToRun.exe'
    condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_value_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Wdigest Enable UseLogonCredential
Detects potential malicious modification of the property value of UseLogonCredential from HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest to enable clear-text credentials
status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) id d6a9b252-c666-4de6-8806-5561bbbd3bdc license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Wdigest Enable UseLogonCredential
id: d6a9b252-c666-4de6-8806-5561bbbd3bdc
status: test
description: Detects potential malicious modification of the property value of UseLogonCredential from HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest to enable clear-text credentials
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190510-RegModWDigestDowngrade/notebook.html
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/microsoft-security-advisory-update-to-improve-credentials-protection-and-management-may-13-2014-93434251-04ac-b7f3-52aa-9f951c14b649
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/73fcfa1d4863f6a4e17f90e54401de6e30a312bb/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-3---modify-registry-to-store-logon-credentials
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2019-09-12
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: 'WDigest\UseLogonCredential'
        Details: DWORD (0x00000001)
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
RDP Sensitive Settings Changed
Detects tampering of RDP Terminal Service/Server sensitive settings. Such as allowing unauthorized users access to a system via the 'fAllowUnsolicited' or enabling RDP via 'fDenyTSConnections', etc. Below is a list of registry keys/values that are monitored by this rule: - Shadow: Used to enable Remote Desktop shadowing, which allows an administrator to view or control a user's session. - DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias: Disables anti-aliasing for remote desktop sessions. - DisableSecuritySettings: Disables certain security settings for Remote Desktop connections. - fAllowUnsolicited: Allows unsolicited remote assistance offers. - fAllowUnsolicitedFullControl: Allows unsolicited remote assistance offers with full control. - InitialProgram: Specifies a program to run automatically when a user logs on to a remote computer. - ServiceDll: Used in RDP hijacking techniques to specify a custom DLL to be loaded by the Terminal Services service. - SecurityLayer: Specifies the security layer used for RDP connections.
status test author Samir Bousseaden, David ANDRE, Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Nasreddine Bencherchali id 3f6b7b62-61aa-45db-96bd-9c31b36b653c license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: RDP Sensitive Settings Changed
id: 3f6b7b62-61aa-45db-96bd-9c31b36b653c
related:
    - id: 171b67e1-74b4-460e-8d55-b331f3e32d67
      type: obsolete
    - id: 41904ebe-d56c-4904-b9ad-7a77bdf154b3
      type: obsolete
    - id: a2863fbc-d5cb-48d5-83fb-d976d4b1743b
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects tampering of RDP Terminal Service/Server sensitive settings.
    Such as allowing unauthorized users access to a system via the 'fAllowUnsolicited' or enabling RDP via 'fDenyTSConnections', etc.

    Below is a list of registry keys/values that are monitored by this rule:

    - Shadow: Used to enable Remote Desktop shadowing, which allows an administrator to view or control a user's session.
    - DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias: Disables anti-aliasing for remote desktop sessions.
    - DisableSecuritySettings: Disables certain security settings for Remote Desktop connections.
    - fAllowUnsolicited: Allows unsolicited remote assistance offers.
    - fAllowUnsolicitedFullControl: Allows unsolicited remote assistance offers with full control.
    - InitialProgram: Specifies a program to run automatically when a user logs on to a remote computer.
    - ServiceDll: Used in RDP hijacking techniques to specify a custom DLL to be loaded by the Terminal Services service.
    - SecurityLayer: Specifies the security layer used for RDP connections.
references:
    - http://etutorials.org/Microsoft+Products/microsoft+windows+server+2003+terminal+services/Chapter+6+Registry/Registry+Keys+for+Terminal+Services/ # Contains description for most of the keys mentioned here (check it out if you want more information)
    - http://woshub.com/rds-shadow-how-to-connect-to-a-user-session-in-windows-server-2012-r2/ # Related to the Shadow RPD technique
    - https://admx.help/HKLM/SOFTWARE/Policies/Microsoft/Windows%20NT/Terminal%20Services # Contains description for most of the keys mentioned here (check it out if you want more information)
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/6f3aa9362d72e806490a8abce245331030d1ab5ac77e400dd475748236a6cc81/
    - https://blog.sekoia.io/darkgate-internals/
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/understanding-the-phobos-affiliate-structure/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/02c7d02fe1f1feb0fc7944550408ea8224273994/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-63---disable-remote-desktop-anti-alias-setting-through-registry
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/02c7d02fe1f1feb0fc7944550408ea8224273994/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-64---disable-remote-desktop-security-settings-through-registry
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/dd526047b8c399c312fee47d1e6fb531164da54d/atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml#L790
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/customize/desktop/unattend/microsoft-windows-terminalservices-rdp-winstationextensions-securitylayer
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190407-RegModEnableRDPConnections/notebook.html
    - https://twitter.com/SagieSec/status/1469001618863624194?t=HRf0eA0W1YYzkTSHb-Ky1A&s=03 # Related to the Shadow RPD technique
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200929062532/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-rdp-hijacking-via.html # Related to RDP hijacking via the "ServiceDll" key
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/i/unmasking-the-gentlemen-ransomware.html
author: Samir Bousseaden, David ANDRE, Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2022-08-06
modified: 2025-11-22
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_shadow:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Control\Terminal Server\'
            - '\Windows NT\Terminal Services\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Shadow'
        Details:
            - 'DWORD (0x00000001)' # Full Control with user’s permission
            - 'DWORD (0x00000002)' # Full Control without user’s permission
            - 'DWORD (0x00000003)' # View Session with user’s permission
            - 'DWORD (0x00000004)' # View Session without user’s permission
    selection_terminal_services_key:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Control\Terminal Server\'
            - '\Windows NT\Terminal Services\'
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias' # Disable anti-aliasing for remote desktop (DarkGate malware)
            - '\DisableSecuritySettings' # Disable security settings, allowing access to programs/entire desktop (DarkGate malware)
            - '\fAllowUnsolicited' # Allow unsolicited remote assistance offers
            - '\fAllowUnsolicitedFullControl'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    selection_tamper_only:
        # Any changes to these keys should be suspicious and looked at
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Control\Terminal Server\InitialProgram' # This value can be set to specify a program to run automatically when a user logs on to a remote computer.
            - '\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\InitialProgram' # This value can be set to specify a program to run automatically when a user logs on to a remote computer.
            - '\services\TermService\Parameters\ServiceDll' # RDP hijacking
            - '\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\SecurityLayer'
            - '\Windows NT\Terminal Services\InitialProgram' # This value can be set to specify a program to run automatically when a user logs on to a remote computer.
    filter_main_securitylayer_tls:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\SecurityLayer'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000002)' # TLS Enabled
    condition: (selection_shadow or selection_terminal_services_key or selection_tamper_only) and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Some of the keys mentioned here could be modified by an administrator while setting group policy (it should be investigated either way)
level: high
related high
NET NGenAssemblyUsageLog Registry Key Tamper
Detects changes to the NGenAssemblyUsageLog registry key. .NET Usage Log output location can be controlled by setting the NGenAssemblyUsageLog CLR configuration knob in the Registry or by configuring an environment variable (as described in the next section). By simplify specifying an arbitrary value (e.g. fake output location or junk data) for the expected value, a Usage Log file for the .NET execution context will not be created.
status test author frack113 id 28036918-04d3-423d-91c0-55ecf99fb892 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: NET NGenAssemblyUsageLog Registry Key Tamper
id: 28036918-04d3-423d-91c0-55ecf99fb892
status: test
description: |
  Detects changes to the NGenAssemblyUsageLog registry key.
  .NET Usage Log output location can be controlled by setting the NGenAssemblyUsageLog CLR configuration knob in the Registry or by configuring an environment variable (as described in the next section).
  By simplify specifying an arbitrary value (e.g. fake output location or junk data) for the expected value, a Usage Log file for the .NET execution context will not be created.
references:
    - https://bohops.com/2021/03/16/investigating-net-clr-usage-log-tampering-techniques-for-edr-evasion/
author: frack113
date: 2022-11-18
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework\NGenAssemblyUsageLog'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Enable LM Hash Storage
Detects changes to the "NoLMHash" registry value in order to allow Windows to store LM Hashes. By setting this registry value to "0" (DWORD), Windows will be allowed to store a LAN manager hash of your password in Active Directory and local SAM databases.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id c420410f-c2d8-4010-856b-dffe21866437 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Enable LM Hash Storage
id: c420410f-c2d8-4010-856b-dffe21866437
related:
    - id: 98dedfdd-8333-49d4-9f23-d7018cccae53 # process_creation
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the "NoLMHash" registry value in order to allow Windows to store LM Hashes.
    By setting this registry value to "0" (DWORD), Windows will be allowed to store a LAN manager hash of your password in Active Directory and local SAM databases.
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/prevent-windows-store-lm-hash-password
    - https://www.sans.org/blog/protecting-privileged-domain-accounts-lm-hashes-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-12-15
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: 'System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\NoLMHash'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Trust Access Disable For VBApplications
Detects registry changes to Microsoft Office "AccessVBOM" to a value of "1" which disables trust access for VBA on the victim machine and lets attackers execute malicious macros without any Microsoft Office warnings.
status test author Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 1a5c46e9-f32f-42f7-b2bc-6e9084db7fbf license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Trust Access Disable For VBApplications
id: 1a5c46e9-f32f-42f7-b2bc-6e9084db7fbf
related:
    - id: 9b894e57-033f-46cf-b7fa-a52804181973
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects registry changes to Microsoft Office "AccessVBOM" to a value of "1" which disables trust access for VBA on the victim machine and lets attackers execute malicious macros without any Microsoft Office warnings.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397
    - https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/zloader-with-a-new-infection-technique/
    - https://securelist.com/scarcruft-surveilling-north-korean-defectors-and-human-rights-activists/105074/
author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Security\AccessVBOM'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
related high
Potential Persistence Via Outlook Home Page
Detects potential persistence activity via outlook home page. An attacker can set a home page to achieve code execution and persistence by editing the WebView registry keys.
status test author Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems), David Bertho (@dbertho) & Eirik Sveen (@0xSV1), Storebrand id ddd171b5-2cc6-4975-9e78-f0eccd08cc76 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential Persistence Via Outlook Home Page
id: ddd171b5-2cc6-4975-9e78-f0eccd08cc76
related:
    - id: 487bb375-12ef-41f6-baae-c6a1572b4dd1
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential persistence activity via outlook home page.
    An attacker can set a home page to achieve code execution and persistence by editing the WebView registry keys.
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=70
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/outlook-home-page-feature-is-missing-in-folder-properties-d207edb7-aa02-46c5-b608-5d9dbed9bd04?ui=en-us&rs=en-us&ad=us
    - https://trustedsec.com/blog/specula-turning-outlook-into-a-c2-with-one-registry-change
author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems), David Bertho (@dbertho) & Eirik Sveen (@0xSV1), Storebrand
date: 2021-06-09
modified: 2024-08-07
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\Outlook\WebView\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\URL'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Windows Event Log Access Tampering Via Registry
Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string, as modifications to these values can restrict access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel. Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or via utilities such as "Get-EventLog" or "wevtutil".
status experimental author X__Junior id ba226dcf-d390-4642-b9af-b534872f1156 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Windows Event Log Access Tampering Via Registry
id: ba226dcf-d390-4642-b9af-b534872f1156
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string, as modifications to these values can restrict access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel. Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or via utilities such as "Get-EventLog" or "wevtutil".
references:
    - https://www.atomicredteam.io/atomic-red-team/atomics/T1562.002#atomic-test-8---modify-event-log-channel-access-permissions-via-registry---powershell
    - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uSYvHUVU8xY
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/security-descriptor-definition-language
author: X__Junior
date: 2025-01-16
modified: 2025-08-16
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    # O:SYG:SYD:(D;;0x1;;;WD)
    # O:BAG:SYD:(A;;0x2;;;S-1-15-2-1)(D;;0x1;;;WD)
    selection_key_1:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\CustomSD'
    selection_key_2:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\ChannelAccess'
    selection_details:
        - Details|contains: 'D:(D;'
        - Details|contains|all:
              - 'D:('
              - ')(D;'
    filter_main_trustedinstaller:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe'
    filter_main_tiworker:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
        Image|endswith: '\TiWorker.exe'
    filter_optional_empty:
        Image: ''
    filter_optional_null:
        Image: null
    condition: 1 of selection_key_* and selection_details and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity, still unlikely
level: high
related high
Uncommon Microsoft Office Trusted Location Added
Detects changes to registry keys related to "Trusted Location" of Microsoft Office where the path is set to something uncommon. Attackers might add additional trusted locations to avoid macro security restrictions.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id f742bde7-9528-42e5-bd82-84f51a8387d2 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Uncommon Microsoft Office Trusted Location Added
id: f742bde7-9528-42e5-bd82-84f51a8387d2
related:
    - id: a0bed973-45fa-4625-adb5-6ecdf9be70ac
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects changes to registry keys related to "Trusted Location" of Microsoft Office where the path is set to something uncommon. Attackers might add additional trusted locations to avoid macro security restrictions.
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://admx.help/?Category=Office2016&Policy=excel16.Office.Microsoft.Policies.Windows::L_TrustedLoc01
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-21
modified: 2023-09-29
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: 'Security\Trusted Locations\Location'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Path'
    filter_exclude_known_paths:
        Details|contains:
            - '%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Templates'
            - '%%APPDATA%%\Microsoft\Templates'
            - '%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Word\Startup'
            - '%%APPDATA%%\Microsoft\Word\Startup'
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Templates\'
            - ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office (x86)\Templates'
            - ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Templates\'
            - ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Templates\'
    filter_main_office_click_to_run:
        Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\'
        Image|endswith: '\OfficeClickToRun.exe'
    filter_main_office_apps:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_exclude_*
falsepositives:
    - Other unknown legitimate or custom paths need to be filtered to avoid false positives
level: high
related high
ETW Logging Disabled In .NET Processes - Sysmon Registry
Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.
status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) id bf4fc428-dcc3-4bbd-99fe-2422aeee2544 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: ETW Logging Disabled In .NET Processes - Sysmon Registry
id: bf4fc428-dcc3-4bbd-99fe-2422aeee2544
related:
    - id: a4c90ea1-2634-4ca0-adbb-35eae169b6fc
      type: similar
status: test
description: Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368
    - https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_
    - https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a
    - http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code
    - https://blog.xpnsec.com/hiding-your-dotnet-complus-etwenabled/
    - https://i.blackhat.com/EU-21/Wednesday/EU-21-Teodorescu-Veni-No-Vidi-No-Vici-Attacks-On-ETW-Blind-EDRs.pdf
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-06-05
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection_etw_enabled:
        TargetObject|endswith: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework\ETWEnabled'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    selection_complus:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\COMPlus_ETWEnabled'
            - '\COMPlus_ETWFlags'
        Details:
            - 0 # For REG_SZ type
            - 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Change the Fax Dll
Detect possible persistence using Fax DLL load when service restart
status test author frack113 id 9e3357ba-09d4-4fbd-a7c5-ad6386314513 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Change the Fax Dll
id: 9e3357ba-09d4-4fbd-a7c5-ad6386314513
status: test
description: Detect possible persistence using Fax DLL load when service restart
references:
    - https://twitter.com/dottor_morte/status/1544652325570191361
    - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/RiccardoAncarani/talks/master/F-Secure/unorthodox-lateral-movement.pdf
author: frack113
date: 2022-07-17
modified: 2022-12-30
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Fax\Device Providers\'
            - '\ImageName'
    filter:
        Details: '%systemroot%\system32\fxst30.dll' # Windows 10
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Security Event Logging Disabled via MiniNt Registry Key - Registry Set
Detects the addition of the 'MiniNt' key to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stop writing events. Windows Event Log is a service that collects and stores event logs from the operating system and applications. It is an important component of Windows security and auditing. Adversary may want to disable this service to disable logging of security events which could be used to detect their activities.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 8839e550-52d7-4958-9f2f-e13c1e736838 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Security Event Logging Disabled via MiniNt Registry Key - Registry Set
id: 8839e550-52d7-4958-9f2f-e13c1e736838
related:
    - id: 1a4bd6af-99ac-4466-b5b2-7b72b4a05462 # Security Event Logging Disabled Via MiniNt Registry Key
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the addition of the 'MiniNt' key to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stop writing events.
    Windows Event Log is a service that collects and stores event logs from the operating system and applications. It is an important component of Windows security and auditing.
    Adversary may want to disable this service to disable logging of security events which could be used to detect their activities.
references:
    - https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-04-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
    - attack.t1112
    - car.2022-03-001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject: 'HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt\(Default)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Highly Unlikely
level: high
related high
Outlook EnableUnsafeClientMailRules Setting Enabled - Registry
Detects an attacker trying to enable the outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows outlook to run applications or execute macros
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 6763c6c8-bd01-4687-bc8d-4fa52cf8ba08 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Outlook EnableUnsafeClientMailRules Setting Enabled - Registry
id: 6763c6c8-bd01-4687-bc8d-4fa52cf8ba08
related:
    - id: c3cefdf4-6703-4e1c-bad8-bf422fc5015a
      type: similar
    - id: 55f0a3a1-846e-40eb-8273-677371b8d912 # ProcCreation variation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects an attacker trying to enable the outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows outlook to run applications or execute macros
references:
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-control-the-rule-actions-to-start-an-application-or-run-a-macro-in-outlook-2016-and-outlook-2013-e4964b72-173c-959d-5d7b-ead562979048
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=44
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-08
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Outlook\Security\EnableUnsafeClientMailRules'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
DHCP Callout DLL Installation
Detects the installation of a Callout DLL via CalloutDlls and CalloutEnabled parameter in Registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DHCP server (restart required)
status test author Dimitrios Slamaris id 9d3436ef-9476-4c43-acca-90ce06bdf33a license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: DHCP Callout DLL Installation
id: 9d3436ef-9476-4c43-acca-90ce06bdf33a
status: test
description: Detects the installation of a Callout DLL via CalloutDlls and CalloutEnabled parameter in Registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DHCP server (restart required)
references:
    - https://blog.3or.de/mimilib-dhcp-server-callout-dll-injection.html
    - https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc726884(v=ws.10).aspx
    - https://msdn.microsoft.com/de-de/library/windows/desktop/aa363389(v=vs.85).aspx
author: Dimitrios Slamaris
date: 2017-05-15
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1574.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\Services\DHCPServer\Parameters\CalloutDlls'
            - '\Services\DHCPServer\Parameters\CalloutEnabled'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Macro Enabled In A Potentially Suspicious Document
Detects registry changes to Office trust records where the path is located in a potentially suspicious location
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id a166f74e-bf44-409d-b9ba-ea4b2dd8b3cd license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Macro Enabled In A Potentially Suspicious Document
id: a166f74e-bf44-409d-b9ba-ea4b2dd8b3cd
related:
    - id: 295a59c1-7b79-4b47-a930-df12c15fc9c2
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects registry changes to Office trust records where the path is located in a potentially suspicious location
references:
    - https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-21
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_value:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Security\Trusted Documents\TrustRecords'
    selection_paths:
        TargetObject|contains:
            # Note: add more locations where you don't expect a user to executed macro enabled docs
            - '/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/'
            - '/AppData/Local/Temp/'
            - '/PerfLogs/'
            - 'C:/Users/Public/'
            - 'file:///D:/'
            - 'file:///E:/'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
related high
RestrictedAdminMode Registry Value Tampering
Detects changes to the "DisableRestrictedAdmin" registry value in order to disable or enable RestrictedAdmin mode. RestrictedAdmin mode prevents the transmission of reusable credentials to the remote system to which you connect using Remote Desktop. This prevents your credentials from being harvested during the initial connection process if the remote server has been compromise
status test author frack113 id d6ce7ebd-260b-4323-9768-a9631c8d4db2 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: RestrictedAdminMode Registry Value Tampering
id: d6ce7ebd-260b-4323-9768-a9631c8d4db2
related:
    - id: 28ac00d6-22d9-4a3c-927f-bbd770104573 # process_creation
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the "DisableRestrictedAdmin" registry value in order to disable or enable RestrictedAdmin mode.
    RestrictedAdmin mode prevents the transmission of reusable credentials to the remote system to which you connect using Remote Desktop.
    This prevents your credentials from being harvested during the initial connection process if the remote server has been compromise
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/a8e3cf63e97b973a25903d3df9fd55da6252e564/atomics/T1112/T1112.md
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/32905.remote-desktop-services-enable-restricted-admin-mode.aspx
author: frack113
date: 2023-01-13
modified: 2024-08-23
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: 'System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\DisableRestrictedAdmin'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
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