title: LSASS Process Crashed - Application
id: a18e0862-127b-43ca-be12-1a542c75c7c5
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects Windows error reporting events where the process that crashed is LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service).
    This could be the cause of a provoked crash by techniques such as Lsass-Shtinkering to dump credentials.
references:
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering
    - https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Asaf%20Gilboa%20-%20LSASS%20Shtinkering%20Abusing%20Windows%20Error%20Reporting%20to%20Dump%20LSASS.pdf
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-erref/596a1078-e883-4972-9bbc-49e60bebca55
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-07
modified: 2025-12-03
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Application Error'
        EventID: 1000
        AppName: 'lsass.exe'
        ExceptionCode: 'c0000001' # STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate crashing of the lsass process
level: high

title: Password Dumper Activity on LSASS
id: aa1697b7-d611-4f9a-9cb2-5125b4ccfd5c
status: test
description: Detects process handle on LSASS process with certain access mask and object type SAM_DOMAIN
references:
    - https://twitter.com/jackcr/status/807385668833968128
author: sigma
date: 2017-02-12
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4656
        ProcessName|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        AccessMask: '0x705'
        ObjectType: 'SAM_DOMAIN'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution - Security
id: f0d1feba-4344-4ca9-8121-a6c97bd6df52
related:
    - id: 4976aa50-8f41-45c6-8b15-ab3fc10e79ed
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution events
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2017-03-05
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.005
    - attack.t1003.006
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.s0005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - 'cachedump'
            - 'dumpsvc'
            - 'fgexec'
            - 'gsecdump'
            - 'mimidrv'
            - 'pwdump'
            - 'servpw'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Administrator using credential dumping tool for password recovery
level: high

title: LSASS Access Detected via Attack Surface Reduction
id: a0a278fe-2c0e-4de2-ac3c-c68b08a9ba98
status: test
description: Detects Access to LSASS Process
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction
author: Markus Neis
date: 2018-08-26
modified: 2022-08-13
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: windefend
    definition: 'Requirements:Enabled Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe) from Attack Surface Reduction (GUID: 9e6c4e1f-7d60-472f-ba1a-a39ef669e4b2)'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 1121
        Path|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
    filter_thor:
        ProcessName|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\'
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\thor64.exe'
            - '\thor.exe'
    filter_exact:
        ProcessName:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\atiesrxx.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\nvwmi64.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\Taskmgr.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe'
    filter_begins:
        ProcessName|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\'
            - 'C:\WINDOWS\Installer\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Google Chrome GoogleUpdate.exe
    - Some Taskmgr.exe related activity
level: high

title: Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution - System
id: 4976aa50-8f41-45c6-8b15-ab3fc10e79ed
status: test
description: Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution events
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2017-03-05
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.005
    - attack.t1003.006
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.s0005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ImagePath|contains:
            - 'cachedump'
            - 'dumpsvc'
            - 'fgexec'
            - 'gsecdump'
            - 'mimidrv'
            - 'pwdump'
            - 'servpw'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Administrator using credential dumping tool for password recovery
level: high

title: Lsass Full Dump Request Via DumpType Registry Settings
id: 33efc23c-6ea2-4503-8cfe-bdf82ce8f719
status: test
description: Detects the setting of the "DumpType" registry value to "2" which stands for a "Full Dump". Technique such as LSASS Shtinkering requires this value to be "2" in order to dump LSASS.
references:
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wer/collecting-user-mode-dumps
    - https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Asaf%20Gilboa%20-%20LSASS%20Shtinkering%20Abusing%20Windows%20Error%20Reporting%20to%20Dump%20LSASS.pdf
author: '@pbssubhash'
date: 2022-12-08
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\LocalDumps\DumpType'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\LocalDumps\lsass.exe\DumpType'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000002)' # Full Dump
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate application that needs to do a full dump of their process
level: high

title: Possible Impacket SecretDump Remote Activity - Zeek
id: 92dae1ed-1c9d-4eff-a567-33acbd95b00e
status: test
description: 'Detect AD credential dumping using impacket secretdump HKTL. Based on the SIGMA rules/windows/builtin/win_impacket_secretdump.yml'
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329153811/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-huting-10-impacketsecretdump.html
author: 'Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron'
date: 2020-03-19
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.003
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: smb_files
detection:
    selection:
        path|contains|all:
            - '\'
            - 'ADMIN$'
        name|contains: 'SYSTEM32\'
        name|endswith: '.tmp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: NTDS.DIT Creation By Uncommon Process
id: 11b1ed55-154d-4e82-8ad7-83739298f720
related:
    - id: 4e7050dd-e548-483f-b7d6-527ab4fa784d
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects creation of a file named "ntds.dit" (Active Directory Database) by an uncommon process or a process located in a suspicious directory
references:
    - https://stealthbits.com/blog/extracting-password-hashes-from-the-ntds-dit-file/
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=2398
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-11
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_ntds:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\ntds.dit'
    selection_process_img:
        Image|endswith:
            # Add more suspicious processes as you see fit
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
            - '\wt.exe'
    selection_process_paths:
        Image|contains:
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\Public\'
            - '\PerfLogs\'
    condition: selection_ntds and 1 of selection_process_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential SAM Database Dump
id: 4e87b8e2-2ee9-4b2a-a715-4727d297ece0
status: test
description: Detects the creation of files that look like exports of the local SAM (Security Account Manager)
references:
    - https://github.com/search?q=CVE-2021-36934
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210725081645/https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-36934
    - https://www.google.com/search?q=%22reg.exe+save%22+sam
    - https://github.com/HuskyHacks/ShadowSteal
    - https://github.com/FireFart/hivenightmare
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-11
modified: 2023-01-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        - TargetFilename|endswith:
              - '\Temp\sam'
              - '\sam.sav'
              - '\Intel\sam'
              - '\sam.hive'
              - '\Perflogs\sam'
              - '\ProgramData\sam'
              - '\Users\Public\sam'
              - '\AppData\Local\sam'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\sam'
              - '_ShadowSteal.zip'       # https://github.com/HuskyHacks/ShadowSteal
              - '\Documents\SAM.export'  # https://github.com/n3tsurge/CVE-2021-36934/
              - ':\sam'
        - TargetFilename|contains:
              - '\hive_sam_'             # https://github.com/FireFart/hivenightmare
              - '\sam.save'
              - '\sam.export'
              - '\~reg_sam.save'
              - '\sam_backup'
              - '\sam.bck'
              - '\sam.backup'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare cases of administrative activity
level: high

title: Dumping of Sensitive Hives Via Reg.EXE
id: fd877b94-9bb5-4191-bb25-d79cbd93c167
related:
    - id: 038cd51c-3ad8-41c5-ba8f-5d1c92f3cc1e
      type: obsolete
    - id: 4d6c9da1-318b-4edf-bcea-b6c93fa98fd0
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the usage of "reg.exe" in order to dump sensitive registry hives. This includes SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives.
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
    - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/aed95fc6-5e3f-49dc-8b35-06508613f979.html
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003/T1003.md
    - https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/windows-command-line-obfuscation
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Endgame, JHasenbusch, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community, frack113
date: 2019-10-22
modified: 2023-12-13
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.005
    - car.2013-07-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_cli_flag:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' save '
            - ' export '
            - ' ˢave '
            - ' eˣport '
    selection_cli_hklm:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'hklm'
            - 'hk˪m'
            - 'hkey_local_machine'
            - 'hkey_˪ocal_machine'
            - 'hkey_loca˪_machine'
            - 'hkey_˪oca˪_machine'
    selection_cli_hive:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\system'
            - '\sam'
            - '\security'
            - '\ˢystem'
            - '\syˢtem'
            - '\ˢyˢtem'
            - '\ˢam'
            - '\ˢecurity'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Dumping hives for legitimate purpouse i.e. backup or forensic investigation
level: high

title: HackTool - Pypykatz Credentials Dumping Activity
id: a29808fd-ef50-49ff-9c7a-59a9b040b404
status: test
description: Detects the usage of "pypykatz" to obtain stored credentials. Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database through Windows registry where the SAM database is stored
references:
    - https://github.com/skelsec/pypykatz
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-2---registry-parse-with-pypykatz
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-05
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - \pypykatz.exe
            - \python.exe
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'live'
            - 'registry'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell SAM Copy
id: 1af57a4b-460a-4738-9034-db68b880c665
status: test
description: Detects suspicious PowerShell scripts accessing SAM hives
references:
    - https://twitter.com/splinter_code/status/1420546784250769408
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-29
modified: 2023-01-06
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy'
            - 'System32\config\sam'
    selection_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Copy-Item'
            - 'cp $_.'
            - 'cpi $_.'
            - 'copy $_.'
            - '.File]::Copy('
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Some rare backup scenarios
    - PowerShell scripts fixing HiveNightmare / SeriousSAM ACLs
level: high

title: Sensitive File Dump Via Print.EXE
id: 2fcda7e2-8c57-4904-86ac-37fc3157e09d
status: test
description: |
    Detects the abuse of the Print.exe utility for credential harvesting which involves using Print.Exe to copy sensitive files such as ntds.dit, SAM, SECURITY, or SYSTEM from the Windows directory in order to extract credentials, locally or remotely.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/02/06/active-exploitation-solarwinds-web-help-desk/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/credential-theft-expanding-your-reach-pt-2
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Print/
author: Ayush Anand (Securityinbits)
date: 2026-04-28
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1003.003
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\print.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Print.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '/D'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\config\SAM'
            - '\config\SECURITY'
            - '\config\SYSTEM'
            - '\windows\ntds\ntds.dit'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_print_dump_sensitive_files/info.yml

title: VolumeShadowCopy Symlink Creation Via Mklink
id: 40b19fa6-d835-400c-b301-41f3a2baacaf
status: stable
description: Shadow Copies storage symbolic link creation using operating systems utilities
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-22
modified: 2023-03-06
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'mklink'
            - 'HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrator working with shadow copies, access for backup purposes
level: high

title: Copying Sensitive Files with Credential Data
id: e7be6119-fc37-43f0-ad4f-1f3f99be2f9f
status: test
description: Files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) copying
references:
    - https://room362.com/post/2013/2013-06-10-volume-shadow-copy-ntdsdit-domain-hashes-remotely-part-1/
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
    - https://dfironthemountain.wordpress.com/2018/12/06/locked-file-access-using-esentutl-exe/
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/2cc01b01132b5c304027a658c698ae09dd6a92bf/yml/OSBinaries/Esentutl.yml
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-22
modified: 2024-06-04
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.003
    - car.2013-07-001
    - attack.s0404
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_esent_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\esentutl.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: '\esentutl.exe'
    selection_esent_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - 'vss'
            - ' /m '
            - ' /y '
    selection_susp_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\config\RegBack\sam'
            - '\config\RegBack\security'
            - '\config\RegBack\system'
            - '\config\sam'
            - '\config\security'
            - '\config\system '        # space needed to avoid false positives with \config\systemprofile\
            - '\repair\sam'
            - '\repair\security'
            - '\repair\system'
            - '\windows\ntds\ntds.dit'
    condition: all of selection_esent_* or selection_susp_paths
falsepositives:
    - Copying sensitive files for legitimate use (eg. backup) or forensic investigation by legitimate incident responder or forensic investigator.
level: high

title: HackTool - Quarks PwDump Execution
id: 0685b176-c816-4837-8e7b-1216f346636b
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Quarks PwDump tool via commandline arguments
references:
    - https://github.com/quarkslab/quarkspwdump
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-apt-iran-middle-east
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-05
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\QuarksPwDump.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine:
            - ' -dhl'
            - ' --dump-hash-local'
            - ' -dhdc'
            - ' --dump-hash-domain-cached'
            - ' --dump-bitlocker'
            - ' -dhd '
            - ' --dump-hash-domain '
            - '--ntds-file'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Possible Impacket SecretDump Remote Activity
id: 252902e3-5830-4cf6-bf21-c22083dfd5cf
status: test
description: Detect AD credential dumping using impacket secretdump HKTL
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329153811/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-huting-10-impacketsecretdump.html
author: Samir Bousseaden, wagga
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2022-08-11
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName: '\\\\\*\\ADMIN$'  # looking for the string  \\*\ADMIN$
        RelativeTargetName|contains|all:
            - 'SYSTEM32\'
            - '.tmp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Critical Hive In Suspicious Location Access Bits Cleared
id: 39f919f3-980b-4e6f-a975-8af7e507ef2b
related:
    - id: 839dd1e8-eda8-4834-8145-01beeee33acd
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
    Detects events from the Kernel-General ETW indicating that the access bits of a hive with a system like hive name located in the temp directory have been reset.
    This occurs when an application tries to access a hive and the hive has not be recognized since the last 7 days (by default).
    Registry hive dumping utilities such as QuarksPwDump were seen emitting this behavior.
references:
    - https://github.com/nasbench/Misc-Research/blob/b20da2336de0f342d31ef4794959d28c8d3ba5ba/ETW/Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-05-15
modified: 2024-01-18
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 16
        Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General
        HiveName|contains:
            - '\Temp\SAM'
            - '\Temp\SECURITY'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Esentutl Volume Shadow Copy Service Keys
id: 5aad0995-46ab-41bd-a9ff-724f41114971
status: test
description: Detects the volume shadow copy service initialization and processing via esentutl. Registry keys such as HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\VSS\\Diag\\VolSnap\\Volume are captured.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-3---esentutlexe-sam-copy
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-20
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: 'System\CurrentControlSet\Services\VSS'
        Image|endswith: 'esentutl.exe' # limit esentutl as in references, too many FP to filter
    filter:
        TargetObject|contains: 'System\CurrentControlSet\Services\VSS\Start'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Reconnaissance For Cached Credentials Via Cmdkey.EXE
id: 07f8bdc2-c9b3-472a-9817-5a670b872f53
status: test
description: Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials on the system
references:
    - https://www.peew.pw/blog/2017/11/26/exploring-cmdkey-an-edge-case-for-privilege-escalation
    - https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754243(v=ws.11).aspx
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/b27a3cb25025161d49ac861cb216db68c46a3537/atomics/T1003.005/T1003.005.md#atomic-test-1---cached-credential-dump-via-cmdkey
author: jmallette, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\cmdkey.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'cmdkey.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -l'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative tasks
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmdkey_recon/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Cached Credential Dump via Cmdkey
      technique: T1003.005
      atomic_guid: 56506854-89d6-46a3-9804-b7fde90791f9

title: OpenCanary - SMB File Open Request
id: 22777c9e-873a-4b49-855f-6072ab861a52
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SMB service on an OpenCanary node has had a file open request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1021
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5000
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Script Interpreter Spawning Credential Scanner - Linux
id: f0025a69-e1b7-4dda-a53c-db21fa2d4071
related:
    - id: 0f60b28c-64dd-4e2c-9a63-5334d3e3a6e6
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog, gitleaks).
    This behavior is indicative of an attempt to find and steal secrets, as seen in the "Shai-Hulud: The Second Coming" campaign.
references:
    - https://github.com/asyncapi/cli/blob/2efa4dff59bc3d3cecdf897ccf178f99b115d63d/bun_environment.js
    - https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-zapier-ens-domains-and-other-prominent-npm-packages-compromised
    - https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/shai-hulud-2-malware-campaign-targets-github-and-cloud-credentials-using-bun-runtime
    - https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/digging-for-secrets-sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-of-the-npm-worm/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552
    - attack.execution
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
    - attack.t1059.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
         # Add more script interpreters as needed
            - '/node'
            - '/bun'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '/trufflehog'
              - '/gitleaks'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'trufflehog'
              - 'gitleaks'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate pre-commit hooks or CI/CD pipeline jobs that use a script to run a credential scanner as part of a security check.
level: high

title: VeeamBackup Database Credentials Dump Via Sqlcmd.EXE
id: b57ba453-b384-4ab9-9f40-1038086b4e53
status: test
description: Detects dump of credentials in VeeamBackup dbo
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/
    - https://forums.veeam.com/veeam-backup-replication-f2/recover-esxi-password-in-veeam-t34630.html
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_tools:
        Image|endswith: '\sqlcmd.exe'
    selection_query:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'SELECT'
            - 'TOP'
            - '[VeeamBackup].[dbo].[Credentials]'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Script Interpreter Spawning Credential Scanner - Windows
id: 0f60b28c-64dd-4e2c-9a63-5334d3e3a6e6
related:
    - id: f0025a69-e1b7-4dda-a53c-db21fa2d4071
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog, gitleaks).
    This behavior is indicative of an attempt to find and steal secrets, as seen in the "Shai-Hulud: The Second Coming" campaign.
references:
    - https://github.com/asyncapi/cli/blob/2efa4dff59bc3d3cecdf897ccf178f99b115d63d/bun_environment.js
    - https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-zapier-ens-domains-and-other-prominent-npm-packages-compromised
    - https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/shai-hulud-2-malware-campaign-targets-github-and-cloud-credentials-using-bun-runtime
    - https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/digging-for-secrets-sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-of-the-npm-worm/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552
    - attack.collection
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1005
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
           # Add more script interpreters as needed
            - '\node.exe'
            - '\bun.exe'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith:
              - 'trufflehog.exe'
              - 'gitleaks.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'trufflehog'
              - 'gitleaks'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate pre-commit hooks or CI/CD pipeline jobs that use a script to run a credential scanner as part of a security check.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_script_interpretor_spawn_credential_scanner/info.yml

title: SQLite Chromium Profile Data DB Access
id: 24c77512-782b-448a-8950-eddb0785fc71
status: test
description: Detect usage of the "sqlite" binary to query databases in Chromium-based browsers for potential data stealing.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/84d9edaaaa2c5511144521b0e4af726d1c7276ce/atomics/T1539/T1539.md#atomic-test-2---steal-chrome-cookies-windows
    - https://blog.cyble.com/2022/04/21/prynt-stealer-a-new-info-stealer-performing-clipper-and-keylogger-activities/
author: TropChaud
date: 2022-12-19
modified: 2023-01-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1539
    - attack.t1555.003
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_sql:
        - Product: SQLite
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\sqlite.exe'
              - '\sqlite3.exe'
    selection_chromium:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\User Data\' # Most common folder for user profile data among Chromium browsers
            - '\Opera Software\' # Opera
            - '\ChromiumViewer\' # Sleipnir (Fenrir)
    selection_data:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Login Data' # Passwords
            - 'Cookies'
            - 'Web Data' # Credit cards, autofill data
            - 'History'
            - 'Bookmarks'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: SQLite Firefox Profile Data DB Access
id: 4833155a-4053-4c9c-a997-777fcea0baa7
status: test
description: Detect usage of the "sqlite" binary to query databases in Firefox and other Gecko-based browsers for potential data stealing.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1539/T1539.md#atomic-test-1---steal-firefox-cookies-windows
    - https://blog.cyble.com/2022/04/21/prynt-stealer-a-new-info-stealer-performing-clipper-and-keylogger-activities/
author: frack113
date: 2022-04-08
modified: 2023-01-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1539
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_sql:
        - Product: SQLite
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\sqlite.exe'
              - '\sqlite3.exe'
    selection_firefox:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'cookies.sqlite'
            - 'places.sqlite' # Bookmarks, history
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Exports Critical Registry Keys To a File
id: 82880171-b475-4201-b811-e9c826cd5eaa
related:
    - id: f0e53e89-8d22-46ea-9db5-9d4796ee2f8a
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the export of a crital Registry key to a file.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regedit/
    - https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f
author: Oddvar Moe, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1012
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\regedit.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'REGEDIT.EXE'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -E '
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'hklm'
            - 'hkey_local_machine'
    selection_cli_3:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '\system'
            - '\sam'
            - '\security'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Dumping hives for legitimate purpouse i.e. backup or forensic investigation
level: high

title: HackTool - PCHunter Execution
id: fca949cc-79ca-446e-8064-01aa7e52ece5
status: test
description: Detects suspicious use of PCHunter, a tool like Process Hacker to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level stuff
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20231210115125/http://www.xuetr.com/
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/falcon-overwatch-report-finds-increase-in-ecrime/
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/20/kernel-hacking-tool-you-might-have-never-heard-of-xuetr-pchunter/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2022-10-10
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1057
    - attack.t1012
    - attack.t1083
    - attack.t1007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_image:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\PCHunter64.exe'
            - '\PCHunter32.exe'
    selection_pe:
        - OriginalFileName: 'PCHunter.exe'
        - Description: 'Epoolsoft Windows Information View Tools'
    selection_hashes:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'SHA1=5F1CBC3D99558307BC1250D084FA968521482025'
            - 'MD5=987B65CD9B9F4E9A1AFD8F8B48CF64A7'
            - 'SHA256=2B214BDDAAB130C274DE6204AF6DBA5AEEC7433DA99AA950022FA306421A6D32'
            - 'IMPHASH=444D210CEA1FF8112F256A4997EED7FF'
            - 'SHA1=3FB89787CB97D902780DA080545584D97FB1C2EB'
            - 'MD5=228DD0C2E6287547E26FFBD973A40F14'
            - 'SHA256=55F041BF4E78E9BFA6D4EE68BE40E496CE3A1353E1CA4306598589E19802522C'
            - 'IMPHASH=0479F44DF47CFA2EF1CCC4416A538663'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: SAM Registry Hive Handle Request
id: f8748f2c-89dc-4d95-afb0-5a2dfdbad332
status: test
description: Detects handles requested to SAM registry hive
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190725-SAMRegistryHiveHandleRequest/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2019-08-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1012
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4656
        ObjectType: 'Key'
        ObjectName|endswith: '\SAM'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: SysKey Registry Keys Access
id: 9a4ff3b8-6187-4fd2-8e8b-e0eae1129495
status: test
description: Detects handle requests and access operations to specific registry keys to calculate the SysKey
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190625-RegKeyAccessSyskey/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2019-08-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1012
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 4656
            - 4663
        ObjectType: 'key'
        ObjectName|endswith:
            - 'lsa\JD'
            - 'lsa\GBG'
            - 'lsa\Skew1'
            - 'lsa\Data'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: OpenCanary - SNMP OID Request
id: e9856028-fd4e-46e6-b3d1-10f7ceb95078
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SNMP service on an OpenCanary node has had an OID request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1016
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 13001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PUA - AdFind Suspicious Execution
id: 9a132afa-654e-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
related:
    - id: 455b9d50-15a1-4b99-853f-8d37655a4c1b
      type: similar
    - id: 75df3b17-8bcc-4565-b89b-c9898acef911
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects AdFind execution with common flags seen used during attacks
references:
    - https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx
    - https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/blob/bf62ece1c679b07b5fb49c4bae947fe24c81811f/fin6/Emulation_Plan/Phase1.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.md#atomic-test-7---adfind---enumerate-active-directory-user-objects
author: Janantha Marasinghe (https://github.com/blueteam0ps), FPT.EagleEye Team, omkar72, oscd.community
date: 2021-02-02
modified: 2025-10-24
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1069.002
    - stp.1u
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'domainlist'
            - 'trustdmp'
            - 'dcmodes'
            - 'adinfo'
            - '-sc dclist'
            - 'computer_pwdnotreqd'
            - 'objectcategory='
            - '-subnets -f'
            - 'name="Domain Admins"'
            - '-sc u:'
            - 'domainncs'
            - 'dompol'
            - ' oudmp '
            - 'subnetdmp'
            - 'gpodmp'
            - 'fspdmp'
            - 'users_noexpire'
            - 'computers_active'
            - 'computers_pwdnotreqd'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin activity
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_adfind_susp_usage/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Computer Objects
      technique: T1018
      atomic_guid: a889f5be-2d54-4050-bd05-884578748bb4
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Domain Controller Objects
      technique: T1018
      atomic_guid: 5838c31e-a0e2-4b9f-b60a-d79d2cb7995e

title: Renamed AdFind Execution
id: df55196f-f105-44d3-a675-e9dfb6cc2f2b
status: test
description: Detects the use of a renamed Adfind.exe. AdFind continues to be seen across majority of breaches. It is used to domain trust discovery to plan out subsequent steps in the attack chain.
references:
    - https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx
    - https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/blob/bf62ece1c679b07b5fb49c4bae947fe24c81811f/fin6/Emulation_Plan/Phase1.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-21
modified: 2025-02-26
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1069.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'domainlist'
            - 'trustdmp'
            - 'dcmodes'
            - 'adinfo'
            - ' dclist '
            - 'computer_pwdnotreqd'
            - 'objectcategory='
            - '-subnets -f'
            - 'name="Domain Admins"'
            - '-sc u:'
            - 'domainncs'
            - 'dompol'
            - ' oudmp '
            - 'subnetdmp'
            - 'gpodmp'
            - 'fspdmp'
            - 'users_noexpire'
            - 'computers_active'
            - 'computers_pwdnotreqd'
    selection_2:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'IMPHASH=BCA5675746D13A1F246E2DA3C2217492'
            - 'IMPHASH=53E117A96057EAF19C41380D0E87F1C2'
            - 'IMPHASH=d144de8117df2beceaba2201ad304764'
            - 'IMPHASH=12ce1c0f3f5837ecc18a3782408fa975'
            - 'IMPHASH=4fbf3f084fbbb2470b80b2013134df35'
            - 'IMPHASH=49b639b4acbecc49d72a01f357aa4930'
            - 'IMPHASH=680dad9e300346e05a85023965867201'
            - 'IMPHASH=21aa085d54992511b9f115355e468782'
    selection_3:
        OriginalFileName: 'AdFind.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\AdFind.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_adfind/info.yml

title: Webshell Detection With Command Line Keywords
id: bed2a484-9348-4143-8a8a-b801c979301c
status: test
description: Detects certain command line parameters often used during reconnaissance activity via web shells
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-ii.html
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/bumblebee-webshell-xhunt-campaign/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/threat-advisory-oh-no-cleo-cleo-software-actively-being-exploited-in-the-wild
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Chad Hudson, Matt Anderson
date: 2017-01-01
modified: 2024-12-14
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1033
    - attack.t1087
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_webserver_image:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\w3wp.exe'
            - '\php-cgi.exe'
            - '\nginx.exe'
            - '\httpd.exe'
            - '\caddy.exe'
            - '\ws_tomcatservice.exe'
    selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat1:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\java.exe'
            - '\javaw.exe'
        ParentImage|contains:
            - '-tomcat-'
            - '\tomcat'
    selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat2:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\java.exe'
            - '\javaw.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'catalina.jar'
            - 'CATALINA_HOME'
    selection_susp_net_utility:
        OriginalFileName:
            - 'net.exe'
            - 'net1.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' user '
            - ' use '
            - ' group '
    selection_susp_ping_utility:
        OriginalFileName: 'ping.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -n '
    selection_susp_change_dir:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '&cd&echo'  # china chopper web shell
            - 'cd /d '  # https://www.computerhope.com/cdhlp.htm
    selection_susp_wmic_utility:
        OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' /node:'
    selection_susp_powershell_cli:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -enc '
            - ' -EncodedCommand '
            - ' -w hidden '
            - ' -windowstyle hidden'
            - '.WebClient).Download'
    selection_susp_misc_discovery_binaries:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\dsquery.exe'
              - '\find.exe'
              - '\findstr.exe'
              - '\ipconfig.exe'
              - '\netstat.exe'
              - '\nslookup.exe'
              - '\pathping.exe'
              - '\quser.exe'
              - '\schtasks.exe'
              - '\systeminfo.exe'
              - '\tasklist.exe'
              - '\tracert.exe'
              - '\ver.exe'
              - '\wevtutil.exe'
              - '\whoami.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'dsquery.exe'
              - 'find.exe'
              - 'findstr.exe'
              - 'ipconfig.exe'
              - 'netstat.exe'
              - 'nslookup.exe'
              - 'pathping.exe'
              - 'quser.exe'
              - 'schtasks.exe'
              - 'sysinfo.exe'
              - 'tasklist.exe'
              - 'tracert.exe'
              - 'ver.exe'
              - 'VSSADMIN.EXE'
              - 'wevtutil.exe'
              - 'whoami.exe'
    selection_susp_misc_discovery_commands:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' Test-NetConnection '
            - 'dir \'  # remote dir: dir \<redacted IP #3>\C$:\windows\temp\*.exe
    condition: 1 of selection_webserver_* and 1 of selection_susp_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Chopper Webshell Process Pattern
id: fa3c117a-bc0d-416e-a31b-0c0e80653efb
status: test
description: Detects patterns found in process executions cause by China Chopper like tiny (ASPX) webshells
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/30/analyzing-attacks-using-the-exchange-vulnerabilities-cve-2022-41040-and-cve-2022-41082/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), MSTI (query)
date: 2022-10-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1033
    - attack.t1087
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_origin:
        - Image|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
        - ParentImage|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
    selection_cmdline:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '&ipconfig&echo'
            - '&quser&echo'
            - '&whoami&echo'
            - '&c:&echo'
            - '&cd&echo'
            - '&dir&echo'
            - '&echo [E]'
            - '&echo [S]'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Webshell Hacking Activity Patterns
id: 4ebc877f-4612-45cb-b3a5-8e3834db36c9
status: test
description: |
    Detects certain parent child patterns found in cases in which a web shell is used to perform certain credential dumping or exfiltration activities on a compromised system
references:
    - https://youtu.be/7aemGhaE9ds?t=641
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-17
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1033
    - attack.t1087
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
   # Webserver
    selection_webserver_image:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\caddy.exe'
            - '\httpd.exe'
            - '\nginx.exe'
            - '\php-cgi.exe'
            - '\w3wp.exe'
            - '\ws_tomcatservice.exe'
    selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat1:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\java.exe'
            - '\javaw.exe'
        ParentImage|contains:
            - '-tomcat-'
            - '\tomcat'
    selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat2:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\java.exe'
            - '\javaw.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'catalina.jar'
            - 'CATALINA_HOME'
    # Suspicious child processes
    selection_child_1:
        # Process dumping
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'comsvcs'
    selection_child_2:
        # Winrar exfil
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -hp'
            - ' a '
            - ' -m'
    selection_child_3:
        # User add
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'net'
            - ' user '
            - ' /add'
    selection_child_4:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'net'
            - ' localgroup '
            - ' administrators '
            - '/add'
    selection_child_5:
        Image|endswith:
            # Credential stealing
            - '\ntdsutil.exe'
            # AD recon
            - '\ldifde.exe'
            - '\adfind.exe'
            # Process dumping
            - '\procdump.exe'
            - '\Nanodump.exe'
            # Destruction / ransom groups
            - '\vssadmin.exe'
            - '\fsutil.exe'
    selection_child_6:
        # SUspicious patterns
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -decode '  # Used with certutil
            - ' -NoP '  # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
            - ' -W Hidden '  # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
            - ' /decode '  # Used with certutil
            - ' /ticket:'  # Rubeus
            - ' sekurlsa'  # Mimikatz
            - '.dmp full'  # Process dumping method apart from procdump
            - '.downloadfile('  # PowerShell download command
            - '.downloadstring('  # PowerShell download command
            - 'FromBase64String' # PowerShell encoded payload
            - 'process call create' # WMIC process creation
            - 'reg save '  # save registry SAM - syskey extraction
            - 'whoami /priv'
    condition: 1 of selection_webserver_* and 1 of selection_child_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: HackTool - NetExec Execution
id: 7638e5fe-600c-4289-a968-f49dd537ec7d
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects execution of the hacktool NetExec.
    NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation tool designed for Active Directory penetration testing and network enumeration
    In enterprise environments, the use of NetExec is considered suspicious or potentially malicious because it enables attackers to enumerate hosts, exploit network services, and move laterally across systems.
    Threat actors and red teams commonly use NetExec to identify vulnerable systems, harvest credentials, and execute commands remotely.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/12/17/cats-got-your-files-lynx-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec
    - https://www.netexec.wiki/
author: Chirag Damani
date: 2026-03-29
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\nxc.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' ftp '
            - ' ldap '
            - ' mssql '
            - ' nfs '
            - ' rdp '
            - ' smb '
            - ' ssh '
            - ' vnc '
            - ' winrm '
            - ' wmi '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of NetExec by security professionals or system administrators for network assessment and management.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_netexec/info.yml

title: OpenCanary - FTP Login Attempt
id: 6991bc2b-ae2e-447f-bc55-3a1ba04c14e5
status: test
description: Detects instances where an FTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 2000
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: OpenCanary - SSH Login Attempt
id: ff7139bc-fdb1-4437-92f2-6afefe8884cb
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SSH service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1021
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 4002
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: OpenCanary - VNC Connection Attempt
id: 9db5446c-b44a-4291-8b89-fcab5609c3b3
status: test
description: Detects instances where a VNC service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 12001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: OpenCanary - SSH New Connection Attempt
id: cd55f721-5623-4663-bd9b-5229cab5237d
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SSH service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1021
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 4000
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Privilege Escalation via Named Pipe Impersonation
id: 9bd04a79-dabe-4f1f-a5ff-92430265c96b
related:
    - id: f35c5d71-b489-4e22-a115-f003df287317
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indicate lateral movement or data staging activity.
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation.html
author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-27
modified: 2022-12-30
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_name:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'Cmd.Exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
    selection_args:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'echo'
            - '>'
            - '\\\\.\\pipe\\'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Other programs that cause these patterns (please report)
level: high

title: OpenCanary - RDP New Connection Attempt
id: 598290cf-5932-45cd-9123-be1e05ab4f2e
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an RDP service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1021.001
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 14001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Publicly Accessible RDP Service
id: 1fc0809e-06bf-4de3-ad52-25e5263b7623
status: test
description: |
    Detects connections from routable IPs to an RDP listener. Which is indicative of a publicly-accessible RDP service.
author: Josh Brower @DefensiveDepth
date: 2020-08-22
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: rdp
detection:
    selection:
        id.orig_h|cidr:
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - '2620:83:8000::/48'
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
    # approved_rdp:
      # dst_ip:
        # - x.x.x.x
    condition: not selection # and not approved_rdp
falsepositives:
    - Although it is recommended to NOT have RDP exposed to the internet, verify that this is a) allowed b) the server has not already been compromised via some brute force or remote exploit since it has been exposed to the internet. Work to secure the server if you are unable to remove it from being exposed to the internet.
level: high

title: RDP to HTTP or HTTPS Target Ports
id: b1e5da3b-ca8e-4adf-915c-9921f3d85481
status: test
description: Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating to target systems on TCP port 80 or 443
references:
    - https://twitter.com/tekdefense/status/1519711183162556416?s=12&t=OTsHCBkQOTNs1k3USz65Zg
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-29
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
    - car.2013-07-002
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        Initiated: 'true'
        SourcePort: 3389
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 443
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: RDP Over Reverse SSH Tunnel
id: 5f699bc5-5446-4a4a-a0b7-5ef2885a3eb4
status: test
description: Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating with the loopback address and on TCP port 3389
references:
    - https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1096842275437625346
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-02-16
modified: 2024-03-12
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
    - car.2013-07-002
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        Initiated: 'true'
        SourcePort: 3389
    selection_destination:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '::1/128'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Outbound RDP Connections Over Non-Standard Tools
id: ed74fe75-7594-4b4b-ae38-e38e3fd2eb23
status: test
description: |
    Detects Non-Standard tools initiating a connection over port 3389 indicating possible lateral movement.
    An initial baseline is required before using this utility to exclude third party RDP tooling that you might use.
references:
    - https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0708
author: Markus Neis
date: 2019-05-15
modified: 2024-02-09
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
    - car.2013-07-002
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationPort: 3389
        Initiated: 'true'
    filter_main_mstsc:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\mstsc.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mstsc.exe'
    filter_optional_dns:
        # Note: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/pull/2249
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\dns.exe'
        SourcePort: 53
        Protocol: 'udp'
    filter_optional_avast:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\Avast Software\Avast\AvastSvc.exe'
            - '\Avast\AvastSvc.exe'
    filter_optional_sysinternals_rdcman:
        Image|endswith: '\RDCMan.exe'
    filter_optional_chrome:
        Image: 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
    filter_optional_third_party:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\FSAssessment.exe'
            - '\FSDiscovery.exe'
            - '\MobaRTE.exe'
            - '\mRemote.exe'
            - '\mRemoteNG.exe'
            - '\Passwordstate.exe'
            - '\RemoteDesktopManager.exe'
            - '\RemoteDesktopManager64.exe'
            - '\RemoteDesktopManagerFree.exe'
            - '\RSSensor.exe'
            - '\RTS2App.exe'
            - '\RTSApp.exe'
            - '\spiceworks-finder.exe'
            - '\Terminals.exe'
            - '\ws_TunnelService.exe'
    filter_optional_thor:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\thor.exe'
            - '\thor64.exe'
    filter_optional_splunk:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\SplunkUniversalForwarder\bin\'
    filter_optional_sentinel_one:
        Image|endswith: '\Ranger\SentinelRanger.exe'
    filter_optional_firefox:
        Image: 'C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
    filter_optional_tsplus:  # Some RAS
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\TSplus\Java\bin\HTML5service.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\TSplus\Java\bin\HTML5service.exe'
    filter_optional_null:
        Image: null
    filter_optional_empty:
        Image: ''
    filter_optional_unknown:
        Image: '<unknown process>'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Third party RDP tools
level: high

title: Potential Tampering With RDP Related Registry Keys Via Reg.EXE
id: 0d5675be-bc88-4172-86d3-1e96a4476536
status: test
description: Detects the execution of "reg.exe" for enabling/disabling the RDP service on the host by tampering with the 'CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' values
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/
    - http://etutorials.org/Microsoft+Products/microsoft+windows+server+2003+terminal+services/Chapter+6+Registry/Registry+Keys+for+Terminal+Services/ # Contain description for most of the keys mentioned here (check it out if you want more information
    - http://woshub.com/rds-shadow-how-to-connect-to-a-user-session-in-windows-server-2012-r2/ # Related to the Shadow RPD technique
    - https://admx.help/HKLM/SOFTWARE/Policies/Microsoft/Windows%20NT/Terminal%20Services # Contain description for most of the keys mentioned here (check it out if you want more information)
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/6f3aa9362d72e806490a8abce245331030d1ab5ac77e400dd475748236a6cc81/
    - https://blog.sekoia.io/darkgate-internals/
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/understanding-the-phobos-affiliate-structure/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/02c7d02fe1f1feb0fc7944550408ea8224273994/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-63---disable-remote-desktop-anti-alias-setting-through-registry
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/02c7d02fe1f1feb0fc7944550408ea8224273994/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-64---disable-remote-desktop-security-settings-through-registry
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/dd526047b8c399c312fee47d1e6fb531164da54d/atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml#L790
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/customize/desktop/unattend/microsoft-windows-terminalservices-rdp-winstationextensions-securitylayer
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190407-RegModEnableRDPConnections/notebook.html
    - https://twitter.com/SagieSec/status/1469001618863624194?t=HRf0eA0W1YYzkTSHb-Ky1A&s=03 # Related to the Shadow RPD technique
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200929062532/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-rdp-hijacking-via.html # Related to RDP hijacking via the "ServiceDll" key
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/i/unmasking-the-gentlemen-ransomware.html
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), @Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport
date: 2022-02-12
modified: 2025-11-22
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1021.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_main_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_main_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' add '
            - '\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server'
            - 'REG_DWORD'
            - ' /f'
    selection_values_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Licensing Core'
            - 'EnableConcurrentSessions'
    selection_values_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'AllowTSConnections'
            - 'fDenyTSConnections'
            - 'fEnableWinStation'
            - 'fSingleSessionPerUser'
            - 'IdleWinStationPoolCount'
            - 'MaxInstanceCount'
            - 'SecurityLayer'
            - 'TSAdvertise'
            - 'TSAppCompat'
            - 'TSEnabled'
            - 'TSUserEnabled'
            - 'WinStations\RDP-Tcp'
    filter_main_values_tls:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'SecurityLayer'
            - '02'  # TLS Enabled
    condition: all of selection_main_* and 1 of selection_values_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious RDP Redirect Using TSCON
id: f72aa3e8-49f9-4c7d-bd74-f8ab84ff9bbb
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious RDP session redirect using tscon.exe
references:
    - http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html
    - https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6
    - https://www.hackingarticles.in/rdp-session-hijacking-with-tscon/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-03-17
modified: 2023-05-16
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1563.002
    - attack.t1021.001
    - car.2013-07-002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: ' /dest:rdp-tcp#'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Plink Port Forwarding
id: 48a61b29-389f-4032-b317-b30de6b95314
status: test
description: Detects suspicious Plink tunnel port forwarding to a local port
references:
    - https://www.real-sec.com/2019/04/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling/
    - https://medium.com/@informationsecurity/remote-ssh-tunneling-with-plink-exe-7831072b3d7d
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-01-19
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Description: 'Command-line SSH, Telnet, and Rlogin client'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -R '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity using a remote port forwarding to a local port
level: high