title: VeeamBackup Database Credentials Dump Via Sqlcmd.EXE
id: b57ba453-b384-4ab9-9f40-1038086b4e53
status: test
description: Detects dump of credentials in VeeamBackup dbo
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/
    - https://forums.veeam.com/veeam-backup-replication-f2/recover-esxi-password-in-veeam-t34630.html
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_tools:
        Image|endswith: '\sqlcmd.exe'
    selection_query:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'SELECT'
            - 'TOP'
            - '[VeeamBackup].[dbo].[Credentials]'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Script Interpreter Spawning Credential Scanner - Windows
id: 0f60b28c-64dd-4e2c-9a63-5334d3e3a6e6
related:
    - id: f0025a69-e1b7-4dda-a53c-db21fa2d4071
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog, gitleaks).
    This behavior is indicative of an attempt to find and steal secrets, as seen in the "Shai-Hulud: The Second Coming" campaign.
references:
    - https://github.com/asyncapi/cli/blob/2efa4dff59bc3d3cecdf897ccf178f99b115d63d/bun_environment.js
    - https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-zapier-ens-domains-and-other-prominent-npm-packages-compromised
    - https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/shai-hulud-2-malware-campaign-targets-github-and-cloud-credentials-using-bun-runtime
    - https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/digging-for-secrets-sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-of-the-npm-worm/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552
    - attack.collection
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1005
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
           # Add more script interpreters as needed
            - '\node.exe'
            - '\bun.exe'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith:
              - 'trufflehog.exe'
              - 'gitleaks.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'trufflehog'
              - 'gitleaks'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate pre-commit hooks or CI/CD pipeline jobs that use a script to run a credential scanner as part of a security check.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_script_interpretor_spawn_credential_scanner/info.yml

title: SQLite Chromium Profile Data DB Access
id: 24c77512-782b-448a-8950-eddb0785fc71
status: test
description: Detect usage of the "sqlite" binary to query databases in Chromium-based browsers for potential data stealing.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/84d9edaaaa2c5511144521b0e4af726d1c7276ce/atomics/T1539/T1539.md#atomic-test-2---steal-chrome-cookies-windows
    - https://blog.cyble.com/2022/04/21/prynt-stealer-a-new-info-stealer-performing-clipper-and-keylogger-activities/
author: TropChaud
date: 2022-12-19
modified: 2023-01-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1539
    - attack.t1555.003
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_sql:
        - Product: SQLite
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\sqlite.exe'
              - '\sqlite3.exe'
    selection_chromium:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\User Data\' # Most common folder for user profile data among Chromium browsers
            - '\Opera Software\' # Opera
            - '\ChromiumViewer\' # Sleipnir (Fenrir)
    selection_data:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Login Data' # Passwords
            - 'Cookies'
            - 'Web Data' # Credit cards, autofill data
            - 'History'
            - 'Bookmarks'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: SQLite Firefox Profile Data DB Access
id: 4833155a-4053-4c9c-a997-777fcea0baa7
status: test
description: Detect usage of the "sqlite" binary to query databases in Firefox and other Gecko-based browsers for potential data stealing.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1539/T1539.md#atomic-test-1---steal-firefox-cookies-windows
    - https://blog.cyble.com/2022/04/21/prynt-stealer-a-new-info-stealer-performing-clipper-and-keylogger-activities/
author: frack113
date: 2022-04-08
modified: 2023-01-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1539
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_sql:
        - Product: SQLite
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\sqlite.exe'
              - '\sqlite3.exe'
    selection_firefox:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'cookies.sqlite'
            - 'places.sqlite' # Bookmarks, history
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Triple Cross eBPF Rootkit Install Commands
id: 22236d75-d5a0-4287-bf06-c93b1770860f
status: test
description: Detects default install commands of the Triple Cross eBPF rootkit based on the "deployer.sh" script
references:
    - https://github.com/h3xduck/TripleCross/blob/1f1c3e0958af8ad9f6ebe10ab442e75de33e91de/apps/deployer.sh
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1014
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/sudo'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' tc '
            - ' enp0s3 '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' qdisc '
            - ' filter '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: OpenCanary - SNMP OID Request
id: e9856028-fd4e-46e6-b3d1-10f7ceb95078
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SNMP service on an OpenCanary node has had an OID request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1016
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 13001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: OpenCanary - FTP Login Attempt
id: 6991bc2b-ae2e-447f-bc55-3a1ba04c14e5
status: test
description: Detects instances where an FTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 2000
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: OpenCanary - SSH Login Attempt
id: ff7139bc-fdb1-4437-92f2-6afefe8884cb
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SSH service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1021
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 4002
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: OpenCanary - VNC Connection Attempt
id: 9db5446c-b44a-4291-8b89-fcab5609c3b3
status: test
description: Detects instances where a VNC service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 12001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: OpenCanary - SSH New Connection Attempt
id: cd55f721-5623-4663-bd9b-5229cab5237d
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SSH service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1021
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 4000
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: HackTool - NetExec Execution
id: 7638e5fe-600c-4289-a968-f49dd537ec7d
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects execution of the hacktool NetExec.
    NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation tool designed for Active Directory penetration testing and network enumeration
    In enterprise environments, the use of NetExec is considered suspicious or potentially malicious because it enables attackers to enumerate hosts, exploit network services, and move laterally across systems.
    Threat actors and red teams commonly use NetExec to identify vulnerable systems, harvest credentials, and execute commands remotely.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/12/17/cats-got-your-files-lynx-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec
    - https://www.netexec.wiki/
author: Chirag Damani
date: 2026-03-29
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\nxc.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' ftp '
            - ' ldap '
            - ' mssql '
            - ' nfs '
            - ' rdp '
            - ' smb '
            - ' ssh '
            - ' vnc '
            - ' winrm '
            - ' wmi '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of NetExec by security professionals or system administrators for network assessment and management.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_netexec/info.yml

title: Privilege Escalation via Named Pipe Impersonation
id: 9bd04a79-dabe-4f1f-a5ff-92430265c96b
related:
    - id: f35c5d71-b489-4e22-a115-f003df287317
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indicate lateral movement or data staging activity.
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation.html
author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-27
modified: 2022-12-30
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_name:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'Cmd.Exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
    selection_args:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'echo'
            - '>'
            - '\\\\.\\pipe\\'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Other programs that cause these patterns (please report)
level: high

title: OpenCanary - RDP New Connection Attempt
id: 598290cf-5932-45cd-9123-be1e05ab4f2e
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an RDP service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1021.001
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 14001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Publicly Accessible RDP Service
id: 1fc0809e-06bf-4de3-ad52-25e5263b7623
status: test
description: |
    Detects connections from routable IPs to an RDP listener. Which is indicative of a publicly-accessible RDP service.
author: Josh Brower @DefensiveDepth
date: 2020-08-22
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: rdp
detection:
    selection:
        id.orig_h|cidr:
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - '2620:83:8000::/48'
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
    # approved_rdp:
      # dst_ip:
        # - x.x.x.x
    condition: not selection # and not approved_rdp
falsepositives:
    - Although it is recommended to NOT have RDP exposed to the internet, verify that this is a) allowed b) the server has not already been compromised via some brute force or remote exploit since it has been exposed to the internet. Work to secure the server if you are unable to remove it from being exposed to the internet.
level: high

title: RDP to HTTP or HTTPS Target Ports
id: b1e5da3b-ca8e-4adf-915c-9921f3d85481
status: test
description: Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating to target systems on TCP port 80 or 443
references:
    - https://twitter.com/tekdefense/status/1519711183162556416?s=12&t=OTsHCBkQOTNs1k3USz65Zg
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-29
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
    - car.2013-07-002
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        Initiated: 'true'
        SourcePort: 3389
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 443
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: RDP Over Reverse SSH Tunnel
id: 5f699bc5-5446-4a4a-a0b7-5ef2885a3eb4
status: test
description: Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating with the loopback address and on TCP port 3389
references:
    - https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1096842275437625346
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-02-16
modified: 2024-03-12
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
    - car.2013-07-002
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        Initiated: 'true'
        SourcePort: 3389
    selection_destination:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '::1/128'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Outbound RDP Connections Over Non-Standard Tools
id: ed74fe75-7594-4b4b-ae38-e38e3fd2eb23
status: test
description: |
    Detects Non-Standard tools initiating a connection over port 3389 indicating possible lateral movement.
    An initial baseline is required before using this utility to exclude third party RDP tooling that you might use.
references:
    - https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0708
author: Markus Neis
date: 2019-05-15
modified: 2024-02-09
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
    - car.2013-07-002
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationPort: 3389
        Initiated: 'true'
    filter_main_mstsc:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\mstsc.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mstsc.exe'
    filter_optional_dns:
        # Note: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/pull/2249
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\dns.exe'
        SourcePort: 53
        Protocol: 'udp'
    filter_optional_avast:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\Avast Software\Avast\AvastSvc.exe'
            - '\Avast\AvastSvc.exe'
    filter_optional_sysinternals_rdcman:
        Image|endswith: '\RDCMan.exe'
    filter_optional_chrome:
        Image: 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
    filter_optional_third_party:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\FSAssessment.exe'
            - '\FSDiscovery.exe'
            - '\MobaRTE.exe'
            - '\mRemote.exe'
            - '\mRemoteNG.exe'
            - '\Passwordstate.exe'
            - '\RemoteDesktopManager.exe'
            - '\RemoteDesktopManager64.exe'
            - '\RemoteDesktopManagerFree.exe'
            - '\RSSensor.exe'
            - '\RTS2App.exe'
            - '\RTSApp.exe'
            - '\spiceworks-finder.exe'
            - '\Terminals.exe'
            - '\ws_TunnelService.exe'
    filter_optional_thor:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\thor.exe'
            - '\thor64.exe'
    filter_optional_splunk:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\SplunkUniversalForwarder\bin\'
    filter_optional_sentinel_one:
        Image|endswith: '\Ranger\SentinelRanger.exe'
    filter_optional_firefox:
        Image: 'C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
    filter_optional_tsplus:  # Some RAS
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\TSplus\Java\bin\HTML5service.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\TSplus\Java\bin\HTML5service.exe'
    filter_optional_null:
        Image: null
    filter_optional_empty:
        Image: ''
    filter_optional_unknown:
        Image: '<unknown process>'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Third party RDP tools
level: high

title: Potential Tampering With RDP Related Registry Keys Via Reg.EXE
id: 0d5675be-bc88-4172-86d3-1e96a4476536
status: test
description: Detects the execution of "reg.exe" for enabling/disabling the RDP service on the host by tampering with the 'CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' values
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/
    - http://etutorials.org/Microsoft+Products/microsoft+windows+server+2003+terminal+services/Chapter+6+Registry/Registry+Keys+for+Terminal+Services/ # Contain description for most of the keys mentioned here (check it out if you want more information
    - http://woshub.com/rds-shadow-how-to-connect-to-a-user-session-in-windows-server-2012-r2/ # Related to the Shadow RPD technique
    - https://admx.help/HKLM/SOFTWARE/Policies/Microsoft/Windows%20NT/Terminal%20Services # Contain description for most of the keys mentioned here (check it out if you want more information)
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/6f3aa9362d72e806490a8abce245331030d1ab5ac77e400dd475748236a6cc81/
    - https://blog.sekoia.io/darkgate-internals/
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/understanding-the-phobos-affiliate-structure/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/02c7d02fe1f1feb0fc7944550408ea8224273994/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-63---disable-remote-desktop-anti-alias-setting-through-registry
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/02c7d02fe1f1feb0fc7944550408ea8224273994/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-64---disable-remote-desktop-security-settings-through-registry
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/dd526047b8c399c312fee47d1e6fb531164da54d/atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml#L790
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/customize/desktop/unattend/microsoft-windows-terminalservices-rdp-winstationextensions-securitylayer
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190407-RegModEnableRDPConnections/notebook.html
    - https://twitter.com/SagieSec/status/1469001618863624194?t=HRf0eA0W1YYzkTSHb-Ky1A&s=03 # Related to the Shadow RPD technique
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200929062532/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-rdp-hijacking-via.html # Related to RDP hijacking via the "ServiceDll" key
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/i/unmasking-the-gentlemen-ransomware.html
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), @Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport
date: 2022-02-12
modified: 2025-11-22
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1021.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_main_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_main_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' add '
            - '\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server'
            - 'REG_DWORD'
            - ' /f'
    selection_values_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Licensing Core'
            - 'EnableConcurrentSessions'
    selection_values_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'AllowTSConnections'
            - 'fDenyTSConnections'
            - 'fEnableWinStation'
            - 'fSingleSessionPerUser'
            - 'IdleWinStationPoolCount'
            - 'MaxInstanceCount'
            - 'SecurityLayer'
            - 'TSAdvertise'
            - 'TSAppCompat'
            - 'TSEnabled'
            - 'TSUserEnabled'
            - 'WinStations\RDP-Tcp'
    filter_main_values_tls:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'SecurityLayer'
            - '02'  # TLS Enabled
    condition: all of selection_main_* and 1 of selection_values_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious RDP Redirect Using TSCON
id: f72aa3e8-49f9-4c7d-bd74-f8ab84ff9bbb
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious RDP session redirect using tscon.exe
references:
    - http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html
    - https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6
    - https://www.hackingarticles.in/rdp-session-hijacking-with-tscon/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-03-17
modified: 2023-05-16
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1563.002
    - attack.t1021.001
    - car.2013-07-002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: ' /dest:rdp-tcp#'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Plink Port Forwarding
id: 48a61b29-389f-4032-b317-b30de6b95314
status: test
description: Detects suspicious Plink tunnel port forwarding to a local port
references:
    - https://www.real-sec.com/2019/04/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling/
    - https://medium.com/@informationsecurity/remote-ssh-tunneling-with-plink-exe-7831072b3d7d
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-01-19
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Description: 'Command-line SSH, Telnet, and Rlogin client'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -R '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity using a remote port forwarding to a local port
level: high

title: User Added to Remote Desktop Users Group
id: ffa28e60-bdb1-46e0-9f82-05f7a61cc06e
related:
    - id: ad720b90-25ad-43ff-9b5e-5c841facc8e5 # Admin groups
      type: similar
    - id: 10fb649c-3600-4d37-b1e6-56ea90bb7e09 # Privileged groups
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects addition of users to the local Remote Desktop Users group via "Net" or "Add-LocalGroupMember".
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/11/16/evolving-trends-in-iranian-threat-actor-activity-mstic-presentation-at-cyberwarcon-2021/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-06
modified: 2022-09-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1136.001
    - attack.t1021.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_main:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'localgroup '
              - ' /add'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'Add-LocalGroupMember '
              - ' -Group '
    selection_group:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Remote Desktop Users'
            - 'Utilisateurs du Bureau à distance' # French for "Remote Desktop Users"
            - 'Usuarios de escritorio remoto' # Spanish for "Remote Desktop Users"
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
level: high

title: RDP over Reverse SSH Tunnel WFP
id: 5bed80b6-b3e8-428e-a3ae-d3c757589e41
status: test
description: Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating with the loopback address
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1096148422984384514
    - https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/blob/44fbe85f72ee91582876b49678f9a26292a155fb/Command%20and%20Control/DE_RDP_Tunnel_5156.evtx
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-02-16
modified: 2022-09-02
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1090.001
    - attack.t1090.002
    - attack.t1021.001
    - car.2013-07-002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5156
    sourceRDP:
        SourcePort: 3389
        DestAddress:
            - '127.*'
            - '::1'
    destinationRDP:
        DestPort: 3389
        SourceAddress:
            - '127.*'
            - '::1'
    filter_app_container:
        FilterOrigin: 'AppContainer Loopback'
    filter_thor:  # checking BlueKeep vulnerability
        Application|endswith:
            - '\thor.exe'
            - '\thor64.exe'
    condition: selection and ( sourceRDP or destinationRDP ) and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
    - Programs that connect locally to the RDP port
level: high

title: RDP Login from Localhost
id: 51e33403-2a37-4d66-a574-1fda1782cc31
status: test
description: RDP login with localhost source address may be a tunnelled login
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2019-01-28
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - car.2013-07-002
    - attack.t1021.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 10
        IpAddress:
            - '::1'
            - '127.0.0.1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe - Zeek
id: 021310d9-30a6-480a-84b7-eaa69aeb92bb
related:
    - id: 52d8b0c6-53d6-439a-9e41-52ad442ad9ad
      type: derived
status: test
description: This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes
references:
    - https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1104489274387451904
author: Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron, Tim Shelton
date: 2020-04-02
modified: 2022-12-27
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: smb_files
detection:
    selection:
        path: '\\\\\*\\IPC$' # Looking for the string \\*\IPC$
    filter_keywords:
        - 'samr'
        - 'lsarpc'
        - 'winreg'
        - 'netlogon'
        - 'srvsvc'
        - 'protected_storage'
        - 'wkssvc'
        - 'browser'
        - 'netdfs'
        - 'svcctl'
        - 'spoolss'
        - 'ntsvcs'
        - 'LSM_API_service'
        - 'HydraLsPipe'
        - 'TermSrv_API_service'
        - 'MsFteWds'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
level: high

title: Suspicious PsExec Execution - Zeek
id: f1b3a22a-45e6-4004-afb5-4291f9c21166
related:
    - id: c462f537-a1e3-41a6-b5fc-b2c2cef9bf82
      type: derived
status: test
description: detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329171218/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-3-detecting-psexec.html
author: Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron, Tim Shelton
date: 2020-04-02
modified: 2022-12-27
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: smb_files
detection:
    selection:
        path|contains|all:
            - '\\'
            - '\IPC$'
        name|endswith:
            - '-stdin'
            - '-stdout'
            - '-stderr'
    filter:
        name|startswith: 'PSEXESVC'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - NetExec File Indicators
id: efc21479-9e83-41da-8cf1-122e06ba8db3
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects file creation events indicating NetExec (nxc.exe) execution on the local machine.
    NetExec is a PyInstaller-bundled binary that extracts its embedded data files to a "_MEI<random>" directory
    under the Temp folder upon execution. Files dropped under the "\nxc\" sub-directory of that
    extraction path are unique to NetExec and serve as reliable on-disk indicators of execution.
    NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation and lateral movement tool used for
    Active Directory enumeration, credential harvesting, and remote code execution.
references:
    - https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec
    - https://www.netexec.wiki/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-04-08
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1059.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|contains: '\nxc-windows-latest\'
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - '\Temp\_MEI'
              - '\nxc\data\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_hktl_netexec_file_indicators/info.yml

title: Rundll32 Execution Without Parameters
id: 5bb68627-3198-40ca-b458-49f973db8752
status: test
description: Detects rundll32 execution without parameters as observed when running Metasploit windows/smb/psexec exploit module
references:
    - https://bczyz1.github.io/2021/01/30/psexec.html
author: Bartlomiej Czyz, Relativity
date: 2021-01-31
modified: 2023-02-28
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1570
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine:
            - 'rundll32.exe'
            - 'rundll32'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positives may occur if a user called rundll32 from CLI with no options
level: high

title: Windows Internet Hosted WebDav Share Mount Via Net.EXE
id: 7e6237fe-3ddb-438f-9381-9bf9de5af8d0
status: test
description: Detects when an internet hosted webdav share is mounted using the "net.exe" utility
references:
    - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-21
modified: 2023-07-25
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\net.exe'
              - '\net1.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'net.exe'
              - 'net1.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' use '
            - ' http'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - SharpMove Tool Execution
id: 055fb54c-a8f4-4aee-bd44-f74cf30a0d9d
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of SharpMove, a .NET utility performing multiple tasks such as "Task Creation", "SCM" query, VBScript execution using WMI via its PE metadata and command line options.
references:
    - https://github.com/0xthirteen/SharpMove/
    - https://pentestlab.blog/tag/sharpmove/
author: Luca Di Bartolomeo (CrimpSec)
date: 2024-01-29
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpMove.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: SharpMove.exe
    selection_cli_computer:
        # In its current implementation the "computername" flag is required in all actions
        CommandLine|contains: 'computername='
    selection_cli_actions:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'action=create'
            - 'action=dcom'
            - 'action=executevbs'
            - 'action=hijackdcom'
            - 'action=modschtask'
            - 'action=modsvc'
            - 'action=query'
            - 'action=scm'
            - 'action=startservice'
            - 'action=taskscheduler'
    condition: selection_img or all of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Rundll32 UNC Path Execution
id: 5cdb711b-5740-4fb2-ba88-f7945027afac
status: test
description: Detects rundll32 execution where the DLL is located on a remote location (share)
references:
    - https://www.cybereason.com/blog/rundll32-the-infamous-proxy-for-executing-malicious-code
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1218.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'rundll32'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: ' \\\\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack
id: 7707a579-e0d8-4886-a853-ce47e4575aaa
status: test
description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteWMIWbemcomnDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\wmiprvse.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\wbem\wbemcomn.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious PsExec Execution
id: c462f537-a1e3-41a6-b5fc-b2c2cef9bf82
status: test
description: detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329171218/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-3-detecting-psexec.html
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2022-08-11
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$' # looking for the string \\*\IPC$
        RelativeTargetName|endswith:
            - '-stdin'
            - '-stdout'
            - '-stderr'
    filter:
        RelativeTargetName|startswith: 'PSEXESVC'
    condition: selection1 and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: SMB Create Remote File Admin Share
id: b210394c-ba12-4f89-9117-44a2464b9511
status: test
description: Look for non-system accounts SMB accessing a file with write (0x2) access mask via administrative share (i.e C$).
references:
    - https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/f7a58156dbfc9b019f17f638b8c62d22e557d350/playbooks/WIN-201012004336.yaml
    - https://securitydatasets.com/notebooks/atomic/windows/lateral_movement/SDWIN-200806015757.html?highlight=create%20file
author: Jose Rodriguez (@Cyb3rPandaH), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-08-06
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName|endswith: 'C$'
        AccessMask: '0x2'
    filter_main_subjectusername:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
    filter_optional_local_ip:
        IpAddress: '::1'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Metasploit SMB Authentication
id: 72124974-a68b-4366-b990-d30e0b2a190d
status: test
description: Alerts on Metasploit host's authentications on the domain.
references:
    - https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/1416b5776d963f21b7b5b45d19f3e961201e0aed/lib/rex/proto/smb/client.rb
author: Chakib Gzenayi (@Chak092), Hosni Mribah
date: 2020-05-06
modified: 2024-01-25
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID:
            - 4625
            - 4624
        LogonType: 3
        AuthenticationPackageName: 'NTLM'
        WorkstationName|re: '^[A-Za-z0-9]{16}$'
    selection2:
        EventID: 4776
        Workstation|re: '^[A-Za-z0-9]{16}$'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Linux hostnames composed of 16 characters.
level: high

title: Protected Storage Service Access
id: 45545954-4016-43c6-855e-eae8f1c369dc
status: test
description: Detects access to a protected_storage service over the network. Potential abuse of DPAPI to extract domain backup keys from Domain Controllers
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190620-DomainDPAPIBackupKeyExtraction/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2019-08-10
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName|contains: 'IPC'
        RelativeTargetName: 'protected_storage'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Metasploit Or Impacket Service Installation Via SMB PsExec
id: 6fb63b40-e02a-403e-9ffd-3bcc1d749442
related:
    - id: 1a17ce75-ff0d-4f02-9709-2b7bb5618cf0
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects usage of Metasploit SMB PsExec (exploit/windows/smb/psexec) and Impacket psexec.py by triggering on specific service installation
references:
    - https://bczyz1.github.io/2021/01/30/psexec.html
author: Bartlomiej Czyz, Relativity
date: 2021-01-21
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1570
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|re: '^%systemroot%\\[a-zA-Z]{8}\.exe$'
        ServiceName|re: '(^[a-zA-Z]{4}$)|(^[a-zA-Z]{8}$)|(^[a-zA-Z]{16}$)'
        ServiceStartType: 3  # on-demand start, see https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4697
        ServiceType: '0x10'
    filter:
        ServiceName: 'PSEXESVC'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Possible, different agents with a 8 character binary and a 4, 8 or 16 character service name
level: high

title: CobaltStrike Service Installations - Security
id: d7a95147-145f-4678-b85d-d1ff4a3bb3f6
related:
    - id: 5a105d34-05fc-401e-8553-272b45c1522d
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement
references:
    - https://www.sans.org/webcasts/119395
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/getting-the-bacon-from-cobalt-strike-beacon/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Wojciech Lesicki
date: 2021-05-26
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    event_id:
        EventID: 4697
    selection1:
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'ADMIN$'
            - '.exe'
    selection2:
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - '%COMSPEC%'
            - 'start'
            - 'powershell'
    selection3:
        ServiceFileName|contains: 'powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand'
    selection4:
        ServiceFileName|base64offset|contains: "IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:"
    condition: event_id and 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Iertutil DLL Hijack - Security
id: c39f0c81-7348-4965-ab27-2fde35a1b641
status: test
description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `iertutil.dll` in the `C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\` directory over the network for a DCOM InternetExplorer DLL Hijack scenario.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteDCOMIErtUtilDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-26
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        RelativeTargetName|endswith: '\Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll'
    filter:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Impacket PsExec Execution
id: 32d56ea1-417f-44ff-822b-882873f5f43b
status: test
description: Detects execution of Impacket's psexec.py.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329171218/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-3-detecting-psexec.html
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2020-12-14
modified: 2022-09-22
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$' # looking for the string \\*\IPC$
        RelativeTargetName|contains:
            - 'RemCom_stdin'
            - 'RemCom_stdout'
            - 'RemCom_stderr'
    condition: selection1
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe
id: 52d8b0c6-53d6-439a-9e41-52ad442ad9ad
status: test
description: This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes
references:
    - https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1104489274387451904
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2023-03-14
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$' # looking for the string \\*\IPC$
    false_positives:
        RelativeTargetName:
            - 'atsvc'
            - 'samr'
            - 'lsarpc'
            - 'lsass'
            - 'winreg'
            - 'netlogon'
            - 'srvsvc'
            - 'protected_storage'
            - 'wkssvc'
            - 'browser'
            - 'netdfs'
            - 'svcctl'
            - 'spoolss'
            - 'ntsvcs'
            - 'LSM_API_service'
            - 'HydraLsPipe'
            - 'TermSrv_API_service'
            - 'MsFteWds'
            - 'sql\query'
            - 'eventlog'
    condition: selection1 and not false_positives
falsepositives:
    - Update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
level: high

title: T1047 Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack
id: f6c68d5f-e101-4b86-8c84-7d96851fd65c
status: test
description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteWMIWbemcomnDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-02-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        RelativeTargetName|endswith: '\wbem\wbemcomn.dll'
    filter:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: smbexec.py Service Installation
id: 52a85084-6989-40c3-8f32-091e12e13f09
status: test
description: Detects the use of smbexec.py tool by detecting a specific service installation
references:
    - https://blog.ropnop.com/using-credentials-to-own-windows-boxes-part-2-psexec-and-services/
    - https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/33058eb2fde6976ea62e04bc7d6b629d64d44712/examples/smbexec.py#L286-L296
    - https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/edef71f17bc1240f9f8c957bbda98662951ac3ec/examples/smbexec.py#L60 # Old service name
author: Omer Faruk Celik
date: 2018-03-20
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_eid:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
    selection_service_name:
        ServiceName: 'BTOBTO'
    selection_service_image:
        ImagePath|contains:
            - '.bat & del '
            - '__output 2^>^&1 >'
    condition: selection_eid and 1 of selection_service_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential CobaltStrike Service Installations - Registry
id: 61a7697c-cb79-42a8-a2ff-5f0cdfae0130
status: test
description: |
    Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement.
references:
    - https://www.sans.org/webcasts/tech-tuesday-workshop-cobalt-strike-detection-log-analysis-119395
author: Wojciech Lesicki
date: 2021-06-29
modified: 2024-03-25
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_key:
        - TargetObject|contains: '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services'
        - TargetObject|contains|all:
              - '\System\ControlSet'
              - '\Services'
    selection_details:
        - Details|contains|all:
              - 'ADMIN$'
              - '.exe'
        - Details|contains|all:
              - '%COMSPEC%'
              - 'start'
              - 'powershell'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Remote PowerShell Session (PS Module)
id: 96b9f619-aa91-478f-bacb-c3e50f8df575
status: test
description: Detects remote PowerShell sessions
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190511-RemotePwshExecution/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Tim Shelton
date: 2019-08-10
modified: 2023-01-20
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.006
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection:
        ContextInfo|contains|all:
            - ' = ServerRemoteHost ' #  HostName: 'ServerRemoteHost'  french : Nom d’hôte =
            - 'wsmprovhost.exe'      #  HostApplication|contains: 'wsmprovhost.exe' french  Application hôte =
    filter_pwsh_archive:
        ContextInfo|contains: '\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Modules\Microsoft.PowerShell.Archive\Microsoft.PowerShell.Archive.psm1'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use remote PowerShell sessions
level: high

title: Potential Remote PowerShell Session Initiated
id: c539afac-c12a-46ed-b1bd-5a5567c9f045
status: test
description: |
    Detects a process that initiated a network connection over ports 5985 or 5986 from a non-network service account.
    This could potentially indicates a remote PowerShell connection.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190511-RemotePwshExecution/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2019-09-12
modified: 2024-02-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.006
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationPort:
            - 5985
            - 5986
        Initiated: 'true' # only matches of the initiating system can be evaluated
        SourceIsIpv6: 'false'
    filter_main_service_users:
        - User|contains: # covers many language settings for Network Service. Please expand
              - 'NETWORK SERVICE'
              - 'NETZWERKDIENST'
              - 'SERVICIO DE RED'
              - 'SERVIZIO DI RETE'
        - User|contains|all:
              - 'SERVICE R'
              - 'SEAU'
    filter_main_localhost:
        SourceIp:
            - '::1'
            - '127.0.0.1'
        DestinationIp:
            - '::1'
            - '127.0.0.1'
    filter_optional_avast:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Avast Software\Avast\AvastSvc.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Avast Software\Avast\AvastSvc.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of remote PowerShell, e.g. remote administration and monitoring.
    - Network Service user name of a not-covered localization
level: high

title: Winrs Local Command Execution
id: bcfece3d-56fe-4545-9931-3b8e92927db1
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of Winrs.exe where it is used to execute commands locally.
    Commands executed this way are launched under Winrshost.exe and can represent proxy execution used for defense evasion or lateral movement.
references:
    - https://cardinalops.com/blog/living-off-winrm-abusing-complexity-in-remote-management/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/winrs
author: Liran Ravich, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1021.006
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        # Note: Example of command to simulate (winrm needs to be enabled): "c:\Windows\System32\winrs.exe" calc.exe
        - Image|endswith: '\winrs.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'winrs.exe'
    selection_local_ip:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - '/r:localhost'
            - '/r:127.0.0.1'
            - '/r:[::1]'
            - '/remote:localhost'
            - '/remote:127.0.0.1'
            - '/remote:[::1]'
    filter_main_remote:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - "/r:"
            - "/remote:"
    condition: all of selection_* or (selection_img and not 1 of filter_main_*)
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious Filename with Embedded Base64 Commands
id: 179b3686-6271-4d87-807d-17d843a8af73
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects files with specially crafted filenames that embed Base64-encoded bash payloads designed to execute when processed by shell scripts.
    These filenames exploit shell interpretation quirks to trigger hidden commands, a technique observed in VShell malware campaigns.
references:
    - https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/the-silent-fileless-threat-of-vshell/
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2025-11-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.004
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '{echo'
            - '{base64,-d}'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate files with similar naming patterns (very unlikely).
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - PowerShell Module
id: 88a22f69-62f9-4b8a-aa00-6b0212f2f05a
related:
    - id: a5a30a6e-75ca-4233-8b8c-42e0f2037d3b
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-08
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_4103:
        Payload|contains|all:
            - '&&'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - 'shellexec_rundll'
        Payload|contains:
            - 'value'
            - 'invoke'
            - 'comspec'
            - 'iex'
    condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - PowerShell Module
id: a136cde0-61ad-4a61-9b82-8dc490e60dd2
related:
    - id: 73e67340-0d25-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2024-04-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_4103:
        Payload|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r).+clip(?:\.exe)?.{0,4}&&.+clipboard]::\(\s\\"\{\d\}.+-f.+"'
    condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - PowerShell Module
id: 07ad2ea8-6a55-4ac6-bf3e-91b8e59676eb
related:
    - id: e55a5195-4724-480e-a77e-3ebe64bd3759
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task31)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-08
modified: 2023-01-04
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection:
        Payload|contains|all:
            - 'set'
            - '&&'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'vbscript:createobject'
            - '.run'
            - '(window.close)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high