Sigma rules for Cellebrite
500 rules · scoped to actor · back to Cellebrite
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.
title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher
id: 6c96fc76-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 25)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2024-04-15
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
# Example 1: c:\windows\sYstEm32\CmD.eXE /C"echO\Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -NoEXiT -"
# Example 2: c:\WiNDOws\sysTEm32\cmd.EXe /C " ECHo Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -nol ${EXEcUtIONCONTeXT}.INvOkEComMANd.InvOKEScRIPt( $InpUt )"
CommandLine|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r).+powershell.+(?:\$\{?input\}?|noexit).+\"'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
id: b222df08-0e07-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-17
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
# CommandLine|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r).+clip(?:\.exe)?.{0,4}&&.+clipboard]::\(\s\\\"\{\d\}.+\-f.+\"'
# Example 1: Cmd /c" echo/Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString |cLiP&& POWerSheLl -Nolog -sT . (\"{1}{2}{0}\"-f'pe','Ad',(\"{1}{0}\" -f'Ty','d-' ) ) -Assemb ( \"{5}{1}{3}{0}{2}{4}\" -f'ows','y','.F',(\"{0}{1}{2}\" -f'stem.W','i','nd'),( \"{0}{1}\"-f 'o','rms' ),'S' ) ; ([SySTEM.wiNDows.FoRmS.CLiPbOArd]::( \"{1}{0}\" -f (\"{1}{0}\" -f'T','TTeX' ),'gE' ).\"invO`Ke\"( ) ) ^| ^&( \"{5}{1}{2}{4}{3}{0}\" -f 'n',( \"{1}{0}\"-f'KE-','o' ),(\"{2}{1}{0}\"-f 'pRESS','x','e' ),'o','i','iNV') ; [System.Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::(\"{0}{1}\" -f( \"{1}{0}\"-f'e','SetT' ),'xt').\"InV`oKe\"( ' ')"
# Example 2: CMD/c " ECho Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString|c:\WiNDowS\SySteM32\cLip && powershElL -noPRO -sTa ^& (\"{2}{0}{1}\" -f 'dd',(\"{1}{0}\"-f 'ype','-T' ),'A' ) -AssemblyN (\"{0}{3}{2}{1}{4}\"-f'Pr','nCo',(\"{0}{1}\"-f'e','ntatio'),'es','re' ) ; ^& ( ( [StRinG]${ve`RB`OSE`pr`e`FeReNCE} )[1,3] + 'x'-JoiN'') ( ( [sySTem.WInDOWs.ClipbOaRD]::( \"{1}{0}\" -f(\"{0}{1}\" -f'tTe','xt' ),'ge' ).\"IN`Vo`Ke\"( ) ) ) ; [System.Windows.Clipboard]::( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f't',( \"{0}{1}\" -f 'tT','ex' ),'Se' ).\"In`V`oKe\"( ' ' )"
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'cmd'
- '&&'
- 'clipboard]::'
- '-f'
CommandLine|contains:
- '/c'
- '/r'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious File Downloaded From File-Sharing Website Via Certutil.EXE
id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794
related:
- id: 19b08b1c-861d-4e75-a1ef-ea0c1baf202b # Direct IP download
type: similar
- id: 13e6fe51-d478-4c7e-b0f2-6da9b400a829 # Generic download
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of certutil with certain flags that allow the utility to download files from file-sharing websites.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil
- https://forensicitguy.github.io/agenttesla-vba-certutil-download/
- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/04/13/compromised-exchange-server-hosting-cryptojacker-targeting-other-exchange-servers/
- https://twitter.com/egre55/status/1087685529016193025
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certutil/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/17/new-ttps-observed-in-mint-sandstorm-campaign-targeting-high-profile-individuals-at-universities-and-research-orgs/
- https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/certutil-one-more-gui-lolbin
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-15
modified: 2025-12-10
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe'
selection_flags:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'urlcache '
- 'verifyctl '
- 'URL '
selection_http:
CommandLine|contains:
- '.githubusercontent.com' # Includes both gists and github repositories / Michael Haag (idea)
- 'anonfiles.com'
- 'cdn.discordapp.com'
- 'ddns.net'
- 'dl.dropboxusercontent.com'
- 'ghostbin.co'
- 'github.com'
- 'glitch.me'
- 'gofile.io'
- 'hastebin.com'
- 'mediafire.com'
- 'mega.nz'
- 'onrender.com'
- 'pages.dev'
- 'paste.ee'
- 'pastebin.com'
- 'pastebin.pl'
- 'pastetext.net'
- 'privatlab.com'
- 'privatlab.net'
- 'send.exploit.in'
- 'sendspace.com'
- 'storage.googleapis.com'
- 'storjshare.io'
- 'supabase.co'
- 'temp.sh'
- 'transfer.sh'
- 'trycloudflare.com'
- 'ufile.io'
- 'w3spaces.com'
- 'workers.dev'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_download_file_sharing_domains/info.yml
title: Potential CommandLine Obfuscation Using Unicode Characters From Suspicious Image
id: 584bca0f-3608-4402-80fd-4075ff6072e3
related:
- id: e0552b19-5a83-4222-b141-b36184bb8d79
type: similar
- id: ad691d92-15f2-4181-9aa4-723c74f9ddc3 # RTLO
type: similar
- id: 2c0d2d7b-30d6-4d14-9751-7b9113042ab9
type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
Detects potential commandline obfuscation using unicode characters.
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit.
references:
- https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/windows-command-line-obfuscation
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027/T1027.md#atomic-test-6---dlp-evasion-via-sensitive-data-in-vba-macro-over-http
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Josh Nickels
date: 2024-09-02
modified: 2025-05-30
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\powershell_ise.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
OriginalFileName:
- 'Cmd.EXE'
- 'cscript.exe'
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
- 'wscript.exe'
selection_special_chars:
CommandLine|contains:
# spacing modifier letters that get auto-replaced
- 'ˣ' # 0x02E3
- '˪' # 0x02EA
- 'ˢ' # 0x02E2
# Forward slash alternatives
- '∕' # 0x22FF
- '⁄' # 0x206F
# Hyphen alternatives
- '―' # 0x2015
- '—' # 0x2014
# Whitespace that don't work as path separator
- ' ' # 0x00A0
# Other
- '¯'
- '®'
- '¶'
# Unicode whitespace characters
- '⠀' # Braille Pattern Blank (Unicode: U+2800)
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - Security
id: 4c54ba8f-73d2-4d40-8890-d9cf1dca3d30
related:
- id: 14bcba49-a428-42d9-b943-e2ce0f0f7ae6
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task27)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
# ServiceFileName|re: '(?i)&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\\"\s+?\-f.*&&.*cmd.*\/c' # FPs with |\/r
# Example 1: CMD /C"sET KUR=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&Set MxI=C:\wINDowS\sYsWow64\winDOWspoWERSheLl\V1.0\PowerShelL.EXe ${ExEcut`IoN`cON`TExT}.\"invo`kEcoMm`A`ND\".( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f 'pt','EscRi','INvOk' ).Invoke( ( .( \"{0}{1}\" -f'D','IR' ) ( \"{0}{1}\"-f'ENV:kU','R')).\"vAl`Ue\" )&& CMD /C%mXI%"
# Example 2: c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C "sEt DeJLz=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&set yBKM=PoWERShelL -noeX ^^^&(\"{2}{0}{1}\"-f '-ItE','m','seT') ( 'V' + 'a'+ 'RiAblE:z8J' +'U2' + 'l' ) ([TYpE]( \"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-f 'e','NT','e','NViRONM' ) ) ; ^^^& ( ( [sTrIng]${VE`Rbo`SepReFER`Ence})[1,3] + 'X'-joIN'')( ( (.('gI') ('V' + 'a' + 'RIAbLe:z8j' + 'u2' +'l' ) ).vALUe::( \"{2}{5}{0}{1}{6}{4}{3}\" -f 'IRo','Nm','GETE','ABlE','I','nv','enTVAr').Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'd','ejLz' ),( \"{1}{2}{0}\"-f'cEss','P','RO') )) )&& c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C %ybkm%"
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- '&&set'
- 'cmd'
- '/c'
- '-f'
ServiceFileName|contains:
- '{0}'
- '{1}'
- '{2}'
- '{3}'
- '{4}'
- '{5}'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Password Protected ZIP File Opened (Suspicious Filenames)
id: 54f0434b-726f-48a1-b2aa-067df14516e4
status: test
description: Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives with suspicious file names. See the filename variable for more details on which file has been opened.
references:
- https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1523383197513379841
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-09
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.t1105
- attack.t1036
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5379
TargetName|contains: 'Microsoft_Windows_Shell_ZipFolder:filename'
selection_filename:
TargetName|contains:
- 'invoice'
- 'new order'
- 'rechnung'
- 'factura'
- 'delivery'
- 'purchase'
- 'order'
- 'payment'
condition: selection and selection_filename
falsepositives:
- Legitimate used of encrypted ZIP files
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - Security
id: 1a0a2ff1-611b-4dac-8216-8a7b47c618a6
related:
- id: 63e3365d-4824-42d8-8b82-e56810fefa0c
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task29)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|contains: '(Clipboard|i'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - Security
id: 80b708f3-d034-40e4-a6c8-d23b7a7db3d1
related:
- id: 487c7524-f892-4054-b263-8a0ace63fc25
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task28)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- 'set'
- '&&'
ServiceFileName|contains:
- 'environment'
- 'invoke'
- '${input)'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - Security
id: fd0f5778-d3cb-4c9a-9695-66759d04702a
related:
- id: 51aa9387-1c53-4153-91cc-d73c59ae1ca9
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references
references:
- https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888
author: Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community
date: 2019-11-08
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection_eid:
EventID: 4697
selection_servicefilename:
- ServiceFileName|re: '\$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\['
- ServiceFileName|re: '\$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\['
- ServiceFileName|re: '\$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\['
- ServiceFileName|re: '\$env:ComSpec\[(\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}'
- ServiceFileName|re: '\\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name'
- ServiceFileName|re: '\$VerbosePreference\.ToString\('
- ServiceFileName|re: '\String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - Security
id: cd0f7229-d16f-42de-8fe3-fba365fbcb3a
related:
- id: 641a4bfb-c017-44f7-800c-2aee0184ce9b
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task30)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- '&&'
- 'rundll32'
- 'shell32.dll'
- 'shellexec_rundll'
ServiceFileName|contains:
- value
- invoke
- comspec
- iex
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - Security
id: 0c718a5e-4284-4fb9-b4d9-b9a50b3a1974
related:
- id: 72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 25)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- 'cmd'
- 'powershell'
selection2:
ServiceFileName|contains:
- '${input}'
- 'noexit'
selection3:
ServiceFileName|contains:
- ' /c '
- ' /r '
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Password Protected ZIP File Opened (Email Attachment)
id: 571498c8-908e-40b4-910b-d2369159a3da
status: test
description: Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives. See the filename variable for more details on which file has been opened.
references:
- https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1523383197513379841
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-09
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5379
TargetName|contains|all:
- 'Microsoft_Windows_Shell_ZipFolder:filename'
- '\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate used of encrypted ZIP files
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - Security
id: dcf2db1f-f091-425b-a821-c05875b8925a
related:
- id: 8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 24)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
# ServiceFileName|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r)(?:\s|)\"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*\"'
# Example 1: C:\winDoWs\SySTeM32\cmd.Exe /C"SET NOtI=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& PowERshElL -NOl SET-iteM ( 'VAR' + 'i'+ 'A' + 'blE:Ao6' + 'I0') ( [TYpe](\"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-F 'iRoN','mENT','e','nv') ) ; ${exECUtIONCOnTEXT}.\"IN`VO`KecOmMaND\".\"inVo`KES`crIPt\"( ( ( GEt-VAriAble ( 'a' + 'o6I0') -vaLU )::(\"{1}{4}{2}{3}{0}\" -f'e','gETenvIR','NtvaRIa','BL','ONme' ).Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'n','oti' ),( \"{0}{1}\" -f'pRoC','esS') )) )"
# Example 2: cMD.exe /C "seT SlDb=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& pOWErShell .(( ^&(\"{1}{0}{2}{3}\" -f 'eT-vaR','G','iab','lE' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f '*m','DR*' ) ).\"na`ME\"[3,11,2]-JOIN'' ) ( ( ^&(\"{0}{1}\" -f'g','CI' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f 'ENV',':SlDb' ) ).\"VA`luE\" ) "
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- 'cmd'
- '"set'
- '-f'
ServiceFileName|contains:
- '/c'
- '/r'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - Security
id: 4edf51e1-cb83-4e1a-bc39-800e396068e3
related:
- id: f7385ee2-0e0c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- 'cmd'
- '&&'
- 'clipboard]::'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - Security
id: 9b8d9203-4e0f-4cd9-bb06-4cc4ea6d0e9a
related:
- id: 7e9c7999-0f9b-4d4a-a6ed-af6d553d4af4
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task31)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- 'mshta'
- 'vbscript:createobject'
- '.run'
- 'window.close'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - System
id: f7385ee2-0e0c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2023-02-20
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
ImagePath|contains|all:
- 'cmd'
- '&&'
- 'clipboard]::'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - System
id: 641a4bfb-c017-44f7-800c-2aee0184ce9b
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task30)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
ImagePath|contains|all:
- '&&'
- 'rundll32'
- 'shell32.dll'
- 'shellexec_rundll'
ImagePath|contains:
- 'value'
- 'invoke'
- 'comspec'
- 'iex'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - System
id: 487c7524-f892-4054-b263-8a0ace63fc25
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task28)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
# ImagePath|re: '(?i)(set).*&&\s?set.*(environment|invoke|\${?input).*&&.*"'
ImagePath|contains|all:
- 'set'
- '&&'
ImagePath|contains:
- 'environment'
- 'invoke'
- 'input'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - System
id: 63e3365d-4824-42d8-8b82-e56810fefa0c
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task29)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
ImagePath|contains: '(Clipboard|i'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - System
id: 72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 25)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection_main:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
# ImagePath|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r).+powershell.+(?:\$\{?input\}?|noexit).+\"'
# Example 1: c:\windows\sYstEm32\CmD.eXE /C"echO\Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -NoEXiT -"
# Example 2: c:\WiNDOws\sysTEm32\cmd.EXe /C " ECHo Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -nol ${EXEcUtIONCONTeXT}.INvOkEComMANd.InvOKEScRIPt( $InpUt )"
ImagePath|contains|all:
- 'cmd'
- 'powershell'
ImagePath|contains:
- '/c'
- '/r'
selection_other:
- ImagePath|contains: 'noexit'
- ImagePath|contains|all:
- 'input'
- '$'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - System
id: 7e9c7999-0f9b-4d4a-a6ed-af6d553d4af4
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task31)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
ImagePath|contains|all:
- 'mshta'
- 'vbscript:createobject'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - System
id: 14bcba49-a428-42d9-b943-e2ce0f0f7ae6
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task27)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
# ImagePath|re: '(?i)&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\\"\s+?\-f.*&&.*cmd.*\/c' # FPs with |\/r
# Example 1: CMD /C"sET KUR=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&Set MxI=C:\wINDowS\sYsWow64\winDOWspoWERSheLl\V1.0\PowerShelL.EXe ${ExEcut`IoN`cON`TExT}.\"invo`kEcoMm`A`ND\".( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f 'pt','EscRi','INvOk' ).Invoke( ( .( \"{0}{1}\" -f'D','IR' ) ( \"{0}{1}\"-f'ENV:kU','R')).\"vAl`Ue\" )&& CMD /C%mXI%"
# Example 2: c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C "sEt DeJLz=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&set yBKM=PoWERShelL -noeX ^^^&(\"{2}{0}{1}\"-f '-ItE','m','seT') ( 'V' + 'a'+ 'RiAblE:z8J' +'U2' + 'l' ) ([TYpE]( \"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-f 'e','NT','e','NViRONM' ) ) ; ^^^& ( ( [sTrIng]${VE`Rbo`SepReFER`Ence})[1,3] + 'X'-joIN'')( ( (.('gI') ('V' + 'a' + 'RIAbLe:z8j' + 'u2' +'l' ) ).vALUe::( \"{2}{5}{0}{1}{6}{4}{3}\" -f 'IRo','Nm','GETE','ABlE','I','nv','enTVAr').Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'd','ejLz' ),( \"{1}{2}{0}\"-f'cEss','P','RO') )) )&& c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C %ybkm%"
ImagePath|contains|all:
- '&&set'
- 'cmd'
- '/c'
- '-f'
ImagePath|contains:
- '{0}'
- '{1}'
- '{2}'
- '{3}'
- '{4}'
- '{5}'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - System
id: 51aa9387-1c53-4153-91cc-d73c59ae1ca9
status: test
description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references
references:
- https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888
author: Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community
date: 2019-11-08
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection_eid:
EventID: 7045
selection_imagepath:
- ImagePath|re: '\$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\['
- ImagePath|re: '\$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\['
- ImagePath|re: '\$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\['
- ImagePath|re: '\$env:ComSpec\[(\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}'
- ImagePath|re: '\\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name'
- ImagePath|re: '\$VerbosePreference\.ToString\('
- ImagePath|re: '\String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - System
id: 8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 24)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
# ImagePath|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r)(?:\s|)\"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*\"'
# Example 1: C:\winDoWs\SySTeM32\cmd.Exe /C"SET NOtI=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& PowERshElL -NOl SET-iteM ( 'VAR' + 'i'+ 'A' + 'blE:Ao6' + 'I0') ( [TYpe](\"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-F 'iRoN','mENT','e','nv') ) ; ${exECUtIONCOnTEXT}.\"IN`VO`KecOmMaND\".\"inVo`KES`crIPt\"( ( ( GEt-VAriAble ( 'a' + 'o6I0') -vaLU )::(\"{1}{4}{2}{3}{0}\" -f'e','gETenvIR','NtvaRIa','BL','ONme' ).Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'n','oti' ),( \"{0}{1}\" -f'pRoC','esS') )) )"
# Example 2: cMD.exe /C "seT SlDb=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& pOWErShell .(( ^&(\"{1}{0}{2}{3}\" -f 'eT-vaR','G','iab','lE' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f '*m','DR*' ) ).\"na`ME\"[3,11,2]-JOIN'' ) ( ( ^&(\"{0}{1}\" -f'g','CI' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f 'ENV',':SlDb' ) ).\"VA`luE\" ) "
ImagePath|contains|all:
- 'cmd'
- '"set'
- '-f'
ImagePath|contains:
- '/c'
- '/r'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: PUA - DefenderCheck Execution
id: f0ca6c24-3225-47d5-b1f5-352bf07ecfa7
status: test
description: Detects the use of DefenderCheck, a tool to evaluate the signatures used in Microsoft Defender. It can be used to figure out the strings / byte chains used in Microsoft Defender to detect a tool and thus used for AV evasion.
references:
- https://github.com/matterpreter/DefenderCheck
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-30
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027.005
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Image|endswith: '\DefenderCheck.exe'
- Description: 'DefenderCheck'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: HackTool - CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation
id: 6f8b3439-a203-45dc-a88b-abf57ea15ccf
status: test
description: The CrachMapExec pentesting framework implements a PowerShell obfuscation with some static strings detected by this rule.
references:
- https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec
- https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/0a49f75347b625e81ee6aa8c33d3970b5515ea9e/cme/helpers/powershell.py#L242
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1027.005
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'join*split'
# Line 343ff
- '( $ShellId[1]+$ShellId[13]+''x'')'
- '( $PSHome[*]+$PSHOME[*]+'
- '( $env:Public[13]+$env:Public[5]+''x'')'
- '( $env:ComSpec[4,*,25]-Join'''')'
- '[1,3]+''x''-Join'''')'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: OpenCanary - TFTP Request
id: b4e6b016-a2ac-4759-ad85-8000b300d61e
status: test
description: Detects instances where a TFTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a request.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1041
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 10001
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: HackTool - PCHunter Execution
id: fca949cc-79ca-446e-8064-01aa7e52ece5
status: test
description: Detects suspicious use of PCHunter, a tool like Process Hacker to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level stuff
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20231210115125/http://www.xuetr.com/
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/falcon-overwatch-report-finds-increase-in-ecrime/
- https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/20/kernel-hacking-tool-you-might-have-never-heard-of-xuetr-pchunter/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2022-10-10
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1057
- attack.t1012
- attack.t1083
- attack.t1007
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_image:
Image|endswith:
- '\PCHunter64.exe'
- '\PCHunter32.exe'
selection_pe:
- OriginalFileName: 'PCHunter.exe'
- Description: 'Epoolsoft Windows Information View Tools'
selection_hashes:
Hashes|contains:
- 'SHA1=5F1CBC3D99558307BC1250D084FA968521482025'
- 'MD5=987B65CD9B9F4E9A1AFD8F8B48CF64A7'
- 'SHA256=2B214BDDAAB130C274DE6204AF6DBA5AEEC7433DA99AA950022FA306421A6D32'
- 'IMPHASH=444D210CEA1FF8112F256A4997EED7FF'
- 'SHA1=3FB89787CB97D902780DA080545584D97FB1C2EB'
- 'MD5=228DD0C2E6287547E26FFBD973A40F14'
- 'SHA256=55F041BF4E78E9BFA6D4EE68BE40E496CE3A1353E1CA4306598589E19802522C'
- 'IMPHASH=0479F44DF47CFA2EF1CCC4416A538663'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Shell Execution via Rsync - Linux
id: e2326866-609f-4015-aea9-7ec634e8aa04
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the use of the "rsync" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/rsync/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.), Florian Roth
date: 2024-09-02
modified: 2025-01-18
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '/rsync'
- '/rsyncd'
CommandLine|contains: ' -e '
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- '/ash '
- '/bash '
- '/dash '
- '/csh '
- '/sh '
- '/zsh '
- '/tcsh '
- '/ksh '
- "'ash "
- "'bash "
- "'dash "
- "'csh "
- "'sh "
- "'zsh "
- "'tcsh "
- "'ksh "
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate cases in which "rsync" is used to execute a shell
level: high
title: Shell Execution via Git - Linux
id: 47b3bbd4-1bf7-48cc-84ab-995362aaa75a
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of the "git" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/git/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '/git'
ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
- ' -p '
- 'help'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'bash 0<&1'
- 'dash 0<&1'
- 'sh 0<&1'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Invocation of Shell via Rsync
id: 297241f3-8108-4b3a-8c15-2dda9f844594
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the execution of a shell as sub process of "rsync" without the expected command line flag "-e" being used, which could be an indication of exploitation as described in CVE-2024-12084. This behavior is commonly associated with attempts to execute arbitrary commands or escalate privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further exploitation.
references:
- https://sysdig.com/blog/detecting-and-mitigating-cve-2024-12084-rsync-remote-code-execution/
- https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/a20436375a1e26524931dd8ea1a3af10
author: Florian Roth
date: 2025-01-18
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
- attack.t1203
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '/rsync'
- '/rsyncd'
Image|endswith:
- '/ash'
- '/bash'
- '/csh'
- '/dash'
- '/ksh'
- '/sh'
- '/tcsh'
- '/zsh'
filter_main_expected:
CommandLine|contains: ' -e '
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Capsh Shell Invocation - Linux
id: db1ac3be-f606-4e3a-89e0-9607cbe6b98a
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of the "capsh" utility to invoke a shell.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/capsh/#shell
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/capsh'
CommandLine|endswith: ' --'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Inline Python Execution - Spawn Shell Via OS System Library
id: 2d2f44ff-4611-4778-a8fc-323a0e9850cc
status: test
description: |
Detects execution of inline Python code via the "-c" in order to call the "system" function from the "os" library, and spawn a shell.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/python/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '/python'
- '/python2'
- '/python3'
- Image|contains:
- '/python2.' # python image is always of the form ../python3.10; ../python is just a symlink
- '/python3.'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' -c '
- 'os.system('
CommandLine|contains:
- '/bin/bash'
- '/bin/dash'
- '/bin/fish'
- '/bin/sh'
- '/bin/zsh'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Potential Netcat Reverse Shell Execution
id: 7f734ed0-4f47-46c0-837f-6ee62505abd9
status: test
description: Detects execution of netcat with the "-e" flag followed by common shells. This could be a sign of a potential reverse shell setup.
references:
- https://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet
- https://www.revshells.com/
- https://www.hackingtutorials.org/networking/hacking-netcat-part-2-bind-reverse-shells/
- https://www.infosecademy.com/netcat-reverse-shells/
- https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/ncat.1.html
author: '@d4ns4n_, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)'
date: 2023-04-07
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_nc:
Image|endswith:
- '/nc'
- '/ncat'
selection_flags:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -c '
- ' -e '
selection_shell:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' ash'
- ' bash'
- ' bsh'
- ' csh'
- ' ksh'
- ' pdksh'
- ' sh'
- ' tcsh'
- '/bin/ash'
- '/bin/bash'
- '/bin/bsh'
- '/bin/csh'
- '/bin/ksh'
- '/bin/pdksh'
- '/bin/sh'
- '/bin/tcsh'
- '/bin/zsh'
- '$IFSash'
- '$IFSbash'
- '$IFSbsh'
- '$IFScsh'
- '$IFSksh'
- '$IFSpdksh'
- '$IFSsh'
- '$IFStcsh'
- '$IFSzsh'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Suspicious Invocation of Shell via AWK - Linux
id: 8c1a5675-cb85-452f-a298-b01b22a51856
status: test
description: |
Detects the execution of "awk" or it's sibling commands, to invoke a shell using the system() function.
This behavior is commonly associated with attempts to execute arbitrary commands or escalate privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further exploitation.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/awk/#shell
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/gawk/#shell
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/nawk/#shell
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/mawk/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '/awk'
- '/gawk'
- '/mawk'
- '/nawk'
CommandLine|contains: 'BEGIN {system'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- '/bin/bash'
- '/bin/dash'
- '/bin/fish'
- '/bin/sh'
- '/bin/zsh'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Java Children Processes
id: d292e0af-9a18-420c-9525-ec0ac3936892
status: test
description: Detects java process spawning suspicious children
references:
- https://www.tecmint.com/different-types-of-linux-shells/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-03
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '/java'
CommandLine|contains:
- '/bin/sh'
- 'bash'
- 'dash'
- 'ksh'
- 'zsh'
- 'csh'
- 'fish'
- 'curl'
- 'wget'
- 'python'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Shell Invocation Via Ssh - Linux
id: 8737b7f6-8df3-4bb7-b1da-06019b99b687
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of the "ssh" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/ssh/
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-08-29
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '/ssh'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'ProxyCommand=;'
- 'permitlocalcommand=yes'
- 'localhost'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- '/bin/bash'
- '/bin/dash'
- '/bin/fish'
- '/bin/sh'
- '/bin/zsh'
- 'sh 0<&2 1>&2'
- 'sh 1>&2 0<&2'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: BPFDoor Abnormal Process ID or Lock File Accessed
id: 808146b2-9332-4d78-9416-d7e47012d83d
status: test
description: detects BPFDoor .lock and .pid files access in temporary file storage facility
references:
- https://www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/bpfdoor-an-evasive-linux-backdoor-technical-analysis/
- https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/a-peek-behind-the-bpfdoor
- https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-bpfdoor-telecom-networks-sleeper-cells-threat-research-report/
- https://github.com/rapid7/Rapid7-Labs/blob/741c7196ec12a0a56b63463d1fd726ff14d3a97a/BPFDoor/rapid7_detect_bpfdoor.sh
author: Rafal Piasecki
date: 2022-08-10
modified: 2026-03-30
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1106
- attack.t1059
logsource:
product: linux
service: auditd
detection:
selection:
type: 'PATH'
name:
- /var/run/aepmonend.pid
- /var/run/auditd.lock
- /var/run/cma.lock
- /var/run/console-kit.pid
- /var/run/consolekit.pid
- /var/run/daemon.pid
- /var/run/hald-addon.pid
- /var/run/hald-smartd.pid
- /var/run/haldrund.pid
- /var/run/hp-health.pid
- /var/run/hpasmlit.lock
- /var/run/hpasmlited.pid
- /var/run/kdevrund.pid
- /var/run/lldpad.lock
- /var/run/mcelog.pid
- /var/run/system.pid
- /var/run/uvp-srv.pid
- /var/run/vmtoolagt.pid
- /var/run/xinetd.lock
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: PCRE.NET Package Temp Files
id: 6e90ae7a-7cd3-473f-a035-4ebb72d961da
status: test
description: Detects processes creating temp files related to PCRE.NET package
references:
- https://twitter.com/rbmaslen/status/1321859647091970051
- https://twitter.com/tifkin_/status/1321916444557365248
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-29
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\ba9ea7344a4a5f591d6e5dc32a13494b\
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Windows Shell/Scripting Application File Write to Suspicious Folder
id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
status: test
description: Detects Windows shells and scripting applications that write files to suspicious folders
references:
- Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-20
modified: 2023-03-29
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_1:
Image|endswith:
- '\bash.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\msbuild.exe' # https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_msbuild_started_by_office_app.toml
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\sh.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
TargetFilename|startswith:
- 'C:\PerfLogs\'
- 'C:\Users\Public\'
selection_2:
Image|endswith:
- '\certutil.exe'
- '\forfiles.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
# - '\rundll32.exe' # Potential FP
- '\schtasks.exe'
- '\scriptrunner.exe'
- '\wmic.exe' # https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
TargetFilename|contains:
- 'C:\PerfLogs\'
- 'C:\Users\Public\'
- 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: HackTool - Stracciatella Execution
id: 7a4d9232-92fc-404d-8ce1-4c92e7caf539
status: test
description: Detects Stracciatella which executes a Powershell runspace from within C# (aka SharpPick technique) with AMSI, ETW and Script Block Logging disabled based on PE metadata characteristics.
references:
- https://github.com/mgeeky/Stracciatella
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-17
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1059
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Image|endswith: '\Stracciatella.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Stracciatella.exe'
- Description: 'Stracciatella'
- Hashes|contains:
- 'SHA256=9d25e61ec1527e2a69d7c2a4e3fe2fe15890710c198a66a9f25d99fdf6c7b956'
- 'SHA256=fd16609bd9830c63b9413671678bb159b89c357d21942ddbb6b93add808d121a'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Suspicious Persistence Via VMwareToolBoxCmd.EXE VM State Change Script
id: 236d8e89-ed95-4789-a982-36f4643738ba
related:
- id: 7aa4e81a-a65c-4e10-9f81-b200eb229d7d
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects execution of the "VMwareToolBoxCmd.exe" with the "script" and "set" flag to setup a specific script that's located in a potentially suspicious location to run for a specific VM state
references:
- https://bohops.com/2021/10/08/analyzing-and-detecting-a-vmtools-persistence-technique/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-14
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_bin_img:
- Image|endswith: '\VMwareToolBoxCmd.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'toolbox-cmd.exe'
selection_bin_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' script '
- ' set '
selection_susp_paths:
CommandLine|contains:
- ':\PerfLogs\'
- ':\Temp\'
- ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
- ':\Windows\Tasks\'
- ':\Windows\Temp\'
- '\AppData\Local\Temp'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Potentially Suspicious Execution From Parent Process In Public Folder
id: 69bd9b97-2be2-41b6-9816-fb08757a4d1a
status: test
description: |
Detects a potentially suspicious execution of a parent process located in the "\Users\Public" folder executing a child process containing references to shell or scripting binaries and commandlines.
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-25
modified: 2024-07-12
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1564
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|contains: ':\Users\Public\'
selection_child:
- Image|endswith:
- '\bitsadmin.exe'
- '\certutil.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- CommandLine|contains:
- 'bitsadmin'
- 'certutil'
- 'cscript'
- 'mshta'
- 'powershell'
- 'regsvr32'
- 'rundll32'
- 'wscript'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Run PowerShell Script from Redirected Input Stream
id: c83bf4b5-cdf0-437c-90fa-43d734f7c476
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell script execution via input stream redirect
references:
- https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/4db780e0f0b2e2bb8cb1fa13e09196da9b9f1834/yml/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Powershell.yml
- https://twitter.com/Moriarty_Meng/status/984380793383370752
author: Moriarty Meng (idea), Anton Kutepov (rule), oscd.community
date: 2020-10-17
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
CommandLine|re: '\s-\s*<'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Add Insecure Download Source To Winget
id: 81a0ecb5-0a41-4ba1-b2ba-c944eb92bfa2
related:
- id: 05ebafc8-7aa2-4bcd-a269-2aec93f9e842
type: similar
- id: c15a46a0-07d4-4c87-b4b6-89207835a83b
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects usage of winget to add a new insecure (http) download source.
Winget will not allow the addition of insecure sources, hence this could indicate potential suspicious activity (or typos)
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/package-manager/winget/source
- https://github.com/nasbench/Misc-Research/tree/b9596e8109dcdb16ec353f316678927e507a5b8d/LOLBINs/Winget
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-17
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\winget.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'winget.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'source '
- 'add '
- 'http://'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- False positives might occur if the users are unaware of such control checks
level: high
title: Suspicious Remote Child Process From Outlook
id: e212d415-0e93-435f-9e1a-f29005bb4723
related:
- id: 208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d # Outlook Child Processes
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious child process spawning from Outlook where the image is located in a remote location (SMB/WebDav shares).
references:
- https://github.com/sensepost/ruler
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/12/overruled-containing-a-potentially-destructive-adversary.html
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=49
author: Markus Neis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-12-27
modified: 2023-02-09
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1059
- attack.t1202
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\outlook.exe'
Image|startswith: '\\\\'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
id: 1228c958-e64e-4e71-92ad-7d429f4138ba
status: test
description: |
Detects suspicious script execution from suspicious directories or folders accessible by environment variables that may indicate malware activity.
Script interpreters (cscript, wscript, mshta, powershell) executing from folders like Temp, Public, or user profile directories may suggest attempts to evade detection or execute malicious scripts.
references:
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/91ba814a86ddedc7a9d546e26f912c541205b47a853d227756ab1334ade92c3f
- https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-russia-ukraine-military
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/shell/csidl
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-08
modified: 2026-02-17
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_proc_image:
Image|endswith:
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
selection_proc_flags:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -ep bypass '
- ' -ExecutionPolicy bypass '
- ' -w hidden '
- '/e:javascript '
- '/e:Jscript '
- '/e:vbscript '
selection_proc_original:
OriginalFileName:
- 'cscript.exe'
- 'mshta.exe'
- 'wscript.exe'
selection_folders_1:
CommandLine|contains:
- ':\Perflogs\'
- ':\Users\Public\'
- '\%Public%'
- '\AppData\Local\Temp'
- '\AppData\Roaming\Temp'
- '\Temporary Internet'
- '\Windows\Temp'
- '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
- '%TEMP%'
- '%TMP%'
- '%LocalAppData%\Temp'
selection_folders_2:
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- ':\Users\'
- '\Favorites\'
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- ':\Users\'
- '\Favourites\'
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- ':\Users\'
- '\Contacts\'
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- ':\Users\'
- '\Documents\'
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- ':\Users\'
- '\Music\'
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- ':\Users\'
- '\Pictures\'
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- ':\Users\'
- '\Videos\'
filter_optional_chocolatey_installer:
ParentImage:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\Msiexec.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Msiexec.exe'
Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command'
- 'AppData\Local\Temp\'
- 'Install-Chocolatey.ps1'
condition: 1 of selection_proc_* and 1 of selection_folders_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Various legitimate software have been observed to use similar techniques for installation or update purposes;thus, it is recommended to review and tune filters for your environment to reduce false positives before deploying to production.
level: high
title: Renamed PingCastle Binary Execution
id: 2433a154-bb3d-42e4-86c3-a26bdac91c45
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed "PingCastle" binary based on the PE metadata fields.
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/
- https://www.pingcastle.com/documentation/scanner/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-01-11
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1059
- attack.t1202
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- OriginalFileName:
- 'PingCastleReporting.exe'
- 'PingCastleCloud.exe'
- 'PingCastle.exe'
- CommandLine|contains:
- '--scanner aclcheck'
- '--scanner antivirus'
- '--scanner computerversion'
- '--scanner foreignusers'
- '--scanner laps_bitlocker'
- '--scanner localadmin'
- '--scanner nullsession'
- '--scanner nullsession-trust'
- '--scanner oxidbindings'
- '--scanner remote'
- '--scanner share'
- '--scanner smb'
- '--scanner smb3querynetwork'
- '--scanner spooler'
- '--scanner startup'
- '--scanner zerologon'
- CommandLine|contains: '--no-enum-limit'
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- '--healthcheck'
- '--level Full'
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- '--healthcheck'
- '--server '
filter_main_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\PingCastleReporting.exe'
- '\PingCastleCloud.exe'
- '\PingCastle.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: PUA - Wsudo Suspicious Execution
id: bdeeabc9-ff2a-4a51-be59-bb253aac7891
status: test
description: Detects usage of wsudo (Windows Sudo Utility). Which is a tool that let the user execute programs with different permissions (System, Trusted Installer, Administrator...etc)
references:
- https://github.com/M2Team/Privexec/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-02
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_metadata:
- Image|endswith: '\wsudo.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'wsudo.exe'
- Description: 'Windows sudo utility'
- ParentImage|endswith: '\wsudo-bridge.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- '-u System'
- '-uSystem'
- '-u TrustedInstaller'
- '-uTrustedInstaller'
- ' --ti '
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Program Names
id: efdd8dd5-cee8-4e59-9390-7d4d5e4dd6f6
status: test
description: Detects suspicious patterns in program names or folders that are often found in malicious samples or hacktools
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-11
modified: 2023-03-22
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_image:
- Image|contains:
- '\CVE-202' # Update this when we reach the year 2100
- '\CVE202' # Update this when we reach the year 2100
- Image|endswith:
- '\poc.exe'
- '\artifact.exe'
- '\artifact64.exe'
- '\artifact_protected.exe'
- '\artifact32.exe'
- '\artifact32big.exe'
- 'obfuscated.exe'
- 'obfusc.exe'
- '\meterpreter'
selection_commandline:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'inject.ps1'
- 'Invoke-CVE'
- 'pupy.ps1'
- 'payload.ps1'
- 'beacon.ps1'
- 'PowerView.ps1'
- 'bypass.ps1'
- 'obfuscated.ps1'
- 'obfusc.ps1'
- 'obfus.ps1'
- 'obfs.ps1'
- 'evil.ps1'
- 'MiniDogz.ps1'
- '_enc.ps1'
- '\shell.ps1'
- '\rshell.ps1'
- 'revshell.ps1'
- '\av.ps1'
- '\av_test.ps1'
- 'adrecon.ps1'
- 'mimikatz.ps1'
- '\PowerUp_'
- 'powerup.ps1'
- '\Temp\a.ps1'
- '\Temp\p.ps1'
- '\Temp\1.ps1'
- 'Hound.ps1'
- 'encode.ps1'
- 'powercat.ps1'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate tools that accidentally match on the searched patterns
level: high