title: Scheduled Task Creation Masquerading as System Processes
id: 9f8573c9-22b4-40e3-89c1-72bc2b8d49ab
status: experimental
description: Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that involve system processes, which may indicate malicious actors masquerading as or abusing these processes to execute payloads or maintain persistence.
references:
    - https://tria.ge/241015-l98snsyeje/behavioral2
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-02-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1036.004
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /create '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' audiodg'
            - ' conhost'
            - ' dwm.exe'
            - ' explorer'
            - ' lsass'
            - ' lsm'
            - ' mmc'
            - ' msiexec'
            - ' regsvr32'
            - ' rundll32'
            - ' services'
            - ' spoolsv'
            - ' svchost'
            - ' taskeng'
            - ' taskhost'
            - ' wininit'
            - ' winlogon'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate system administration tasks scheduling trusted system processes.
level: high

title: Flash Player Update from Suspicious Location
id: 4922a5dd-6743-4fc2-8e81-144374280997
status: test
description: Detects a flashplayer update from an unofficial location
references:
    - https://gist.github.com/roycewilliams/a723aaf8a6ac3ba4f817847610935cfb
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-10-25
modified: 2022-08-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1189
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        - c-uri|contains: '/flash_install.php'
        - c-uri|endswith: '/install_flash_player.exe'
    filter:
        cs-host|endswith: '.adobe.com'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown flash download locations
level: high

title: OpenCanary - TFTP Request
id: b4e6b016-a2ac-4759-ad85-8000b300d61e
status: test
description: Detects instances where a TFTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1041
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 10001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Remote DCOM/WMI Lateral Movement
id: 68050b10-e477-4377-a99b-3721b422d6ef
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls that performs remote DCOM operations. These could be abused for lateral movement via DCOM or WMI.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-srvs/accf23b0-0f57-441c-9185-43041f1b0ee9
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1021.003
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:367abb81-9844-35f1-ad32-98f038001003'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid:
            - 4d9f4ab8-7d1c-11cf-861e-0020af6e7c57
            - 99fcfec4-5260-101b-bbcb-00aa0021347a
            - 000001a0-0000-0000-c000-000000000046
            - 00000131-0000-0000-c000-000000000046
            - 00000143-0000-0000-c000-000000000046
            - 00000000-0000-0000-c000-000000000046
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Some administrative tasks on remote host
level: high

title: WMImplant Hack Tool
id: 8028c2c3-e25a-46e3-827f-bbb5abf181d7
status: test
description: Detects parameters used by WMImplant
references:
    - https://github.com/FortyNorthSecurity/WMImplant
author: NVISO
date: 2020-03-26
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'WMImplant'
            - ' change_user '
            - ' gen_cli '
            - ' command_exec '
            - ' disable_wdigest '
            - ' disable_winrm '
            - ' enable_wdigest '
            - ' enable_winrm '
            - ' registry_mod '
            - ' remote_posh '
            - ' sched_job '
            - ' service_mod '
            - ' process_kill '
            # - ' process_start '
            - ' active_users '
            - ' basic_info '
            # - ' drive_list '
            # - ' installed_programs '
            - ' power_off '
            - ' vacant_system '
            - ' logon_events '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrative scripts that use the same keywords.
level: high

title: Suspicious Encoded Scripts in a WMI Consumer
id: 83844185-1c5b-45bc-bcf3-b5bf3084ca5b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious encoded payloads in WMI Event Consumers
references:
    - https://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/LiquidSnake
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-09-01
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: wmi_event
detection:
    selection_destination:
        Destination|base64offset|contains:
            - 'WriteProcessMemory'
            - 'This program cannot be run in DOS mode'
            - 'This program must be run under Win32'
    condition: selection_destination
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious WmiPrvSE Child Process
id: 8a582fe2-0882-4b89-a82a-da6b2dc32937
related:
    - id: 692f0bec-83ba-4d04-af7e-e884a96059b6
      type: similar
    - id: d21374ff-f574-44a7-9998-4a8c8bf33d7d
      type: similar
    - id: 18cf6cf0-39b0-4c22-9593-e244bdc9a2d4
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects suspicious and uncommon child processes of WmiPrvSE
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
    - https://blog.osarmor.com/319/onenote-attachment-delivers-asyncrat-malware/
    - https://twitter.com/ForensicITGuy/status/1334734244120309760
author: Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2023-11-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1218.010
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe'
    selection_children_1:
        # TODO: Add more LOLBINs or suspicious processes that make sens in your environment
        Image|endswith:
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\verclsid.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    selection_children_2:
        # This is in a separate selection due to the nature of FP generated with CMD
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'cscript'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh'
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'wscript'
    filter_main_werfault:
        Image|endswith: '\WerFault.exe'
    filter_main_wmiprvse:
        Image|endswith: '\WmiPrvSE.exe' # In some legitimate case WmiPrvSE was seen spawning itself
    filter_main_msiexec:
        Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '/i '
    condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_children_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - Potential Impacket Lateral Movement Activity
id: 10c14723-61c7-4c75-92ca-9af245723ad2
related:
    - id: e31f89f7-36fb-4697-8ab6-48823708353b
      type: obsolete
status: stable
description: Detects wmiexec/dcomexec/atexec/smbexec from Impacket framework
references:
    - https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/wmiexec.py
    - https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/atexec.py
    - https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/smbexec.py
    - https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/dcomexec.py
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi.html
author: Ecco, oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Tim Rauch
date: 2019-09-03
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_other:
        # *** wmiexec.py
        #    parent is wmiprvse.exe
        #    examples:
        #       cmd.exe /Q /c whoami 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1567439113.54 2>&1
        #       cmd.exe /Q /c cd  1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1567439113.54 2>&1
        # *** dcomexec.py -object MMC20
        #   parent is mmc.exe
        #   example:
        #       "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /Q /c cd  1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1567442499.05 2>&1
        # *** dcomexec.py -object ShellBrowserWindow
        #  runs %SystemRoot%\System32\rundll32.exe shell32.dll,SHCreateLocalServerRunDll {c08afd90-f2a1-11d1-8455-00a0c91f3880} but parent command is explorer.exe
        #  example:
        #   "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /Q /c cd \ 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1567520103.71 2>&1
        # *** smbexec.py
        #   parent is services.exe
        #   example:
        #       C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /Q /c echo tasklist ^> \\127.0.0.1\C$\__output 2^>^&1 > C:\Windows\TEMP\execute.bat & C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /Q /c C:\Windows\TEMP\execute.bat & del C:\Windows\TEMP\execute.bat
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\wmiprvse.exe'        # wmiexec
            - '\mmc.exe'        # dcomexec MMC
            - '\explorer.exe'        # dcomexec ShellBrowserWindow
            - '\services.exe'        # smbexec
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cmd.exe'
            - '/Q'
            - '/c'
            - '\\\\127.0.0.1\\'
            - '&1'
    selection_atexec:
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            - 'svchost.exe -k netsvcs'       # atexec on win10 (parent is "C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs")
            - 'taskeng.exe'       # atexec on win7 (parent is "taskeng.exe {AFA79333-694C-4BEE-910E-E57D9A3518F6} S-1-5-18:NT AUTHORITY\System:Service:")
            # cmd.exe /C tasklist /m > C:\Windows\Temp\bAJrYQtL.tmp 2>&1
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cmd.exe'
            - '/C'
            - 'Windows\Temp\'
            - '&1'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Autorun Registry Modified via WMI
id: c80e66d8-1780-48a9-b412-46663fd21ac0
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious activity where the WMIC process is used to create an autorun registry entry via reg.exe, which is often indicative of persistence mechanisms employed by malware.
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/e4c7b21b8f36c97c35b7c622732b38a189ce18f7/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-02-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_execution_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe' # wmic process call create 'reg.exe add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v Desktops /t REG_SZ /d "\"C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\tre\Desktops.exe\" random" /f'
        - ParentImage|endswith: '\wmiprvse.exe'
    selection_execution_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'reg'
            - ' add '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - '\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run'
    selection_suspicious_paths_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs'
            - :\ProgramData'
            - ':\Windows\Temp'
            - ':\Temp'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
            - '\AppData\Roaming'
            - ':\$Recycle.bin'
            - ':\Users\Default'
            - ':\Users\public'
            - '%temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - '%Public%'
            - '%AppData%'
    selection_suspicious_paths_user_1:
        CommandLine|contains: ':\Users\'
    selection_suspicious_paths_user_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Favorites'
            - '\Favourites'
            - '\Contacts'
            - '\Music'
            - '\Pictures'
            - '\Documents'
            - '\Photos'
    condition: all of selection_execution_* and (selection_suspicious_paths_1 or (all of selection_suspicious_paths_user_*))
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activity or software installations
level: high

title: HackTool - CrackMapExec Execution
id: 42a993dd-bb3e-48c8-b372-4d6684c4106c
status: test
description: This rule detect common flag combinations used by CrackMapExec in order to detect its use even if the binary has been replaced.
references:
    - https://mpgn.gitbook.io/crackmapexec/smb-protocol/authentication/checking-credentials-local
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/telegram-malware-iranian-espionage
    - https://www.infosecmatter.com/crackmapexec-module-library/?cmem=mssql-mimikatz
    - https://www.infosecmatter.com/crackmapexec-module-library/?cmem=smb-pe_inject
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-25
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1053
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1201
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_binary:
        Image|endswith: '\crackmapexec.exe'
    selection_special:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -M pe_inject '
    selection_execute:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' --local-auth'
            - ' -u '
            - ' -x '
    selection_hash:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' --local-auth'
            - ' -u '
            - ' -p '
            - " -H 'NTHASH'"
    selection_module_mssql:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' mssql '
            - ' -u '
            - ' -p '
            - ' -M '
            - ' -d '
    selection_module_smb1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' smb '
            - ' -u '
            - ' -H '
            - ' -M '
            - ' -o '
    selection_module_smb2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' smb '
            - ' -u '
            - ' -p '
            - ' --local-auth'
    part_localauth_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' --local-auth'
            - ' -u '
            - ' -p '
    part_localauth_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' 10.'
            - ' 192.168.'
            - '/24 '
    condition: 1 of selection_* or all of part_localauth*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious HH.EXE Execution
id: e8a95b5e-c891-46e2-b33a-93937d3abc31
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious execution of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
references:
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/chm-badness-delivers-a-banking-trojan/
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-27939090904026cc396b0b629c8e4314acd6f5dac40a676edbc87f4567b47eb7
    - https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/unintentional-leak-glimpse-attack-vectors-apt37
author: Maxim Pavlunin
date: 2020-04-01
modified: 2023-04-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1218.001
    - attack.t1218.010
    - attack.t1218.011
    - attack.t1566
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'HH.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\hh.exe'
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.application'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Content.Outlook\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            # - '\AppData\Local\Temp\Temp?_'
            # - '\AppData\Local\Temp\Rar$'
            # - '\AppData\Local\Temp\7z'
            # - '\AppData\Local\Temp\wz'
            # - '\AppData\Local\Temp\peazip-tmp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE
id: 3c89a1e8-0fba-449e-8f1b-8409d6267ec8
related:
    - id: 526be59f-a573-4eea-b5f7-f0973207634d # Generic
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects WMIC executing "process call create" with suspicious calls to processes such as "rundll32", "regsrv32", etc.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'process '
            - 'call '
            - 'create '
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more susupicious paths and binaries as you see fit in your env
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'bitsadmin'
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'cmd.exe /c '
            - 'cmd.exe /k '
            - 'cmd.exe /r '
            - 'cmd /c '
            - 'cmd /k '
            - 'cmd /r '
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh'
            - 'certutil'
            - 'cscript'
            - 'wscript'
            - 'mshta'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - '%temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - '%ProgramData%'
            - '%appdata%'
            - '%comspec%'
            - '%localappdata%'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50
related:
    - id: c27515df-97a9-4162-8a60-dc0eeb51b775 # Speicifc OneNote rule due to its recent usage in phishing attacks
      type: derived
    - id: e1693bc8-7168-4eab-8718-cdcaa68a1738
      type: derived
    - id: 23daeb52-e6eb-493c-8607-c4f0246cb7d8
      type: obsolete
    - id: 518643ba-7d9c-4fa5-9f37-baed36059f6a
      type: obsolete
    - id: 04f5363a-6bca-42ff-be70-0d28bf629ead
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process spawning from one of the Microsoft Office suite products (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio, etc.)
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/465aabe132ccb949e75b8ab9c5bda36d80cf2fd503d52b8bad54e295f28bbc21?environmentId=100
    - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
    - https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e
    - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
    - https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/300af51b88ad5d5b27ce4f5f54e4d6e6a3a2c06d/detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml
    - https://twitter.com/andythevariable/status/1576953781581144064?s=20&t=QiJILvK4ZiBdR8RJe24u-A
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/exploring-the-ref2731-intrusion-set
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_msbuild_started_by_office_app.toml
    - https://www.vmray.com/analyses/2d2fa29185ad/report/overview.html
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, FPT.EagleEye Team, Vadim Khrykov, Cyb3rEng, Michael Haag, Christopher Peacock @securepeacock, @scythe_io
date: 2018-04-06
modified: 2023-04-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1218.010
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\EQNEDT32.EXE'
            - '\EXCEL.EXE'
            - '\MSACCESS.EXE'
            - '\MSPUB.exe'
            - '\ONENOTE.EXE'
            - '\POWERPNT.exe'
            - '\VISIO.exe'
            - '\WINWORD.EXE'
            - '\wordpad.exe'
            - '\wordview.exe'
    selection_child_processes:
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'bitsadmin.exe'
              - 'CertOC.exe'
              - 'CertUtil.exe'
              - 'Cmd.Exe'
              - 'CMSTP.EXE'
              - 'cscript.exe'
              - 'curl.exe'
              - 'HH.exe'
              - 'IEExec.exe'
              - 'InstallUtil.exe'
              - 'javaw.exe'
              - 'Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe'
              - 'msdt.exe'
              - 'MSHTA.EXE'
              - 'msiexec.exe'
              - 'Msxsl.exe'
              - 'odbcconf.exe'
              - 'pcalua.exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'RegAsm.exe'
              - 'RegSvcs.exe'
              - 'REGSVR32.exe'
              - 'RUNDLL32.exe'
              - 'schtasks.exe'
              - 'ScriptRunner.exe'
              - 'wmic.exe'
              - 'WorkFolders.exe'
              - 'wscript.exe'
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\AppVLP.exe'
              - '\bash.exe'
              - '\bitsadmin.exe'
              - '\certoc.exe'
              - '\certutil.exe'
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\cmstp.exe'
              - '\control.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\curl.exe'
              - '\forfiles.exe'
              - '\hh.exe'
              - '\ieexec.exe'
              - '\installutil.exe'
              - '\javaw.exe'
              - '\mftrace.exe'
              - '\Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe'
              - '\msbuild.exe'
              - '\msdt.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\msidb.exe'
              - '\msiexec.exe'
              - '\msxsl.exe'
              - '\odbcconf.exe'
              - '\pcalua.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\regasm.exe'
              - '\regsvcs.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\schtasks.exe'
              - '\scrcons.exe'
              - '\scriptrunner.exe'
              - '\sh.exe'
              - '\svchost.exe'
              - '\verclsid.exe'
              - '\wmic.exe'
              - '\workfolders.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
    selection_child_susp_paths: # Idea: Laiali Kazalbach, Mohamed Elsayed (#4142)
        Image|contains:
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\ProgramData\'
            - '\Windows\Tasks\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
    condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_child_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Script Event Consumer Spawning Process
id: f6d1dd2f-b8ce-40ca-bc23-062efb686b34
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious child process of Script Event Consumer (scrcons.exe).
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/child-processes/
    - https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cortex-xdr/cortex-xdr-analytics-alert-reference/cortex-xdr-analytics-alert-reference/scrcons-exe-rare-child-process.html
author: Sittikorn S
date: 2021-06-21
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\scrcons.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\svchost.exe'
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\msbuild.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Windows Defender Tampering Via Wmic.EXE
id: 51cbac1e-eee3-4a90-b1b7-358efb81fa0a
status: test
description: Detects potential tampering with Windows Defender settings such as adding exclusion using wmic
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5c1e6f1b4fafd01c8d1ece85f510160fc1275fbf/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gootkit-malware-bypasses-windows-defender-by-setting-path-exclusions/
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/iobit-forums-hacked-to-spread-ransomware-to-its-members/
author: frack113
date: 2022-12-11
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\WMIC.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '/Namespace:\\\\root\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Defender'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious WMIC Execution Via Office Process
id: e1693bc8-7168-4eab-8718-cdcaa68a1738
related:
    - id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50
      type: derived
    - id: 518643ba-7d9c-4fa5-9f37-baed36059f6a
      type: obsolete
    - id: 9d1c72f5-43f0-4da5-9320-648cf2099dd0
      type: obsolete
    - id: c0e1c3d5-4381-4f18-8145-2583f06a1fe5
      type: obsolete
    - id: 04f5363a-6bca-42ff-be70-0d28bf629ead
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Office application called wmic to proxye execution through a LOLBIN process. This is often used to break suspicious parent-child chain (Office app spawns LOLBin).
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
author: Vadim Khrykov, Cyb3rEng
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1218.010
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\WINWORD.EXE'
            - '\EXCEL.EXE'
            - '\POWERPNT.exe'
            - '\MSPUB.exe'
            - '\VISIO.exe'
            - '\MSACCESS.EXE'
            - '\EQNEDT32.EXE'
            - '\ONENOTE.EXE'
            - '\wordpad.exe'
            - '\wordview.exe'
    selection_wmic_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wbem\WMIC.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
    selection_wmic_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'process'
            - 'create'
            - 'call'
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more suspicious LOLBINs as you see fit
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'msiexec'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'verclsid'
            - 'wscript'
            - 'cscript'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HTML Help HH.EXE Suspicious Child Process
id: 52cad028-0ff0-4854-8f67-d25dfcbc78b4
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious child process of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
references:
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/chm-badness-delivers-a-banking-trojan/
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-27939090904026cc396b0b629c8e4314acd6f5dac40a676edbc87f4567b47eb7
    - https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/unintentional-leak-glimpse-attack-vectors-apt37
author: Maxim Pavlunin, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-04-01
modified: 2023-04-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1218.001
    - attack.t1218.010
    - attack.t1218.011
    - attack.t1566
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\hh.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\CertReq.exe'
            - '\CertUtil.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\installutil.exe'
            - '\MSbuild.exe'
            - '\MSHTA.EXE'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - CrackMapExec Execution Patterns
id: 058f4380-962d-40a5-afce-50207d36d7e2
status: stable
description: Detects various execution patterns of the CrackMapExec pentesting framework
references:
    - https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2023-11-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1053
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.s0106
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # cme/protocols/smb/wmiexec.py (generalized execute_remote and execute_fileless)
            - 'cmd.exe /Q /c * 1> \\\\*\\*\\* 2>&1'
            # cme/protocols/smb/atexec.py:109 (fileless output via share)
            - 'cmd.exe /C * > \\\\*\\*\\* 2>&1'
            # cme/protocols/smb/atexec.py:111 (fileless output via share)
            - 'cmd.exe /C * > *\\Temp\\* 2>&1'
            # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/d8c50c8cbaf36c29329078662473f75e440978d2/cme/helpers/powershell.py#L136 (PowerShell execution with obfuscation)
            - 'powershell.exe -exec bypass -noni -nop -w 1 -C "'
            # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/d8c50c8cbaf36c29329078662473f75e440978d2/cme/helpers/powershell.py#L160 (PowerShell execution without obfuscation)
            - 'powershell.exe -noni -nop -w 1 -enc '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Remote SquiblyTwo Technique Execution
id: 8d63dadf-b91b-4187-87b6-34a1114577ea
related:
    - id: 06ce37c2-61ab-4f05-9ff5-b1a96d18ae32
      type: similar
    - id: 05c36dd6-79d6-4a9a-97da-3db20298ab2d
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential execution of the SquiblyTwo technique that leverages Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)
    to execute malicious code remotely. This technique bypasses application whitelisting by using wmic.exe to process
    malicious XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) scripts that can contain embedded JScript or VBScript.
    The attack typically works by fetching XSL content from a remote source (using HTTP/HTTPS) and executing it
    with full trust privileges directly in memory, avoiding disk-based detection mechanisms. This is a common
    LOLBin (Living Off The Land Binary) technique used for defense evasion and code execution.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20190209154607/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html
    - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/986280382042595328 # Deleted
    - https://atomicredteam.io/defense-evasion/T1220/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/
    - https://x.com/byrne_emmy12099/status/1932346420226658668
author: Markus Neis, Florian Roth, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2026-01-24
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1220
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pe:
        - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
        - Hashes|contains:  # Sysmon field hashes contains all types
              - 'IMPHASH=1B1A3F43BF37B5BFE60751F2EE2F326E'
              - 'IMPHASH=37777A96245A3C74EB217308F3546F4C'
              - 'IMPHASH=9D87C9D67CE724033C0B40CC4CA1B206'
              - 'IMPHASH=B12619881D79C3ACADF45E752A58554A'
              - 'IMPHASH=16A48C3CABF98A9DC1BF02C07FE1EA00'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '/format:'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '://'
            - '\\\\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PSExec and WMI Process Creations Block
id: 97b9ce1e-c5ab-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
status: test
description: Detects blocking of process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction-rules-reference?view=o365-worldwide#block-process-creations-originating-from-psexec-and-wmi-commands
    - https://twitter.com/duff22b/status/1280166329660497920
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2020-07-14
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: windefend
    definition: 'Requirements:Enabled Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands from Attack Surface Reduction (GUID: d1e49aac-8f56-4280-b9ba-993a6d77406c)'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 1121
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\wmiprvse.exe'
            - '\psexesvc.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Remote Schedule Task Lateral Movement via ATSvc
id: 0fcd1c79-4eeb-4746-aba9-1b458f7a79cb
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls to create or execute a scheduled task via ATSvc
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-tsch/d1058a28-7e02-4948-8b8d-4a347fa64931
    - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-TSCH.md
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053
    - attack.t1053.002
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:1ff70682-0a51-30e8-076d-740be8cee98b"'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid: 1ff70682-0a51-30e8-076d-740be8cee98b
        OpNum:
            - 0
            - 1
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Remote Schedule Task Lateral Movement via SASec
id: aff229ab-f8cd-447b-b215-084d11e79eb0
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls to create or execute a scheduled task via SASec
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-tsch/d1058a28-7e02-4948-8b8d-4a347fa64931
    - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-TSCH.md
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053
    - attack.t1053.002
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:378e52b0-c0a9-11cf-822d-00aa0051e40f"'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid: 378e52b0-c0a9-11cf-822d-00aa0051e40f
        OpNum:
            - 0
            - 1
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Remote Schedule Task Lateral Movement via ITaskSchedulerService
id: ace3ff54-e7fd-46bd-8ea0-74b49a0aca1d
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls to create or execute a scheduled task
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-tsch/d1058a28-7e02-4948-8b8d-4a347fa64931
    - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-TSCH.md
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1053
    - attack.t1053.002
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:86d35949-83c9-4044-b424-db363231fd0c"'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid: 86d35949-83c9-4044-b424-db363231fd0c
        OpNum:
            - 1
            - 3
            - 4
            - 10
            - 11
            - 12
            - 13
            - 14
            - 15
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Scheduled Task Write to System32 Tasks
id: 80e1f67a-4596-4351-98f5-a9c3efabac95
status: test
description: Detects the creation of tasks from processes executed from suspicious locations
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-16
modified: 2022-01-12
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1053
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\Windows\System32\Tasks'
        Image|contains:
            - '\AppData\'
            - 'C:\PerfLogs'
            - '\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - SharPersist Execution
id: 26488ad0-f9fd-4536-876f-52fea846a2e4
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the hacktool SharPersist - used to deploy various different kinds of persistence mechanisms
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/sharpersist-windows-persistence-toolkit
    - https://github.com/mandiant/SharPersist
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-15
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharPersist.exe'
        - Product: 'SharPersist'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -t schtask -c '
            - ' -t startupfolder -c '
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -t reg -c '
            - ' -m add'
    selection_cli_3:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -t service -c '
            - ' -m add'
    selection_cli_4:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -t schtask -c '
            - ' -m add'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Scheduled TaskCache Change by Uncommon Program
id: 4720b7df-40c3-48fd-bbdf-fd4b3c464f0d
status: test
description: Monitor the creation of a new key under 'TaskCache' when a new scheduled task is registered by a process that is not svchost.exe, which is suspicious
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
    - https://labs.f-secure.com/blog/scheduled-task-tampering/
author: Syed Hasan (@syedhasan009)
date: 2021-06-18
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\'
    filter_main_empty:
        Details: '(Empty)'
    filter_main_null:
        Details: null
    filter_main_other:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - 'Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator'
            - 'Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\SvcRestartTask\Index'
            - 'Microsoft\Windows\Flighting\OneSettings\RefreshCache\Index'
    filter_main_mousocoreworker:
        Image|endswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\MoUsoCoreWorker.exe'
    filter_main_services:
        Image|endswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\services.exe'
    filter_main_tiworker:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\'
        Image|endswith: '\TiWorker.exe'
    filter_main_svchost:
        Image: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe'
    filter_main_ngen:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework' # \Framework\ and \Framework64\
        Image|endswith: '\ngen.exe'
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks\{B66B135D-DA06-4FC4-95F8-7458E1D10129}'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\Microsoft\Windows\.NET Framework\.NET Framework NGEN'
    filter_main_office:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Integration\Integrator.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Integration\Integrator.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe'
    filter_main_msiexec:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
    filter_main_explorer:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor\'
    filter_main_system:
        Image: 'System'
    filter_main_runtimebroker:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe'
    filter_optional_dropbox_updater:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\Update\DropboxUpdate.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Dropbox\Update\DropboxUpdate.exe'
    filter_optional_edge:
        Image|endswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe'
    filter_optional_onedrive:
        Image|endswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft OneDrive\OneDrive.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft OneDrive\OneDrive.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Renamed Schtasks Execution
id: f91e51c9-f344-4b32-969b-0b6f6b8537d4
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of renamed schtasks.exe binary, which is a legitimate Windows utility used for scheduling tasks.
    One of the very common persistence techniques is schedule malicious tasks using schtasks.exe.
    Since, it is heavily abused, it is also heavily monitored by security products. To evade detection, threat actors may rename the schtasks.exe binary to schedule their malicious tasks.
references:
    - https://x.com/JangPr0/status/1932034543026065833
    - https://ss64.com/nt/schtasks.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.003
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cmd_operation:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' /create '
            - ' /delete '
            - ' /query '
            - ' /change '
            - ' /run '
            - ' /end '
    selection_cmd_flags:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' /tn '
            - ' /tr '
            - ' /sc '
            - ' /st '
            - ' /ru '
            - ' /fo '
    selection_pe:
        OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    filter_main_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains: 'schtasks'
    filter_main_img:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
    condition: (all of selection_cmd_* and not filter_main_cmd) or (selection_pe and not filter_main_img)
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Schtasks Creation Or Modification With SYSTEM Privileges
id: 89ca78fd-b37c-4310-b3d3-81a023f83936
status: test
description: Detects the creation or update of a scheduled task to run with "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" privileges
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/exploring-the-qbot-attack-pattern
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-28
modified: 2025-02-15
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_root:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /change '
            - ' /create '
    selection_run:
        CommandLine|contains: '/ru '
    selection_user:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'NT AUT' # This covers the usual NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
            - ' SYSTEM ' # SYSTEM is a valid value for schtasks hence it gets it's own value with space
    filter_optional_teamviewer:
        # FP from test set in SIGMA
        # Cannot use ParentImage on all OSes for 4688 events
        # ParentImage|contains|all:
        #     - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
        #     - 'TeamViewer_.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/TN TVInstallRestore'
            - '\TeamViewer_.exe'
    filter_optional_office:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            # https://answers.microsoft.com/en-us/msoffice/forum/all/office-15-subscription-heartbeat-task-created-on/43ab5e53-a9fb-47c6-8c14-44889974b9ff
            - 'Subscription Heartbeat'
            - '\HeartbeatConfig.xml'
            - '\Microsoft Shared\OFFICE'
    filter_optional_avira:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/Create /F /RU System /SC WEEKLY /TN AviraSystemSpeedupVerify /TR '
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\Avira\System Speedup\setup\avira_speedup_setup.exe'
            - '/VERIFY /VERYSILENT /NOSTART /NODOTNET /NORESTART" /RL HIGHEST'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation Involving Temp Folder
id: 39019a4e-317f-4ce3-ae63-309a8c6b53c5
status: test
description: Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that involves a temporary folder and runs only once
references:
    - https://discuss.elastic.co/t/detection-and-response-for-hafnium-activity/266289/3
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-03-11
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' /create '
            - ' /sc once '
            - '\Temp\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
    - Software installation
level: high

title: Scheduled Task Executing Encoded Payload from Registry
id: c4eeeeae-89f4-43a7-8b48-8d1bdfa66c78
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a schtask that potentially executes a base64 encoded payload stored in the Windows Registry using PowerShell.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), @Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport, X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-12
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        # schtasks.exe /Create /F /TN "{97F2F70B-10D1-4447-A2F3-9B070C86E261}" /TR "cmd /c start /min \"\" powershell.exe -Command IEX([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String((Get-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Pvoeooxf).yzbbvhhdypa))) " /SC MINUTE /MO 30
        - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    selection_cli_create:
        CommandLine|contains: '/Create'
    selection_cli_encoding:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'FromBase64String'
            - 'encodedcommand'
    selection_cli_get:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Get-ItemProperty'
            - ' gp ' # Alias
    selection_cli_hive:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'HKCU:'
            - 'HKLM:'
            - 'registry::'
            - 'HKEY_'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Powershell Search Order Hijacking - Task
id: b66474aa-bd92-4333-a16c-298155b120df
related:
    - id: 6e8811ee-90ba-441e-8486-5653e68b2299
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious powershell execution via a schedule task where the command ends with an suspicious flags to hide the powershell instance instead of executeing scripts or commands. This could be a sign of persistence via PowerShell "Get-Variable" technique as seen being used in Colibri Loader
references:
    - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/04/colibri-loader-combines-task-scheduler-and-powershell-in-clever-persistence-technique/
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-08
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage: 'C:\WINDOWS\System32\svchost.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-k netsvcs'
            - '-s Schedule'
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - ' -windowstyle hidden'
            - ' -w hidden'
            - ' -ep bypass'
            - ' -noni'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Uncommon One Time Only Scheduled Task At 00:00
id: 970823b7-273b-460a-8afc-3a6811998529
status: test
description: Detects scheduled task creation events that include suspicious actions, and is run once at 00:00
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/ransomware-spotlight/ransomware-spotlight-blackbyte
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-15
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|contains: '\schtasks.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'wscript'
            - 'vbscript'
            - 'cscript'
            - 'wmic '
            - 'wmic.exe'
            - 'regsvr32.exe'
            - 'powershell'
            - '\AppData\'
    selection_time:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'once'
            - '00:00'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Software installation
level: high

title: Schtasks From Suspicious Folders
id: 8a8379b8-780b-4dbf-b1e9-31c8d112fefb
status: test
description: Detects scheduled task creations that have suspicious action command and folder combinations
references:
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/lazarus-dream-job-chemical
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-15
modified: 2022-11-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    selection_create:
        CommandLine|contains: ' /create '
    selection_command:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh'
            - 'cmd /c '
            - 'cmd /k '
            - 'cmd /r '
            - 'cmd.exe /c '
            - 'cmd.exe /k '
            - 'cmd.exe /r '
    selection_all_folders:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'C:\ProgramData\'
            - '%ProgramData%'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Schtasks Execution AppData Folder
id: c5c00f49-b3f9-45a6-997e-cfdecc6e1967
status: test
description: 'Detects the creation of a schtask that executes a file from C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local'
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-15
modified: 2022-07-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/Create'
            - '/RU'
            - '/TR'
            - 'C:\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'NT AUT' # This covers the usual NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
            - ' SYSTEM ' # SYSTEM is a valid value for schtasks hence it gets it's own value with space
    filter:
        # FP from test set in SIGMA
        ParentImage|contains|all:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - 'TeamViewer_.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '/TN TVInstallRestore'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Schtasks Schedule Types
id: 24c8392b-aa3c-46b7-a545-43f71657fe98
related:
    - id: 7a02e22e-b885-4404-b38b-1ddc7e65258a
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects scheduled task creations or modification on a suspicious schedule type
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks-change
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks-create
    - http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    selection_time:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' ONLOGON '
            - ' ONSTART '
            - ' ONCE '
            - ' ONIDLE '
    filter_privs:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'NT AUT' # This covers the usual NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
            - ' SYSTEM' # SYSTEM is a valid value for schtasks hence it gets it's own value with space
            - 'HIGHEST'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate processes that run at logon. Filter according to your environment
level: high

title: Potential SSH Tunnel Persistence Install Using A Scheduled Task
id: 2daa93a0-a5fb-41c5-8cd8-3c11294bfd1f
status: experimental
description: Detects the creation of new scheduled tasks via commandline, using Schtasks.exe. This rule detects tasks creating that call OpenSSH, which may indicate the creation of reverse SSH tunnel to the attacker's server.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/
    - https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/cactus-ransomware-prickly-new-variant-evades-detection
author: Rory Duncan
date: 2025-07-14
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.command-and-control
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    selection_cli_sshd:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' /create '
            - 'sshd.exe'
            - '-f'
    selection_cli_ssh:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' /create '
            - 'ssh.exe'
            - '-i'
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - Default PowerSploit/Empire Scheduled Task Creation
id: 56c217c3-2de2-479b-990f-5c109ba8458f
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a schtask via PowerSploit or Empire Default Configuration.
references:
    - https://github.com/0xdeadbeefJERKY/PowerSploit/blob/8690399ef70d2cad10213575ac67e8fa90ddf7c3/Persistence/Persistence.psm1
    - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/powershell/persistence/userland/schtasks.py
author: Markus Neis, @Karneades
date: 2018-03-06
modified: 2023-03-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.s0111
    - attack.g0022
    - attack.g0060
    - car.2013-08-001
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/Create'
            - 'powershell.exe -NonI'
            - '/TN Updater /TR'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/SC ONLOGON'
            - '/SC DAILY /ST'
            - '/SC ONIDLE'
            - '/SC HOURLY'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious Command Patterns In Scheduled Task Creation
id: f2c64357-b1d2-41b7-849f-34d2682c0fad
status: test
description: Detects scheduled task creation using "schtasks" that contain potentially suspicious or uncommon commands
references:
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/512c1352-6380-4436-b27d-bb62f0c020d6/
    - https://twitter.com/RedDrip7/status/1506480588827467785
    - https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/devil-bait/NCSC-MAR-Devil-Bait.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-23
modified: 2024-03-19
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_schtasks:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '/Create '
    selection_pattern_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/sc minute '
            - '/ru system '
    selection_pattern_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'cmd /c'
            - 'cmd /k'
            - 'cmd /r'
            - 'cmd.exe /c '
            - 'cmd.exe /k '
            - 'cmd.exe /r '
    selection_uncommon:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -decode '
            - ' -enc '
            - ' -w hidden '
            - ' bypass '
            - ' IEX'
            - '.DownloadData'
            - '.DownloadFile'
            - '.DownloadString'
            - '/c start /min ' # https://twitter.com/RedDrip7/status/1506480588827467785
            - 'FromBase64String'
            - 'mshta http'
            - 'mshta.exe http'
    selection_anomaly_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Tmp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\'
            - '%AppData%'
            - '%Temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
    selection_anomaly_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'cscript'
            - 'curl'
            - 'wscript'
    condition: selection_schtasks and ( all of selection_pattern_* or selection_uncommon or all of selection_anomaly_* )
falsepositives:
    - Software installers that run from temporary folders and also install scheduled tasks are expected to generate some false positives
level: high

title: Suspicious Modification Of Scheduled Tasks
id: 1c0e41cd-21bb-4433-9acc-4a2cd6367b9b
related:
    - id: 614cf376-6651-47c4-9dcc-6b9527f749f4 # Security-Audting Eventlog
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects when an attacker tries to modify an already existing scheduled tasks to run from a suspicious location
    Attackers can create a simple looking task in order to avoid detection on creation as it's often the most focused on
    Instead they modify the task after creation to include their malicious payload
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-28
modified: 2022-11-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_schtasks:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' /Change '
            - ' /TN '
    selection_susp_locations:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\WINDOWS\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\'
            - 'C:\Perflogs\'
            - '%ProgramData%'
            - '%appdata%'
            - '%comspec%'
            - '%localappdata%'
    selection_susp_images:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'cmd /c '
            - 'cmd /k '
            - 'cmd /r '
            - 'cmd.exe /c '
            - 'cmd.exe /k '
            - 'cmd.exe /r '
            - 'powershell'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'wscript'
            - 'cscript'
            - 'certutil'
            - 'bitsadmin'
            - 'bash.exe'
            - 'bash '
            - 'scrcons'
            - 'wmic '
            - 'wmic.exe'
            - 'forfiles'
            - 'scriptrunner'
            - 'hh.exe'
            - 'hh '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation
id: 3a734d25-df5c-4b99-8034-af1ddb5883a4
status: test
description: Detects suspicious scheduled task creation events. Based on attributes such as paths, commands line flags, etc.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-05
modified: 2022-12-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The Advanced Audit Policy setting Object Access > Audit Other Object Access Events has to be configured to allow this detection. We also recommend extracting the Command field from the embedded XML in the event data.'
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 4698
    selection_paths:
        TaskContent|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\WINDOWS\Temp\'
            - 'C:\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\'
            - 'C:\Perflogs\'
    selection_commands:
        TaskContent|contains:
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'cmd.exe</Command>'
            - 'cmd</Command>'
            - '<Arguments>/c '
            - '<Arguments>/k '
            - '<Arguments>/r '
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'wscript'
            - 'cscript'
            - 'certutil'
            - 'bitsadmin'
            - 'bash.exe'
            - 'bash '
            - 'scrcons'
            - 'wmic '
            - 'wmic.exe'
            - 'forfiles'
            - 'scriptrunner'
            - 'hh.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Persistence and Execution at Scale via GPO Scheduled Task
id: a8f29a7b-b137-4446-80a0-b804272f3da2
status: test
description: Detect lateral movement using GPO scheduled task, usually used to deploy ransomware at scale
references:
    - https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1106899890377052160
    - https://www.secureworks.com/blog/ransomware-as-a-distraction
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/7.17/prebuilt-rule-0-16-1-scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.html
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2024-09-04
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
    selection_5136:
        EventID: 5136
        AttributeLDAPDisplayName:
            - 'gPCMachineExtensionNames'
            - 'gPCUserExtensionNames'
        AttributeValue|contains:
            - 'CAB54552-DEEA-4691-817E-ED4A4D1AFC72'
            - 'AADCED64-746C-4633-A97C-D61349046527'
    selection_5145:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName|endswith: '\SYSVOL' # looking for the string \\*\SYSVOL
        RelativeTargetName|endswith: 'ScheduledTasks.xml'
        AccessList|contains:
            - 'WriteData'
            - '%%4417'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - If the source IP is not localhost then it's super suspicious, better to monitor both local and remote changes to GPO scheduled tasks.
level: high

title: Suspicious Scheduled Task Update
id: 614cf376-6651-47c4-9dcc-6b9527f749f4
related:
    - id: 1c0e41cd-21bb-4433-9acc-4a2cd6367b9b # ProcCreation schtasks change
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects update to a scheduled task event that contain suspicious keywords.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The Advanced Audit Policy setting Object Access > Audit Other Object Access Events has to be configured to allow this detection. We also recommend extracting the Command field from the embedded XML in the event data.'
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 4702
    selection_paths:
        TaskContentNew|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\WINDOWS\Temp\'
            - 'C:\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\'
            - 'C:\Perflogs\'
    selection_commands:
        TaskContentNew|contains:
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'cmd.exe</Command>'
            - 'cmd</Command>'
            - '<Arguments>/c '
            - '<Arguments>/k '
            - '<Arguments>/r '
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'wscript'
            - 'cscript'
            - 'certutil'
            - 'bitsadmin'
            - 'bash.exe'
            - 'bash '
            - 'scrcons'
            - 'wmic '
            - 'wmic.exe'
            - 'forfiles'
            - 'scriptrunner'
            - 'hh.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Important Scheduled Task Deleted/Disabled
id: 7595ba94-cf3b-4471-aa03-4f6baa9e5fad
related:
    - id: dbc1f800-0fe0-4bc0-9c66-292c2abe3f78 # ProcCreation schtasks delete
      type: similar
    - id: 9ac94dc8-9042-493c-ba45-3b5e7c86b980 # ProcCreation schtasks disable
      type: similar
    - id: 9e3cb244-bdb8-4632-8c90-6079c8f4f16d # TaskScheduler EventLog
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by deleting or disabling their respective scheduled tasks in order to conduct data destructive activities
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4699
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4701
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-05
modified: 2023-03-13
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The Advanced Audit Policy setting Object Access > Audit Other Object Access Events has to be configured to allow this detection. We also recommend extracting the Command field from the embedded XML in the event data.'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 4699 # Task Deleted Event
            - 4701 # Task Disabled Event
        TaskName|contains:
            # Add more important tasks
            - '\Windows\SystemRestore\SR'
            - '\Windows\Windows Defender\'
            - '\Windows\BitLocker'
            - '\Windows\WindowsBackup\'
            - '\Windows\WindowsUpdate\'
            - '\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule'
            - '\Windows\ExploitGuard'
    filter_main_defender_update:
        EventID: 4699
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'  # False positives during upgrades of Defender, where its tasks get removed and added
        TaskName|contains: '\Windows\Windows Defender\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_scheduled_task_delete_or_disable/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Windows - Disable the SR scheduled task
      technique: T1490
      atomic_guid: 1c68c68d-83a4-4981-974e-8993055fa034

title: Potential Registry Persistence Attempt Via Windows Telemetry
id: 73a883d0-0348-4be4-a8d8-51031c2564f8
related:
    - id: 4e8d5fd3-c959-441f-a941-f73d0cdcdca5
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential persistence behavior using the windows telemetry registry key.
    Windows telemetry makes use of the binary CompatTelRunner.exe to run a variety of commands and perform the actual telemetry collections.
    This binary was created to be easily extensible, and to that end, it relies on the registry to instruct on which commands to run.
    The problem is, it will run any arbitrary command without restriction of location or type.
references:
    - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/abusing-windows-telemetry-for-persistence/
author: Lednyov Alexey, oscd.community, Sreeman
date: 2020-10-16
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: Sysmon config that monitors \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\TelemetryController subkey of the HKLM hives'
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\TelemetryController\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Command'
        Details|contains:
            - '.bat'
            - '.bin'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.dat'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.jar'
            - '.js'
            - '.msi'
            - '.ps'
            - '.sh'
            - '.vb'
    filter_main_generic:
        Details|contains:
            - '\system32\CompatTelRunner.exe'
            - '\system32\DeviceCensus.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Shell Execution via Rsync - Linux
id: e2326866-609f-4015-aea9-7ec634e8aa04
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of the "rsync" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/rsync/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.), Florian Roth
date: 2024-09-02
modified: 2025-01-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/rsync'
            - '/rsyncd'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -e '
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/ash '
            - '/bash '
            - '/dash '
            - '/csh '
            - '/sh '
            - '/zsh '
            - '/tcsh '
            - '/ksh '
            - "'ash "
            - "'bash "
            - "'dash "
            - "'csh "
            - "'sh "
            - "'zsh "
            - "'tcsh "
            - "'ksh "
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate cases in which "rsync" is used to execute a shell
level: high

title: Shell Execution via Git - Linux
id: 47b3bbd4-1bf7-48cc-84ab-995362aaa75a
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "git" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/git/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '/git'
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -p '
            - 'help'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'bash 0<&1'
            - 'dash 0<&1'
            - 'sh 0<&1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Invocation of Shell via Rsync
id: 297241f3-8108-4b3a-8c15-2dda9f844594
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of a shell as sub process of "rsync" without the expected command line flag "-e" being used, which could be an indication of exploitation as described in CVE-2024-12084. This behavior is commonly associated with attempts to execute arbitrary commands or escalate privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further exploitation.
references:
    - https://sysdig.com/blog/detecting-and-mitigating-cve-2024-12084-rsync-remote-code-execution/
    - https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/a20436375a1e26524931dd8ea1a3af10
author: Florian Roth
date: 2025-01-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '/rsync'
            - '/rsyncd'
        Image|endswith:
            - '/ash'
            - '/bash'
            - '/csh'
            - '/dash'
            - '/ksh'
            - '/sh'
            - '/tcsh'
            - '/zsh'
    filter_main_expected:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -e '
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Capsh Shell Invocation - Linux
id: db1ac3be-f606-4e3a-89e0-9607cbe6b98a
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "capsh" utility to invoke a shell.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/capsh/#shell
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/capsh'
        CommandLine|endswith: ' --'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Inline Python Execution - Spawn Shell Via OS System Library
id: 2d2f44ff-4611-4778-a8fc-323a0e9850cc
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of inline Python code via the "-c" in order to call the "system" function from the "os" library, and spawn a shell.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/python/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '/python'
              - '/python2'
              - '/python3'
        - Image|contains:
              - '/python2.'  # python image is always of the form ../python3.10; ../python is just a symlink
              - '/python3.'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -c '
            - 'os.system('
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Netcat Reverse Shell Execution
id: 7f734ed0-4f47-46c0-837f-6ee62505abd9
status: test
description: Detects execution of netcat with the "-e" flag followed by common shells. This could be a sign of a potential reverse shell setup.
references:
    - https://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet
    - https://www.revshells.com/
    - https://www.hackingtutorials.org/networking/hacking-netcat-part-2-bind-reverse-shells/
    - https://www.infosecademy.com/netcat-reverse-shells/
    - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/ncat.1.html
author: '@d4ns4n_, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)'
date: 2023-04-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_nc:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/nc'
            - '/ncat'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -c '
            - ' -e '
    selection_shell:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' ash'
            - ' bash'
            - ' bsh'
            - ' csh'
            - ' ksh'
            - ' pdksh'
            - ' sh'
            - ' tcsh'
            - '/bin/ash'
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/bsh'
            - '/bin/csh'
            - '/bin/ksh'
            - '/bin/pdksh'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/tcsh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
            - '$IFSash'
            - '$IFSbash'
            - '$IFSbsh'
            - '$IFScsh'
            - '$IFSksh'
            - '$IFSpdksh'
            - '$IFSsh'
            - '$IFStcsh'
            - '$IFSzsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high