title: Renamed Whoami Execution
id: f1086bf7-a0c4-4a37-9102-01e573caf4a0
status: test
description: Detects the execution of whoami that has been renamed to a different name to avoid detection
references:
    - https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1247926/agent-tesla-keylogger-delivered-inside-a-power-iso-daa-archive/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/7eaba74e-c1ea-400f-9c17-5e30eee89906/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-12
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
    - car.2016-03-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        OriginalFileName: 'whoami.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\whoami.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: HackTool - Sliver C2 Implant Activity Pattern
id: 42333b2c-b425-441c-b70e-99404a17170f
status: test
description: Detects process activity patterns as seen being used by Sliver C2 framework implants
references:
    - https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/79f2d48fcdfc2bee4713b78d431ea4b27f733f30/implant/sliver/shell/shell_windows.go#L36
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/looking-for-the-sliver-lining-hunting-for-emerging-command-and-control-frameworks/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-25
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: '-NoExit -Command [Console]::OutputEncoding=[Text.UTF8Encoding]::UTF8'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: Bad Opsec Powershell Code Artifacts
id: 8d31a8ce-46b5-4dd6-bdc3-680931f1db86
related:
    - id: 73e733cc-1ace-3212-a107-ff2523cc9fc3
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    focuses on trivial artifacts observed in variants of prevalent offensive ps1 payloads, including
    Cobalt Strike Beacon, PoshC2, Powerview, Letmein, Empire, Powersploit, and other attack payloads
    that often undergo minimal changes by attackers due to bad opsec.
references:
    - https://newtonpaul.com/analysing-fileless-malware-cobalt-strike-beacon/
    - https://labs.sentinelone.com/top-tier-russian-organized-cybercrime-group-unveils-fileless-stealthy-powertrick-backdoor-for-high-value-targets/
    - https://www.mdeditor.tw/pl/pgRt
author: 'ok @securonix invrep_de, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_4103:
        Payload|contains:
            - '$DoIt'
            - 'harmj0y'
            - 'mattifestation'
            - '_RastaMouse'
            - 'tifkin_'
            - '0xdeadbeef'
    condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
    - 'Moderate-to-low; Despite the shorter length/lower entropy for some of these, because of high specificity, fp appears to be fairly limited in many environments.'
level: critical

title: Silence.EDA Detection
id: 3ceb2083-a27f-449a-be33-14ec1b7cc973
status: test
description: Detects Silence EmpireDNSAgent as described in the Group-IP report
references:
    - https://www.group-ib.com/resources/threat-research/silence_2.0.going_global.pdf
author: Alina Stepchenkova, Group-IB, oscd.community
date: 2019-11-01
modified: 2023-04-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1529
    - attack.g0091
    - attack.s0363
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    empire:
        # better to randomise the order
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'System.Diagnostics.Process'
            - 'Stop-Computer'
            - 'Restart-Computer'
            - 'Exception in execution'
            - '$cmdargs'
            - 'Close-Dnscat2Tunnel'
    dnscat:
        # better to randomise the order
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'set type=$LookupType`nserver'
            - '$Command | nslookup 2>&1 | Out-String'
            - 'New-RandomDNSField'
            - '[Convert]::ToString($SYNOptions, 16)'
            - '$Session.Dead = $True'
            - '$Session["Driver"] -eq'
    condition: empire and dnscat
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: HackTool - BabyShark Agent Default URL Pattern
id: 304810ed-8853-437f-9e36-c4975c3dfd7e
status: test
description: Detects Baby Shark C2 Framework default communication patterns
references:
    - https://nasbench.medium.com/understanding-detecting-c2-frameworks-babyshark-641be4595845
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-09
modified: 2024-02-15
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri|contains: 'momyshark\?key='
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: PwnDrp Access
id: 2b1ee7e4-89b6-4739-b7bb-b811b6607e5e
status: test
description: Detects downloads from PwnDrp web servers developed for red team testing and most likely also used for criminal activity
references:
    - https://breakdev.org/pwndrop/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-04-15
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1102.001
    - attack.t1102.003
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri|contains: '/pwndrop/'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: Win Susp Computer Name Containing Samtheadmin
id: 39698b3f-da92-4bc6-bfb5-645a98386e45
status: test
description: Detects suspicious computer name samtheadmin-{1..100}$ generated by hacktool
references:
    - https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1511760068743766026
    - https://github.com/helloexp/0day/blob/614227a7b9beb0e91e7e2c6a5e532e6f7a8e883c/00-CVE_EXP/CVE-2021-42287/sam-the-admin/sam_the_admin.py
author: elhoim
date: 2022-09-09
modified: 2023-01-04
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - cve.2021-42278
    - cve.2021-42287
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    service: security
    product: windows
detection:
    # Not adding an EventID on purpose to try to match on any event in security (including use of account), not just 4741 (computer account created)
    selection1:
        SamAccountName|startswith: 'SAMTHEADMIN-'
        SamAccountName|endswith: '$'
    selection2:
        TargetUserName|startswith: 'SAMTHEADMIN-'
        TargetUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: HackTool - F-Secure C3 Load by Rundll32
id: b18c9d4c-fac9-4708-bd06-dd5bfacf200f
status: test
description: F-Secure C3 produces DLLs with a default exported StartNodeRelay function.
references:
    - https://github.com/FSecureLABS/C3/blob/11a081fd3be2aaf2a879f6b6e9a96ecdd24966ef/Src/NodeRelayDll/NodeRelayDll.cpp#L12
author: Alfie Champion (ajpc500)
date: 2021-06-02
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32.exe'
            - '.dll'
            - 'StartNodeRelay'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: Moriya Rootkit - System
id: 25b9c01c-350d-4b95-bed1-836d04a4f324
status: test
description: Detects the use of Moriya rootkit as described in the securelist's Operation TunnelSnake report
references:
    - https://securelist.com/operation-tunnelsnake-and-moriya-rootkit/101831
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-05-06
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ServiceName: ZzNetSvc
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: CobaltStrike Service Installations - System
id: 5a105d34-05fc-401e-8553-272b45c1522d
status: test
description: Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement
references:
    - https://www.sans.org/webcasts/119395
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/getting-the-bacon-from-cobalt-strike-beacon/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Wojciech Lesicki
date: 2021-05-26
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_id:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
    selection1:
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'ADMIN$'
            - '.exe'
    selection2:
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - '%COMSPEC%'
            - 'start'
            - 'powershell'
    selection3:
        ImagePath|contains: 'powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand'
    selection4:
        ImagePath|base64offset|contains: "IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:"
    condition: selection_id and (selection1 or selection2 or selection3 or selection4)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: HackTool - SecurityXploded Execution
id: 7679d464-4f74-45e2-9e01-ac66c5eb041a
status: stable
description: Detects the execution of SecurityXploded Tools
references:
    - https://securityxploded.com/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200601000524/https://cyberx-labs.com/blog/gangnam-industrial-style-apt-campaign-targets-korean-industrial-companies/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-12-19
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1555
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Company: SecurityXploded
        - Image|endswith: 'PasswordDump.exe'
        - OriginalFileName|endswith: 'PasswordDump.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: OpenCanary - SNMP OID Request
id: e9856028-fd4e-46e6-b3d1-10f7ceb95078
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SNMP service on an OpenCanary node has had an OID request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1016
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 13001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PUA - AdFind Suspicious Execution
id: 9a132afa-654e-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
related:
    - id: 455b9d50-15a1-4b99-853f-8d37655a4c1b
      type: similar
    - id: 75df3b17-8bcc-4565-b89b-c9898acef911
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects AdFind execution with common flags seen used during attacks
references:
    - https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx
    - https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/blob/bf62ece1c679b07b5fb49c4bae947fe24c81811f/fin6/Emulation_Plan/Phase1.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.md#atomic-test-7---adfind---enumerate-active-directory-user-objects
author: Janantha Marasinghe (https://github.com/blueteam0ps), FPT.EagleEye Team, omkar72, oscd.community
date: 2021-02-02
modified: 2025-10-24
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1069.002
    - stp.1u
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'domainlist'
            - 'trustdmp'
            - 'dcmodes'
            - 'adinfo'
            - '-sc dclist'
            - 'computer_pwdnotreqd'
            - 'objectcategory='
            - '-subnets -f'
            - 'name="Domain Admins"'
            - '-sc u:'
            - 'domainncs'
            - 'dompol'
            - ' oudmp '
            - 'subnetdmp'
            - 'gpodmp'
            - 'fspdmp'
            - 'users_noexpire'
            - 'computers_active'
            - 'computers_pwdnotreqd'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin activity
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_adfind_susp_usage/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Computer Objects
      technique: T1018
      atomic_guid: a889f5be-2d54-4050-bd05-884578748bb4
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Domain Controller Objects
      technique: T1018
      atomic_guid: 5838c31e-a0e2-4b9f-b60a-d79d2cb7995e

title: Renamed AdFind Execution
id: df55196f-f105-44d3-a675-e9dfb6cc2f2b
status: test
description: Detects the use of a renamed Adfind.exe. AdFind continues to be seen across majority of breaches. It is used to domain trust discovery to plan out subsequent steps in the attack chain.
references:
    - https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx
    - https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/blob/bf62ece1c679b07b5fb49c4bae947fe24c81811f/fin6/Emulation_Plan/Phase1.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-21
modified: 2025-02-26
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1069.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'domainlist'
            - 'trustdmp'
            - 'dcmodes'
            - 'adinfo'
            - ' dclist '
            - 'computer_pwdnotreqd'
            - 'objectcategory='
            - '-subnets -f'
            - 'name="Domain Admins"'
            - '-sc u:'
            - 'domainncs'
            - 'dompol'
            - ' oudmp '
            - 'subnetdmp'
            - 'gpodmp'
            - 'fspdmp'
            - 'users_noexpire'
            - 'computers_active'
            - 'computers_pwdnotreqd'
    selection_2:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'IMPHASH=BCA5675746D13A1F246E2DA3C2217492'
            - 'IMPHASH=53E117A96057EAF19C41380D0E87F1C2'
            - 'IMPHASH=d144de8117df2beceaba2201ad304764'
            - 'IMPHASH=12ce1c0f3f5837ecc18a3782408fa975'
            - 'IMPHASH=4fbf3f084fbbb2470b80b2013134df35'
            - 'IMPHASH=49b639b4acbecc49d72a01f357aa4930'
            - 'IMPHASH=680dad9e300346e05a85023965867201'
            - 'IMPHASH=21aa085d54992511b9f115355e468782'
    selection_3:
        OriginalFileName: 'AdFind.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\AdFind.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_adfind/info.yml

title: Webshell Detection With Command Line Keywords
id: bed2a484-9348-4143-8a8a-b801c979301c
status: test
description: Detects certain command line parameters often used during reconnaissance activity via web shells
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-ii.html
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/bumblebee-webshell-xhunt-campaign/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/threat-advisory-oh-no-cleo-cleo-software-actively-being-exploited-in-the-wild
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Chad Hudson, Matt Anderson
date: 2017-01-01
modified: 2024-12-14
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1033
    - attack.t1087
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_webserver_image:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\w3wp.exe'
            - '\php-cgi.exe'
            - '\nginx.exe'
            - '\httpd.exe'
            - '\caddy.exe'
            - '\ws_tomcatservice.exe'
    selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat1:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\java.exe'
            - '\javaw.exe'
        ParentImage|contains:
            - '-tomcat-'
            - '\tomcat'
    selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat2:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\java.exe'
            - '\javaw.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'catalina.jar'
            - 'CATALINA_HOME'
    selection_susp_net_utility:
        OriginalFileName:
            - 'net.exe'
            - 'net1.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' user '
            - ' use '
            - ' group '
    selection_susp_ping_utility:
        OriginalFileName: 'ping.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -n '
    selection_susp_change_dir:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '&cd&echo'  # china chopper web shell
            - 'cd /d '  # https://www.computerhope.com/cdhlp.htm
    selection_susp_wmic_utility:
        OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' /node:'
    selection_susp_powershell_cli:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -enc '
            - ' -EncodedCommand '
            - ' -w hidden '
            - ' -windowstyle hidden'
            - '.WebClient).Download'
    selection_susp_misc_discovery_binaries:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\dsquery.exe'
              - '\find.exe'
              - '\findstr.exe'
              - '\ipconfig.exe'
              - '\netstat.exe'
              - '\nslookup.exe'
              - '\pathping.exe'
              - '\quser.exe'
              - '\schtasks.exe'
              - '\systeminfo.exe'
              - '\tasklist.exe'
              - '\tracert.exe'
              - '\ver.exe'
              - '\wevtutil.exe'
              - '\whoami.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'dsquery.exe'
              - 'find.exe'
              - 'findstr.exe'
              - 'ipconfig.exe'
              - 'netstat.exe'
              - 'nslookup.exe'
              - 'pathping.exe'
              - 'quser.exe'
              - 'schtasks.exe'
              - 'sysinfo.exe'
              - 'tasklist.exe'
              - 'tracert.exe'
              - 'ver.exe'
              - 'VSSADMIN.EXE'
              - 'wevtutil.exe'
              - 'whoami.exe'
    selection_susp_misc_discovery_commands:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' Test-NetConnection '
            - 'dir \'  # remote dir: dir \<redacted IP #3>\C$:\windows\temp\*.exe
    condition: 1 of selection_webserver_* and 1 of selection_susp_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Chopper Webshell Process Pattern
id: fa3c117a-bc0d-416e-a31b-0c0e80653efb
status: test
description: Detects patterns found in process executions cause by China Chopper like tiny (ASPX) webshells
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/30/analyzing-attacks-using-the-exchange-vulnerabilities-cve-2022-41040-and-cve-2022-41082/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), MSTI (query)
date: 2022-10-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1033
    - attack.t1087
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_origin:
        - Image|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
        - ParentImage|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
    selection_cmdline:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '&ipconfig&echo'
            - '&quser&echo'
            - '&whoami&echo'
            - '&c:&echo'
            - '&cd&echo'
            - '&dir&echo'
            - '&echo [E]'
            - '&echo [S]'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Webshell Hacking Activity Patterns
id: 4ebc877f-4612-45cb-b3a5-8e3834db36c9
status: test
description: |
    Detects certain parent child patterns found in cases in which a web shell is used to perform certain credential dumping or exfiltration activities on a compromised system
references:
    - https://youtu.be/7aemGhaE9ds?t=641
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-17
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1033
    - attack.t1087
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
   # Webserver
    selection_webserver_image:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\caddy.exe'
            - '\httpd.exe'
            - '\nginx.exe'
            - '\php-cgi.exe'
            - '\w3wp.exe'
            - '\ws_tomcatservice.exe'
    selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat1:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\java.exe'
            - '\javaw.exe'
        ParentImage|contains:
            - '-tomcat-'
            - '\tomcat'
    selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat2:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\java.exe'
            - '\javaw.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'catalina.jar'
            - 'CATALINA_HOME'
    # Suspicious child processes
    selection_child_1:
        # Process dumping
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'comsvcs'
    selection_child_2:
        # Winrar exfil
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -hp'
            - ' a '
            - ' -m'
    selection_child_3:
        # User add
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'net'
            - ' user '
            - ' /add'
    selection_child_4:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'net'
            - ' localgroup '
            - ' administrators '
            - '/add'
    selection_child_5:
        Image|endswith:
            # Credential stealing
            - '\ntdsutil.exe'
            # AD recon
            - '\ldifde.exe'
            - '\adfind.exe'
            # Process dumping
            - '\procdump.exe'
            - '\Nanodump.exe'
            # Destruction / ransom groups
            - '\vssadmin.exe'
            - '\fsutil.exe'
    selection_child_6:
        # SUspicious patterns
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -decode '  # Used with certutil
            - ' -NoP '  # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
            - ' -W Hidden '  # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
            - ' /decode '  # Used with certutil
            - ' /ticket:'  # Rubeus
            - ' sekurlsa'  # Mimikatz
            - '.dmp full'  # Process dumping method apart from procdump
            - '.downloadfile('  # PowerShell download command
            - '.downloadstring('  # PowerShell download command
            - 'FromBase64String' # PowerShell encoded payload
            - 'process call create' # WMIC process creation
            - 'reg save '  # save registry SAM - syskey extraction
            - 'whoami /priv'
    condition: 1 of selection_webserver_* and 1 of selection_child_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: HackTool - NetExec Execution
id: 7638e5fe-600c-4289-a968-f49dd537ec7d
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects execution of the hacktool NetExec.
    NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation tool designed for Active Directory penetration testing and network enumeration
    In enterprise environments, the use of NetExec is considered suspicious or potentially malicious because it enables attackers to enumerate hosts, exploit network services, and move laterally across systems.
    Threat actors and red teams commonly use NetExec to identify vulnerable systems, harvest credentials, and execute commands remotely.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/12/17/cats-got-your-files-lynx-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec
    - https://www.netexec.wiki/
author: Chirag Damani
date: 2026-03-29
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\nxc.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' ftp '
            - ' ldap '
            - ' mssql '
            - ' nfs '
            - ' rdp '
            - ' smb '
            - ' ssh '
            - ' vnc '
            - ' winrm '
            - ' wmi '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of NetExec by security professionals or system administrators for network assessment and management.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_netexec/info.yml

title: Suspicious Filename with Embedded Base64 Commands
id: 179b3686-6271-4d87-807d-17d843a8af73
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects files with specially crafted filenames that embed Base64-encoded bash payloads designed to execute when processed by shell scripts.
    These filenames exploit shell interpretation quirks to trigger hidden commands, a technique observed in VShell malware campaigns.
references:
    - https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/the-silent-fileless-threat-of-vshell/
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2025-11-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.004
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '{echo'
            - '{base64,-d}'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate files with similar naming patterns (very unlikely).
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - PowerShell Module
id: 88a22f69-62f9-4b8a-aa00-6b0212f2f05a
related:
    - id: a5a30a6e-75ca-4233-8b8c-42e0f2037d3b
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-08
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_4103:
        Payload|contains|all:
            - '&&'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - 'shellexec_rundll'
        Payload|contains:
            - 'value'
            - 'invoke'
            - 'comspec'
            - 'iex'
    condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - PowerShell Module
id: a136cde0-61ad-4a61-9b82-8dc490e60dd2
related:
    - id: 73e67340-0d25-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2024-04-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_4103:
        Payload|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r).+clip(?:\.exe)?.{0,4}&&.+clipboard]::\(\s\\"\{\d\}.+-f.+"'
    condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - PowerShell Module
id: 07ad2ea8-6a55-4ac6-bf3e-91b8e59676eb
related:
    - id: e55a5195-4724-480e-a77e-3ebe64bd3759
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task31)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-08
modified: 2023-01-04
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection:
        Payload|contains|all:
            - 'set'
            - '&&'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'vbscript:createobject'
            - '.run'
            - '(window.close)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - PowerShell Module
id: f3c89218-8c3d-4ba9-9974-f1d8e6a1b4a6
related:
    - id: e54f5149-6ba3-49cf-b153-070d24679126
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task27)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2024-04-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_4103:
        Payload|re: '(?i)&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\"\s+?-f.*&&.*cmd.*/c' # FPs with |\/r
    condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - PowerShell Module
id: 2f211361-7dce-442d-b78a-c04039677378
related:
    - id: 1b9dc62e-6e9e-42a3-8990-94d7a10007f7
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block cited in the reference section below
references:
    - https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888
author: Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community
date: 2019-11-08
modified: 2022-12-31
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_payload:
        - Payload|re: '\$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\['
        - Payload|re: '\$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\['
        - Payload|re: '\$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\['
        - Payload|re: '\$env:ComSpec\[(\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}'
        - Payload|re: '\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name'
        - Payload|re: '\$VerbosePreference\.ToString\('
        - Payload|re: '\[String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference'
    condition: selection_payload
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - PowerShell Module
id: 9ac8b09b-45de-4a07-9da1-0de8c09304a3
related:
    - id: 779c8c12-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 25)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2024-04-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_4103:
        Payload|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r).+powershell.+(?:\$\{?input\}?|noexit).+"'
    condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - PowerShell Module
id: 6bfb8fa7-b2e7-4f6c-8d9d-824e5d06ea9e
related:
    - id: 0adfbc14-0ed1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 24)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2024-04-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_4103:
        Payload|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r)(?:\s|)"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\"\s+?-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*"'
    condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - PowerShell Module
id: c72aca44-8d52-45ad-8f81-f96c4d3c755e
related:
    - id: 86b896ba-ffa1-4fea-83e3-ee28a4c915c7
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task28)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2024-04-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_4103:
        Payload|re: '(?i)(set).*&&\s?set.*(environment|invoke|\$?\{?input).*&&.*"'
    condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - PowerShell Module
id: ebdf49d8-b89c-46c9-8fdf-2c308406f6bd
related:
    - id: db92dd33-a3ad-49cf-8c2c-608c3e30ace0
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task29)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2024-04-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_4103:
        Payload|re: '(?i)echo.*clip.*&&.*(Clipboard|i`?n`?v`?o`?k`?e`?)'
    condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - PowerShell
id: 1b9dc62e-6e9e-42a3-8990-94d7a10007f7
status: test
description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the following code block \u2014
references:
    - https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888
author: 'Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community'
date: 2019-11-08
modified: 2022-12-31
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_iex:
        - ScriptBlockText|re: '\$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\['
        - ScriptBlockText|re: '\$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\['
        - ScriptBlockText|re: '\$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\['
        - ScriptBlockText|re: '\$env:ComSpec\[(\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}'
        - ScriptBlockText|re: '\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name'
        - ScriptBlockText|re: '\$VerbosePreference\.ToString\('
    condition: selection_iex
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - Powershell
id: 86b896ba-ffa1-4fea-83e3-ee28a4c915c7
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task28)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2024-04-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_4104:
        ScriptBlockText|re: '(?i)(set).*&&\s?set.*(environment|invoke|\$\{?input).*&&.*"'
    condition: selection_4104
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - PowerShell
id: a5a30a6e-75ca-4233-8b8c-42e0f2037d3b
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-08
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_4104:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - '&&'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - 'shellexec_rundll'
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'value'
            - 'invoke'
            - 'comspec'
            - 'iex'
    condition: selection_4104
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - PowerShell
id: 0adfbc14-0ed1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 24)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2024-04-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_4104:
        ScriptBlockText|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r)(?:\s|)"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\"\s+?-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*"'
    condition: selection_4104
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - PowerShell
id: 73e67340-0d25-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2024-04-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_4104:
        ScriptBlockText|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r).+clip(?:\.exe)?.{0,4}&&.+clipboard]::\(\s\\"\{\d\}.+-f.+"'
    condition: selection_4104
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - Powershell
id: db92dd33-a3ad-49cf-8c2c-608c3e30ace0
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task29)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2024-04-15
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_4104:
        ScriptBlockText|re: '(?i)echo.*clip.*&&.*(Clipboard|i`?n`?v`?o`?k`?e`?)'
    condition: selection_4104
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - PowerShell
id: e54f5149-6ba3-49cf-b153-070d24679126
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task27)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2024-04-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_4104:
        ScriptBlockText|re: '(?i)&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\"\s+?-f.*&&.*cmd.*/c' # FPs with |\/r
    condition: selection_4104
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - PowerShell
id: e55a5195-4724-480e-a77e-3ebe64bd3759
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task31)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-08
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_4104:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'set'
            - '&&'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'vbscript:createobject'
            - '.run'
            - '(window.close)'
    condition: selection_4104
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - Powershell
id: 779c8c12-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 25)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2024-04-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_4104:
        ScriptBlockText|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r).+powershell.+(?:\$?\{?input\}?|noexit).+"'
    condition: selection_4104
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Winnti Dropper Activity
id: 130c9e58-28ac-4f83-8574-0a4cc913b97e
status: test
description: Detects files dropped by Winnti as described in RedMimicry Winnti playbook
references:
    - https://redmimicry.com/posts/redmimicry-winnti/#dropper
author: Alexander Rausch
date: 2020-06-24
modified: 2023-01-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\gthread-3.6.dll'
            - '\sigcmm-2.4.dll'
            - '\Windows\Temp\tmp.bat'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Get-Variable.exe Creation
id: 0c3fac91-5627-46e8-a6a8-a0d7b9b8ae1b
status: test
description: |
    Get-Variable is a valid PowerShell cmdlet
    WindowsApps is by default in the path where PowerShell is executed.
    So when the Get-Variable command is issued on PowerShell execution, the system first looks for the Get-Variable executable in the path and executes the malicious binary instead of looking for the PowerShell cmdlet.
references:
    - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/04/colibri-loader-combines-task-scheduler-and-powershell-in-clever-persistence-technique/
    - https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/465533/0/html
author: frack113
date: 2022-04-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1546
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: 'Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Get-Variable.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
id: e32d4572-9826-4738-b651-95fa63747e8a
status: test
description: Detects usage of the "FromBase64String" function in the commandline which is used to decode a base64 encoded string
references:
    - https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/6af876ee72b51676c82a2db8d2cd3639
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-01-29
modified: 2023-01-26
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1140
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: '::FromBase64String('
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrative script libraries
level: high

title: Ping Hex IP
id: 1a0d4aba-7668-4365-9ce4-6d79ab088dfd
status: test
description: Detects a ping command that uses a hex encoded IP address
references:
    - https://github.com/vysecurity/Aggressor-VYSEC/blob/0d61c80387b9432dab64b8b8a9fb52d20cfef80e/ping.cna
    - https://twitter.com/vysecurity/status/977198418354491392
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-03-23
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1140
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\ping.exe'
        CommandLine|re: '0x[a-fA-F0-9]{8}'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, because no sane admin pings IP addresses in a hexadecimal form
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher
id: 27aec9c9-dbb0-4939-8422-1742242471d0
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 24)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2024-04-15
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Example 1: C:\winDoWs\SySTeM32\cmd.Exe /C"SET NOtI=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& PowERshElL -NOl SET-iteM ( 'VAR' + 'i'+ 'A' + 'blE:Ao6' + 'I0') ( [TYpe](\"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-F 'iRoN','mENT','e','nv') ) ; ${exECUtIONCOnTEXT}.\"IN`VO`KecOmMaND\".\"inVo`KES`crIPt\"( ( ( GEt-VAriAble ( 'a' + 'o6I0') -vaLU )::(\"{1}{4}{2}{3}{0}\" -f'e','gETenvIR','NtvaRIa','BL','ONme' ).Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'n','oti' ),( \"{0}{1}\" -f'pRoC','esS') )) )"
        # Example 2: cMD.exe /C "seT SlDb=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& pOWErShell .(( ^&(\"{1}{0}{2}{3}\" -f 'eT-vaR','G','iab','lE' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f '*m','DR*' ) ).\"na`ME\"[3,11,2]-JOIN'' ) ( ( ^&(\"{0}{1}\" -f'g','CI' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f 'ENV',':SlDb' ) ).\"VA`luE\" ) "
        CommandLine|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r)(?:\s|)\"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*\"'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell Base64 Encoded Reflective Assembly Load
id: 62b7ccc9-23b4-471e-aa15-6da3663c4d59
related:
    - id: 9c0295ce-d60d-40bd-bd74-84673b7592b1
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects base64 encoded .NET reflective loading of Assembly
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine/blob/20a569fa21625086433dcce8bb2765d0ea08dcb6/yara/mal_revil.yar
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), pH-T (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-01
modified: 2023-01-30
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.t1620
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # [Reflection.Assembly]::Load(
            - 'WwBSAGUAZgBsAGUAYwB0AGkAbwBuAC4AQQBzAHMAZQBtAGIAbAB5AF0AOgA6AEwAbwBhAGQAKA'
            - 'sAUgBlAGYAbABlAGMAdABpAG8AbgAuAEEAcwBzAGUAbQBiAGwAeQBdADoAOgBMAG8AYQBkACgA'
            - 'bAFIAZQBmAGwAZQBjAHQAaQBvAG4ALgBBAHMAcwBlAG0AYgBsAHkAXQA6ADoATABvAGEAZAAoA'
            # [reflection.assembly]::("Load")
            - 'AFsAcgBlAGYAbABlAGMAdABpAG8AbgAuAGEAcwBzAGUAbQBiAGwAeQBdADoAOgAoACIATABvAGEAZAAiAC'
            - 'BbAHIAZQBmAGwAZQBjAHQAaQBvAG4ALgBhAHMAcwBlAG0AYgBsAHkAXQA6ADoAKAAiAEwAbwBhAGQAIgAp'
            - 'AWwByAGUAZgBsAGUAYwB0AGkAbwBuAC4AYQBzAHMAZQBtAGIAbAB5AF0AOgA6ACgAIgBMAG8AYQBkACIAK'
            # [Reflection.Assembly]::("Load")
            - 'WwBSAGUAZgBsAGUAYwB0AGkAbwBuAC4AQQBzAHMAZQBtAGIAbAB5AF0AOgA6ACgAIgBMAG8AYQBkACIAKQ'
            - 'sAUgBlAGYAbABlAGMAdABpAG8AbgAuAEEAcwBzAGUAbQBiAGwAeQBdADoAOgAoACIATABvAGEAZAAiACkA'
            - 'bAFIAZQBmAGwAZQBjAHQAaQBvAG4ALgBBAHMAcwBlAG0AYgBsAHkAXQA6ADoAKAAiAEwAbwBhAGQAIgApA'
            # [reflection.assembly]::Load(
            - 'WwByAGUAZgBsAGUAYwB0AGkAbwBuAC4AYQBzAHMAZQBtAGIAbAB5AF0AOgA6AEwAbwBhAGQAKA'
            - 'sAcgBlAGYAbABlAGMAdABpAG8AbgAuAGEAcwBzAGUAbQBiAGwAeQBdADoAOgBMAG8AYQBkACgA'
            - 'bAHIAZQBmAGwAZQBjAHQAaQBvAG4ALgBhAHMAcwBlAG0AYgBsAHkAXQA6ADoATABvAGEAZAAoA'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious File Encoded To Base64 Via Certutil.EXE
id: ea0cdc3e-2239-4f26-a947-4e8f8224e464
related:
    - id: e62a9f0c-ca1e-46b2-85d5-a6da77f86d1a
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the execution of certutil with the "encode" flag to encode a file to base64 where the extensions of the file is suspicious
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/35c22725a92d5cb1016b09421c0a6cdbfd860fd4778b3313669b057d4a131cb7/behavior
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/427616528b7dbc4a6057ac89eb174a3a90f7abcf3f34e5a359b7a910d82f7a72/behavior
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/34de4c8beded481a4084a1fd77855c3e977e8ac643e5c5842d0f15f7f9b9086f/behavior
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4abe1395a09fda06d897a9c4eb247278c1b6cddda5d126ce5b3f4f499e3b8fa2/behavior
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-15
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-encode'
    selection_extension:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.acl'
            - '.bat'
            - '.doc'
            - '.gif'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.mp3'
            - '.pdf'
            - '.png'
            - '.ppt'
            - '.tmp'
            - '.xls'
            - '.xml'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_encode_susp_extensions/info.yml

title: File Decoded From Base64/Hex Via Certutil.EXE
id: cc9cbe82-7bc0-4ef5-bc23-bbfb83947be7
status: test
description: Detects the execution of certutil with either the "decode" or "decodehex" flags to decode base64 or hex encoded files. This can be abused by attackers to decode an encoded payload before execution
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-babyshark-malware-targets-u-s-national-security-think-tanks/
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/04/13/compromised-exchange-server-hosting-cryptojacker-targeting-other-exchange-servers/
    - https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/835149808817991680
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/pki/basic-crl-checking-with-certutil
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certutil/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2023-02-15
modified: 2025-06-04
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - '-decode ' # Decode Base64
            - '-decodehex ' # Decode Hex
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_decode/info.yml

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation
id: 4bf943c6-5146-4273-98dd-e958fd1e3abf
status: test
description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the following code block
references:
    - https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888
author: 'Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community'
date: 2019-11-08
modified: 2026-03-16
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - CommandLine|re: '\$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\['
        - CommandLine|re: '\$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\['
        - CommandLine|re: '\$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\['
        - CommandLine|re: '\$env:ComSpec\[(?:\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}'
        - CommandLine|re: '\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name'
        - CommandLine|re: '\$VerbosePreference\.ToString\('
        - CommandLine|re: '\[String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip
id: e1561947-b4e3-4a74-9bdd-83baed21bdb5
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task29)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2026-03-16
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Example 1: C:\WINdoWS\sySteM32\CMd /c " ECho\Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString|Clip.Exe&&C:\WINdoWS\sySteM32\CMd /c pOWerSheLl -STa . ( \"{2}{0}{1}\"-f'dd-',(\"{0}{1}\" -f 'T','ype' ),'A' ) -Assembly ( \"{4}{1}{3}{0}{2}\"-f (\"{0}{1}\" -f 'nd','ow'),( \"{1}{0}\"-f'.W','stem' ),( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f 'rms','Fo','s.'),'i','Sy') ; ${exeCUtIOnCONTeXT}.\"INV`oKECOM`m`ANd\".\"INV`ok`ESCriPT\"( ( [sYSteM.wiNDoWS.forMs.ClIPboaRD]::( \"{2}{0}{1}\" -f'Ex','t',(\"{0}{1}\" -f'Get','t' ) ).\"iNvo`Ke\"( )) ) ; [System.Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::(\"{1}{0}\" -f 'ar','Cle' ).\"in`V`oKE\"( )"
        # Example 2: C:\WINDowS\sYsTEM32\CmD.eXE /C" echo\Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString| C:\WIndOWs\SYSteM32\CLip &&C:\WINDowS\sYsTEM32\CmD.eXE /C POWERSHeLL -sT -noL [Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::( \"{0}{3}{4}{1}{2}\" -f( \"{0}{1}\"-f'Lo','adW' ),( \"{0}{1}\"-f 'Par','t'),( \"{0}{1}{2}\"-f 'ial','N','ame'),'it','h' ).\"in`VO`KE\"( ( \"{3}{1}{4}{5}{2}{0}\"-f'rms','ystem.Windo','Fo','S','w','s.' )) ; ( [wIndows.fOrms.cLIPBOArD]::( \"{1}{0}\"-f'T',( \"{1}{0}\" -f'tEX','gET' )).\"i`Nvoke\"( ) ) ^^^| ^^^& ( ( ^^^& ( \"{2}{1}{0}\"-f 'e',( \"{2}{1}{0}\"-f'IABl','aR','v' ),( \"{0}{1}\"-f'Get','-' ) ) ( \"{1}{0}\"-f'*','*MDr' )).\"n`Ame\"[3,11,2]-jOin'') ; [Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::( \"{0}{1}\" -f (\"{1}{0}\"-f'tT','Se' ),'ext').\"in`VoKe\"(' ' )"
        CommandLine|re: '(?i)echo.*clip.*&&.*(?:Clipboard|i`?n`?v`?o`?k`?e`?)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Encoded And Obfuscated Reflection Assembly Load Function Call
id: 9c0295ce-d60d-40bd-bd74-84673b7592b1
related:
    - id: 62b7ccc9-23b4-471e-aa15-6da3663c4d59
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious base64 encoded and obfuscated "LOAD" keyword used in .NET "reflection.assembly"
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine/blob/20a569fa21625086433dcce8bb2765d0ea08dcb6/yara/mal_revil.yar
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.appdomain.load?view=net-7.0
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-01
modified: 2023-04-06
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # ::("L"+"oad")
            - 'OgA6ACgAIgBMACIAKwAiAG8AYQBkACIAKQ'
            - 'oAOgAoACIATAAiACsAIgBvAGEAZAAiACkA'
            - '6ADoAKAAiAEwAIgArACIAbwBhAGQAIgApA'
            # ::("Lo"+"ad")
            - 'OgA6ACgAIgBMAG8AIgArACIAYQBkACIAKQ'
            - 'oAOgAoACIATABvACIAKwAiAGEAZAAiACkA'
            - '6ADoAKAAiAEwAbwAiACsAIgBhAGQAIgApA'
            # ::("Loa"+"d")
            - 'OgA6ACgAIgBMAG8AYQAiACsAIgBkACIAKQ'
            - 'oAOgAoACIATABvAGEAIgArACIAZAAiACkA'
            - '6ADoAKAAiAEwAbwBhACIAKwAiAGQAIgApA'
            # ::('L'+'oad')
            - 'OgA6ACgAJwBMACcAKwAnAG8AYQBkACcAKQ'
            - 'oAOgAoACcATAAnACsAJwBvAGEAZAAnACkA'
            - '6ADoAKAAnAEwAJwArACcAbwBhAGQAJwApA'
            # ::('Lo'+'ad')
            - 'OgA6ACgAJwBMAG8AJwArACcAYQBkACcAKQ'
            - 'oAOgAoACcATABvACcAKwAnAGEAZAAnACkA'
            - '6ADoAKAAnAEwAbwAnACsAJwBhAGQAJwApA'
            # ::('Loa'+'d')
            - 'OgA6ACgAJwBMAG8AYQAnACsAJwBkACcAKQ'
            - 'oAOgAoACcATABvAGEAJwArACcAZAAnACkA'
            - '6ADoAKAAnAEwAbwBhACcAKwAnAGQAJwApA'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA
id: ac20ae82-8758-4f38-958e-b44a3140ca88
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009   # (Task31)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-08
modified: 2022-03-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'set'
            - '&&'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'vbscript:createobject'
            - '.run'
            - '(window.close)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: File In Suspicious Location Encoded To Base64 Via Certutil.EXE
id: 82a6714f-4899-4f16-9c1e-9a333544d4c3
related:
    - id: e62a9f0c-ca1e-46b2-85d5-a6da77f86d1a
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the execution of certutil with the "encode" flag to encode a file to base64 where the files are located in potentially suspicious locations
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/35c22725a92d5cb1016b09421c0a6cdbfd860fd4778b3313669b057d4a131cb7/behavior
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/427616528b7dbc4a6057ac89eb174a3a90f7abcf3f34e5a359b7a910d82f7a72/behavior
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/34de4c8beded481a4084a1fd77855c3e977e8ac643e5c5842d0f15f7f9b9086f/behavior
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4abe1395a09fda06d897a9c4eb247278c1b6cddda5d126ce5b3f4f499e3b8fa2/behavior
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-15
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-encode'
    selection_extension:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: Add more suspicious locations to increase coverage
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Local\Temp\'
            - '\PerfLogs\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - '$Recycle.Bin'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_encode_susp_location/info.yml