Sigma rules for Cellebrite
500 rules · scoped to actor · back to Cellebrite
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.
title: Unfamiliar Sign-In Properties
id: 128faeef-79dd-44ca-b43c-a9e236a60f49
status: test
description: Detects sign-in with properties that are unfamiliar to the user. The detection considers past sign-in history to look for anomalous sign-ins.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#unfamiliar-sign-in-properties
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
logsource:
product: azure
service: riskdetection
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'unfamiliarFeatures'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- User changing to a new device, location, browser, etc.
level: high
title: Atypical Travel
id: 1a41023f-1e70-4026-921a-4d9341a9038e
status: test
description: Identifies two sign-ins originating from geographically distant locations, where at least one of the locations may also be atypical for the user, given past behavior.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#atypical-travel
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
logsource:
product: azure
service: riskdetection
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'unlikelyTravel'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high
title: Azure AD Threat Intelligence
id: a2cb56ff-4f46-437a-a0fa-ffa4d1303cba
status: test
description: Indicates user activity that is unusual for the user or consistent with known attack patterns.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#azure-ad-threat-intelligence-sign-in
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#azure-ad-threat-intelligence-user
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-07
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
logsource:
product: azure
service: riskdetection
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'investigationsThreatIntelligence'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high
title: Impossible Travel
id: b2572bf9-e20a-4594-b528-40bde666525a
status: test
description: Identifies user activities originating from geographically distant locations within a time period shorter than the time it takes to travel from the first location to the second.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#impossible-travel
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
logsource:
product: azure
service: riskdetection
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'impossibleTravel'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Connecting to a VPN, performing activity and then dropping and performing additional activity.
level: high
title: Suspicious SignIns From A Non Registered Device
id: 572b12d4-9062-11ed-a1eb-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects risky authentication from a non AD registered device without MFA being required.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in
author: Harjot Singh, '@cyb3rjy0t'
date: 2023-01-10
modified: 2025-07-02
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
logsource:
product: azure
service: signinlogs
detection:
selection_main:
Status: 'Success'
AuthenticationRequirement: 'singleFactorAuthentication'
RiskState: 'atRisk'
selection_empty1:
DeviceDetail.trusttype: ''
selection_empty2:
DeviceDetail.trusttype: null
condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_empty*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Roles Assigned Outside PIM
id: b1bc08d1-8224-4758-a0e6-fbcfc98c73bb
status: test
description: Identifies when a privilege role assignment has taken place outside of PIM and may indicate an attack.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#roles-are-being-assigned-outside-of-privileged-identity-management
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
product: azure
service: pim
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'rolesAssignedOutsidePrivilegedIdentityManagementAlertConfiguration'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Investigate where users are being assigned privileged roles outside of Privileged Identity Management and prohibit future assignments from there.
level: high
title: Roles Activated Too Frequently
id: 645fd80d-6c07-435b-9e06-7bc1b5656cba
status: test
description: Identifies when the same privilege role has multiple activations by the same user.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#roles-are-being-activated-too-frequently
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
product: azure
service: pim
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'sequentialActivationRenewalsAlertIncident'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Investigate where if active time period for a role is set too short.
level: high
title: Roles Activation Doesn't Require MFA
id: 94a66f46-5b64-46ce-80b2-75dcbe627cc0
status: test
description: Identifies when a privilege role can be activated without performing mfa.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#roles-dont-require-multi-factor-authentication-for-activation
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
product: azure
service: pim
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'noMfaOnRoleActivationAlertIncident'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Investigate if user is performing MFA at sign-in.
level: high
title: Too Many Global Admins
id: 7bbc309f-e2b1-4eb1-8369-131a367d67d3
status: test
description: Identifies an event where there are there are too many accounts assigned the Global Administrator role.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#there-are-too-many-global-administrators
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
product: azure
service: pim
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'tooManyGlobalAdminsAssignedToTenantAlertIncident'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Investigate if threshold setting in PIM is too low.
level: high
title: Stale Accounts In A Privileged Role
id: e402c26a-267a-45bd-9615-bd9ceda6da85
status: test
description: Identifies when an account hasn't signed in during the past n number of days.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#potential-stale-accounts-in-a-privileged-role
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
product: azure
service: pim
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'staleSignInAlertIncident'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Investigate if potential generic account that cannot be removed.
level: high
title: Roles Are Not Being Used
id: 8c6ec464-4ae4-43ac-936a-291da66ed13d
status: test
description: Identifies when a user has been assigned a privilege role and are not using that role.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#administrators-arent-using-their-privileged-roles
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
product: azure
service: pim
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'redundantAssignmentAlertIncident'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Investigate if potential generic account that cannot be removed.
level: high
title: Invalid PIM License
id: 58af08eb-f9e1-43c8-9805-3ad9b0482bd8
status: test
description: Identifies when an organization doesn't have the proper license for PIM and is out of compliance.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#the-organization-doesnt-have-microsoft-entra-premium-p2-or-microsoft-entra-id-governance
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
product: azure
service: pim
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'invalidLicenseAlertIncident'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Investigate if licenses have expired.
level: high
title: PIM Alert Setting Changes To Disabled
id: aeaef14c-e5bf-4690-a9c8-835caad458bd
status: test
description: Detects when PIM alerts are set to disabled.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-09
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
properties.message: Disable PIM Alert
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrator disabling PIM alerts as an active choice.
level: high
title: Azure Subscription Permission Elevation Via AuditLogs
id: ca9bf243-465e-494a-9e54-bf9fc239057d
status: test
description: |
Detects when a user has been elevated to manage all Azure Subscriptions.
This change should be investigated immediately if it isn't planned.
This setting could allow an attacker access to Azure subscriptions in your environment.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts#assignment-and-elevation
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-26
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
Category: 'Administrative'
OperationName: 'Assigns the caller to user access admin'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- If this was approved by System Administrator.
level: high
title: Account Created And Deleted Within A Close Time Frame
id: 6f583da0-3a90-4566-a4ed-83c09fe18bbf
status: test
description: Detects when an account was created and deleted in a short period of time.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#short-lived-accounts
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', MikeDuddington, '@dudders1', Tim Shelton
date: 2022-08-11
modified: 2022-08-18
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
properties.message:
- Add user
- Delete user
Status: Success
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legit administrative action
level: high
title: Azure Login Bypassing Conditional Access Policies
id: 13f2d3f5-6497-44a7-bf5f-dc13ffafe5dc
status: experimental
description: |
Detects a successful login to the Microsoft Intune Company Portal which could allow bypassing Conditional Access Policies and InTune device trust using a tool like TokenSmith.
author: Josh Nickels, Marius Rothenbücher
references:
- https://labs.jumpsec.com/tokensmith-bypassing-intune-compliant-device-conditional-access/
- https://github.com/JumpsecLabs/TokenSmith
date: 2025-01-08
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
logsource:
service: audit
product: m365
detection:
selection:
Operation: 'UserLoggedIn'
ApplicationId: '9ba1a5c7-f17a-4de9-a1f1-6178c8d51223'
ResultStatus: 'Success'
RequestType: 'Cmsi:Cmsi'
filter_main_bjectid:
ObjectId: '0000000a-0000-0000-c000-000000000000' # Microsoft Intune seen when mobile devices are enrolled
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: External Remote SMB Logon from Public IP
id: 78d5cab4-557e-454f-9fb9-a222bd0d5edc
related:
- id: 259a9cdf-c4dd-4fa2-b243-2269e5ab18a2
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects successful logon from public IP address via SMB. This can indicate a publicly-exposed SMB port.
references:
- https://www.inversecos.com/2020/04/successful-4624-anonymous-logons-to.html
- https://twitter.com/Purp1eW0lf/status/1616144561965002752
author: Micah Babinski (@micahbabinski), Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
date: 2023-01-19
modified: 2024-03-11
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.credential-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1133
- attack.t1078
- attack.t1110
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4624
LogonType: 3
filter_main_local_ranges:
IpAddress|cidr:
- '::1/128' # IPv6 loopback
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '127.0.0.0/8'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
- '169.254.0.0/16'
- 'fc00::/7' # IPv6 private addresses
- 'fe80::/10' # IPv6 link-local addresses
filter_main_empty:
IpAddress: '-'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate or intentional inbound connections from public IP addresses on the SMB port.
level: high
title: Okta New Admin Console Behaviours
id: a0b38b70-3cb5-484b-a4eb-c4d8e7bcc0a9
status: test
description: Detects when Okta identifies new activity in the Admin Console.
references:
- https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
- https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection
author: kelnage
date: 2023-09-07
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: okta
service: okta
detection:
selection_event:
eventType: 'policy.evaluate_sign_on'
target.displayName: 'Okta Admin Console'
selection_positive:
- debugContext.debugData.behaviors|contains: 'POSITIVE'
- debugContext.debugData.logOnlySecurityData|contains: 'POSITIVE'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- When an admin begins using the Admin Console and one of Okta's heuristics incorrectly identifies the behavior as being unusual.
level: high
title: AWS IAM S3Browser User or AccessKey Creation
id: db014773-d9d9-4792-91e5-133337c0ffee
status: test
description: Detects S3 Browser utility creating IAM User or AccessKey.
references:
- https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor
author: daniel.bohannon@permiso.io (@danielhbohannon)
date: 2023-05-17
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1059.009
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
eventName:
- 'CreateUser'
- 'CreateAccessKey'
userAgent|contains: 'S3 Browser'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Valid usage of S3 Browser for IAM User and/or AccessKey creation
level: high
title: AWS IAM S3Browser LoginProfile Creation
id: db014773-b1d3-46bd-ba26-133337c0ffee
status: test
description: Detects S3 Browser utility performing reconnaissance looking for existing IAM Users without a LoginProfile defined then (when found) creating a LoginProfile.
references:
- https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor
author: daniel.bohannon@permiso.io (@danielhbohannon)
date: 2023-05-17
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1059.009
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
eventName:
- 'GetLoginProfile'
- 'CreateLoginProfile'
userAgent|contains: 'S3 Browser'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Valid usage of S3 Browser for IAM LoginProfile listing and/or creation
level: high
title: AWS IAM S3Browser Templated S3 Bucket Policy Creation
id: db014773-7375-4f4e-b83b-133337c0ffee
status: test
description: Detects S3 browser utility creating Inline IAM policy containing default S3 bucket name placeholder value of "<YOUR-BUCKET-NAME>".
references:
- https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor
author: daniel.bohannon@permiso.io (@danielhbohannon)
date: 2023-05-17
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1059.009
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
eventName: PutUserPolicy
userAgent|contains: 'S3 Browser'
requestParameters|contains|all:
- '"arn:aws:s3:::<YOUR-BUCKET-NAME>/*"'
- '"s3:GetObject"'
- '"Allow"'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Valid usage of S3 browser with accidental creation of default Inline IAM policy without changing default S3 bucket name placeholder value
level: high
title: Potential MFA Bypass Using Legacy Client Authentication
id: 53bb4f7f-48a8-4475-ac30-5a82ddfdf6fc
status: test
description: Detects successful authentication from potential clients using legacy authentication via user agent strings. This could be a sign of MFA bypass using a password spray attack.
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20230217071802/https://blooteem.com/march-2022
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/10/26/protect-your-business-from-password-sprays-with-microsoft-dart-recommendations/
author: Harjot Singh, '@cyb3rjy0t'
date: 2023-03-20
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.credential-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078.004
- attack.t1110
logsource:
product: azure
service: signinlogs
detection:
selection:
Status: 'Success'
userAgent|contains:
- 'BAV2ROPC'
- 'CBAinPROD'
- 'CBAinTAR'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Known Legacy Accounts
level: high
title: Sign-in Failure Due to Conditional Access Requirements Not Met
id: b4a6d707-9430-4f5f-af68-0337f52d5c42
status: test
description: Define a baseline threshold for failed sign-ins due to Conditional Access failures
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-06-01
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.credential-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1110
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: azure
service: signinlogs
detection:
selection:
ResultType: 53003
Resultdescription: Blocked by Conditional Access
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Service Account misconfigured
- Misconfigured Systems
- Vulnerability Scanners
level: high
title: Sign-ins from Non-Compliant Devices
id: 4f77e1d7-3982-4ee0-8489-abf2d6b75284
status: test
description: Monitor and alert for sign-ins where the device was non-compliant.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in
author: Michael Epping, '@mepples21'
date: 2022-06-28
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: azure
service: signinlogs
detection:
selection:
DeviceDetail.isCompliant: 'false'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Use of Legacy Authentication Protocols
id: 60f6535a-760f-42a9-be3f-c9a0a025906e
status: test
description: Alert on when legacy authentication has been used on an account
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-06-17
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.credential-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078.004
- attack.t1110
logsource:
product: azure
service: signinlogs
detection:
selection:
ActivityDetails: Sign-ins
ClientApp:
- Other client
- IMAP
- POP3
- MAPI
- SMTP
- Exchange ActiveSync
- Exchange Web Services
Username: 'UPN'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- User has been put in acception group so they can use legacy authentication
level: high
title: Application URI Configuration Changes
id: 0055ad1f-be85-4798-83cf-a6da17c993b3
status: test
description: |
Detects when a configuration change is made to an applications URI.
URIs for domain names that no longer exist (dangling URIs), not using HTTPS, wildcards at the end of the domain, URIs that are no unique to that app, or URIs that point to domains you do not control should be investigated.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-configuration-changes
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-02
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1528
- attack.t1078.004
- attack.persistence
- attack.credential-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
properties.message: Update Application Sucess- Property Name AppAddress
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- When and administrator is making legitimate URI configuration changes to an application. This should be a planned event.
level: high
title: PIM Approvals And Deny Elevation
id: 039a7469-0296-4450-84c0-f6966b16dc6d
status: test
description: Detects when a PIM elevation is approved or denied. Outside of normal operations should be investigated.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-09
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
properties.message: Request Approved/Denied
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Actual admin using PIM.
level: high
title: Temporary Access Pass Added To An Account
id: fa84aaf5-8142-43cd-9ec2-78cfebf878ce
status: test
description: Detects when a temporary access pass (TAP) is added to an account. TAPs added to priv accounts should be investigated
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-10
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
properties.message: Admin registered security info
Status: Admin registered temporary access pass method for user
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrator adding a legitimate temporary access pass
level: high
title: User Added To Privilege Role
id: 49a268a4-72f4-4e38-8a7b-885be690c5b5
status: test
description: Detects when a user is added to a privileged role.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-06
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
properties.message:
- Add eligible member (permanent)
- Add eligible member (eligible)
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legtimate administrator actions of adding members from a role
level: high
title: Users Added to Global or Device Admin Roles
id: 11c767ae-500b-423b-bae3-b234450736ed
status: test
description: Monitor and alert for users added to device admin roles.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices#device-administrator-roles
author: Michael Epping, '@mepples21'
date: 2022-06-28
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
Category: RoleManagement
OperationName|contains|all:
- 'Add'
- 'member to role'
TargetResources|contains:
- '7698a772-787b-4ac8-901f-60d6b08affd2'
- '62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Application AppID Uri Configuration Changes
id: 1b45b0d1-773f-4f23-aedc-814b759563b1
status: test
description: Detects when a configuration change is made to an applications AppID URI.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#appid-uri-added-modified-or-removed
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-02
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.credential-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1552
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
properties.message:
- Update Application
- Update Service principal
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- When and administrator is making legitimate AppID URI configuration changes to an application. This should be a planned event.
level: high
title: Changes To PIM Settings
id: db6c06c4-bf3b-421c-aa88-15672b88c743
status: test
description: Detects when changes are made to PIM roles
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-09
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
properties.message: Update role setting in PIM
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legit administrative PIM setting configuration changes
level: high
title: Azure Subscription Permission Elevation Via ActivityLogs
id: 09438caa-07b1-4870-8405-1dbafe3dad95
status: test
description: |
Detects when a user has been elevated to manage all Azure Subscriptions.
This change should be investigated immediately if it isn't planned.
This setting could allow an attacker access to Azure subscriptions in your environment.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftauthorization
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-26
modified: 2022-08-23
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
operationName: MICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ELEVATEACCESS/ACTION
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- If this was approved by System Administrator.
level: high
title: Potential GobRAT File Discovery Via Grep
id: e34cfa0c-0a50-4210-9cb3-5632d08eb041
status: test
description: Detects the use of grep to discover specific files created by the GobRAT malware
references:
- https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2023/05/gobrat.html
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/60bcd645450e4c846238cf0e7226dc40c84c96eba99f6b2cffcd0ab4a391c8b3/detection
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3e44c807a25a56f4068b5b8186eee5002eed6f26d665a8b791c472ad154585d1/detection
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-06-02
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1082
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/grep'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'apached'
- 'frpc'
- 'sshd.sh'
- 'zone.arm'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: HackTool - WinPwn Execution - ScriptBlock
id: 851fd622-b675-4d26-b803-14bc7baa517a
related:
- id: d557dc06-62e8-4468-a8e8-7984124908ce
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects scriptblock text keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-12-04
references:
- https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn
- https://www.publicnow.com/view/EB87DB49C654D9B63995FAD4C9DE3D3CC4F6C3ED?1671634841
- https://reconshell.com/winpwn-tool-for-internal-windows-pentesting-and-ad-security/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/4d6c4e8e23d465af7a2388620cfe3f8c76e16cf0/atomics/T1082/T1082.md
- https://grep.app/search?q=winpwn&filter[repo][0]=redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.discovery
- attack.execution
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1046
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1106
- attack.t1518
- attack.t1548.002
- attack.t1552.001
- attack.t1555
- attack.t1555.003
logsource:
category: ps_script
product: windows
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- 'Offline_Winpwn'
- 'WinPwn '
- 'WinPwn.exe'
- 'WinPwn.ps1'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- As the script block is a blob of text. False positive may occur with scripts that contain the keyword as a reference or simply use it for detection.
level: high
title: Suspicious Kernel Dump Using Dtrace
id: 7124aebe-4cd7-4ccb-8df0-6d6b93c96795
status: test
description: Detects suspicious way to dump the kernel on Windows systems using dtrace.exe, which is available on Windows systems since Windows 10 19H1
references:
- https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1474899714290208777?s=12
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/devtest/dtrace
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-28
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1082
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_plain:
Image|endswith: '\dtrace.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'lkd(0)'
selection_obfuscated:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'syscall:::return'
- 'lkd('
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dtrace_kernel_dump/info.yml
title: HackTool - WinPwn Execution
id: d557dc06-62e8-4468-a8e8-7984124908ce
related:
- id: 851fd622-b675-4d26-b803-14bc7baa517a
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects commandline keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-12-04
references:
- https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn
- https://www.publicnow.com/view/EB87DB49C654D9B63995FAD4C9DE3D3CC4F6C3ED?1671634841
- https://reconshell.com/winpwn-tool-for-internal-windows-pentesting-and-ad-security/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/4d6c4e8e23d465af7a2388620cfe3f8c76e16cf0/atomics/T1082/T1082.md
- https://grep.app/search?q=winpwn&filter[repo][0]=redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.discovery
- attack.execution
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1046
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1106
- attack.t1518
- attack.t1548.002
- attack.t1552.001
- attack.t1555
- attack.t1555.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Offline_Winpwn'
- 'WinPwn '
- 'WinPwn.exe'
- 'WinPwn.ps1'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: HackTool - winPEAS Execution
id: 98b53e78-ebaf-46f8-be06-421aafd176d9
status: test
description: WinPEAS is a script that search for possible paths to escalate privileges on Windows hosts. The checks are explained on book.hacktricks.xyz
references:
- https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng
- https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation
author: Georg Lauenstein (sure[secure])
date: 2022-09-19
modified: 2023-03-23
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1087
- attack.t1046
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- OriginalFileName: 'winPEAS.exe'
- Image|endswith:
- '\winPEASany_ofs.exe'
- '\winPEASany.exe'
- '\winPEASx64_ofs.exe'
- '\winPEASx64.exe'
- '\winPEASx86_ofs.exe'
- '\winPEASx86.exe'
selection_cli_option:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' applicationsinfo' # Search installed applications information
- ' browserinfo' # Search browser information
- ' eventsinfo' # Display interesting events information
- ' fileanalysis' # Search specific files that can contains credentials and for regexes inside files
- ' filesinfo' # Search generic files that can contains credentials
- ' processinfo' # Search processes information
- ' servicesinfo' # Search services information
- ' windowscreds' # Search windows credentials
selection_cli_dl:
CommandLine|contains: 'https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/'
selection_cli_specific:
- ParentCommandLine|endswith: ' -linpeas'
- CommandLine|endswith: ' -linpeas'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Network Reconnaissance Activity
id: e6313acd-208c-44fc-a0ff-db85d572e90e
status: test
description: Detects a set of suspicious network related commands often used in recon stages
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-07
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1087
- attack.t1082
- car.2016-03-001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'nslookup'
- '_ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high
title: Shell Execution GCC - Linux
id: 9b5de532-a757-4d70-946c-1f3e44f48b4d
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of the "gcc" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/gcc/#shell
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/c89/#shell
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/c99/#shell
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1083
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '/c89'
- '/c99'
- '/gcc'
CommandLine|contains: '-wrapper'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- '/bin/bash,-s'
- '/bin/dash,-s'
- '/bin/fish,-s'
- '/bin/sh,-s'
- '/bin/zsh,-s'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Shell Execution via Find - Linux
id: 6adfbf8f-52be-4444-9bac-81b539624146
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of the find command to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or exploitation attempt.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/find/#shell
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1083
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '/find'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' . '
- '-exec'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- '/bin/bash'
- '/bin/dash'
- '/bin/fish'
- '/bin/sh'
- '/bin/zsh'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Shell Execution via Flock - Linux
id: 4b09c71e-4269-4111-9cdd-107d8867f0cc
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of the "flock" command to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/flock/#shell
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1083
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '/flock'
CommandLine|contains: ' -u '
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- '/bin/bash'
- '/bin/dash'
- '/bin/fish'
- '/bin/sh'
- '/bin/zsh'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Shell Execution via Nice - Linux
id: 093d68c7-762a-42f4-9f46-95e79142571a
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of the "nice" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/nice/#shell
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1083
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/nice'
CommandLine|endswith:
- '/bin/bash'
- '/bin/dash'
- '/bin/fish'
- '/bin/sh'
- '/bin/zsh'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Vim GTFOBin Abuse - Linux
id: 7ab8f73a-fcff-428b-84aa-6a5ff7877dea
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of "vim" and it's siblings commands to execute a shell or proxy commands.
Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/vim/
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/rvim/
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/vimdiff/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-28
modified: 2024-09-02
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1083
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '/rvim'
- '/vim'
- '/vimdiff'
CommandLine|contains:
- ' --cmd'
- ' -c '
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- ':!/'
- ':lua '
- ':py '
- '/bin/bash'
- '/bin/dash'
- '/bin/fish'
- '/bin/sh'
- '/bin/zsh'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: PUA - Seatbelt Execution
id: 38646daa-e78f-4ace-9de0-55547b2d30da
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the PUA/Recon tool Seatbelt via PE information of command line parameters
references:
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt
- https://www.bluetangle.dev/2022/08/fastening-seatbelt-on-threat-hunting.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-18
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1526
- attack.t1087
- attack.t1083
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\Seatbelt.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Seatbelt.exe'
- Description: 'Seatbelt'
- CommandLine|contains:
# This just a list of the commands that will produce the least amount of FP in "theory"
# Comment out/in as needed in your environment
# To get the full list of commands see reference section
- ' DpapiMasterKeys'
- ' InterestingProcesses'
- ' InterestingFiles'
- ' CertificateThumbprints'
- ' ChromiumBookmarks'
- ' ChromiumHistory'
- ' ChromiumPresence'
- ' CloudCredentials'
- ' CredEnum'
- ' CredGuard'
- ' FirefoxHistory'
- ' ProcessCreationEvents'
# - ' RDPSessions'
# - ' PowerShellHistory'
selection_group_list:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -group=misc'
- ' -group=remote'
- ' -group=chromium'
- ' -group=slack'
- ' -group=system'
- ' -group=user'
- ' -group=all'
selection_group_output:
CommandLine|contains: ' -outputfile='
condition: selection_img or all of selection_group_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: SharpHound Recon Account Discovery
id: 65f77b1e-8e79-45bf-bb67-5988a8ce45a5
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls useb by SharpHound to map remote connections and local group membership.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-wkst/55118c55-2122-4ef9-8664-0c1ff9e168f3
- https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-WKST.md
- https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
- https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
- attack.t1087
- attack.discovery
logsource:
product: rpc_firewall
category: application
definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:6bffd098-a112-3610-9833-46c3f87e345a opnum:2'
detection:
selection:
EventLog: RPCFW
EventID: 3
InterfaceUuid: 6bffd098-a112-3610-9833-46c3f87e345a
OpNum: 2
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Webshell Detection With Command Line Keywords
id: bed2a484-9348-4143-8a8a-b801c979301c
status: test
description: Detects certain command line parameters often used during reconnaissance activity via web shells
references:
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-ii.html
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/bumblebee-webshell-xhunt-campaign/
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/threat-advisory-oh-no-cleo-cleo-software-actively-being-exploited-in-the-wild
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Chad Hudson, Matt Anderson
date: 2017-01-01
modified: 2024-12-14
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1505.003
- attack.t1018
- attack.t1033
- attack.t1087
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_webserver_image:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\w3wp.exe'
- '\php-cgi.exe'
- '\nginx.exe'
- '\httpd.exe'
- '\caddy.exe'
- '\ws_tomcatservice.exe'
selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat1:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\java.exe'
- '\javaw.exe'
ParentImage|contains:
- '-tomcat-'
- '\tomcat'
selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat2:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\java.exe'
- '\javaw.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'catalina.jar'
- 'CATALINA_HOME'
selection_susp_net_utility:
OriginalFileName:
- 'net.exe'
- 'net1.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- ' user '
- ' use '
- ' group '
selection_susp_ping_utility:
OriginalFileName: 'ping.exe'
CommandLine|contains: ' -n '
selection_susp_change_dir:
CommandLine|contains:
- '&cd&echo' # china chopper web shell
- 'cd /d ' # https://www.computerhope.com/cdhlp.htm
selection_susp_wmic_utility:
OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
CommandLine|contains: ' /node:'
selection_susp_powershell_cli:
Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -enc '
- ' -EncodedCommand '
- ' -w hidden '
- ' -windowstyle hidden'
- '.WebClient).Download'
selection_susp_misc_discovery_binaries:
- Image|endswith:
- '\dsquery.exe'
- '\find.exe'
- '\findstr.exe'
- '\ipconfig.exe'
- '\netstat.exe'
- '\nslookup.exe'
- '\pathping.exe'
- '\quser.exe'
- '\schtasks.exe'
- '\systeminfo.exe'
- '\tasklist.exe'
- '\tracert.exe'
- '\ver.exe'
- '\wevtutil.exe'
- '\whoami.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'dsquery.exe'
- 'find.exe'
- 'findstr.exe'
- 'ipconfig.exe'
- 'netstat.exe'
- 'nslookup.exe'
- 'pathping.exe'
- 'quser.exe'
- 'schtasks.exe'
- 'sysinfo.exe'
- 'tasklist.exe'
- 'tracert.exe'
- 'ver.exe'
- 'VSSADMIN.EXE'
- 'wevtutil.exe'
- 'whoami.exe'
selection_susp_misc_discovery_commands:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' Test-NetConnection '
- 'dir \' # remote dir: dir \<redacted IP #3>\C$:\windows\temp\*.exe
condition: 1 of selection_webserver_* and 1 of selection_susp_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Chopper Webshell Process Pattern
id: fa3c117a-bc0d-416e-a31b-0c0e80653efb
status: test
description: Detects patterns found in process executions cause by China Chopper like tiny (ASPX) webshells
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/30/analyzing-attacks-using-the-exchange-vulnerabilities-cve-2022-41040-and-cve-2022-41082/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), MSTI (query)
date: 2022-10-01
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1505.003
- attack.t1018
- attack.t1033
- attack.t1087
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_origin:
- Image|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
- ParentImage|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
selection_cmdline:
CommandLine|contains:
- '&ipconfig&echo'
- '&quser&echo'
- '&whoami&echo'
- '&c:&echo'
- '&cd&echo'
- '&dir&echo'
- '&echo [E]'
- '&echo [S]'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Webshell Hacking Activity Patterns
id: 4ebc877f-4612-45cb-b3a5-8e3834db36c9
status: test
description: |
Detects certain parent child patterns found in cases in which a web shell is used to perform certain credential dumping or exfiltration activities on a compromised system
references:
- https://youtu.be/7aemGhaE9ds?t=641
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-17
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1505.003
- attack.t1018
- attack.t1033
- attack.t1087
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
# Webserver
selection_webserver_image:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\caddy.exe'
- '\httpd.exe'
- '\nginx.exe'
- '\php-cgi.exe'
- '\w3wp.exe'
- '\ws_tomcatservice.exe'
selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat1:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\java.exe'
- '\javaw.exe'
ParentImage|contains:
- '-tomcat-'
- '\tomcat'
selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat2:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\java.exe'
- '\javaw.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'catalina.jar'
- 'CATALINA_HOME'
# Suspicious child processes
selection_child_1:
# Process dumping
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'rundll32'
- 'comsvcs'
selection_child_2:
# Winrar exfil
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' -hp'
- ' a '
- ' -m'
selection_child_3:
# User add
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'net'
- ' user '
- ' /add'
selection_child_4:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'net'
- ' localgroup '
- ' administrators '
- '/add'
selection_child_5:
Image|endswith:
# Credential stealing
- '\ntdsutil.exe'
# AD recon
- '\ldifde.exe'
- '\adfind.exe'
# Process dumping
- '\procdump.exe'
- '\Nanodump.exe'
# Destruction / ransom groups
- '\vssadmin.exe'
- '\fsutil.exe'
selection_child_6:
# SUspicious patterns
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -decode ' # Used with certutil
- ' -NoP ' # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
- ' -W Hidden ' # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
- ' /decode ' # Used with certutil
- ' /ticket:' # Rubeus
- ' sekurlsa' # Mimikatz
- '.dmp full' # Process dumping method apart from procdump
- '.downloadfile(' # PowerShell download command
- '.downloadstring(' # PowerShell download command
- 'FromBase64String' # PowerShell encoded payload
- 'process call create' # WMIC process creation
- 'reg save ' # save registry SAM - syskey extraction
- 'whoami /priv'
condition: 1 of selection_webserver_* and 1 of selection_child_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: HackTool - SOAPHound Execution
id: e92a4287-e072-4a40-9739-370c106bb750
status: test
description: |
Detects the execution of SOAPHound, a .NET tool for collecting Active Directory data, using specific command-line arguments that may indicate an attempt to extract sensitive AD information.
references:
- https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
- https://medium.com/falconforce/soaphound-tool-to-collect-active-directory-data-via-adws-165aca78288c
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2024-01-26
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1087
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_1:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' --buildcache '
- ' --bhdump '
- ' --certdump '
- ' --dnsdump '
selection_2:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -c '
- ' --cachefilename '
- ' -o '
- ' --outputdirectory'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high